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Preface
"All is yet molten, mercurial. 17ure are more departures to make than
precedents to follow. To have a histOly may be an old land's glOlY
and safeguard; to make histOly is a new land's peri/ous employment. "
New Zealand Herald (/925)
This book is about what might lie ahead for rural New Zealand .~ its
people, its resources and its institutions. In discussing issues and events
surrounding people who produce, process and market New Zealand's
food and fibre products, it outlines many of the choices presented by the
future. .
Several New Zealanders have written of turning points in the
country's commercial, cultural, social and political thought, pointing to
the I 890s, the 1930s, World War II, and the 1970s as critical periods
when this happened. We may now be at another crossroads.
Over the past decade or so, and particularly since 1984, there have
been many changes in rural areas. While these are important to note,
one must watch not to exaggerate their current importance when longer
term influences may, ultimately, be the more important ones to col1sider.
Fifty years ago, Henry 'Belshaw, in a definitive work of the times, saw
the situation surrounding the nation's agriculture as: a cost-price squeeze
on farmers, excess production that looked to diminishing export markets
and increased international protectionism; lower farm incomes and
profits; and forced farm liquidation and amalgamation as constant
concerns for those people who were left. There was a growing
awareness that internal policies would have to bear the burden of rural
readjustments.
A parallel situation confronts New Zealand today, although many of
the causal influences are different. Technological progress on a global
scale and the accelerating interdependence of nation groups both raise
special issues for island economies like New Zealand. Three oil shocks
catapulted world energy prices upwards in 1974 and 1979, and
downwards in 1980. Communication improvements have shrunk
established geographic boundaries. Time has become a different
dimension than it was 50 years ago.
This book poses an array of topics and analyses about the effect of
these changes on rural New Zealand. It does not endorse any particular
forecast. Rather, it offers options to think about and different points of
view on the same issue. Its interest is not limited to those people who
work and live on their land - and love it. It is also directed to those who
make their livings based on using rural resources: the processing firms,
tourist and recreation operations, and all individuals who enjoy the land
and waters of this country.
The authors mention many things but do not resolve any. They are
not presumptious enough to do that. In an era of increasing choice it is
important to know how choices come about, what the consequences of
decisions are, and to whom the benefits and costs of those actions
accrue. Knowledge of trade-offs is important. For example, if one
selects a particular course of action - political isolationism, a certain
building code. a pattern of Government "incentives", one kind of health
plan. or a specific conservation or environmental protection programme -
other courses of action are, at least temporarily, precluded. To make a
sound choice, one needs to be aware of what might happen by taking
one path as opposed to another.
A more informed New Zealand public will become increasingly aware
of the outcome of any manuoevring by private interests or policy makers.
Knowledge means moving toward a consciously chosen goal rather than
drifting. It means not being nlisled by the speeches of those wishing to
exert power over rural areas for their own gain. It means moving
towards an ever more capable and effective agricultural leadership for
New Zealand.
The focus of this work is on offering insights into how New Zealand's
food and fibre system works, and what the physical points are which
connect that system and make it work.
Recognising these inter-relationships is the key to understanding
questions such as why consumers are upset about food quality and food
safety; why Government programmes to 'help' agriculture have by and
large. failed; why we and the Governments of other nations are .upset
about trade policies; why environmentalists and many farmers are
confused about the 'right' long run course for using the nation's natural
resources; why the education and research establishment has such
trouble anticipating the next round of emerging technical, institutional or
political issues; and why there is wide concern for the survival of rural
COllllllunities.
The book begins with a brief discussion of the macro-forces
influencing New Zealand's rural areas, emphasising that their future
course, largely influenced by international considerations, will also be
increasingly impacted by domestic non-farm policies and actions
initiated, in main, by urban residents. Whether directly or indirectly,
these forces will affect the costs and productivity of all farms,
processing, distribution and food retailing firms.
The second section reviews the farm production and technology base.
It describes the complex relationships between producer, agribusiness,
consumer, Government and environmental interests within the system.
In the same way as agriculture is, itself. affected by large~ forces, it
affects other parts of the economy. When farm incomes slip, less
fertiliser and machinery is purchased. This reduces incomes of farm
suppliers who live in rural areas. When unemployment in a rural
community occurs it, in turn, affects other facets of rural living. It can
lead to reduced public services, notably education and health, cause
changes in the attitude of rural people towards people living in cities and
positions of public power; and exert negative 'domino' effects on other
rural communities. The continuous systematic weaving of research,
information and analysis is pointed out to be crucial to any successful
rural business or community.
The changing patterns of farm size and ownership, types of farms, the
farm people themselves, and the rural workforce are shown as reflecting
much of this weaving and communication of ideas. The use of farm
capital and how the rural sector avails itself of credit underscores
thoughts on the increasing competition for natural resources by farmers
and non-farmers alike.
A third section reviews the demand for food and fibre, dealing with
domestic demand, international trade and international relations.
A fourth section survey the structure of agriculture, adding to what
has already been said about farms and farm income. The agribusiness
component is presented in order to create increased awareness of its
structure, conduct and performance.
A picture of the markets is offered in section five to show what
specific markets do, how they behave, and what changes the future might
hold for them. The wholesale/retail food situation, advertising and
promotion are presented to show that ultimately the food and fibre system
is consumer driven not producer directed as so many farmers now
believe. The role of producer boards is examined in details, and options
to them are presented.
A sixth section covers the role that Government plays in facilitating
New Zealand's agricultural politics and policy. What are the 'politics of
agriculture' and 'intervention'? Is regulation always useful, or are there
times when it actually retards economic and social advance?
These questions are again analysed from domestic and international
perspectives; again contrasting views are presented. One author presents
an argument for 'going back', while others question not only the basis of
this thesis but also the effects of the 'fortress-New Zealand' approach.
A final section outlines some of the other major emerging or
persisting issues confronting rural areas in the decade ahead: the
importance, and difficulties, of trying to differentiate an agricultural
product; the rise of an active rural feminine consciousness concerning
effective equality of participation; property rights issues with a focus on
Maori and pakeha concerns about land and fishing; the important role of
personal values in planning and executing land and water use
programmes; the long run effectiveness of currently in vogue user-pay
programmes; and whether or not separate policies to resolve the many
concerns of rural New Zealand should be considered.
In each section we try to identify the forces leading to the present
situation, and indicate the consequences of alternative choices for the
future. From this exposure we hope to show that:
1. agriculture is a business as well as a life style whether we like it or
not;
2. that farms and agribusiness are increasingly influenced by non-farm
policy decisions; and
3. that managers of successful food and fibre system finns must be
ever aware of how their income and lifestyles, and those of their
employees, are influenced by Government policy and private sector
reactions to it.
The ideas presented here are sometimes conflicting. This has been
deliberate. There are differences of interpretation of the evidence and
opinion as to the type of society New Zealanders want and the risks they
are prepared to take. The editors would also not like to be first in
breaking with tradition in making it appear that all economists agree.
Why should we? Not all fanners do.
Inasmuch as this book is a success it will be because you, the readers,
will have made it so by absorbing and discussing the points made by the
contributors - bringing out many more not covered in these pages, and
airing them too, for thoughtful consideration.
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Chapter 1
Overview of
New Zealand Agriculture
Gary Hawke
Economic Historian
Victoria Univeristy
New Zealand is often regarded as an agricultural country, especially
by people abroad for whom its exports are its most familiar economic
feature. But the justification for such a characterisation is far from
obvious. By 1970, agriculture employed about the same share of the
total labour force in New Zealand as it did in many other countries,
including some rich ones in western Europe, and a much smaller share
than was usual in the poorer countries of the world. The share of
agriculture in national income, however, was larger in New Zealand
than in most countries with comparable income levels; output per person
in agriculture was not less than the economy-wide average as it was in
most rich countries .. That was what made agriculture of more economic
importance in New Zealand than in most OEeD countries; it was not an
activity preserved for non-economic reasons, a cost to the economy to be
kept to tolerable limits, but an activity where \he productivity of labour
was at or above that available in other countries.
This was less obvious than the role of agriculture in exports, but there
is nothing intrinsically meritorious about producing goods for other
countries; the essence of economic activity is to use resources to produce
goods and services which people wish to buy, whether the whole process
occurs in one country or partly in one and partly in another. The
common suggestion in New Zealand that exports were especially
desirable was a shorthand way of saying that the demand for imports was
higher than could readily be financed, and that this could be alleviated
by higher exports. Thus, the claims for a special economic role for
agriculture were essentially a reflection of the foreign exchange
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constraint which the economy was perceived to be experiencing, together
with the observation that goods able to compete in international markets
were more readily produced by agriculture than by other sectors of the
economy.
These comments seemed to have acquired permanence as a description
of the macroeconomic context of agriculture in the New Zealand
economy. However, a major change in policy occurred in 1984.
Nevertheless to understand the current context of agriculture, it is
necessary to analyse more closely the earlier setting, including the
changes which did occur within it.
Full employment and Import substitution
The macroeconomic context of the 1950s and 1960s can be traced
back at least to 1938. The response of the First Labour Government to
the Depression of the 1930s included a determination to strengthen local
control of the economy, and its early measures included guaranteed
prices for dairy produce. The more extreme notion of separating
incomes for dairy farmers from world trade trends through a trade
agreement with the United Kingdom was quickly found to be
impracticable, but some income smoothing could be achieved by using
reserve accounts to average overseas prices into less volatile local pay-
outs. In 1938, a balance of payments crisis was met by the imposition
of import licencing and exchange controls. The Labour Government
wanted to avoid any repetition of the Depression experience of deflation,
and direct controls could be portrayed as part of its policy to increase the
power of local decisions over economic fortunes. 'Insulationism' was a
not unreasonable characterisation of the policy.
It was World War II rather than direct controls which ended the
balance of payments crisis of 1938. Wartime conditions limited imports
while most of New Zealand's agricultural exports were demanded in
Britain. The war also led to the extension of direct controls into many
parts of the economy. So it did in other countries, but controls were
usually seen as wartime emergency measures whereas in New Zealand
they seemed to be part of a deliberate economic policy. During the war
years, officials and politicians in New, Zealand, as in other countries,
absorbed the lesson of Keynesian economics that fiscal policy could be
used to balance aggregate demand and supply in the economy as a
whole, and that the budget was not merely a matter of government
housekeeping. But this was grafted on to an economy where official
controls were widespread and not regarded as a transitory phenomenon.
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In the post-war years, import licencing was seen as the most
significant control, and it was related especially to the achievement of
full employment. It was commonly believed that full employment was
maintained through government deficit spending, prevented from spilling
into the demand for imports by import licencing, and so achieving full
employment at the expense of inflation and a misallocation of resources.
This analysis was at least defective. Import licencing had much more
effect on the composition of imports than on their total. The total of
imports was not a major influence in the administrative system used to
allocate import licences while licences were readily available for
materials needed for employment-generating factories and were restricted
mainly for consumer goods. Furthermore, the Government's internal
financial transactions did not have a significant deficit before the 1970s.
Nor for that matter was New Zealand's inflation out of line with that
experienced in those countries which were major trading partners until
the 1970s.
The basic mechanism for the achievement of full employment was
therefore not that of the common analysis. Rather it owed more to
buoyancy of private investment. The role of import licences was
precisely that the system restricted the possibility of imports which
competed directly with local production. Investment for the local market
was therefore rendered secure; even if it was somewhat optimistic,
population growth and at least constant per capita income would soon
justify or ratify the investment decision while the market could not be
taken by competitive imports. Fiscal and monetary policy could be used
to iron out temporary deviations from a balance of exports and imports,
as in 1957-58 and 1961, but Government's powers would normally
preserve a reasonable return to private investment.
Import licencing is now regarded with disfavour, but it is important to
recognise that full employment was achieved in the 1950s and 1960s. It
is always difficult to calculate the average effective protection conferred
by a licencing system because it is necessary to know the cost at which
goods could have been landed in New Zealand. The best estimates are
that the average effective protection to industry was a little over 50
percent in the mid-1950s and early 1970s, and over 70 percent in the
mid-1960s but the calculations for the groups of years are not entirely"
comparable and are subject to wide margins of error. It can be
concluded that the average degree of protection was not particularly high
by world standards; the frequent assertions to the contrary result from
comparisons with a limited range of countries, those of the OECD where
industry was less protected than agriculture. It remains possible
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that lower protection rates would have produced a more efficient use of
resources.
The distribution of the protection conferred by import licencing on
individual industries was haphazard. It is difficult enough to co-ordinate
tariff protection since it depends on duties on inputs and the proportion
of material inputs to the value of the final product as well as on the
duties levied on goods which compete with tlte final product. But a tariff.
system does leave it open for importers to respond to changes in overseas
costs whereas a licencing system does not. The distribution of protection
levels among industries shows no coherent pattern and is explicable
mostly in terms of changes in costs of production overseas of final goods
excluded from the New Zealand market.
Variations among firms within industries were revealed when
manufactured exports grew in the early 1970s. Exporters were
competitive at least with Australia; some were large firms and some were
small; there were some in all categories of industries while many other
firms required high levels of protection to survive at all. The licencing
system impeded the ability of efficient producers to draw resources from
the less efficient, an ability that would have existed to a greater extent
under a tariff system even if it gave the same average level of protection.
Debate about import licencing proceeded throughout the 1950s and
1960s but analysis such as that stated bluntly here could not make much
headway against the assertions that licencing was less inflationary than
tariffs, and that licencing was an instrument of social control. The
former argument overlooks the ability to use the revenue from tariffs to
reduce taxes elsewhere. It is also clear from the premiums paid for
companies with a licencing entitlement that monopolistic positions
conferred by licences were exploited although it is likely that a sense of
social responsbility and a business climate of less than cutthroat
competition did exercise some restraintin the 1950s and 1960s. Nor is
there much evid~nce of social control in the use of licences. Protection
was spread among industries without the knowledge of relative levels
which was needed to make sensible decisions about the public interest.
Most importing decisions were private ones, as they had been in pre-
licencing days; they were guided by governments only to a preference
for industrial inputs over finished goods. That could have been achieved
.~y differential tariffs and any further assistance to individual enterprises
judged to be especially desirable could have been provided in some form
of bounty.
The debate about import licencing was really a debate about the place
of industry in the New Zealand economy. It was far froOl wholly
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economic. Industry was wanted for several reasons, including a
misplaced belief that it was the only path to modernisation. but a sound
argument was that New Zealand should provide a range of opportunities
so that its population could develop and use a variety of aptitudes and
skHIs. The issue which should have been debated was whether the
opportunities for personal development which were being created were
costing as little as possible, or whether more could have been achieved
in agriculture-related activities which did not need protection. But
debate seldom moved beyond the free trade versus protection discussion
of the nineteenth century which indeed included even the argument that
tariffs provided opportunities for development of a range of personal
abilities.
While most attention was focused on industry and urban services,
agriculture was not stagnant. 'Insulationism' gave way to a desire for
export growth and those exports for a long time were seen almost
exclusively as the produce of agriculture. Institutions such as the
Marketing Department. which was responsible for separating local and
international prices, were revised to become producer boards with
promotion of exports as their principal function (although they continued
to operate price-smoothing schemes). The key concept was
diversification, the underlying idea being that exports could be increased
by finding new export products and new export markets. The reality was
that Britain's economy was growing less rapidly than those of other
countries while the British government reserved more of the British
market for British farmers. Diversification was essentially finding
different products which could be sold in markets other than that of
Britain.
Diversification met with considerable success in the I960s . Lamb
continued to be sold to Britain, but mutton was sold in markets such as
that of Japan and beef was sold in Japan and the USA Butter and cheese
ceased to be the only significant dairy products exported as the industry
produced casein and non-solid-fat products for Japan and the Pacific
Basin. Horticultural exports grew mainly in the 1970s when the
traditional sale of apples and pears to Britain were joined by kiwifruit
and berries sold in North America and other northern hemisphere
markets where the seasons for local producers did not coincide with
those of New Zealand. Bigger markets were also found for hides, skins,
pelts, sausage casings and tallows. There was also expansion of other
fish exports in the exploitation of crayfish resources in the late 1960s.
Even forestry exports owed a great deal to primary production in that log
sales to Japan were important although more attention was given to pulp
and paper. The contribution to diversification of more clearly
manufactured products remained small until the 1970s.
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The 19708
Some farming leaders and some economists were dissatisfied with the
economy which evolved in the 20 years after the end of World War II.
But it was not intellectual or sectional criticism of the established
resource allocation which promoted change. Rather it was realisation in
the course of the 1960s that New Zealand's economic growth was not as
great as was being achieved in other countries. Faster growth was being
achieved not only as a matter of postwar recovery or the particular
circumstances of Japan, but in a range of European countries which
were reaching income levels above that of New Zealand. The engine of
growth was identified as international trade in manufactured goods,
fostered by the lowering of trade barriers, and New Zealand was not
participating in that process. Diversification was not enough. Too many
countries imposed barriers to agricultural trade, and the constant
likelihood through the 1960s that Britain would join the EEC and accept
its preference of local agriculture added impetus to the belief that New
Zealand manufacturing should be redirected from the provision of
employment to direct relief of the foreign exchange constraint.
Attention was also directed towards the exchange rate. A devaluation
was used in 1933, primarily to redistribute income towards exporters
(who were almost entirely farmers) and this was reversed in 1948 when
the balance of payments position was buoyant and revaluation was seen
as a suitable response to inflationary import prices. Thereafter, in the
international context of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates, New Zealand generally maintained parity between its currency and
sterling. Devaluation was sometimes advocated as an instrument for
promoting exports relative to imports but it was not favoured. Within
the Bretton Woods system, devaluation was often seen as political
failure. Furthermore, in New Zealand, the arbitration system tended to
keep average wage rates in line with inflation, and there was genuine
doubt over whether a devaluation could affect the real exchange rate or
would be negated by compensating wage and price movements.
Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s, there was increasing concern about
the effect of overvaluation of New Zealand's currency on the balance of
exports and imports.
Freer trade with Australia had been negotiated in the earlier 1960s,
mainly at the urging of the pulp and paper industry. But the procedures
were cumbersome and progress was slow. In early 1967, some senior
officials came close to persuading the government to devalue in order to
make exporting more "attractive. The government withdrew, mainly at
the urging of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, who feared
pressure on sterling, but when sterling was devalued in November,
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1967, the opportunity was taken to reduce the value of the New Zealand
dollar to equality with the Australian dollar.
It took some time for the growth of exports of manufactured goods,
primarily to Australia and the Pacific Basin, to become significant.
Markets had to be established and developed. Furthermore, the growth
of manufactured exports had been trumpeted for some time and so
reports of success generated some scepticism, especially as much of the
increase in their value could be traced to the Tiwai Point aluminium
smelter which also generated substantial offsetting imports of alumina
and other materials. In the early 1970's, exports of traditional
agricultural products also expanded. It only later became clear that meat
exports had risen at the expense of longer-term livestock investments as
farmers judged the favourable effect of devaluation on the ratio of
product prices to internal costs to be unlikely to persist. Nor was it
immediately apparent how much was due to an international commodity
boom rather than to specifically New Zealand developments.
By the end of the 1970s, however, there had been a significant switch
to non-traditional exports. There was still some validity in the
observation made about aluminium exports in that non-traditional exports
required more imports than traditional ones, so that the gains in net
foreign exchange were only two-thirds to four-fifths of the apparent gain
in export receipts. Nevertheless, the nature of the economy was
significantly changed. Whereas in 1966 Professor Blyth could cogently
argue that much of New Zealand's history could be written in terms of
'creaming off' some of the output of farming to support industries and
services, by the end of the 1970s a real economic problem was
persuading farmers that it was not worth their while expanding
production at all.
The attempt to expand new exports ran into unexpected obstacles. In
1973. OPEC chose to force a considerable redistribution of the world's
income in its favour. The markets for New Zealand's exports in the
industrialised and oil-importing countries contracted sharply and were
not readily replaced in the more wealthy oil-producing countries.
Furthermore, as an oil importer, New Zealand shared in the relative loss
of income.
Unemployment increased and the levels of the second half of the
1970s and early 1980s dwarfed those of the first half of the 1970s which
themselves were markedly different from the years of full employment.
The policy response to the 1973 oil price rise was to spread the required
income reduction over several years. Slow growth over a longer period
was preferred to a sudden reduction in incomes, overseas borrowing
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being used to gain time as was recommended by most international
authorities concerned to recylce 'petrodollars' as part of a worldwide
adjustment mechanism. But the international economy was more
depressed in the mid to late 1970s than had been expected, especially
because not all countries honoured the international understandings. It
was therefore difficult for New Zealand to keep to schedule.
For a variety of reasons, including the traditional opposition of Labour
voters to overseas borrowing, there was a change of government in
November, 1975. The new government sought a quicker solution to the
balance of payments deficit and this required slower growth of New
Zealand's national income including National Superannuation,
commendable enough in itself especially for people not already included
in an inflation-proofed superannuation scheme, but in conjunction with
other elements such as the use of tax rebates to support exporters, it
required levels of personal taxation beyond what were readily acceptable.
The community sought levels of disposable income beyond the available
supply of goods and services and from the mid 1970s New Zealand's
inflation rate significantly exceeded that of its main trading partners.
This was combined with unemployment, albeit less than in most OECD
countries.
By the late 1970s, there was no longer a widespread belief that
government policy would ratify investment decisions. On the contrary,
there were always worries that the government would find it necessary to
dampen demand in the search for balance of payments equilibrium or in
an effort to combat inflation. In the 1960s, many economists called for
more flexibility in government policy in order to balance aggregate
demand and supply throughout the year rather than in an annual set-
piece budget. In the late 1970s, there were more minibudgets but
attempts at fine-tuning were swamped by a loss of belief in the power of
the government to control the economy.
Furthermore, . inflation proved to have a much bigger impact on
investment than expected. Indexation, mostly informal but nonetheless
effective, moderated the effects of inflation on the distribution of incomes
although less so for farmers than for most sections of the community.
But the direct effect of inflation on growth was greater than expected.
Inflation created uncertainty, especially about future output and input
prices on which the profitability of investment depended. Uncertainty
was greatest in respect to long-term growth of real output. This was
reinforced by the tax system which made capital gains much more
attractive than increased income flows. In addition, concentration on the
short term diverted resources to essentially unproductive uses like
refinancing short-term debt, making applications to regulatory agencies
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for price increases, and so on. Private investment was therefore low,
and a countervailing increase in public investment was not sufficient to
generate the aggregate demand demanded to avoid unemployment.
Public investment was dominated by 'think big' or the 'growth
projects'. The value of New Zealand's hydrocarbon sources, and indeed
of all energy, increased in sympathy with the world oil price and it was
sertsible to exploit them. But policy was dominated by ideas of
independent sources of energy rather than by optimal resource
allocation. The'growth projects' were the centrepiece of a political
strategy but their integration with the course of private investment was
less than convincing. There was little attention to imports and overall
adjustment to the changed international context. There was much talk of
'structural change' but the movement of resources into areas where they
made most contribution to national income was slow. Existing uses
seemed to be offered protection by government intervention.
Agriculture was caught up in the loss of direction in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. In the 1960s various tax incentives. were used to
promote new forms of exports. A strong sense of fairness was among
the reasons why some tax concessions were also extended to farmers but
they were kept mostly to areas which could be defended as drawing an
appropriate line between social and private benefits. Thus· the most
important were related to land development, although some were used to
encourage farmers to believe that price fluctuations were temporary and
that farm decisions should look to the longer term. In the 1970s,
however, such sophistication was largely abandoned and 'supplementary
minimum prices' (SMPs) were little more than indiscriminate subsidies
to farm exporters. They were rapidly incorporated into land values and
substantially captured by suppliers of farm inputs and processors of farm
products. Their greatest economic defect, however, was that they
removed any incentive to farmers to respond to the changed international
environment. The optimal decision for farmers was to continue to
produce traditional products, knowing that their returns were determined
by SMPs more than by world prices.
'Protection all round' is a phrase often associated with Australia in the
1920s, but it also reasonably applied to New Zealand in the early 1980s.
The level of the overseas debt, which had seemed worrying to many in
1975, was much greater by 1983 and projection of current trends
produced really worrying scenarios. New Zealanders wanted levels of
consumption being observed overseas, but the economy was not
producing the goods and services which would suppOli it. A wage and
price freeze disguised inflation and produced a surge of growth, but
private decision-makers did not have sufficent confidence in the future to
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undertake the resource reallocation needed for a fundamental change in
the economic outlook. Extraordinary interest rate controls meant that
entrepreneurial effort was further directed towards evading official
limitations rather than to effecting economic reorganisation.
Recent changes
By the early 1980s, it was clear to many economists and officials that
significant changes were required. The Economic Monitoring Group of
the New Zealand Planning Council commented in December, 1983:
In recent years, while world incomes have grown slowly,
New Zealand has stagnated. In order to sustain consumption
levels and to promote development of our energy resources, the
Government has engaged in overseas borrowing to a much greater
extent than formerly. The borrowing has undoubtedly kept
employment and incomes higher than they would otherwise have
been, even though unemployment has increased while incomes
have not grown much. Unfortunately, it seems to the Monitoring
Group that the economy has not used the time adequately when
consumption was supported by borrowing, to get into a position
from which it could meet our income aspirations while financing
needed imports by our exports. The cost of servicing our
overseas debt seems to the Monitoring Group to have reached the
position where it would be unwise to continue to rely on
borrowing for the purpose much longer. It is therefore necessary
to find ways of speeding up the internal adjustment to our
international environment...
And in a subsequent publication, the same group argues:
The main aspects of this requirement for adaptability will be as
follows:
(a) To ensure that the price signals received by businessmen (in
particular) are those that reflect the situation in the real world.
This will enable them to make more soundly based decisions in
regard to investment, production and sales.
(b) There will be a greater role for the exchange rate in relaying
overseas realities into the New Zealand economy. This will call
for greater· flexibility in the use of the exchange rate as a total
economic management and development.
(c) Greater flexibility will be required in labour markets both in
regard to mobility and income levels. This will clearly have
implication for the level and patterns of consumption.
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Similar conclusions had been reached by other analysts, especially
those within Treasury, and the election of a new government in July,
1984 created the political environment in which a change of direction
could be implemented.
There are, of course, many questions which can be directed to the
new policy environment. Some sections of the economy can respond
. more quickly than others; there is room for debate whether the removal
of government assistance has been even-handed across different sectors
of the economy; and the line between interventions to preserve valued
aspects of New Zealand society and assistance to particular interest
groups is not clear-cut. But government policy in recent years has been
much more directed towards the efficient use of New Zealand resources
than it was in the 1970s. Many farmers have been disturbed because
agriculture and exporting no longer rank highly in official and
government rhetoric. But the change is not that all of agriculture has
been d9wngraded; rather it is that Government favour extends only to
those aspects of agriculture and exporting which are efficient relative to
New Zealand's place in the international economy.
This central change is now well established in New Zealand's political
economy. Farming does not have the. political power to reverse even if
the leaders of the sector were so minded. The economic consequences
ofa reversal in terms of the loss of international confidence and the
stifling of enterprise are too great to be contemplated. The pace of
change is, however, still open to debate. It is never easy to find the
right path between too much haste which leads only to confusion and too
slow a pace which allows change to be stifled as particular interests
merely absorb pressure and protect their positions. It is however,
difficult to see that a slower pace could prevent the distinctions which are
arising between areas within agriculture according to the extent to which
they have the ability and will to adapt to changing market situations.
Similarly. it would be possible to change the relative emphasis of the
various components of the central policy shift. For example, a greater
reliance 00 fiscal policy relative to monetary policy would probably put
relatively more of the burden of adjustment on to domestic consumption
and less on the tradeables sector of the economy including farming;
unemployment would probably be higher but the average exchange rate
would be more favourable to exporters of farm produce. This is the
level of policy at which debate should be focused, but again, whatever
path is chosen, the experience of farming is likely to be diverse, with the'
same criterion of adjustment to the world environment being pre-
eminent.
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Chapter 2
Agriculture in
New Zealand's Economy
Brian Easton
Economic Consultant
Wellington
Arguably, agriculture has been the single most important factor in
shaping New Zealand's economy. Yet the intricacies of its influence on
the macroeconomy have not been fully explored.
Agriculture in New Zealand covers arable and pastoral farming plus
horticulture. Its scope could be extended to include silviculture and
parts of hunting, fish farming, and tourism, since farmers are also
involved in those areas.
When considering agriculture in the macroeconomy one should
include those industries which supply farmers or process farm
production. Indeed there are some industries, producing fertiliser,
agriculture and livestock chemicals, farm equipment manufacturers,
together with stock and station agents, which exist almost solely to
provide farm inputs. Similarly meat and dairy processing and some
parts of the textile industries exist only to process farm raw materials.
Many industries are substantially dependent upon the farm sector
(Guthrie and Lattimore, 1984).
This wider definition of agriculture explains why the industry is so
important, despite its apparent small proportion of total national output.
According to the Government statistician the net output of the
agricultural market production group (sometimes called the "farming
sector") was 7.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market
prices in 1984/85. The food, beverages, and tobacco manufacturing
group net output was another 6.9 percent.
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The employment generation of the agricultural sector may be gauged
from Table 1. Column I shows the direct employment in the
agricultural sector as 117.8 thousand in 1986/87, or about 9 percent of
the New Zealand labour force.
In addition there are jobs created by the initial purchase of farm
inputs and family spending, plus the further rounds of purchases and
spending thus generated. The employment multipliers associated with
these backward linkages are shown in Column 2. Column 3 shows that
including the backward linkages, the agricultural sector covers 348,000
jobs or about 28 percent of the of the labour force.
Butcher also estimates multipliers for the forward linkages for
dairying, meat and some wool processing. When these are included
(Table I, columns 4 and 5) they give a sector total of around 571,000
jobs or 46 percent of the nation's labour force.
Table 2 shows that, in the year ending June 1985, 57 percent of
exports of goods and services came from categories readily identified
with the agricultural sector. This excludes chemicals generated from the
agricultural sector (e.g. casein), farm equipment and farm services (e.g.
consulting, software) which would raise the true proportion to about 60
percent.
There is a danger here, of under emphasising the contribution of
import substitution relative to that of exporting. Given that, broadly, the
same quantity of resources is used for each dollar produced, then each is
equally valuable to the economy. And since the agricultural sector also
produces domestically-used products, it is an -import substitutor.
As foreign exchange is concerned, possibly the appropriate measure is
the net foreign exchange earning of the sector. This has not been
measured with precision but, noting that the share of the sector in
employment creation (and probably economic activity) is slightly smaller
than its share in exporting, it seems likely that the whole sector is -a
small net foreign exchange generator.
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Table I: Direct and Indirect Employment Generation, Agricultural
Sector
Jobs Employment Total Employment Total
Direct Multiplier Jobs Multiplier Jobs
OOO's (backward OOO's (forward OOO's
linkages) linkages)
Dairy & cattle 49.2 3.0 148 5.6* 273
Sheep 38.4 3.2 122 5.8 223
Cropping 7.9 3.2 25 3.2 25
Fresh Fruit &
vegetables 13.5 2.0 27 2.0 27
Other Farming
services 8.8 2.6 23 2.6 23
Total
Employment 117.8 348 571
Source: Butcher, 1985
* Butcher calculates 4.2 for Dairying but that excludes Dairy Beef
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Table 2: Exports in Year Ended June 1985
Classification $m %
Food and Live Animals 5,090 37.8
Beverages and Tobacco .27 .2
Crude Materials - Farm Based 19.80 14.7
Mineral Fuels etc. 100 .7
Animal and Vegetable Oils ]29 1.0
Chemical and Related Products* 593 4.4
Manufactured Goods
Farm based 396 2.9
Other 1,326 9.9
Machinery and Transport Equipment* 416 3. ]
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 413 3.1
NEI and re exports 413 3.1
Non Merchandise Exports *, ** 2,144 15.9
TOTAL Merchandise and
Non-Merchandise Exports ** 13,460 100.0
Source: NZ70B, 1986
Notes: * includes some agricultural sector exports
** estimated from SNA
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Table 3: The Agricultural Sector over time: Shares in Total
Economy (percent)
Year
1959/60 1965/6 1971/2 1976/7
Real Net Output
Input-supply 3 3 2 1
Farming 14 12 9 9
Processing. Distribution
& Retail 12 11 10 11
TOTAL 29 26 21 21
Employment
Input-supply 3 3 3 3
Fanning 13 12 10 8
Processing. Distribution
& Retail 16 15 15 15
TOTAL 32 30 28 26
Export
Input-Supply na na na na
Farming 26 22 11 10
Processing. Distribution
& Retail 52 48 50 48
TOTAL 78 70 61 58
Source:
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Guthrie and Lattimore (1984)
Guthrie and Lattimore (1984) provide some assessment of the
changing significance of the sector. They identify a group of
agricultural sector industries, and calculate their economy-wide share of
net output, employment and exports for the four selected years (Table 3).
The agricultural sector's share of economic activity has decreased, as
other sectors (such as forestry, fishing, manufactured exporting, and
tourism) have expanded. Nevertheless it still remains the largest sector
in the economy.
Agriculture in the World Economy
The agricultural sector is intimately involved in the world economy,
and its activities have dominated the current revenue side of the external
activities. Indeed the agricultural sector is one of the main channels
through which the world economy affects the New Zealand economy.
Until a few decades ago almost all New Zealand exports were pastoral
products in various degrees of processing. Today pastoral exports
remain the dominant component of agricultural exports although there
has been considerable diversification.
The international agricultural economy is primarily a grain one, with
livestock trade at its periphery. Moreover, the Northern Hemisphere
livestock industry is primarily grain-fed, contrasting with the grass-fed
livestock of New Zealand, Australia alld Latin America. Thus the New
Zealand pastoral industry is very much on the periphery. However, in
international trade of those pastoral products, New Zealand is a major
participant for two reasons: first, New Zealand is a substantial producer
of dairy products, sheep and cattle meats, and crossbred wool; second,
many Northern Hemisphere livestock producers receive considerable
protection (most often by means of quotas), so that the international
market is small relative to its total production. Ultimately New Zealand
is a major supplier to the small international market for most pastoral
products.
There is considerable Northern Hemisphere dumping into these
markets, and there is a recognition that, as a significant supplier, New
Zealand can drive prices against producers. (The recent decision by the
New Zealand Dairy Board to restrict entry into dairy farming is symbolic
of this recognition).
They have fallen since the peak in the early 1950s (Wilson and
Easton, 1984). Some people say that the fall only really began in 1966,
or began for different products at different times (e.g. dairy ,products late
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1950s, wool 1966, meat mid-1970s). A falling price indicates that the
supply of a commodity is growing faster than its demand. The slow-
growing demand can indicate many things: a low world disposable
income, a change in preference, substitution from other products (e.g.
margarine, synthetic fibres, white meats).
The Consequences on Farming of Changes in the Terms of Trade
The broad details of the mechanism hy which the pastoral terms of
trade affect the sector are known, even though the details are not. It is
noticeable that aggregate farm profitahility has been deteriorating at least
since the mid- 1960s (O'Dea and Horsfield 1982; Easton, 1983;
Grimmond and Kay, 1983), although it was obscured by fluctuations in
the terms of trade, by Government subsidisation, and by complex
interactions between inflation, land prices and taxation.
The reasons why New Zealand went into a high inflation phase in the
early 1970s are also complex, but one (partial) explanation might be that
a fall in the terms of trade involves a change in price relatives and, given
the downward tendencies of prices in New Zealand, it is hard to envisage
adjustment to an external downward price shock without a considerable
rise in the average price level. Once inflation is underway, prices
become much less effective signals. A taxation system, such as New
Zealand's where investment income is treated differently if it is a capital
gain rather than a nominal return, adds to the turmoil. In such an
environment, land prices were rising faster than general prices, even
though. farm profitability was falling. Interest rates were also rising.
Thus fanning appeared to be maintaining profitability if the capital gains
on land were included. But such perversity was only possible at the
expense of buying land at over-valued prices. Optimism, borrowing on
inflated land values and Government subsidisation could put off the day
of reckoning, but ultimately (or in New Zealand's case from 1984) land
prices began to fall, and the weak profitability of the farm sector became
apparent.
While a closed economy can experience business cycles, it is accepted
that the main source of fluctuations in New Zealand is the external
sector. In the past, variations in the pastoral prices have been the main
external influence, although in recent years the world business cycle's
effect on manufactured exports and the oil shocks haye also been
ililportant.
Consider a rise in pastoral export prices. This will show through in
higher incomes to farmers. There will not be an immediate major
supply response, although slaughter rates may rise a little and a second
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shear introduced, or as when wool was a pound for a pound in 1950,
children may collect wool off barbed wire fences. The additional income
will be spent generating jobs in the remainder of the agricultural sector.
Indeed the multipliers may be higher because the additional spending
and easier access to credit generates additional investment. The ensuing
taxation may also induce the Government to spend more.
A typical sequence could go something like this. Increased'
Government spending could lead to a minor 'boom' and a desire of
people to import items. Increases in imports could, in turn, offset
increases in pastoral prices, result in a national credit drain, and thereby
reduce the balance of payment surplus. If the Government reaction is to
reduce its spending, the economic upswing weakens, the cycle turns
downwards, pastoral prices fall. and the entire economy begins to
contract. Some of these factors have been evident since 1985.
What is interesting about the New Zealand business cycle is that the
upswing and the downswing are usually brief, typically one quarter or at
the most, two. While it would be wrong to completely ignore the
imports, we are nonetheless, left with the strong impression that the
major determinant of the ability of the New Zealand economy to grow
has been the ability of its export sector to generate revenue.
Agriculture and Economic Growth
It is not difficult to see why a healthy external sector should facilitate
economic growth. It is at the top of the business cycle that physical and
human capital is being most increased, resources redeveloped and
management busy. Providing that economic strength is not compromised
by a deterioration in the balance of payments and/or inflation the
outcome will be to raise the productive capacity of the economy. The
longer the period of economic strength the greater will be the ensuing
growth.
Thus, as well as directly contributing to economic growth through
raising its own productivity. the farm sector acts as a leader inducing
productivity growth into the rest of agriculture and therefore in the rest
of the economy.
Philpott and Nana (1986) have provided some estimates of the growth
performance of the New Zealand economy from 1959/60 to 1983/4
(Table 4). These figures may underestimate the volume of growth of
some sectors, particularly the service sector (Easton, 1987).
Nevertheless the conclusion is clear -tthe farm and agricultural
processing sectors have among the highest productivity responses to
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technology of any in the economy. Using a finer breakdown, only
electricity (3.6 percent p.a.) and communications (4.4. percent p.a.)
show greater improvement.
Table 4: Sectoral Measure of Productivity Performance, 1959/60 -
1983/84 (Change % p.a.)
Average Net Product Technological
Labour Capital Residual
Agriculture (Farming) 3.2 2.5 3.0
Food and Beverages 4. I 1.6 3.3
Forestry & Processing 2.2 1.7 2.0
Other Manufacturing 1.0 -2.2 -.2
Energy 5.0 1.4 2.6
Construction 1.8 -.3 1.0
Transport &
Communication 2.6 1.5 2.3
Services .1 -.9 -.4
TOTAL 1.2 -.9 -.4
* includes fishing
Source: Philpott and Nana (1986)
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The most detailed assessment we have of the future of agriculture in
the macroeconomy comes from the National Sectoral Programme of the
New Zealand Planning Council which reported six different scenarios for
the two years, 1990 and 1995. To reduce the complexity let's focus on
two of them.
The first scenario, called the 'calibration run', was made after asking
different industry groups what they thought would be significant export
performance levels for them. There was sufficient detail in these
forecasts to explore policy consequences and it soon became evident that,
despite what may be judged as modestly favourable assumptions about
the pastoral terms of trade, there was a need for a substantial increase in
export subsidies, above the level prevailing in 1981/2, to enable the
sectors to attain the export targets.
This was thought unlikely, so a second run called the 'current policy
re-run' was prepared. This· run assumed export performance was
constrained by profitability. Not surprisingly the levels of pastoral
exports were now lower than the sectors could achieve; indeed they were
forecast as lower than the 1985 levels.
Table 5 summarises the two runs. Under the calibration run the
economy grows at 3.4 percent p.a., with an export volume increase of
5.7 percent p.a. Pastoral exports make a very small contribution to this
growth (with expectations of a decline in wool exports), although
horticulture and agricultural based manufactures are shown as growing
quickly. Profitability to attain this goal requires that there be a six
percent export subsidy. That an export subsidy is necessary does not
imply the forecast is unorthodox. It is well-established that under certain
assumptions, a judicious selection of interventions can increase GDP.
The current policy re-run shows a somewhat slower GDP growth of
2.9 percent p.a., and a much slower export volume increase of 2.5
percent p.a. The exportable sector share of the economy diminishes,
and pastoral exports decline. The story the run appears to be telling us
is that, in order to attain the required profitability without export
subsidies, the exportable sector must contract, which might raise
overseas prices and perhaps also increase productivity.
These are not projections which will be readily acceptable by all.
However, rather than dismissing them, let us consider what might be
investigated in the future.
First. researchers already have looked at the significance of
introducing modest tariff protection in the current policy re-run. There
2-10
is not a lot of difference in a non-protection run, if anything pastoral
exports are a little lower.
Second, researchers have experimented with an assumption 'that world
market conditions operate in such a way as to raise New Zealand export
prices relative to world prices ... we assume the increase in export prices
applies equally across all export commodities'. Surprisingly the high
export prices run again is not markedly different from the current policy
re-run.
Nonetheless it would be worth refining this investigation. The
forecasts are telling us that in the early 1980s the pastoral sector was
over-extended; that farming was unprofitable without substantial export
subsidies; and that a different economic picture with a smaller pastoral
sector would have made more money. If the farm base is still too large,
farming may be facing a prolonged squeeze, much longer than most
observers currently expect.
What we may take from all this is that there is a need to carry out
some urgent investigation into these issues. It could be that the problem
is in current research estimates, or it could be that the research has
picked up a serious underlying weakness in farming's ability to produce
in existing cost, price and technological conditions. .
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Table 5: The NSP Projections to 1995
1995
Base Calibration Current Policy
Year Run Re-Run
Eiports(G& S) $m 1982 $m 1982 $m 1982
(1985)
Dairy 1192 1324 (1.1 ) 1034 (-1.4)
Meat 1565 1677 (.7) 1296 (-1.9)
Wool 1042 919 (-1.2) 773 (-2.9)
Horticulture 352 1230 (13.3) 1050 (11.6)
Other Food 539 1533 (11.0) 861 (4.8)
Textiles 444 1177 (10.3) 780 (5.8)
Remainder 4622 9702 (7.7) 6755 (3.9)
Total Exports 9756 17062 (5.7) 12549 (2.5)
Output (Gross) (1982)
Agriculture 5229 8309 (3.6) 7369 (3.4)
Other Food 6281 8767 (2.6) 7847 (1.8)
Textiles 2618 3965 (4.2) 3887 - (4.0)
GDP 29155 44843 (4.3) 42241 (3.8)
Capital -
Stock in Use) (1982)
Agriculture 19920 20830 (2.1) 21334 (.7)
Other Food 3950 5151 (2.7) 4343 (1.0
Textiles 887 832 (-.6) 775 (-1.3)
Entire Economy 110064 158289 (3.7) 149889 (3.1)
Employment (1982)
'000 '000 '000
Agriculture 129.6 170.7 (2.1) 156.2 (1.4)
Other Food 75.5 102.2 (3.0) 93.4 (2. I)
Textiles 45.0 43.8 (.1 ) 44.3 (.1)
Entire Economy 1284 1636 (2.4) 1636 (2.4)
Memoranda (1982)
Pastoral Terms
of Trade 1000 890 na
Terms of Trade 1000 982 1100
Real Exchange Rate 1000 1084 1120
Mean Export
Subsidy 2.6% 6.0% 0%
Mean Tariff
Equivalent 14.9% 0% 4.3%
Source: NSP (1986)
Note: (Numbers in brackets are annual increase (% p.a.) since base
year)
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The Future of Agriculture
While the magnitudes which arise out of the National Sectoral forecast
may be wrong, the broad directions seem right - agriculture's share in
the macroeconomy will continue to decline, and pastoral farming may
contract in absolute terms. However, given the difficulties the industry
is currently experiencing and the likelihood that agricultural subsidies
will not be reinstated, perhaps we should not be surprised.
One may even argue that the forecasters were optimistic. They have
followed the practice of the last 20 years of forecasting a modest upturn
in the pastoral terms of trade which actually have continued to
deteriorate. There is perhaps a strong prospect of a continuing fall,
particularly if there is no major reversal in Northern Hemisphere farm
protectionism. Within the next decade there may be some moderation in
the intervention, including reductions in dumping into third markets.
Nevertheless, world supply of pastoral commodities seems likely to
continue to rise faster than world demand (at a given price). As New
Zealand is a significant supplier, changes in its supply will affect the
world supply schedule and hence the price. .
This diminishing share for agriculture will in some ways be to its
benefit. Increasingly it will share responsibility for macroeconomic
performance and management. For instance, the overall impact of any
pastoral terms of trade shock from the Australian and other
manufacturing economies and from oil will become more important.
While the overall impact of shocks from the external economy may not
change much, their immediate effect will be shared with others and as a
result, should be spread more evenly through the economy.
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Chapter 3
Innovation, Information
and Communication
Alastair McArthur
Agricultural Economist
Lincoln College
An important characteristic of New Zealand agriculture is that our
successful farming systems have been developed locally. Information
and communication systems between farming and extension, education
and research have played a critical role in that development. It is
worthwhile analysing how these systems have worked in the past lest
enthusiasts for new doctrines should throwaway unthinkingly the key to
adaptability .
The British people who settled in New Zealand in the middle of the
last century were well-informed about British agriculture which was
reaching its zenith after undergoing 100 years of revolution. The British
were recognised as the world leaders in agricultural technology.
Farming settlers brought with them the skills of horsemanship,
shepherding, stockmanship, and those general rural skills which were
essential for the daunting task of breaking in this country. They also
brought with them improved farm animals - fast-walking Clydesdales,
strong-eyed Border collies, footrot-resistant Romneys, the hardy
Aberdeen Angus and the small butter-producing Jersey, all of which
were to play crucial roles in the development of New Zealand
agriculture.
However, the farming systems which were so successful at 'home'
proved almost useless here. There was no market in New Zealand for
the mixture of products flowing out of the English Four-Course Rotation
and similar farming systems developed in Britain. British agriculture
had blossomed because of the demand for food from the growing urban
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population which was half a world distant from New Zealand. Sailing-
ship transport was very expensive and the technology of shipping frozen
meat and dairy products was still 30 years away. The settlers on the east
coasts of both islands borrowed the wool-growing system from across the
Tasman, running their Merinos extensively on the native tussock
grassland. Just before 1900 the price of wool crashed, forcing some
run-holding settlers to adopt the wheat-growing technology from the
North American prairies using John Deere's ploughs, McCormick's
binders, and tin threshing mills. This wheat-growing boom collapsed
after World War I because of low prices and also because continuous
cropping had exhausted the natural soil fertility.
In this century New Zealanders have increasingly evolved their own
unique farming systems. Dairying, hill sheep and cattle farming, and,
more recently, deer farming and kiwifruit growing, are all examples of
indigenous farming systems which suit our environment. They are
emulated by farmers with similar environments elsewhere around the
world.
In contrast few industrial processes used in New Zealand have been
developed here. A Christchurch dry-cleaning plant is almost identical to
dry-cleaning plants in New York or London. A New Zealand tyre
factory uses the same plant as its overseas parent company used a few
years previously. World industrialists do not beat a path to New Zealand
to see the latest and greatest in manufacturing. World farmers do come
to New Zealand to find out what their most efficient competitors are up
to.
The business of information transfer in industry tends to be traded like
'a private good' with the emphasis on patent rights, process licencing,
and buying the services of consultants. By contrast the information and
communication process in New Zealand agriculture is co-operative.
Farmers, extension workers, and researchers have cooperated in the free
exchange of information which has been an important factor in the
establishment of world-recognised farming systems.
At one end of the information process, New Zealand innovators have
always made all the information they have acquired available to anyone.
While few farmers do applied research, farming innovators carry out the
equivalent of what in industry is called new product development by
applying their own ideas and ideas from research to build or improve
their farming systems. Innovators provide free information to
agricultural journalists writing up their innovations, extension workers
holding field days and lecturers wanting learning experiences for their
students. Innovators exchange information with other innovators, with
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extension workers and, very importantly, with researchers. At the other
end of the information process, DSIR and MAF research stations have
always made information freely available to anyone. These government
agencies have not restricted the flow of information in order to sell it to
recoup research costs. Similarly most MAF extension services have
been provided free.
This cooperative approach by farmers towards the flow of information
derives from the fact that New Zealand producers are exporters to world
markets and do not see themselves as being in competition with one
another. The inct'eased production from helping a neighbour with
information has but a negligible effect on the supply of product. Hence
this assistance will not cause a decline in prices. In contrast most
industrial firms are imperfect competitors and have a share of a local
market. Helpful technical advice to a neighbouring firm may result in a
reduction of market share. Sharing technical information is often not in
the firm's interest.
The cooperative approach has also been a feature of the scientific
attitude of agricultural researchers employed by the Government. They
have seen it as their scientific duty in life to share information with the
farming community and with each other. One rationale for the
cooperative approach is that information is a public good. The cost of
providing information for one farmer is often precisely the same as the
cost of providing it for all farmers.
The following hypothetical story provides the reason why research to
provide information is sponsored by the Government. An individual
farmer cannot justify the cost of carrying out controlled experiments on
alternative methods of controlling gorse in a post 245T-free world fit for
environmentalists. The cost to a research-minded farmer far outweighs
the benefits to him. Yet farmers and others with gorse problems, as a
group, would find it worthwhile to pay for gorse control research. Their
net expected social benefits will improve if they form a club to pay for
gorse research. Farmers with serious gorse problems consider forming
such a research club.
Unfortunately, the 'shrewdies' see immediately the merit in refusing
to join the club, waiting until the guileless pay for the research, and then
finding out how to control gorse when that is discovered. It is neither
easy nor desirable to stop information flowing over the farm gate. Once
it is rumoured that there are bludgers about who are opting out of the
club, fewer and fewer of those with gorse problems volunteer with their·
subscriptions. Eventually society as a whole agrees that it is the
Government's job to chase up piking beneficiaries for their subscriptions
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to pay for gorse research. However, this proves to be much easier said
than done particularly in identifying those who will benefit in the future
but don't have a gorse problem now. Moreover chasing up beneficiaries
turns out to be a vote losing exercise. The cost both economically and
politically rules out making the beneficiary pay.
Next the Government proposes that it will give chemical companies tax
relief for doing research on gorse control. However, farmers grumble
that the answer probably lies in biological methods of control rather than
chemicals and that they don't want to be continually paying out
monopoly prices for patented products evaluated by dubious methods.
Taxpayers object to monopoly rights being given to firms whose research
they have funded. Moreover, scurrilous newspapers say that companies
claim as 'research' funds misused by executives taking attractive people
of the opposite sex out to dinner!
All in all it is very difficult under the user pay system to clobber
sufficient beneficiaries to fund a socially desirable level of research.
Eventually the Government decides to use taxpayers' funds to carry out
research on gorse control through the DSIR and the MAF. Subject to
some reservations, particularly as to whether or not government
departments can execute research efficiently by getting the maximum
amount of appropriate information for the money spent, group funding
for research seems the appropriate way for society to produce the
appropriate amount of a public good like information.
Currently the New Zealand Government faces a large deficit and is
searching for ways of reducing expenditure by making the user pay for
the services it provides. There is much merit in this concept of the user
paying for private goods and services, but user-pay is inappropriate for a
public good like research as the example above explains.
It is not possible to be so dogmatic about who should pay for
extension which is a most misunderstood activity because it consists of at
least three activities. First, there are those extension workers who
provide private consulting services. These services produce no spill-over
benefits which flow over the clients farm gate. For example,
neighbouring farmers get few benefits from an irrigation design drawn
tip for a client by the agricultural engineer from the MAF. Unless the
irrigation design is innovative and entirely new to the district, the only
beneficiary will be the farmer client. In other words, irrigation design
services are private goods rather than public goods.
Veterinary, engineering and farm management consultations usually
come into the category of private services. Most of them -are now paid
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for by client farmers and this seems appropriate whether they are
provided by the private sector or by government departments. If
extension activities are seen as being synonymous with consultant
services with no spillover benefits, then user-pays is highly appropriate.
A second task undertaken by extension workers is that of taking
research results to the farming community. This 'marketfng' activity is
part and parcel of research and is often executed with the same
professional expertise. It is done by either specialist extension workers
attached to research stations or by individual research workers with a
flair for extension work. Famous New Zealand agricultural scientists
have had this flair - Sir Bruce Levy, P.D. Sears, and C.P. McMeekan
are the best-known examples. This kind of extension work, which
frequently relies on mass and group methods, is very much a public
good. The cost of running a field day for one farmer is more or less the
same as the cost of running it for 5,000. Along with research it should
be paid for by the benefiting group, by the industry, or by the
Government. To make the individual beneficiary pay is likely to be
counter-productive and expensive to implement.
System-design is the third and most important activity carried out by
the best extension workers. Here they collaborate with innovating
farmers in assembling the components of new farming systems and sub-
systems. This has been the role of the great extension workers of the
past. Acknowledged system design extension workers are Bill Stafford
for pre-war South Canterbury farming, 'Mac' McKenzie for streamlined
North Island dairying, Ernest Neilson for controlled grazing, Eddie
Suckling for hill· country improvement, and Hugh Kirton for Northland
dairying.
It is this third system-design activity which has achieved the largest
response for the extension expenditure incurred - the largest bang for the
extension buck. System improvement and development has been pursued
actively by the consulting officers of the New Zealand Dairy Board
working mainly through discussion groups composed of innovating
farmers. It was in such a group in the Wairarapa that the concept of
large-scale dairying with 500 cows being milked through one
herringbone shed was born and subsequently put to the test. This
revolutionary idea was contrary to the conventional wisdom of 25 years
ago. Then it was held that by the time a herd had reached 150 cows,
diseconomies of scale had set in with a vengeance.
It is this crucial area of system-design which is very much at risk
from the enthusiast for user-pays. Imagine an extension service which
fails to recognise system design as an extension activity and fails to
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understand that it is a public good. Those who administer the extension
service want every hour of their extension officer's time charged out to a
client. An extension worker who in the past had a close relationship
with innovators now has to charge them $100 a visit. The innovator
estimates that he is unlikely to get $100 of benefit from the extension
worker's visit. Hence, the artery between innovators and extension
workers is fatally severed.
This severance is perhaps verified by the experience of extension
workers previously employed in the public sector who later became fee-
charging consultants. Usually these private consultants find themselves
cut off from the mainspring of ideas - the innovators. Of course this is
not always so.
Having started with a discussion of farming systems of a century ago,
it is appropriate to note one of the system changes which has occurred
since World War II. The calf- rearing system is a good example of how
the cooperative flow of information between farming innovators and
research and extension workers has wrought considerable improvements
in farming efficiency.
Forty years ago rearing 50 calves was a full-time job for one person
for about three months of the year. Now it can take as little as an hour
a day to rear 150. In the days of home separation, calves were started
on whole milk, switched to skim milk over weeks 3 and 5, and then they
were fed skim milk until they were weaned at 16 weeks. Each calf was
taught to drink from a bucket which was washed up to Florence
Nightingale standards after each of the two feeds a day.
When tanker collection came along, farmers started rearing calves on
whole milk which had a high opportunity cost. Some Waikato farmers
tried weaning calves at eight weeks instead of 16. To check this practice
out, comparisons were made experimentally between early-weaning and
late-weaning at the Ruakura Animal Research Station. The early-weaned
calves grew almost as well. confirming the experience of the innovators.
These experiments were widely 'marketed' at the Ruakura field days and
through the media.
More fundamental work was called for because the technical literature
held that calves could not digest grass efficiently until they were six
months of age because of inadequate rumen development. Ruakura
research discovered that the calf rumen was well-developed at eight
weeks and, moreover, calves were just as good as adult cows at digesting
grass at that age.
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Note the close relationship between farmers and research workers:
how cooperation resulted in an idea developed by farmers, and it then
being confirmed by research and marketed to the industry by extension.
Although the Ruakura research indicated that calves were more robust
than had previously been thought, calves were still difficu lt to rear on
pumice soils in spite of rigid adherence to top dressing with cobalt and
copper to correct mineral deficiencies in growing animals. Research on
white muscle disease in new-born lambs in the South Island was shown
to be due to selenium deficiency. This also proved a boon for rearing
healthy calves. Here research for the benefit of the sheep industry
l:esulted in gains by the dairy industry.
The amount of labour needed to rear calves was much reduced by the
commercial development of rubber teats so that calves could suckle their
milk rather than be fed from a bucket. No longer was it necessary to
risk bitten fingers from teaching calves to drink. Some discussion group
farmers saw immediately the potential of eliminating the time-consuming
business of driving calves up to the calf shed for a feed. They inserted
25 teats into a 44-galion drum which was left in the paddock with the
calves. Once a day, milk was tipped into the drum. Cleaning it out was
found to be quite unnecessary. This new streamlined calf-rearing system
was marketed to the industry through television and the mass media by
extension workers.
This example indicates the important contribution that innovative
farmers make to the development of new systems. Unfortunately, the
amount of money spent by farmers on this activity is not reflected in the
statistics for the contribution by farmers to 'R & D'. Governments have
argued that farmers should pay half of 'R & D' costs as do some
segments of industry. However, this overlooks the informal contribution
of innovating activities of farmers.
The tenor of this chapter has indicated that research should be funded
by the nation or by some other group of interests because it is a public
good. The same applies to extension work which promotes research
iesults and which designs farming systems. On the other hand,
consultancy services should be paid for by the user.
This summary might give the impression that there are no serious
drawbacks with government funded research and extension. That is not
so, there are some serious problems which require urgent policy
changes.
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It can happen that the objectives of the farming industry sometimes
diverge from the objectives of government research workers. What
interests a scientist may not have much value to an industry. Compared
with older countries, New Zealand has been fortunate to have so many
of its scientists with a commitment to farming. For instance, the British
scientist may be more attracted by the glittering prize of a Fellowship
rather than generating economic gain for farming. New Zealand
scientists do not suffer from the feelings of social inferiority in doing
applied research work which seems to afflict the class-conscious British.
Moreover, New Zealand agriculture is fortunate to have avoided the
extreme divergence in objectives between scientist and businessmen
which has arisen in the forestry industry. On the one hand there are
some in the scientific community who, as botanists, so love the objects
of their study that they cannot bear to see trees cut down, and, on the
other, there are commercial foresters who produce social benefits by
harvesting trees. A similar divergence has occurred in agriculture
between farmers and soil conservators but it has been of lesser moment.
The more serious problems have arisen because of difficulties of
managing research and extension under the employment policies for
Government and quasi-Government employees. Effective research and
extension requires outstanding people rather than large numbers. This
implies attracting and holding the key people required in the areas which
are expected to produce the greatest benefit.
As an example of this problem, great future opportunities for New
Zealand agriculture may well flow from the recent advances in genetic
engineering. Little has been done by New Zealand to hire genetic
engineers because the egalatarian public service paying scale prevents
paying them the market price.
Likewise in extension, MAF have a programme of shifting their
extension staff from district to district. Their best men can gain
promotion only by becoming administrators. This policy makes it
difficult for a MAF extension worker to become a system-designer
because it takes time to gain sufficient local experience and mana. The
Dairy Board has had a different policy where the outstanding field man
could reach higher salaries than those further up the hierarchy.
The converse of attracting the best people into research and extension
is the firing of the inadequate. This too is very difficult under current
employment policies for government employees.
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The ·management of government research and extension services has
also been constrained by the difficulty of moving specialists out of sunset
area of industry into sunrise area. The lag in obtaining resources can
result in research and extension effort being allocated to a sunset area
past its zenith. This lag is because, under Government funding, it takes
considerable effort and time to move resources in any new direction.
The flow of resources to research can reach its zenith just as the
industry reaches its nadir! This is sometimes used to explain the sailing
ship paradox - the discovery of how ships sailed was made when steam
made sail redundant!
In New Zealand agricultural science, tremendous advances were made
in soils and fertilisers in the 1940s and early 1950s when a few scientists
with slim resources discovered potassium, sulphur, and molybdenum
deficiencies. Their successes generated subsequent research effort in
soil research which has so far failed to produce the same early
successes. Under government employment policies it is difficult to
reduce soil research and transfer those resources into say genetic
engineering.
The tendency for success to generate resources for more extension
effort rather than for the expectation of more gains has led to massive
increases in the number of public servants working in some areas of
extension where, in my opinion, the marginal returns from employing
less than outstanding people are likely to be meagre. The recent claims
that MAF is moving people from extension inside the farm gate to
extension effort on the processing side suggests a previous misallocation.
What is required for future policy is not inappropriate recipes like
user-pay but the removal of constraints on research and extension
administrators so that they can adopt a flexible approach to resource
allocation.
No chapter on the future of information and communication is
complete without a resounding endorsement of modern electronic
technology. At a very low price, the new hardware and software can:
store and retrieve high volumes of data quickly, re-estimate statistical
parameters using the most sophisticated techniques, and run complex
decision models to assist managerial decisions-making.
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The management-information systems (MIS) approach to decision
making has been used to a limited extent in New Zealand agriculture.
The artificial breeding system has used it for a very long time, but it
obviously has a place, too in factory farming for producing pigmeat and
poultry products. Because of lower costs, these managerial information
systems will spread into new areas of agriculture.
However, the benefits of information systems derive from better
decisions. Experience with the implementation of operation research
models suggests worthwhile gains of five to ten per cent. Hence, we will
see more computer use in farming and particularly in industries allied to
farming.
However, computers neither dream up new ideas nor take risks. The
real gains are most likely to occur at the boundary between new
technology and innovative business for developing biological systems for
producing new products of increasing sophistication. For this cross-
fertilisation to occur the cooperative attitude and mutual respect between
science and farming businessmen which has been built up in the past
must continue in the future. The farmer and the scientist must be
friends!
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Chapter 4
Farm Size
and Population
John Fairweather
Research Sociologist
Lincoln College
Farm structure means farming's overall character and includes things
such as farm type and size distribution, land use and stock numbers.
Since the late 1800s, average farm size has had two peaks, one in 1881
and the other in 1976 (Figure I). In 1881, average farm size was 340
hectares. It was followed by a decline to about 243 hectares, a size
which persisted for almost 60 years. However, during 1956-76, average
farm size increased to about 324 hectares. These two decades also saw a
dramatic decline in farm numbers of about 20,000, or 1,000 farms per
year.
However, only reviewing farm size data ignores two important
elements of farm structure. The first is the total area of occupied land.
It increased steadily to 17.6 million hectares in 1921, and then stayed
roughly constant until 1976. For over 50 years changes in the occupied
area have not had a significant impact on average farm size.
The second element is the distribution of farm sizes among the total
number of farms. From 1886 to 1960 there was an increase in the
number of medium-sized farms (Table 1) while the number of small
farms declined. Since then the reverse has been true. A new data series
available in 1972 shows more detailed information (Table 2). This table
shows the number of dairy, sheep/beef and horticulture farms for 1972,
1978 and 1984. The last column shows an increase in total farm
numbers of about 14,000 during this 12-year period. The subtotals for
each farm size category show a large increase of over 14,000 small
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farms showing a slight increase of about 900. The large increase in
small farm numbers is in sharp contrast to changes before 1970. This
information also implies a movement of farm land out of medium-sized
holdings into both small and large-sized farms, and follows an
international trend begun shortly after Word War II.
Table 1: Number of Farms by Size, 1886 to 1960
Small Farms
1-49 acres
Medium Farms
50-999 acres
Large Farms
over 1,000 ac
1886 16,679 17,882 1,924
1906 31,532 34,012 4,398
1926 29,484 49,282 6,978
1946 25,394 53,919 6,926
1957 22,161 55,711 6,732
1960 11,742* 58,192 7,015
* Farms less than 10 acres not included.
The type-of-farm classification is based on the proportion of income
received from' farming activities. Despite its problems and the
incomplete coverage of commodities, this approach still gives an
indication of where New Zealand farmers think farm profitability lies.
Looking at Table 2, we see marked stability in the number of large
dairy farms, a decline of almost 3,400 for medium-sized ones, and a
resurgence of small dairy operations back to 1972 numbers. Part of this
large farm stability can be explained by the significant sums of capital
fixed into milking sheds, and the number of years it takes to establish
good herd blood lines. Losses of medium-sized dairy farms might be
explained simply by their inability to generate sufficient family income in
today's economy. The decline and subsequent revival of small-sized
4-2
today's economy. The decline and subsequent revival of small-sized
dairy farms may be a response to the increase in part-time farming by
people who also hold non-farm jobs.
There was an increase of about 2,500 beef/sheep farms during that
same period, all of which occurred on farms of less than 20 hectares.
Numbers of both mediul11- and large-sized sheep/beef farms declined.
The reasons for the increase in small operations, significant declines in
medium-sized farms. and some stability in the larger operations can
probably be explained in terms similar to those offered above for changes
in dairy farm numbers.
Horticu Iture presents an entirely different picture. Since 1972, all
three farm size grouping have increased. The total number of
horticulture farms has almost doubled, with the biggest increase in the
less-than-20 hectare category, and the least increase in farms with over
200 hectares.
Hectares
500
400
300
200
100
1881 1901 1921
Years
1941 1961 1981
Figure I:
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Average Farm Size (in hectares). 1874 to 1983
Table 2: Number of Farms, 1972 1978 and 1984 by Size and Type
of Farm
Year Small Farms Medium Farms Large Farms Total
1-19 20 to 199 over 200
hectares hectares hectares
1972
Dairy 801 17,661 824 19,286
Sheep/Beef 3,499 15,632 14,436 33,566
Hortl. 2,702 704 47 3,435
Total 8,751 37,489 16,552 62,789
1978
Dairy 532 15.108 818 16.459
Sheep/Beef 5,950 14,148 14,748 34,846
Hortl. 3.612 845 45 4.532
Total 16,368 35,793 17,240 69,401
1984
Dairy 820 14,285 824 15,934
Sheep/Beef 7,838 14,206 14,060 36.100
HortI. 5,505 1,294 52 6,851
Total 22,927 36,295 17,411 76,633
Stock numbers give another indication of changes in types of farming
(Table 3). These data parallel many of the changes in farm numbers.
For example, stability in .large and small dairy farms accompanied high
dairy cattle nunibers in 1972, slumped in 1972-84, and then resumed
the same 1972 peak in 1985. However, with the large decline in the
middle-sized grouping, evidence points to a significant increase in
average herd size for the remaining larger farms. This. in turn,
generally reflects a more intensive use of paddocks, some increased
capital expenditures, and a higher level of management.
Beef cattle numbers fell 13 percent in 1972-85, while sheep numbers
rose just over 11 percent. This stock substitution is consistent with the
increase of both small and large livestock operations.
4-4
Deer and goats contain the largest increases, with goats increasing
faster than deer. Pig numbers remained constant over this period. Both
the growth and stability situations can be fairly easily explained.
Pigmeat markets were pretty well established, and with a stable demand
there was no reason to change supplies. On the other hand, new
markets were being explored and developed for deer and goats. Both
animals had been introduced in response to the need for agricultural
diversification, and both markets were therefore being pushed to find
their limits.
Table 3: Change in Selected Stock Numbers, Selected Years, 1972-
85 (millions)
1972 1975 1978 1979 1981 1984 1985
Dairy 3.3 3.0 2.9 - 2.3 3.2 3.3
Sheep 60.9 55.3 62.2 - 5.1 4.5 4.6
Beef 5.3 6.3 5.5 - 5.1 4.5 4.6
Deer - - - .012 .109 .258 .320
Goats - - - .008 .068 .230 .427
Pigs .486 .422 .473 - .420 .436 .454
Source: Agricultural Statistics, Department of Statistics, Wellington
Land use is yet another indicator of changes in the type of farming
(Table 4). Pastoral agriculture, along with horticulture and forestry,
shows an overall increase in occupied area from 1972 to 1984.
However, the area in pastoral agriculture declined from 1981 to 1984,
while the other two categories showed a steady increase from 1972 to
1984. In absolute terms, pastoral agriculture showed the largest
increase (excluding the 'other land' category). Forestry showed the
largest relative increase which may be .partly explained by the
enlargement trend seen above in the distribution of farm sizes. The
tussock or danthonia category declined by a modest amount presumably
as some of this extensive land was brought under cultivation.
In general, Table 4 shows that the most significant land use change is
forestry. Pastoral occupation has increased steadily but now is starting
to decrease, while horticulture has increased rapidly from a low base.
From 1972 to 1978, the total occupied area grew by 2.2 million
hectares, and has since stabilised. The addition of cultivated land from
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Table 4: Area in Cultivation, Selected Crops, Selected Years 1972-84 (millions hal
1972 1975 1978 1981 1984
Change
1972-84
ha. %
Pastoral Agriculture
(grassland & lucerne) 8.47 9.23 9.13 9.72 9.42 .95 11
Horticulture
(crops, fruit, nursery) .41 .41 .43 .45 .40 .08 22
Forestry
(exotic trees) .55 .70 .81 .95 1.04 .49 90
Tussock, danthonia 5.06 4.71 4.66 4.45 4.56 .50 10
Other land 4.55 5.90 5.98 5.67 5.71 1.16 26
Total Occupied Land 19.03 20.91 21.23 21.25 21.22 2.19 12
.j::.
I Source: Agricultural Statistics, department of Statistics, Wellington.0'\
tussock or danthonia does not match the increase in the first three types
of cultivation. Land previously unaccounted for must have been
included in these three categories, just as the area of land has increased
for the 'other land' category.
In addition to the increased total agricultural land occupied. urban
land uses have increased by over a third since 1967. In that year urban
areas contained 277,000
hectares and by 1980 the total had grown to 424,000 hectares. Since
then increasing subdivision on the rural/urban fringe has undoubtedly
claimed more land for residential or commercial uses.
If present trends continue, the number of both large and small
farming operations will increase, but the number of small farms will
grow more rapidly than that for large farms. Middle-sized dairy farms
are in a definite decline which is likely to continue. However, medium-
sized horticultural operations are quite likely to increase, especially as
markets are developed.
While sheep and beef numbers have both declined in 1981-85,
improved access to overseas markets, and producer response to changing
market requirements, could lead to an increase in numbers of both
stock. However, if dairy and beef stock numbers follow sheep numbers
downwards then the future will see a steady movement from pastoral land
use to the alternatives of forestry, horticulture, cash crops, deer and
goats. Forestry will tend to occur on large-sized farms; all the other
land uses are suitable on small-sized farms. Thus, the future pattern of
farm size distribution would continue the trends of subdivision and
enlargement. We can expect to see horticulture, cash crops, deer and
goats increase in the small-sized holdings.
Main Features of Rural Population Change
The dominant trend in population change for New Zealand is
urbanisation. Since 1900, most of the population has been urban, and
since 1926 there has been a steady increase in urban population
(Table 5).
Urbanisation has included a shift in population concentration from
smaller to larger urban centres. Thus, the number of residents in cities
of 20,000 persons or more increased from less than half in 1926 to
more than two-thirds in 1981 (New Zealand Rural Profile, 1983).
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Table 5: Rural New Zealand Population, 1926-86
Population Percentage Change
Urban % Rural % Urban Rural
1926 952,102 67.9 449,572 32.1
1936 1.065,228 67.9 503,885 32.1 11.9 12.1
1945 1,227,069 72.2 472,076 27.8 15.2 -6.3
1951 1,424,745 73.7 508,849 26.3 16.1 7.8
1956 1.625,887 74.9 543,727 25.1 14.1 6.9
1961 1,866,894 77.5 542,525 22.5 ]4.8 -0.2
1966 2,145,601 80.3 526,507 19.7 14.9 -3.0
1971 2,361,314 82.6 496,171 17.4 10.1 -5.8
1976 2,614,314 83.6 511,004 16.4 10.7 3.0
1981 2,650,904 83.6 520.487 16.4 1.4 1.9
1986* 2,731,947 83.8 527,547 16.2 1.4 1.4
* Provisional Figures
Source: Department of Statistics, 1983.
Despite the decline in the percentage of people living in rural areas
between 1926 and 1976, the absolute number of rural residents has
increased slightly. This long-term upward trend shows a decline in
1936-45 and in 1956-7 I. The former break is possibly related to the
termination of Depression relief schemes and wartime industrialisation
(Department of Statistics, 1983). The latter break is possibly related to
the sharp decline in farm numbers that occurred over the same period.
Table 5 does not show regional variations, but using 1986 Census
data, results show that the rural population increase is strongly
concentrated along the North Island coastline between Opotiki County. in
the Bay of Plenty and Mangonui County, in Northland. Twelve of the
26 counties and districts with population increases substantially higher
than New Zealand as a whole are located there. In the South Island
there is an area of growth on the north-west (Golden Bay, Waimea, and
Buller counties) and some localised growth in Lake County
(Queenstown) and Vincent County (Cromwell and Clyde).
The areas of decline are more widespread. Most rural counties in
central and southern North Island have lost population. In the South
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Island this pattern of decline is even more widespread, with the number
of areas recording absolute decline outnumbering those with relative
decline by two to one.
Population growth is due possibly to economic developments such as
tourism, construction, or horticulture in particular counties. or is due to
non-economic factors such as climate and environment preferences
(Cant, 1986). Population declines are due possibly to changes in
primary production or the lack of non-farm employment in rural areas.
These factors combine to threaten the viability of rural non-farm
businesses and ultimately future population growth.
If present trends continue, there will be an increasingly smaller
proportion of total population in rural areas in both the North and South
Islands. However, the North Island will continue to hold its 3: I margin
in total population over the South Island.
One factor which may increase rural population in some areas is the
upsurge in small holdings (Table 6). At the time of rapid increase in
farm size between 1951 and 1971 when total farm numbers declined by
over 25,000, the rural population declined by 47,556 people. These
data suggest that farm number changes are related to rural population
change by a factor of two, and that a decline in farm numbers precedes a
drop in rural population by about 5 years.
Table 6: Changes in Farm numbers and Rural Population
Year Farm Numbers Rural Population
1951-71 -25,348
1956-71 -47,556
1972-76 292
1971-76 14.883
1976-81 5,038 9,483
1981-86 2,247* 7,060
* Extended from the 1981-84 estimate of 1,348 people.
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Although Table 6 does not show a direct cause and effect relationship
between farm numbers and population, they certainly are related.
Subdivision and intensive land use are also related, with increases in
population accompanying any successful subdivision plans.
Social Organisation
For most people the typical New Zealand farm is and has always been
a family farm, a farming system which relies for most of its labour on
the farm family, and in which the family is the owner of the farm land.
However. New Zealand history belies the familiar idea that New
Zealand is fundamentally a country which has always had family farms.
There are three main phases in the history of social organisation of
production. Initially, 'run' leaseholders let sheep graze freely over the
natural tussock and grass cover. The runs were very large and loosely
organised around rights to graze particular geographical areas. The
management was extensive with' little attempt to control grazing and
confine stock. Shepards were employed for wages to handle stock, and
others were employed to shear and wash the wool clip. The social
environment was pioneering, masculine and makeshift.
Following the economic downfall of run-holding in the I 860s, land
was taken up as freehold, in many cases in the form of large-scale
estates, featuring new technology such as double-furrowed ploughs,
mechanical reapers and binders. Development work such as fencing,
draining and clearing was also undertaken.
Large-scale production successfully provided for large-scale estate
houses and luxurious homes. Economic success sustained a colonial
gentry life style in which estate owners played a dominant role in 9th
century politics and society. These employed large groups of workmen
and many servants in the houses. On some estates up to 100 people
were employed in the harvest season. From 1870 to 1890 the
conspicuous elements of New Zealand farming were based on a system
of capitalist social organisation. However, the advent of estate farming
contained conditions essential to the rise of family farming in the
twentieth century.
From the 1890s onwards, there was a decline in world wool and
wheat prices which, when combined with government land policies and
changes in the growing New Zealand economy, produced the right
conditions for the rise of family farm. Estate subdivision, both private
and compulsory, and the occupation of new land also provided incentives
for families to take up farming.
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Family farms are difficult to define in narrow terms because of the
wide range in ownership and labour structures involved. Data available
on changes in type of ownership from 1972-85 show that company and
trust ownership are a small proportion of the total, with most farms
individually owned or in partnership (Table 7). In 1972, individual
ownership was dominant. but by 1985 the proportion of individual
ownerships was not much greater than partnerships. Current trends
suggest that the two types will soon be equal. However, based on
Valuation Department farm land sales information, the extent of
partnerships is greater than individual ownerships. Since 1983, about
50 percent of freehold open market sales have involved partnerships and
30 percent have involved individual ownership. Thus, partnerships are
emerging as a dominant pattern of ownership.
Table 7: Main Types of Ownership of Farm Land 1972 to 1983 (As
Percentage of Total Number)
Private
Registered
Company
Individual
Ownership Partnership Trust
1972 8.5 64.7 21.4 2.8
1982 9.3 52.2 33.6 3.0
1983 8.9 51.5 34.6 3.0
1984 9.2 48.7 37.1 3.2
1985 9.2 46.6 39.1 3.4
Source: Agricultural Statistics, Department of Statistics, Wellington
In some cases a partnership could simply be between husband and
wife with no change in the character of the farm. In other cases, it
could reflect a change in financial and managerial roles undertaken by
two or more specialised people. Such arrangements would include non-
family relationships between investors and farm managers. These kinds
of partnerships represent significant changes from the family farm
pattern.
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The involvement of businesses in rural land purchases is documented
by the Valuation Department and suggests an increase in non-family
forms of organisation. From 1981 to 1986, the proportion of business
buyers of freehold, open market land averaged about 17 percent. This
class of purchase by an individual or a company, usually does not
involve working on the farm but the employment of a farm manager who
supervises day to day activities. As such, the ownership of the farm is
separate from the operation of the farm. Valuation Department data
show that there is a tendency for horticulture and forestry farms to be
purchased by businesses. Also, horticulture has the highest proportion
of 'no relationship' between buyer and seller.
Some evidence for changes in types of farm organisation is available
from a recent survey of farmers (Fairweather, 1984). In the area of
management objectives, results show that there are four main types of
farmer: (I) the 'financial manager' who concentrates on responding to
market prices, increasing income by decreasing costs, using contractors,
planning and exercising close financial management; (2) the 'productivity
increaser' who emphasises increasing production on the existing area;
(3) the 'individualist worker' who emphasises control over efficient farm
work, and seeks to minimise dependence; and (4) the 'life style farmer'
who regards farm work as a craft and enjoys the non-financial reward of
doing farm work well.
The first three types represent the historical succession of approaches
to family farming in New Zealand. It is quite likely that our early
farmers found management success in hard, practical work as they
developed their farms in rugged individualistic style. Then, especially
from the 1950s to the 1970s, increasing productivity was the key to
success. Now it is financial sophistication which seems to fulfill that
promise.
If the above historical sequence of management continues, then in the
future many farmers will tend towards being financial managers. As
such they may not function as traditional family farmers with their
inherent imprecision over measuring labour. These managers may
contract farm work rather than do it themselves. Changes of this sort
would make farming closer to non-farm businesses and parallel a
growing integration of producers into agribusiness.
It is with horticulture and other capital and labour intensive operations
on the growing number of small holdings that the new types of farms are
occurring. Horticulture has heavy seasonal demands for wage labour
which makes even the small-scale operations distinctly· different in their
organisation compared with family farms engaged in pastoral production.
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In addition to signs of new types of farm organisation, there is the
phenomenon of part-time farming. Many of the new small holdings are
part-time farms, and, if trends in the United States and Europe occur in
New Zealand, then the proportion of part-time farmers will grow even
more.
The Agricultural Statistics show that since the mid-1970s, there has
been a large increase in the number of working owners, leaseholders
and share-milkers who do less than 30 hours of farm work per week;
most of this increase is by women.
Future Trends
It is unlikely that the traditional family farm will dominate New
Zealand's organisation of farming as it has in the past. Alongside the
traditional family farm will be a growing number of new and diverse
operations featuring separation of ownership from management and
employing a moderate to large-size group of wage labour or small
numbers of technical or professional consultants. High skill levels will
be needed by those who provide the high-technology services required.
In general, these new forms of social organisation will take on the
characteristics of capitalist production. The contributions of different
types of work will be measured a a precise cost.
However, New Zealand's managerially sophisticated future farms may
have a different character than those in corporate U.S. agriculture.
Grassland animal production may not lend itself to such large-scale
cropping and factory production schemes as increasingly typify the
United States. What is more likely in New Zealand is the concentration
of capital with associated sophisticated technology and financial
organisations, but not on the same physical scale as in the United States.
New Zealand's 'corporate' agriculture may, initially at least, be
composed of numerous groups of relatively small-scale, financially
sophisticated producers with the potential for later amalgamation and
concentration of production.
The above trends represent a growing differentiation in New Zealand
agriculture from which could emerge three distinct components: one
wou ld concentrate capital in either new or intensive types of production.
The second component would involve the growth of part-time, semi-
commercial land ownership, comprising hobby farms, weekend retreats,
life style farming, and land ownership for reasons of status or prestige.
The third component would involve the remaining family farms
continuing without significant change to their individual ownership
characteristics. In some ways the first two trends are related. For while
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growing financial sophistication in production can entail separation of the
ownership of production resources, it is quite likely that the successful
investor may also purchase rural land for weekend farming.
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Chapter 5
Rural Work Force
Rupert Tipples
Management Specialist
Lincoln College
People and the labour services they provide are the most important
resource in agriculture. Yet, in spite of the importance of agricultural
labour, we know surprisingly little about it whether it's on the farm, in
processing plants or at the retail level.
Bushnell and Gibson analysed employment changes during 1950-1980
(Table I). Total employment expanded by 106 percent, farm labour fell
by 2 percent, and agricultural processing jobs expanded by 191 percent,
While expansion in the farm sector appeared steady, data for individual
decades shows a fall of 5 percent for 1950-60, an 8 percent drop for
1960-70, and an increase of 12 percent for 1970-1980.
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Table I: Agricultural and non-agricultural employment
1950/60, 1960170, and 1970/80
(% change in numbers employed)
Employment Type 1950/60 1960170 1970/80 1950/80
Farm labour -5 -8 12 -2
Agricultural
processing 49 35 45 191
All except
agricultural 30 34 19 106
Source: MAF, 1982
Table 2: Trends in farm employment ('000), 1950, 1970 and 1980
Farm employment type 1950 1970 1980 Total Change
Full-time working
owners 70.4 62.1 70.9 0.5
Part-time working
owners 23.1 20.4 23.0 -0.1
Full-time employees 29.6 25.2 26.5 -3.1
Part-time employees 9.7 8.3 8.8 -0.9
Casual employees 10.8 9.2 11.1 0.3
Total 143.6 125.2 140.3 -3.3
Note: Unpaid family labour and agricultural services, such as
fencing and harvesting, have been excluded.
Sources: Department of Statistics, Department of Labour, MAF
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Farm labour numbers were highly influenced by the declining number
of working owners in 1950-1970 and by their resurgence in 1970-1980.
However the resurgence did not occur in the same types of farming
which experienced declines. Much of it was due to the expansion of
horticulture (MAP, 1982). In the processing sector the expansion in
employment was almost entirely due to increases in numbers of full time
employees from 22,000 in 1950 to 65,000 in 1980 (Table 3). Thus,
while on-farm employment has remained fairly static over the period
1950-80, employment in processing has increased faster than the
expansion in employment in the economy at large.
Table 3: Employment in agricultural processing ('000). 1950, 1970
and 1980
Employment type 1950 1970 1980 Total Change
Working proprietors 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.2
Full-time employees 22.3 44.4 65.2 42.9
Part-time employees 0.4 1.6 1.5 1.1
Total 23.0 46.6 67.2 44.2
Sources: Department of Labour, Department of Statistics,
MAF
Guthrie and Lattimore (1984) shed some light on this matter (Table
4). They show a falling rate of growth of labour productivity for the
sector as a whole, but one which disguises a marked increase in on-farm
labour productivity towards the end of the period. Meanwhile labour
productivity in the agricultural processing, distribution and retail sectors
was static, and declined sharply in the input sector.
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Table 4: Agricultural Sector: Compound Rates of Growth of
Real Net Output and Labour Productivity
Annual Compound Rates
of Growth of Real Net
Output
1959/60, '65166 '71/72
1965/66 '71/72 '76/77
(%)
Annual Compound Rates
of Growth of Labour
Productivity
1959/60 '65/66 '71172
1965/66 '71172 '76177
(%)
Agriculture:
- input supply 4.5 1.0 -2.8 2.3 1.5 -4.2
- farming 2.7 -1.3 2.8 2.3 0.2 3.4
- processing,
d'butioll etc. 4.2 3.2 2.8 3.2 2.0 0.4
Total Agricultural
Sector: 3.5 1.0 2.4 2.7 0.8 1.2
NZ Economy 3.7 4.5 1.8 3.2 3.2 -0.6
Source: Guthrie and Lattimore (1984)
Has New Zealand followed the classical growth path of most developed
economies with a decline in the relative importance of employment in
agriculture? The answer is yes. But while the relative importance of the
farm sector has declined, there has been no decline in farm employment
in over 60 years (Figure. 1). This is unlike either Great Britain or the
United States of America.
After an initial build-up prior to 1921, the rural labour force has
since oscillated at just above 120,000 people. In the U.S.A. the number
of persons employed in agriculture fell from 13.5 million in 1910 to 3.7
million in 1980 (Smith and Coltrane 1981). In Great Britain it fell from
1.5 million in 1921 to 500,000 in 1981 (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Index of Total Farm Labour Force 1920-1981 in U.S.A.,
Great Britain and New Zealand
Not only has the New Zealand total been reasonably consistent but,
when analysed by occupational status, the same pattern of stability
emerges (Figure 2). Over the period covered the proportion of
employers has fluctuated between one-fifth and one-quarter. The
proportion of self employed farmers has increased marginally from
approximately 24 to 30 percent and the proportion of employees has
oscillated around 40 percent of the farm labour force. The only category
of major change is that of the unpaid relatives, declining at the turn of
the century from abollt one-fifth of the labour force to now being almost
negligible.
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In 1951, dairy farming employed the most people, 39 percent of the
labour force. Sheep farming had 27 percent. Thirty years later sheep
farming was top with 34· percent of the labour force, dairy farming was
second with 26 percent and horticulture third with 15 percent (Table 5).
Over the same period the proportion of farm employees fell in dairy and
sheep farming and it rose in horticulture. These trends were probably
initiated by labour saving technology adopted by farmers. The number of
employees per 100 employers declined iIi dairy and sheep farming and
increased in horticulture. Only a minority of farms now employ
labour. Of 72,500 farms with at least one hectare in 1982, only one in
seven employed a full-time worker and one in fourteen a regular part-
time worker. Only about 40,000 of these were full time farms.
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Table 5: Characteristics of Farm Labour by Sector of
Production in 1951 and 1981
Sector Proportion of Proportion of Employees
farm labour farm labour per 100
force force who employers
are employees
1951 1981 1951 1981 1951 1981
(%) (%) (%)
Dairy 39 26 31 27 142 106
Sheep 27 34 48 39 179 149
Horticulture 7 15 50 60 234 336
Other 27 25
TOTAL 100 100
Source: Census of Population, 1951 and 1981
The regional distribution of employment has also changed.
Approximately one quarter of the permanent male labour force is now
employed in the South Auckland statistical area, an area of intensive
dairy farming and horticultural development; nearly one third is
employed on the east coast of the North Island (East Coast, Hawke's
Bay, Wairarapa), an area of extensive pastoral farming with concentrated
pockets of horticultural production. Only 18 percent is employed in
Canterbury and Otago (Harris, 1980).
Annual labour turnover may be as high as 60 percent in both North
Island dairy farming and Canterbury crop farming (Gill, 1981). Such
rates are higher than in other employment sectors and it would appear
that many farm workers leave farm employment by their mid-twenties
and are replaced by younger entrants (Gill, 1981).
High levels of turnover occur despite better economic conditions for
farm workers (Belshaw, 1936; Harris 1980). While there is still
dissatisfaction with wages and employment conditions, perhaps a more
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critical influence is the aspirations many farm workers have for farm
ownership. In a recent study of farm workers (Harris 1980) 83 percent
aged 19 or less and 65 percent aged 20-29 had 'owning a farm' as their
main goal in life. Only 5 percent of those aged 40 and over had the
same goal - they were more concerned with attaining home ownership
and educating their children.
Female participation in farming has increased. In 1981, 20 percent of
farmers were female with greater proportions in the 30-50 age group and
smaller proportions among younger and older farmers. However, it is
unclear how many farms are actually run jointly by husbands and wives,
and what their respective roles might be. Female farm workers also tend
- to be older than males.
Only three percent of farm managers and supervisors are female. The
total number of working owners, leaseholders and sharemilkers of both
sexes has increased since 1974, peaking at 96,000 in 1981-2. Since
then, while the total number has decreased, the number of female
working owners, leaseholders and sharemilkers has continued to
increase. At the same time the numbers of unpaid family members
assisting also increased dramatically, particu larly female family
members. The decline of permanent paid, full-time and part time
employees from a peak of 40,000 in 1977"8 to just under 29,000 in
1984-5 involved mostly male workers. The llumber of female casual
employees has increased recently.
Increased female participation has been particularly evident in
horticultural production. Total employment in horticultural production
expanded by 237 percent between 1956-1981 and the number of females
involved increased by 483 percent, until in 1981, they made up 42
percent of the horticultural work force of 20,600. Since 1981, that work
force has continued to expand with continuing increases in the female
particpation rate (Tipples, 1984).
Employment Conditions
Conditions for a farm worker are much different from those of people
working in agricultural supply, processing/distribution and retail
businesses. Fanns usually consist of personal proprietorships,
employing perhaps one or two employees 011 a daily basis. Off farm,
there are a small number of very large corporate enterprises. The
typical worker seldom has face to face contact with the senior managers,
let alone the owners of the business, and most likely only deals with
front-line supervisors and personnel staff who are also employees.
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The regulations are much different too. Farm work has been subject
to the Agricultural Workers Act (1977) while employment in the
agricultural inputs and Processing-Distribution-Retailing (PDR) sub
sectors falls under the Industrial Relations Act (1973). While the
boundaries between the two Acts overlap somewhat. the question arises
as to why the same general rules should not apply. In a nutshell,
vigorous lobbying by farming groups and a sympathetic ear from
Government have prevented farm workers from benefiting from the
industrial conciliation and arbitration procedures available to most non-
farm workers since 1900. Until 1936, farm employment conditions
were entirely unregulated. Passage of the Agricultural Workers Act
(1936) and its subsequent application was only achieved by farmers
being offered some financial incentives and agreement that minimum
conditions would be set by Ministerial fiat rather than the Court of
Arbitration (Tipples, 1987).
In 1972, the New Zealand Workers Union (NZWU) attempted to have
farm workers brought under the new Industrial Relations Bill (and
subject to the same general rules as most private sector employees) but
the farm workers formed their own Farm Workers Association (FWA).
This body was not a registered trade union but, helped by Federated
Farmers and a National Party Government, it obtained coverage of
workers on dairy, meat. wool and cropping farms under the
Agricultural Workers Act of 1977. This Act established an Agricultural
Tribunal to settle disputes between employers and employees. The new
structure permitted farm workers to have their terms and conditions
revised regularly by a group with agricultural expertise and
understanding. Unfortunately for farm workers, arrangements built
around the Farm Workers Association, were unstable.
Following the defeat of the NZWU, the FWA had to confront its
former ally, Federated Farmers, in negotiations. Both bodies were
opposed to compulsory unionism, and the FWA found its membership
base collapsing in spite of significant achievements in getting farm
workers' voices heard and revised wages awards. When it was created,
the FWA had profited from the lack of the NZWU. There were,
however, organisational difficulties in agriculture even without alliances
with industrial unionism and the Labour Party.
One of the major reasons for the FWA's success in 1973-74 was also
to be its undoing. Farm workers did not like industrial unionism
because they mostly aspired to become farmers themselves; their
managerial views aligned closely with those of farmers (Harris, 1980).
It was inevitable that the FWA would lose some members who became
farmers. Other members were lost when they realised they never would
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become owners and consequently gave up farm employment. Still other
members were undoubtedly lost to apathy once the 1977 Act had been
achieved.
The membership of the FWA declined from a peak of 8,000 in 1975-
76 to 2,200 in 1983. By this time the organisation was burdened with a
rapidly increasing debt (Kelly, 1980). While it had been founded on the
principle of voluntary membership, by 1975 the association realised that
some type of assistance would be required. In 1979, employers were
asked to include a membership clause in the Dairy Farms and Farms
and Stations Awards, requiring farm workers to be members of the
association unless they opted out.
The employers rejected the proposal as compulsory unionism.
Disheartened, the FWA came to believe that Federated Farmers wanted
them sufficiently weak so that employers could dictate their own terms.
However, in 1982, when the FWA's position had deteriorated still
further. all the farm employers, with the exception of the dairy farmers,
agreed to the inclusion of the membership clause in the award (Cosgriff,
1982). The FWA was prepared to abandon its claim to represent dairy
farm workers when all award negotiations were frozen by the
Government as part of a 'wage freeze'. Before the freeze was lifted the
Industrial Relations Amendment Act (1983) was passed. It prohibited all
forms of compulsory unionism, preference of employment to union or
non-union members, any kind of discrimination based on membership,
or any person exerting undue influence on a worker to become, or
remain. a union member. The association's campaign for a membership
clause had been in vain.
The FWA was also not helped by resignations of senior officers, the
return of a Labour Government, and the renewed possibility of
compulsory unionism. Continued decline in membership and a
prolonged dispute with the Department of Labour exhausted its
resources. Early in 1987 the association was forced to dissolve.
It is a different story in the agricultural processing sector. It has a
number of strong trade unions which have not been afraid to flex their
muscles. These unions have been aided by the fact that they operate
plants dependent on production line or continuous flow technology, and
handle perishable produce. While farmers as a whole have been able to
control a recalcitrant farm work force, the off-farm food-fibre system
employees have been beyond their control. However, in recent times,
with the contractions in demand for farm supplies, increased competition
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for stock, and the prospect of the closure of more freezing works, the
balance of power between employers and employees is changing.
Farmers find it difficult to understand why processing workers seem
so ready to strike and disrupt an industry vital to New Zealand's
economic success. The reason probably lies in the different attitudes to
work in the two sectors (Greer, 1982 and Inkson, 1977).
The farmer works for himself and the farm worker is most often
working to work for himself. While some processing/distribution
workers have aspirations to work for themselves, most feel they work in
a large impersonal organisation in which they identify more closely with
their mates than the company.
While farmers and farm workers are concerned with their incomes
they also have strong attachments to working outside, and to the intrinsic
attributes of farm work. In contrast, processing workers appear to have
little enthusiasm for their work. They are there for the money and
endure the unpleasant activity to obtain it. Further, prospects of
advancement may not appeal because a person ceases to be a mate and
instead is transformed into one of 'them'. Farmers have a much greater
chance of overcoming this problem with their more intimate
employer/employee relationships.
The term 'psychological contract' has been coined to describe the
mutual expectations of employers and employees which go beyond the
minimum terms set in their legal contract (Schein, 1980). Where such
expectations are clearly understood high levels of job satisfaction, greater
longevity in the job and lower staff turnover are the result (Kotter,
1973). The farmers' 'psychological contracts' with the downstream
processing and distribution workers are at variance with the realities of
employment and the expectations of employees in the processing and
distribution sectors. With the shift in employment to food processing and
distribution firms it looks like these problems could get worse rather
than better. The 'more market' philosophy associated with Government
since t 984, has not overlooked the field of industrial relations. Farmers
who believe they are one of the groups most affected by this philosophy
have been keen that workers supplying their inputs and processing their
production should also experience the cold winds of competition.
As a result, the labour force with its practices of trade unionism,
compulsory membership, blanket clauses, minimum wage rates, and lack
of competition between unions has become a target. The ensuing debate
about more flexibility in the labour market has resulted in a draft
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Industrial Relations Bill which might well bring about the most radical
changes since the introduction of compulsory arbitration in 1894.
The Future
The demand for on-farm labour will be influenced by progress in
obtaining foreign markets. At present it appears that the most prornising
growth areas are in horticultural production. Most of the labour
projections focus on the seasonal labour needs of this industry.
Projecting labour shortages is tricky. By drawing attention to peak
needs, growers stimulate the development of labour saving technology
which, in turn, reduces the need for workers. They can also establish a
favourable climate for the immigration of suitable labour from within or
from outside New Zealand. Overseas evidence suggests that the greater
the demand for labour, the faster new labour saving technology and
systems are adopted. Technological changes often have other significant
effects such as a growth in the· number of other permanent jobs, and
multiplier effects based on increased income and employment.
Horticultural developments in areas which have no previous history of
horticulture have tended to take this form (Martin, 1983).
Where horticultural development is the result of syndication,
businesses:
(a) are oriented towards the product market;
(b) are concerned with the economic rather than intrinsic aspects of
farming;
(c) have larger numbers of employees with no kinship ties to their
employers or financial involvement in the business;
(d) have social relations and structure which are more class based
(Newby et al., 1978)
If they are family businesses with the horticu Itural enterprise being
developed alongside traditional cropping or pastoral enterprises, they can
also experience substantial social changes. For example, in one study of
Canterbury horticultural developments associated with irrigation, 'busy
times' became frantic; workloads increased; planning for and managing
labour changed work routines and increased stress; book work and
industry meetings increased; wives and children were more involved in
farm work; wives became particularly involved in supervising staff,
'gate sales', 'pick your own' programmes, and office work (Blake and
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Taylor, 1986). The management of a substantial labour force was a new
experience and added to the stress: 'you can fine tune a tractor, but you
cannot fine tune labour' .
Another issue, highlighted by recent developments, is the need to be
ahle to accommodate seasonal workers in districts in which the labour
requirements cannot be met from the local labour force. Existing town
and country planning controls and accommodation regulations for
agricultural workers make provision of inexpensive accommodation
difficult. Also there may be tensions between local residents and
seasonal migrants.
There has also been considerable debate about the availability of
adequate numbers of horticulturally skilled workers to operate the new
enterprises. In spite of a substantial expansion in horticultural education
and training it is uncertain whether there will be enough skilled people.
Other new enterprises requiring new skills include deer and goat
farming, and the production of new fibres such as mohair and angora.
The present prospects in the export markets for traditional products
do not suggest a resurgence of demand for labour for meat, dairy and
arable farms. The supply of labour for these enterprises may contract
further as a result of changes in recent labour relations legislation. The
expected net effect of these measures is to deregulate the farm labour
market and thereby reduce minimum farm wages to the level set by the
Minimum Wage Act 1983 (at present $210 per 40 hour week). At such
wage levels the relatively high costs of living remote from urban
settlements may lead to an accelerated withdrawal.
Freeing up the labour market
The proposed 1987 Labour Relations Bill implements the
Government's policy on employer-employee relations. It is intended to
encourage effective organisations able to negotiate agreements, A single
comprehensive agreement is to cover each employee's employment, and
is to be negotiated, administered and enforced by both the parties. The
abolition of compulsory arbitration for awards subject to the Industrial
Relations Act 1973, is extended to the whole of agriculture. The
sections of the 1977 Act, establishing the Agricultural Tribunal and
union registration procedures, are repealed, and agriculture is brought
under the Labour Relations Bill. Thus, a separate system for agriculture
will no longer exist. However, some uncertainty remains as to whether
the New Zealand Workers Union will persist in representing farm
workers' interests if farmers refuse to negotiate new awards and ~cannot
be compelled to do so.
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What might happen? If there were a situation where all wage awards
in agriculture failed to be renewed a very dispet'sed labour force in many
small employment units would find it extremely difficult to raise wages
and improve working conditions. It is costly for a union to organise
farm and horticultural workers and even more difficult to organise any
kind of industrial action which might compel their employers to agree to
a new award. Without that agricultural and horticultural workers would
be dependent upon the minimum wage levels set by the Minimum Wage
Act 1983 and whatever benefits might be available to them from the
Family Support programme. While the best employers would be
unlikely to force wages down to such a level, there is sufficient evidence
to suggest that farmers think of themselves first and their employees
second.
Will non-farm food processing/distribution workers experience similar
changes? No, because they are strongly unionised. Only employers
prepared to engage in a prolonged industrial struggle would be able to
enforce their will. In the case of individual plants such a policy may
prove effective (e.g. the closure of Longburn Freezing Works in 1986-
7), but is unlikely to be so at an industry level without disrupting the
industries involved. Only where a company has an alternative source of
supply (Fletcher Challenge's Canadian wood pulp to substitute for that
lost when the Kawerau plant was on strike, 1986) or has almost
monopoly control of an industry (Wattie-Goodman-Fielder in fruit and
vegetable processing), and thus has no significant market competitors can
such an aggressive free market policy be contemplated. Moreover, the
perishability and the consequential losses for producers in the event of
prolonged industrial strife are likely to lead to pressures for an early
settlement.
Employers have recently begun to adopt a new strategy in order to
recover economic losses from strikes. Perhaps the action by Ford (NZ)
Ltd against the Northern Storespersons and Packers Union for such
actions is a sign of things to come.
Under existing law it is unlawful to strike once an official disputes
procedure has been invoked; or in an essential industry without giving
14 days notice. Direct action is lawful before a 'dispute of interest'
procedure has been invoked or if a party has withdrawn from the
proceedings. Under the new Bill, while direct action is specifically
unlawful over a 'dispute of rights', final settlements are not inevitable. A
'dispute of interest' with 'voluntary' arbitration, and strikes and lockouts
are expressly stated to be lawful. The statutory penalties for unlawful
strikes are abolished and the remedies provided by the new Bill include
an order for compliance or a civil action for an injunction, damages or
both.
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Conclusions
Changes in the food-fibre labour force and the environment in which
it operates, suggest we are at a turning point. Should the status quo be
allowed to continue? The Government and employers believe that it
should not, yet disagree as the extent to which it should be freed up.
Discussions have proceeded for years with few signs of progress until
the reintroduction of voluntary arbitration in 1984 and its proposed
extension in 1987. To continue as before is to risk atrophy, but to go as
far as the Business Round Table desire would be to return to the dark
ages of industrial relations. While such a move may give short term
benefit to the employer, in the longer term a severe reaction may be
experienced, especially if a period of 'comfortable' conditions occur as
happened in the New Zealand Meat Industry (Inkson and Cammack,
1984). In the post-World War II period some of the perceived losses
resulting from the introduction of killing chains in 1932 were recouped
by the meatworkers. However, it took until the mid-1980s for employers
to regain their position of strength.
But the question must be asked: Has anyone learnt anything about
labour relations in the intevening 50 years? From the present attitudes
of employers and employees, it appears that very little has been learnt
about improving the management of poeple. There is argument about
the unity of interest between employers and employees. Building better
employment relationships involves more than renegotiating the contract
of employment of each employee in the food-fibre system. It requires
substantial clarification of the set of 'psychological contracts' not only
between employers and employees, but also between supervisors and
managers, between foremen and labourers, between blue collar and
clerical staff, and between board members and senior executives.
Clarification of mutual expectations will not occur without considerable
thought, discussion and understanding. It will be impeded if honesty and
sincerity are not apparent, and if there is no willingness to give and take.
In terms of contract law, genuine consent between the parties is
required to exist for a contract to be enforceable. Consent does not exist
if it can be shown there was a mistake, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
undue influence or unconscionability. Unfortunately, many employees
are unable to demonstrate the freedom that this principle implies being
tied by personal circumstances and lack of alternative employment
options to their present employer. In such situations while the
psychological contracts are broken, the legal contract continues and work
degenerates into tokenism
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New Zealand cannot afford the continuation of such unsatisfactory
employment relationships in the food and fibre sector. While the
Government is trying to improve the legislative framework for labour
relations, employers and employees can both contribute to the
achievement of standards which will improve both productivity and
relationships between employers and employees. They will not be
achieved by lobbying parliament in the hope that the lobbyists view of
the world will be adopted in the debate, but will be greatly helped by the
types of maturity and improvement outlined above.
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Chapter 6
Capital and Agriculture
John Pryde
Agricultural Economist
Lincoln College
Capital has. always been of major importance in New Zealand
agriculture. From early times farmers insisted on securing the freehold
of their land, which alone created demands for heavy doses of capital.
To this had to be added the substantial finance required for
mechanisation, improvements and working capital. These demands have
involved Government as well as the private sector and any discussion of
capital must refer to the activities and policies of both. It is also
important to note that agricultut"al finance is heavily influenced by policy
decisions outside the farm sector. Nevertheless substantial quantities of
farm capital are generated from savings within the industry itself.
On Farm Sources of Capital
'The farm is the farmer's own bank' is a trite but largely true
expression in New Zealand. Whether it be due to the ingrained saving
habits of farmers, the reluctance of some to borrow, the fear of owing
excessive amounts to external creditors and being 'beholden to them' in
some way, or a taxation system that encourages self-financing, it is well .
recognised that 'plough-back' capital has always been a characteristic of
many farms.
The level of this plough-back is determined by a range of factors
including profitability, the rate of interest, expectations of farmers,
availability of credit, inflation, the general attitude to borrowing, the
availability of price support-schemes, the degree of retirement schemes
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available. and comparative the returns that can be secured from off-farm
investment.
Recent studies have shown that there are still many of farmers intent
on taking every opportunity to reduce their indebtedness to off-farm
lenders. During the production years 1982 to 1986 the proportion of
farmers with no off-farm liabilities increased from 9 percent to 19
percent. In the early part of this period the sheep-beef farmers were
receiving substantial subsidies from Government and farm land prices
were rising rapidly, while over the period the cost of borrowing rose
significantly. Table I shows the distribution of liabilities for farmers as
a whole and by the main individual types.
Another reason for the increase in the proportion of farmers with
virtually no borrowings could have been the decreasing export prices of
the main farm products. Farmers concerned may well have decided it
would be prudent to reduce the indebtedness to enable them to withstand
the lower incomes that were in prospect.
Investment 'off-the-farm' has become important for 53 percent of
farmers. A 1982-86 farmer-opinion survey indicated that many farmers
were turning to non-farm investments. Falling land prices, reduced
farm profitability and high returns in some non-farm sectors have
influenced farmers to invest some of their capital off-the-farm. Over half
the farmers surveyed indicated they had off-farm investments. Some
were in real estate, but most had bought shares of some kind. To New
Zealand agriculture this is a fairly new development and could have even
greater significance in the future when the subject of re-investment is
being discussed. Increased off-farm investment will certainly have an
influence on the amount available for farming's overall capital needs.
Off-Farm Sources of Credit
Off-farms sources of farm finance can be divided into three main
categories: Government institutions, private sector institutions and other
private sector areas
In the 1890s the Government established the 'Advances to Settlers'
organisation to help farmers obtain farms created by the break-up of
large estates. The purpose was to provide funds at competitive rates of
interest to help settle the new farmers. Today the Rural Banking and
Finance Corporation is the successor to that original body.
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Table 2: Loans Outstanding to the Agricultural Sector as at 31 March
($ million)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Stockiind Station Agents 353 403 431 414 506 549 568
Trading Banks 348 467 658 674 806 827 966
Trustee Savings Banks 48 67 111 142 141 151 149
Private Savings Banks 35 37 40 25 16 12 8
.Finance Companies 82 113 156 161 223 236 250
Development Finance Corp. 6(E) 6(E) 19(E) 4O(E) 55 71 133
Building Societies 49 54 61 69 82 l04(E) 110(E)
Insurance Companies 210 256 303 354 397 447 449
Dept. of Maori Affairs 38 47 58 73 85 93(E) III
Dept. of Lands & Survey 108 126 158 190 214 231 252
Marginal Land Board 30 32 33
Rural Bank 1,043 1,242 1,510 1,820 2,074 2,262 2,440
Sub Total: 2,350 2,850 3,538 3,962 4,599 4,983 5,436
Solicitors Trust Funds 194 247 318 389 462 530 570
Family Loans 490 569 675 880 1,050 1,200 1,300
Private Sectors 187 250 337 309 330 300 300
Trust Companies 124 135 148 164 165 190 150
Local Body Loans 29 38 50 42 46 40 41
Dairy Companies 33 39 47 26 33 46 64
Other 46 68 103 61 66 80 60
TOTAL 3,453 4,196 5,216 5,833 6,751 7,369 7,921
0\
I Sources: Pryde (1978), Pryde and McCartin 1982-86, Pryde and Bain.~
Table 2 emphasises the dominant role of the Rural Bank in financing
farming. In holding over 30 percent of total rural debt it occupies the
significant position in the financing of agriculture. It is also a vehicle of
government agricultural policy and there are few Budget documents that
do not contain at least some policy measures affecting it. In turn the
bank itself has, especially in the period since 1984, felt the effects of
changes in Government monetary and fiscal policy. For example, it has
been forced to meet its capital needs from the open market rather than
from out of taxation receipts. This has had a traumatic effect on the cost
of its loans to farmers. The trauma is not so much at the level of
interest rate charges as much as the magnitude of the increase. Many
loans have doubled their costs, while the average loan cost has risen
about 50 percent. In addition to the rate charge. the large size of
individual farm loans has made debt servicing an even worse significant
problem. For an institution noted for its low cost loans this has had a
big impact on the increased outgoings of those farmers who are indebted
to the it.
The new Government policy has forced the bank to review its pattern
of lending and to increase slightly its proportion of shorter-term loans.
It has had to consider offering farmer clients 'over-all' or 'one-stop'
finance packages in contrast to its former policy of concentrating on
medium and long-term finance.
The Rural Bank's dominant role in the provision of capital to
agriculture has inevitably subjected it to accusations that its policies have
encouraged escalations in the prices of farmland. This allegation was
difficult to refute when the bank's policy was to offer low interest loans
for the purchase and development of farms. Also it exposed the bank to
the other accusation that its policies were having the effect of driving out
private sector lenders, especially institutional lenders. Later in this
chapter we shall examine these allegations.
One of the bank's unusual services is that its staff are trained in
agricultural and horticultural sciences and are better able to assist would-
be borrowers than many other would-be lenders. There is no doubt that
this has helped the bank in its operations.
Despite its virtual corporatisation. the Rural Bank has remained under
the control of the State Services Commission. This situation seems
anachronistic as the Commission is not a financial organisation and other
State-owned institutions such as the central bank (the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand) and the Government-owned trading bank, the Bank of
New Zealand, control their staffs independently of the Commission.
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Table 3: Average Size, Interest Rate and Tenn of FannLoans by Selected Lender, 1986
Average Average Rate Term (% of average loan)
loan of Interest Long Medium Short
1. Local Body $11,400 9.1 77 20 3
2. Private Savings Bank $20,000 18.0 100
3. Building Society $28,700 20.0 82 18
4. Trading Bank $29,600 20.3 7 30 63
5. Stock & Station Agent $34,400 22.1 5 8 87
6. Finance Company $37,900 21.4 6 22 72
7. Dairy Company $41,200 19.6 15 49 36
8. Trustee Savings Bank $47,900 19.7 65 22 13
9. Solicitors Trust Fund $56,800 19.5 8 29 63
10. Govt Agency - Other than Rural Bank $58,800 12.0 82 15 3
11. 'Other' $60,700 14.3 47 32 21
12. Trust Company $62,400 18.1 32 24 44
13. Insurance Co. $66,500 17.9 69 21 10
14. Family Loan $70,900 10.4 61 27 12
15. Rural Bank $82,150 12.1 79 19 2
16. The Last Owner (The Vendor) $89,000 14.2 21 48 31
17. Offshore Lender 255,900 10.7 8 83 8
Note: Long-term (longer than 10 years)
Medium-term (3 - 10 years)
Short-term (up to 3 years)
0\ Source: Pryde, J.G. and McCartin, P.J. (1986), "New Zealand Farmer Intentions and Opinions Surveys",
I A.E.R.U., Lincoln College.0\
Table 3 provides data on the average loans size to farmers from the
various lending sources in New Zealand, the average rate of interest (as
at mid October 1986) and the proportion of the loan in the three term
categories identified.
Approximately 80 percent of the average loan ($82.150) from the
Rural Bank is long-term and almost all the balance medium-term. This
pattern is arguably justification for the Bank's existence. Long-term
capital is imperative for a viable agricultural industry. The experience in
agriculture is that many development projects on the farm involve a long
payback period.
Other Government agencies such as the former Lands Department,
also can lend money to fanners. Here again the average rate of interest
is low and the largest proportion of the money is on a long-term basis.
The three major short-term lending sources of the private institutional
sector are the trading banks, the stock and station agencies and the
finance companies.
The trading banks are the largest short-term lenders to agriculture,
their overdraft system being appropriate for the rapidly fluctuating short-
term needs of farmers. The branches of the four main trading banks
operate throughout the country and although few, if any, of the staff of
these institutions have specialised training in agricultural finance, they
have developed a close rapport with the industry's needs.
Perhaps the stock and station industry can claim the closest association
with farm lending in the short term category. They are institutions
unique to New Zealand and Australia and provide a myriad of services to
the farm sector. In recent years the stock and station sector has had to
implement drastic rationalisation moves in the face of increasing costs,
declining farm profitability and greater competition from other
organisations competing for the farmers dollar.
The finance companies are relative newcomers to the farm credit
industry. They are a product of new institutional arrangements that have
emerged from the rapid developments in the financial services sector.
Their speciality appears to be the provision of hire purchase funds for
farm machinery.
Insurance companies are still major long and medium term lenders to
agriculture and here again their lending policies have been influenced
greatly by changes in government economic policies. Following the
Government decontrol policy instituted after 1984 and the decline in
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agricultural profitability, insurance companies have reduced significantly
the rate of increase in their lending to farming. The removal of coercive
Government financial controls has enabled this sector to pursue more
profitable investment avenues outside agriculture, even though farmers
themselves are major policy holders. Recent research, Pryde and
McCartin (1986), showed that farmers in the 1985/86 year paid an
average of $1,398 to insurance companies in life insurance policies and
$1,643 for fire and general insurance.
In some areas of New Zealand trustee and private savings banks and
building societies are, significant long-term lenders to the agricultural
sector. In the past their interest rate charges tended to be constrained
but market forces have compelled them to match other lenders if they are
to secure their necessary level of deposits. The same observation would
apply to trust companies operating throughout the country.
Local bodies have administered low-cost farm-housing loans in the
past on behalf of the Rural Bank. The scheme assisted farmers in the
housing needs of themselves and staff.
Perhaps the most significant new lending source mentioned in Table 3
is 'the off-shore lender'. These are mainly private institutions in
countries such as U.S.A., Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
Singapore, Hong Kong and West Germany. Off-shore borrowing by
New Zealand farmers is a development of recent years and is a reaction
to the high interest rate charges incurred in borrowiilg large sums on the
New Zealand market.
International loans can be raised at what, compared with levels
prevailing in New Zealand, are very modest interest rates in foreign
currency. Some farmers with substantial development projects have
decided to face the risks inherent in such borrowing. These risks
include depreciation of the N.Z. dollar and possible rises in interest
rates in the borrowing country. The loans are mainly medium-term and
for amounts averaging about $250.000. However. should the value of
the borrowed currency firm (Le. Jhe $NZ decline) the cost of repayment
could. in some instances, prove 'embarrassing'. Borrowers may
minimise their risks by adopting flexible loan management practices,
taking out insurance cover and maintaining an alert monitoring of
international exchange rate movements.
The demands on the borrower who raises an international loan are
new to New Zealand farm borrowers. The 'sign and forget' mentality
adopted for most local borrowing is no longer apt. In borrowing off-
shore the farmer borrower must not only be a successful producer but
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also develop an expertise in the management of foreign exchange. He
can of course delegate the latter task to a foreign exchange manager but
complete delegation could prove costly to the borrower - it has already
done so in some cases.
Other Private Sector Sources
In this category are sources such as the solicitors' trust fund
administered by law offices in rural and provincial centres throughout
New Zealand. The operations of the law offices are of vital importance
to the industry. They offer a personal service and are in close touch
with the available resources and needs. Although not specialists in
agriculture the law firms are generally familiar with the financial
situation in agriculture and are major mobilisers of private savings
available for farm investment.
Family loans are usually at low rates of interest and available for long
and medium terms. The fact that there is still a large family element in
farming probably causes a substantial amount of money to be available in
the industry. Often it can be classified as farm settlement money, loaned
to help establish a younger member of a farming family.
The other important source of private finance is the vendor who, in
order to sell a property, is required to leave a significant amount of
money in the business for a medium or longterm at a rate of interest that
is usually described as 'reasonable'. This kind of source becomes very
important when the industry itself is experiencing low profitability.
Factors Affecting the Supply and Demand for Capital.
There are many factors which affect borrowers and lenders. Some are
personal, some are institutional. Major factors for New Zealand include
government policies, attitudes toward equity capital, and 'creative'
financing.
Government Policies
Reference has already been made to the impact of Government policies
on finance for agriculture. Government policies include: exchange rate;
input substitution protection; budgetary deficits, monetary and fiscal
policies; attitudes towards inflation; trade and foreign relations, labour
mal'ket legislation; and research and education expenditures. These are
only some examples of ways by which agriculture can be influenced in
terms of capital investment.
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Alternatively a government in aiming to assist the farm sector may in
fact harm it. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand summed up this
problem, noting the two-way relationship between Government policies
and the farming industry. The quotation below describes how the
industry can be affected adversely by a subsidy policy adopted by
Government.
" .. .technological advances in agriculture have resulted in an over-
supply of agricultural products, placing many farmers at risk of
failure and forcing considerable numbers off their land on a world
wide scale. The problem was compounded in New Zealand and
elsewhere by a failure to adapt to consumer demand shifts away
from traditional pastoral products. Policy makers and the industry
were slow to recognise the nature of the problem which was
manifesting itself in failing international commodity prices. A
.framework of assistance packages evolved over time aimed at
maintaining farm incomes and encouraging increased production.
Borrowing for investment in future production was heavily
subsidised by the Government through the Rural Bank while farm
incomes were supplemented through various devices including the
Meat Industry Stabilisation Account and the Supplementary
Minimum Price Scheme.
Government policies in the five years to March 1985 resulted in
$2.5 billion of public money being spent on farm income support
and interest subsidies on Government loans. These measures
sustained a high demand for land which had the effect that the
subsidies became capitalised in rising land prices. The average
nominal sale price of farm land increased 240 percent between 1976
and 1982 while incomes from the land inclusive of SMPs rose only
25 percent. The anticipation of continued income support and
continued rising land values resulted in farmers borrowing heavily
against their rising equity. In turn the subsequent removal of
support structures and the fall of farm incomes means that farmers
who purchased land in the early 1970s are now servicing debt levels
which are unsustainable. The estimated declines in farm incomes
over the 1985/86 season coupled with forecasts of future earnings
has depressed land prices, leaving farmers with decreased equity
and lenders with reduced security. In some cases farmers are
technically insolvent with debt levels now exceeding the reduced
land value of the farm. 11
Sometimes the effect can be in the opposite direction.
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There have been occasions in the past when the farm sector has
pressured Government to adopt policies that are not necessarily in the
best possible interests of the industry or the economy. Some of the post-
war so-called 'stabilisation' schemes might be included in this group. In
some cases the 'floors' at which point the schemes were triggered off
were set too low. Conversely there were occasions where the 'ceilings'
at which point producers had to contribute to the stabilisation fund were
set too high, resulting in payouts that were excessive in the economic
climate prevailing at the time. Recent research has disclosed that, a
majority of fanners would prefer to invest their own surpluses and not
contribute to any producer income stabilisation schemes.
It will always be a matter of major debate as to what is the most
appropriate role for Government in the provision of capital for
agriculture. Too much intervention undoubtedly drives the private sector
to look to other avenues for the investment of its funds. Also, there is
general acceptance now that farming cannot expect to receive special
treatment. But in a small economy like New Zealand, it is clear that
considerable Government involvement in finance is inevitable.
Equity Capital
The deep-seated view that farming is still very much a way of life in
addition to being a business, has been one of the major obstacles to the
development of a role for equity capital in agriculture. This method of
financing would not only reduce the demand for borrowed capital but
also secure for the industry a much broader support base and the reality
that farming is a business, viable only if business methods are applied to
it. This has wide implications for agriculture including the contention
that all farmers in the future will have to undergo instruction in business
and financial management. It also implies a closer relationship to the
business and financial sector, the impact of which would be beneficial to
all in the long run.
The farm sector has in the past opposed the separation of ownership
and management. The deveiopment of equity capital financing of
farming could see an end to this separation and it could be to farming's
advantage.
Other Innovations
The financial sector is introducing innovation in methods of financing
enterprises at a very fast rate. Some people call this creative financing,
others call it common sense. Agriculture cannot be isolated from this
trend if it is to keep up with other advanced industries. The New
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Zealand farming industry has more than its share of entrepreneurs
willing to change their methods of farming, to take risks and to adopt
new systems of financing their enterprises. They do not demand
subsidies or special treatment. But they also would want an economic
climate that does not disadvantage their industry. The future could be an
exciting and successful period for New Zealand agriculture.
It will be seen from Table 2 that total farm debt in New Zealand has
now reached approximately $NZ 8 billion at a time when there are
strong pressures to ensure that the returns from capital invested in
agriculture are maximised. In the future these pressures will increase in
a capital hungry economy.
Agriculture will have to compete in the market with all the other
fiercely competing forces. It is likely that farming practitioners in the
years ahead will have an even greater regard to the returns to be derived
from every increment of capital available to their enterprise. This could
have significant effects on the structure and organisation of the industry
and the infrastructure that services it.
The Future
From this brief discussion on finance and New Zealand agriculture,
some indicators for the future emerge:
Greater emphasis will fall on the efficiency with which farmers
utilise their capital.
Lenders will be more selective and employ more conservative
lending margins.
Farmers will have received more intensive business training and
understanding of financial matters.
There will be more emphasis on annual profit and less on capital
gains.
Farmers will be less concerned with the repayment of their
borrowings and more adept at rolling over their loans in an
increasingly sophisticated finance market.
Financial advisers will achieve greater recognition.
Much greater emphasis will be placed on the commercial aspects
of fanning, e.g. marketing signals will be heeded more
consciously.
Farmers will forge closer links with the agribusiness sector.
There will be increased partnerships with women in agriculture.
In arable farming in particular, machinery syndication will
increase as a means of minimising the burdens of servicing the
high cost of new and innovative plant and machinery..
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There will be greater opportunities in farming for highly-trained
executive managers who understand farm finance.
Non-farm investors will have greater opportunities to purchase
shares in large farms.
While the so called 'family' farm will continue there will also be
an increase in other forms of farm capital ownership and control.
There will be a continued decline in the short-term financing of
agriculture by stock and station agents; trading banks and finance
companies will increase their share of such financing.
Farmers in the future will operate their own income stabilisation
arrangements; new forms of income smoothing schemes will
emege.
A farm mortgage market is likely to emerge in a better organised
form.
Farmers in some sectors will require to invest less of their capital
in land. The State, for example, could emerge as a landlord
rather than a vendor of land, especially in sectors such as
horticulture.
Farmers will have greater variety in the marketing of their output
e.g. the sale abroad of live animals will expand and some farmers
will extend their operations to countries in which important and
developing markets exist.
Farmers will be made aware of a much wider range of financial
services available to them, including offshore loans.
Large institutional lenders such as the Rural Bank will develop
'one-stop' lending facilities to enable the varied demands of
farmers to be met from one lender. This facility will reduce the
number of mortgages per farm.
It is unlikely there will be a dramatic increase in on-farm
computers as an aid to farm financial operations. Rather, greater
use will be made of facilities owned and operated by the lending
institutions and financial advisers.
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Chapter 7
Competition
for Resources
Chris Kerr
Land and Water Specialist
Lincoln College
In the competition for control of resources the question of pastoral
leasing has been raised with increasing frequency. Most of the occupied
land in New Zealand is held in private ownership or leased from the
Crown (or a public agency) under a system of land tenure largely
derived from the United Kingdom. Other forms of land tenure are
occupation licences, private leases, share agreements, deferred payment
licences (a transition from lease to ownership) and cooperative and
corporate ownership.
The doctrine of 'eminent domain of the Crown' applies to all land in
New Zealand, and gives the Crown ultimate rights of ownership,
particularly where the public interest prevails or the land becomes
vacant. Maori freehold land is a special category of private land. Its
title is derived from Maori customary title, and though it continues to be
owned by Maori proprietors is deemed freehold land under fee simple
from the Crown.
Crown land is used for a wide range of public purposes such as
roading, railways. airports, government building sites and nature
conservation. Many public agencies own land or administer land for the
Crown for a wide variety of public purposes. Ownership of coal, oil and
mineral resources is reserved to the Crown except in cases where the
grant of land from the Crown to the initial owner did not make the
reservation.
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Private land is traded freely in New Zealand and its allocation is
determined by the market except where it is subject to controls by district
planning schemes or legislation concerning aggregation and overseas
ownership. In the case of Crown leasehold land, the transfer of leases is
subject to the approval of the Crown, but this is withheld only in
exceptional cases. Provided there are no caveats or other restraints on
dealing in land, the legal transfer of land is readily achieved under the
Land Transfer Act, 1952. Titles are state-guaranteed under this Act.
Ownership of all natural water in New Zealand remains with the
Crown. Uses of water other than for domestic, livestock. or t1refighting
purposes require rights (to dam, divert, take or discharge) from a
regional water board after a study of the specific water involved.
Consents for the use of water by a Crown agency are also required.
Water rights, or consents, may be subject to special conditions.
There is no charge for the use of water other than an application and
investigation fee. Water rights are for limited duration and must be
reapplied for. They may also be transferred during their currency.
Water, therefore, is allocated on a planned or administrative basis rather
than by any market mechanism. There are, nevertheless, some
examples where land with an associated water right for irrigation has
been sold for a substantial premium.
Ownership or tenancy of land, and the rights to use water are
prescribed by a number of statutory restraints, incentives or specially-
imposed conditions. The Town and Country Planning Act, 1977,
requires territorial local authorities to regulate land use. Another
statutory instrument is the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act,
1941, which provides for the protection of the land.
Pastoral leases are the dominant form of land tenure in the occupied
high country of the South Island. Special land use conditions. as well as
those listed above, apply to pastoral leases, and are intended to regulate
the use of high country land. There are 370 pastoral leases covering 2.5
million hectares of South Island high country. Crown land is classified
pastoral when it is suitable or adaptable primarily for pastoral purposes
only (land Act, 1948, S 51.1).
During the debate in Parliament which preceded the passing of the
Land Act 1948, establishing the pastoral lease as it is today, several
points were made: (I) that it may be necessary for soil conservation for
some control to be exercised over the type of land contained in these
leases, (2) that a substantially less secure pastoral licence should be
replaced by offering perpetual rights of renewal, (3) that stocking
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restrictions be retained, and (4) that the use of the land was clearly for
extensive pastoral farming. However, since 1948, there have been many
developments in farming and a growing realisation that there are other
possible uses for high country land.
Recently the future of pastoral leases and the uses of high country
land in general have been under discussion, as a result of attempts to
renew the rental conditions (initially based on the stock-carrying
capacity) for leases, unchanged for 33 years. The rental issue developed
into a battle for jurisdiction and use of the land, i.e., who controlled the
use of the high country and for what purpose? On the one hand,
lessees, concerned about the possibility of a major escalation in rents,
emphasised their inherent property rights. On the other hand, the
public interest began to be reflected in calls for removing high country
land from leases to allow for conservation, recreation, or other more
intensive, diverse and profitable uses.
In the mid-1970s the subject of rentals for pastoral leases came to the
public arena as the Land Settlement Board, the administrative authority;
began to examine bases for establishing a 'fair annual rent' for those
leases coming due for renewal in the early 1980s. A vigorous debate
between the board and representatives of pastoral lessees ensued. The
board considered many alternatives including arbitration, rent based on
stock carrying capacity, indexing existing rents, adjusting rents according
to the terms of exchange for pastoral farmers and rent based on the
market value of land.
Eventually, the board decided that the rent for pastoral leases should
be on the same basis as other Crown leases, i.e. as a percentage of the
value of land, exclusive of improvements. This was considered both
equitable and provable. The principles which govern the valuing of land
in this manner have been well-documented (Valuer-General, 1968;
Smith, J., 1980; Kerr et.aI., 1979; and in the recent case of the
Assistant Commissioner of Crown Lands vs. Associated Taverners,
Ltd.). The board initially committed itself to a rental of three percent of
such land value, but after representation from lessees altered its position,
and in effect. passed the problem to Parliament which passed the Land
Amendment Act 1979.
Using that Act as a basis, the Land Settlement Board stated that
pastoral land must be rented for pastoral purposes only. It follows that
the demand for land for pastoral use should be reflected in the value of
the unimproved land and thereby serve to determine the rent payable.
However, where there is a 'higher' or 'better' use (e.g. infusion
farming, forestry or commercial recreation) for the land, the result is
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likely to mean land values higher than if the land were used solely for
pastoral purposes. For instance, a pastoral leasehold property located
close to a major resort area is currently being offered for sale at $3
million for its tourist potential when as a pastoral farming enterprise it
could be expected to only bring about $1 million.
Strangely, if a pastoral lessee applies to the Crown for approval to
use the land for forestry purposes the rent is likely to be double that for
pastoral farming. Evidence has been growing over many years that
forestry, particularly when associated with pastoral farming, as a highly
productive, sustainable and potentially economic form of land use.
Thus, it appears, through its own rental policy, the Crown is
discriminating against investment in forestry.
Likewise, should an application for commercial recreation be
approved on high country lands, the rent is likely to be a percentage of
the annual turnover of the business. A number of high country farmers
have developed commercial vacation enterprises ranging from
intermittent holiday accommodation to large-scale skifields, hunting,
fishing and other recreation opportunities. Many of the smaller
operations have been set up without official approval, but the larger
enterprises have all been through cumbersome approval procedures,
designed to maintain a public interest in the development while enabling
the lessee to acquire preemptive rights for the form of land use not
envisaged in the initial pastoral lease. Why there should be a special
rental for commercial recreation over and above that for pastoral land is
unclear, especially when the rental value will recognise the values of the
new commercial possibility.
Clearly the present rental policy is not neutral in the matter of land
use. The issue affecting pastoral leases is whether or not the rental
value truly reflects the optimal use of the land, and whether there are
serious administrative bar,riers to the attainment of the best use(s) of that
land consistent with public policy.
Recent changes in the high country policy of the Land Settlement
Board went some way toward removing the anomalies which restrict the
development of a land use mix for the high country. Reclassification of
pastoral land to farm land, with few restrictions to use, is now possible.
Similarly, the former requirements for pastoral leases to be 'economic
units' have been reinoved. It is now intended that all land required for
nature conservation, recreation or other purposes should be identified
and protected by the Crown.
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Since 1 April ]987, the responsibility for the administration,
management, development, alienation, settlement, protection and care of
Crown land (which formerly rested with the Land Settlement Board) now
lies with the Minister of Lands. Some, but not all, of these duties are to
be carried out by the Land Corporation on an agency basis. The high
country policy of the former Land Settlement Board will be carried on
by the Minister of Lands, the Corporation, and the Minster of
Conservation. The board's high country policy statement in 1984 made
particular reference to a government policy statement dealing with the
use of high mountain resources (NZ Government, 1979). This
statement set out policies, goals and objectives for the use of mountain
lands, including pastoral land and conservation; sustained production;
provision of opportunities for work; recreation, relaxation and learning;
management of landscape; and maximising choice by present and future
generations. The recent policy changes by the Government and the
Land Settlement Board concerning rentals, partial reclassification, and
protection of natural areas are examples of implementation of
government policy.
Each holder of a pastoral lease still holds it for 33 years with a
perpetual right of renewal for the. same term (Land Act, ]948, S 66.3).
Provided the lease-holder has performed and fulfilled the covenants and
conditions of the lease, renewal of the 'lease under the same terms and
conditions is assured. Similarly, the holder of any lease registered
under the Land Transfer Act ]952 (and the Land Act, 1948) enjoys
exclusive possession of all the land in the lease, reinforced by the
wrongful trespass provisions in the Trespass Act, ]980.
Implied convenants apply to any lease (Property Law Act, ]952;
Brookfield, 1975). Important among them are obligations on the Ieasor
to ensure quiet enjoyment of the property leased, an obligation on the
lessee to pay rent, keep the premises in repair, and allow the landlord
reasonable right of entry to view the state of repair. Broadly, the
general conditions which apply to all leases also apply to Crown leases.
In addition, as with many private leases, all Crown leases have 'good
husbandry' and 'residency' covenants. Pastoral leases are also subject to
special conditions which govern, among other things, the burning of
vegetation, cultivation, cropping and grassing, and the numbers of stock
that can be carried.
The future course of high country land under various land use
classifications is unclear. Under the Land Act of 1948, the Crown has
reserved rights of leased land resumption for the whole or any part of a
lease (or licence) if the land is required for' ... any public purpose ... ' or
in the case of reserves ' ... in the public interest' (Land Act, 1948, S
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117.1, 167.1). For these provisions to be put into effect, the board,
acting for the Crown, requires a clearly authorised public purpose and
clearly defined public interest. Failure to do so would leave the board
open to challenges to its authority or administrative action through the
Judicature Amendment Act, 1973.
As the public policy statements imply, major changes to the
contractual tenure arrangements of pastoral lease-holders, the Crown
may not be able to disturb these arrangements except by consent of the
tenant. by resumption, upon surrender of the tenancy or by legislation
(McGeorge, 1983, pel's. cOlllm.).
In implementing public policies which involve removal of land the
Crown apparently will seek agreement of the lease-holder by way of
negotiation, but on what basis is not at all clear. A tradeoff of some of
the existing rights of pastoral lease-holders for a new 'right' to acquire
the fee simple appears to be one possibility. However, for this to
happen. the pastoral lease-holder must first seek reclassification of the
land in the lease. While it is uncertain how many are likely to do this,
it is certain that not all the board's policies can be handled in this way.
It is also certain that, in the matter of pastoral leasehold tenure, both
the lease-holder and the Crown could be greatly limited in the
achievement of their goals. The lease-holder is limited to pastoral
farming and the Crown is bound not to disturb the lease. Should either
party embark on the tortuous course of administrative change the
outcome is uncertain for both. Inevitably an institutionalised mono-
culture of extensive pastoralism continues in spite of public and private
policies for a mix of uses involving farming, forestry, tourism,
recreation and conservation to which the high country is admirably
suited.
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Chapter 8
Food and Fibre
Consumers
W. R. Schroder
Business Management Specialist,
Massey University
Visitors to New Zealand observe that: (a) it rains a lot, (b) the
countryside is green and lush, and (c) there are a lot of sheep and cattle
about. The better informed tourist knows that we have (or had) nearly
70 million sheep, but only three million people which gives us the
highest sheep/people ratio in the world.
These observations tell us two important facts and a major conclusion
about New Zealand's agriculture: first, our climate and topography
favour production systems based on grazing ruminant animals and
second, that for many agricultural products, we produce more than we
consume thereby leaving a surplus for export. The meat, dairy and
horticultural products we export generally go to relatively affluent
countries which already produce most of what they need. Production of
these items is encouraged in those countries by means of various
subsidies designed to raise the incomes of agricultural producers; at the
same time, imports are discouraged to achieve the same objective. New
Zealand is thus in the position of being a residual supplier of products
for which trade represents a small proportion of world consumption.
We are increasingly dependent on trade, and increasingly restricted due
to the agricultural and trade policies of other nations.
The proportion of New Zealand's agricultural and horticultural
production which is exported is high in comparison with most other
countries. It varies widely depending on the product: over 90 percent
for lamb to almost nothing for pig and poultry meat, eggs and some
horticultural products. Table 1 expresses local consumption as a
percentage of total production for animal and dairy products.
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Table I: Production and Consumption
(1983-84 production year)
Commodity Production Consumption Proportion
Consumed
(tonnes '000) Domestically
%
(I) (2) (2)/(1)
Beef 418.9 127.3 30.4
Veal 14.5 2.8 19.3
Mutton 194.3 69.1 35.6
Lamb 473.4 22.1 4.7
Pig meat 43.2 42.0 97.2
Poultry meat 41.1 41.1 100.0
Butter 291.9 40.2 13.8
Cheese 109.3 25.3 23.1
Powder - whole 125.4 19.8 15.7
- skim 218.9 60.9 27.9
Casein 63.1 5.1 7.9
Liquid milk -
(ll1.litres) 349.8 349.8 100.0
Wool 364.0 55.8 15.3
Source: 'Livestock and Feed Policy in New Zealand: 1975 to
the Present' , Centre for Agricultural Policy Studies
Discussion Paper No.8, Masey University, 1986.
Many of the newer horticultural crops have been established
specifically for export and are even difficult to buy locally (e.g. Asian
pears). The major horticultural exports are apples and kiwifruit and, for
these crops, the proportions exported are about 50 and 80 percent
respectively.
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00 Table 2: . Destinations of New Zealand's Main Agricultural Exports (percent)W
Wool Beef & veal Lamb Butter Cheese Apples
1959 1983 1958 1983 19586 1983 1958 1983 1958 1983 1958 1983
UK 37.4 12.9 11.1 0.8 93.6 43.3 95.7 45.3 93.4 9.3 79.2 12.0
Other Europea 36.8 26.3 2.6 - 1.8 5.5 0.6 - 1.5 8.8 17.5 34.9c
USA, Canada 12.2 3.7 76.1 84.3 3.9 4.2 0.3 0.4 1.8 25.2 - 20.8
Japan 3.5 10.5 2.4 2.9 - 3.6 - 0.9 - 30.0
USSR 0.7 10.8 - - - - - 31.0
China 1.0 12.2 - 0.6 - - - 0.4
Middle East &
Other Asia 0.3 13.1 0.4 4.2 - 37.9 0.2 11.9 - 6.0 - 6.7
Other 8.1 10.5 7.4 7.2 0.7 5.5 3.2 10.1 3.3 20.7 3.3 25.6
a Including Eastern Europe and Mediterranean countries
b Lamb and mutton combined
c EEC only
Source: New Zealand Yearbook
Agricultural exports (excluding forest products) now represent less
than 60 percent of total exports. This proportion has fallen from over 90
percent in the early 1970s. The percentage breakdown by major
commodity for the 1985-86 export season is: wool 12.6 (of total
merchandise exports); meat 17.1; dairy 15.9; fruit and cereals 6.4; other
agricultural exports 6.8.
Over much of our trading history, Britain has been the dominant
market for our agricultural exports. This situation changed when the
United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community in 1973.
Britain remains an important market for butter and lamb, but her share
of New Zealand's exports of other agricultural and horticultural products
has fallen sharply (Table 2). The export markets for wool and dairy
products (apart from butter) are quite diversified, without undue
dependence on anyone. There has been no reduction in our
dependence on the USA as a market for beef, and lamb is still dominated
by the U.K. and, additionally, the Middle East, predominantly Iran.
New Zealand's share of world agricultural production and trade for
our major export commodities is given in Table 3.
Table 3: New Zealand's Share of World Production and Trade
Circa 1980
Commodity
Beef
Sheepmeats
Wool*
Butter
Kiwifruit
Production
NZ/Total (%)
1
10
12
4
58
Exports
NZ/Total (%)
6
53
31
19
Over 90 (estimate)
*
Source:
These figures give New Zealand's share of total world wool
production and trade. New Zealand's share of total world
fibre production is much less - about 0.7 percent.
Author's estimates
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00 Table 4: Comparison of Growth of Demand for Agricultural Products at Different Stages ofI
VI Development,_ Hypothetical Cases
Levels % of Rate of Rate of Income Rate of
of population population per capita elasticity growth of
Development in growth income of demand food demand
agriculture growth
Very low income 70 2.5 0.5 1.0 3.0
Low income 60 3.0 1.0 0.9 3.9
Medium income 50 2.5 4.0 0.7 5.1
High income 30 2.0 4.0 0.5 4.0
Very high income 10 1.0 3.0 0.1 1.3
Source: Mellor and Adams (1986)
While New Zealand has a major share of world trade in dairy
products, sheepmeats and wool, these products are relatively unimportant
in world agricultural trade which is dominated by wheat and feedgrains.
This situation does not strengthen New Zealand's position when dealing
in international agricultural trade negotiations. As Ojala puts it: ' ...New
Zealand least of all can command attention to her agricultural trade
problems. It is a country offering products which (except fOI: milk
powder) are considered to be the rich man's food; it lacks industrial
resources important to the multinational corporations, but it is not yet
poor enough to qualify for international welfare.'
In economic terms the major factors affecting the total demand for any
product include:
(l) Household income (total level and distribution)
(2) Aggregate population (number, age, race and sex)
(3) The price of the food product relative to substitutes for it, and
(4) individual attitudes and tastes.
One tool for analysing the demand is what economists call 'elasticity'.
It measures the responsiveness of changes in consumption to changes in
prices and income, and is defined as the percentage change in
consumption (or expenditure) resulting from a one percent change in
price or income. If consumption is sensitive to changes in these
variables, demand is said to be elastic (the elasticity coefficient is greater
than one); if it is insensitive, demand is said to be inelastic. If one
knows changes in total income and in food prices, then one can estimate
changes in the total demand at differing price and income levels.
Income elasticities for individual products tend to fall as income
increases. For example, the income elasticity for milk in Japan was
estimated at 1.3 in 1965 and 0.4 in 1976. Comparing product
categories, income elasticities for animal products tend to be higher
(more elastic) than those for grains. In general, income elasticities are a
useful predictor of changes in demand for food in the aggregate such as
'meat' or 'cereals', but of less value for individual products such as
chicken or apples.
For the purposes of analysing demand for food and fibre we can
classify the world into the categories listed in Table 4. Essentially they
are: (1) low income developing countries; (2) medium income or newly-
industrialising countries (NICs); and (3) high income industrialised
economies.
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Conclusions that New Zealanders can draw from Table 4 are that as
countries get richer, the population growth rate falls (except for very
poor countries where poverty, famine and disease are the limiting
factors). Also, that per capita income growth rates, expressed in
percentage terms, first increase and then fall as countries get richer.
Finally, aggregate income elasticity of demand for food falls with
increasing income.
These factors help identify nations which have increasing rates of
growth of food demand as they move from low income to medium
income categories. They also indicate nations where rates of demand for
food decline as they move from medium into high income brackets. In
fact, classifying nations by their population growth, their income, and
their income elasticity for food criteria begins to shape the potential
market for certain of New Zealand's exportable products.
Taste,or personal food preference, is another strong determinant of
demand. Its importance increases as the relative importance of income
declines. For instance, in a rich country like West Germany income
changes have little effect on aggregate food consumption. New markets
for specialised food products can be found that take advantage of changes
in tastes and life styles. On the other hand, in a poor country like
Chad, incomes are the dominant factor influencing food consumption
and tastes are relatively less important. The important thing here is
simply to have enough income to buy enough food to live.
A second aspect is that, as countries get richer, it appears that the
tastes of their consumers become increasingly 'westernised'. We have
seen dramatic increases in the consumption of meat and dairy products
in countries such as Japan. Forecasts of per capita incomes indicate that
consumers in countries like South Korea will be as rich as American
consumers in the foreseeable future. But this does not mean that the
Korean diets will be the same as Americans. Common sense tells us
that cultural variables are important, too, and they put ceilings on the
degree of 'westej'nisation' of any diet. The problem is that we don't
really know where these ceilings are and the ceilings probably change.
This is an issue of considerable importance to New Zealand as a supplier
of western-type food products.
Relative prices for food items means a lot to shoppers who have a
limited food budget. People like to get the most good quality food they
can for their money. That's one of the reasons why food stores change
prices as often as they do - to attract shoppers. If one food item is
priced low because it is in abundant supply, perhaps the buyer will buy
more of the item, or spend the 'savings' on another.
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A significant determinant of relative prices and their effect on demand
is technological change, the primary force behind agricultural production
actually increasing by almost one-third between 1972 and 1985.
Demand grew as fast as forecast but supply grew faster. The result
worldwide has been a fall in the real agricultural commodity prices since
about 1980-81. The future holds promise of even greater increases in
production using recent technological advances.
An example of how technology has had a major influence on food
prices can be seen in meat. The rate of improvement of efficiency in the
production of monogastric meat products (pigs and poultry) has been
much faster than for ruminants (beef and sheepmeats). In the United
Kingdom, chicken was more expensive than beef in 1960; now it is less
than 30 percent of the beef price.
In addition to the above variables the demand for food imports in any
country is influenced by local supply; that is the total demand for food·
imports equals total consumption less local supply.
Agricultural and trade policies can also influence relative food prices
by subsidising local production through low-priced technology (fertiliser,
irrigation), restricting cheaper food imports, and depressing international
trade prices by subsidised exports. The effects can be dramatic.
Expressed in a common currency, there can be a five- to six-fold
between-country variation in the producer prices of such products as
wheat, beef and milk.
All of these variables are combined· in Figure 1. Note that
agricultural policy or trade policy can govern demand for imports,.
increase exportable supplies, or change the mix of relative food prices.
In all cases, however, in order to raise incomes in the long run, exports
must be sold at higher prices than they cost to produce.
Earlier we noted that variables besides incomes and relative prices
become increasingly important influences on food consumption in
affluent countries. Let's take a closer look at three of these variables:
demographics, life styles and attitudes.
8-8
Income.
Income
Distribution
Income
Elasticity Population Tastes
Relative
Prices
Technology
Trade Policy
Agriculture Policy
Figure I: Main Determinants of Demand
Demographics are finely tuned characteristics of a population. For
example, birth and death rates have both declined in most affluent
countries. The result has been a static and gradually aging population.
In New Zealand, the proportion of the population over 60 years was
about 14 percent in 1982; by 2016 it is projected to be 20 percent. The
'baby boomers' born in the ]950s are now in the 'nest building' phase
of the life cycle and will be retiring by 2000. One implication of these
phenomena is that increases in demand due to aggregate population
changes will be negligible. Secondly, the demand for products
consumed mainly by young people (e.g. milk) will likely fall, while the
demand for products bought mainly by older people will increase (e.g.
certain types of health foods). Finally, while middle and older age
groups may continue to buy products that they were exposed to when
young, their children. with exposure to many new food products, may
remove the 'old fashioned' items from their food list. There is evidence
that lamb suffers from this 'vintage effect' in the UK and the USA.
Today, compared with thirty years ago men do less physical work and
work fewer hours. More women have joined the work force and taken
demanding professional jobs. People have fewer children - often, none
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at all - and have them later in life. Several new words have been coined
to describe the various economically important socio-demographic
categories: 'Yuppy' (young urban professional), 'Dinkie' (Double
income - no kids), 'Muppy' (Middle-aged urban professional), and
'Gruppy' (Grey retired urban professional). Yuppies are often also
dinkies and, because of the demographic trends discussed above, are
declining in economic importance as compared with muppies and
gruppies. The nest built by Mr and Mrs Muppy may not be blessed
with chickens, and, having been established by two partners, is often
soon inhabited by only one as separation and divorce rates increase.
Single-parent households and working mothers are also on the increase.
To really make it in the muppy set, you need to be lean and tanned
and generally as beautiful as your genes permit. Hence, there is an
increasing level of diet and health awareness. Mllppies have plenty of
money to spend, but like to get value for it, and consumerism is another
important trend on the rise. Categorisation of socio-demographic groups
in this way implies a degree of stereotyping, but, in fact. there is
increasing acceptance of diversity among the affluent middle class.
People are more willing to be non-conformist than they were 20 years
ago - and they seek products that differentiate them from their
neighbours. Muppies change jobs, and hence houses, a lot. New nests
are also built for new partners.
There is a close, but not complete, association between socio-
demographic categories and segmentation based on attitudes towards food
and food preparation. For example, many yuppy couples. where both
people work, do not want to take the time to 'shop around' for the best
grocery buys or spend a· lot of time in meal preparation. As a
generalisation, this is true, but market research has already identified
economically important sub-categories of yuppies that are both price
conscious, and innovative cooks. It's the in-thing!
Implications for food and fibre marketing are many. Health and
.. nutritional awareness (as well as relative prices) has been one factor
causing red meat consumption to fall in most affluent countries. If
housewives buy red meat, they want it lean. The consumption of fresh
fruit and vegetables has increased dramatically, and there is an
increasing demand for 'Fresh is Best' quality.
Yuppy couples, with limited time for cooking, may look for
. convenience of meal preparation. But. they are also looking for products
that are distinctive and healthy. Canned products and old-style TV
dinners seem to be olit. Microwave, calorie-counted products, such as
the 'Lean Cuisine' line are in.
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The 'most dramatic trend is the increase in the consumption of food
away from home. In the USA, 41 cents of every dollar spent on food is
for away-from-home eating. In Japan, the restaurant industry is bigger
than the car industry.
The demand for diversity of food items has resulted in a big increase
in the number of lines carried by supermarkets (an average of over
30,000 items in a large U.S. store). Competition for shelf space and
placing means that supermarket managers will not handle products that
have not been carefully researched and aggressively promoted by the
supplier. Products that do not meet profitability targets are quickly
dropped.
For wool, most demographic and life style indicators are positive.
Nest building, changing marital partners and job mobility all help the
demand for carpets. Wool is a 'quality' fibre, fitting easily with the
muppy life style. It is particularly suitable for creating individualistic
patterns and styles - allowing for a little muppy non-conformity.
The implications of most of the food demand indicators for New
Zealand do not, at first, appear very encouraging. This is basically
because of low income elasticities for pastoral products combined with
low rates of income and population growth in our traditional markets.
The Economic Monitoring Group of the New Zealand Planning Council
argued along these lines, referring to a Reserve Bank estimate of the
world income elasticity of demand for New Zealand exports of 0.6; that
is, other things being equal, New Zealand's exports would increase by 6
percent for every 10 percent increase in world GNP.
However, market analysis at this degree of aggregation is not really
very useful. The 0.6 income elasticity figure is an average measure,
based on an historical pattern of exports which will likely not repeat
itself. The changes that have occurred since the 1950s are shown in
Table 5. There is no indication that the rate of change is decreasing.
Basically, the trend has been away from Europe and North America to
the rapidly expanding economies of Asia and the Middle East. In these
countries, the income elasticities for meat and dairy products are
relatively high. However, New Zealand's niche as a supplier of a
particular set of meat and dairy products is not in the least assured due
to the availability of cheaper competitive products (e.g. chicken) and the
protection of local suppliers through subsidies and trade restrictions (in
particular for dairy products). Also, not all of our export products have
low income elasticities in affluent countries. Major export products such
as wool and kiwifruit are luxury products, even for rich people.
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Table 5: Per Capita Food Consumption
. Year Total Total Potatoes Fresh Beef Mutton Poultry Fresh Butter Dairy
cereals rice Vegetables & Lamb Milk excI. butter
Germany, 1955-59 90. I 1.0 148.0 49.0 16.1 0.4 2.6 101.5 7.3 134.2
Federal 1973 66.7 1.7 92.7 69.8 21.1 0.4 8.8 92.7 7.3 133.0
Republic 1982 70.9 2.1 74.0 74.1 20.4 0.8 9.9 101.7 6.9 145.8
Japan 1955-59 40.5 113.3 15.7 83.4 1.2 0.4 8.0 0.1 8.9
1973 33.8 91.1 11.8 128.6 3.9 2.5 6.7 27.9 0.6 30.0
1982 34.7 76.6 14.1 130.8 5.5 1.4 11.1 36.1 0.6 39.3
New 1955-59 83.4 1.3 46.9 66.9 45.6 35.8 2.0 183.8 15.7 192.2
Zealand 1973 73.2 2.0 62.0 69.6 44.4 42.1 7.3 196.0 15.3 215.2
1982 70. I 2.5 54.9 63.9 47.0 31.0 11.3 155.8 12.9 166.8
Turkey 1955-59
1973 200.1 4.3 43.3 112.6 7.1 9.1 3.6 39.1 1.8 61.6
1982 190.4 4.0 49.5 141.7 8.5 8.6 3.0 27.4 2. I 54.1
USA 1955-59 65.3 2.5 43.3 68.8 37.5 2.0 14.2 153.6 3.1 194.3
1973 61.9 3.1 30.7 63.4 49.9 1.2 22.4 141.2 2.2 162.6
1982 57.3 5.3 32.1 68.4 47.6 0.8 29.1 123.0 2.0 147.9
00
I
..... Source: OECD Food Consumption Statistics, Selected Products and Countriestv
If we accept that technology could continue to increase production
faster than demand, we can expect the real prices of agricultural
commodities will continue to fall. Unless the rate of technological
change in New Zealand agriculture is faster than competing commodity
suppliers, any comparative advantage that New Zealand has held as low
cost supplier will be eroded. There is no evidence to suggest that New
Zealand will, in fact, be able to take advantage of such technologies as
genetic engineering and recombinant growth hormones in a way that will
give us an advantage over our competitors. Furthermore, many of those
commodity products are the ones most subject to trade barriers and
domestic support measures.
Commodity products are, by definition, 'me too' products. Somehow,
we have to identify products which are not the 'me too' ones - imitative
products, which can be developed 'tailor made' to meet the needs of
specialised markets. Such specialised products are not necessarily
processed or oriented to the consumer market. They may be for a
processor. The niche may be a one or two week seasonal market for a
fruit crop or a specialised casein product developed for a particular food
manufacturer.
Niche marketing implies that New Zealand agriculture may in the
future be a lot smaller in volume terms, with a more diverse product
range, and a variety of production schedules. Low cost seasonal
production would be secondary to meeting the needs of a specialised
market. If we take the market-oriented philosophy a step further, we
may find that the best way to meet the requirements of some markets is
not to supply from New Zealand at all, but to use product from any
appropriate source. This is particularly appropriate if a continuous
market flow cannot be sustained from New Zealand. In this case the
comparative advantage of the New Zealand supplier would not be as a
raw materials producer, but rather as a person or company with
marketing and management skills.
These ideas are not as revolutionary as they may sound. Horticultural
export producers are used to organising production and post-harvest
activities to meet special market requirements. The New Zealand Dairy
Board has, on several occasions, purchased dairy products from other
countries and further processed them for sale through their established
distribution system.
It has been argued for a long time that New Zealand's comparative
advantage as an agricultural producer is based on low cost systems for
ruminant animal production. For all the reasons we have discussed, this
comparative advantage has been eroded. It remains to be seen whether
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or not the producers, processors and exporters of New Zealand's
_agricultural and horticultural products can find a similarly advantageous
competitive niche based on activities other than the efficient utilisation of
pasture.
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Chapter 9
Trade Relations:
Coming of Age
Ralph Lattimore
Agricultural Economist
Lincoln College
International relations are an important component of agriculture and
rural life. Basically, of course, 'our rural growth depends on overseas
market development - a fact ingrained in the thinking of every New
Zealander over the age of ten - but international relations in the broader
areas of cultural, social. political and recreational (tourist) matters also
have important commercial implications.
Beginning our story in 1930s, we find that New Zealand's
international relations were Dominated (capital D) then by bilateral
relations with the United Kingdom. This resulted in (and may even have
been caused by) the slow faltering development of our national identity
(Sinclair, 1986), as it manifested itself in constitutional, trading,
immigration, commercial and sectoral policies.
These facts will help to set the scene:
(a) The United Kingdom offered New Zealand its formal
constitutional independence (Statue of Westminister) in 1931.
The New Zealand Government ratified that position in 1947.
(b) It was not until the early 1980s that the defence of New Zealand
itself was given first priority in New Zealand Defence Policy.
(c) New Zealanders travel overseas much more than do residents of
other countries even though the real cost of doing so is
significantly higher than in other industrial countries.
(d) New Zealand has jealously guarded her 'independence' on the
one hand, refusing closer political ties in the past with Australia
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(and. it is rumoured. the European Economic Community), while
clinging to quasi-colony status on the other.
The. ambivalence implied by the above remarks may be a pakeha
phenomenon. The Maori people have had the time to achieve
nationhood and the stimulus to work to rediscover it. The pakeha,
how~ver, may be regarded as collectively conservative and as individually
independent.
The world has changed markedly since World War II. There have
been explosions in science and technology, in information, international
trade, population and the number of sovereign states. There have been
major changes, too, for the human environment - the physical and
political. Each has been important because increasing information flows
and improved technology have created an increasingly interdependent
world.
This international process was aided immediately after World War II
by multilateral initiatives to facilitate trade (GATT), macro-economic co-
operation (IMF, OECD) , political co-operation (UN), technological and
institutional information transfer (UN system including UNESO,
UNIDO, FAO, WHO, WMO, etc.), and aid transfers (World Bank).
New Zealand was a rather reluctant participant in these developments.
It was an early member of GATT and the United Nations but held off
joining the IMF, World Bank and the OECD for many years. One
possible explanation for the hesitancy is that New Zealand remained
unsure of itself in the immediate post-war period, having grasped
elements of economic sovereignty in a unique fashion during the 1930s.
Between 1934 and 1938, under two governments, New Zealand
progressively insulated itself from the world economy by adopting an
inward-looking development and financial system with an interventionist
approach to domestic social, political and economic affairs.
The year 1934 saw the introduction of high, most favoured nation
import tariffs. These tended later to impair not only trade but
technological transfer and broader international relations with important
countries outside the Commonwealth including the United States, Japan
and Western Europe. Import selection and foreign exchange controls in
1938 further deterred these relationships and caused Commonwealth ties
to weaken as well, although the situation was eased during the War by
other programmes like the bulk purchase and sterling area
arrangements. At War's end, New Zealand was closer to Britain than
before in export activities, and more distant from most other countries,
especially those that were about to take a leading role in post-war
recovery.
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\0 Table 1: Destination and Origin of External TradeW
United Other United Other
Year Britain Australia Japan States Countries Britain Australia Japan States Countries
Exports Imports
percent percent
December
1920... 74 5 ... 16 5 48 17
"
18 17
1930... 80 3 .. 5 12 47 8 .. 18 27
1940... 88 3 .. 4 5 47 16
"
12 25
1950... 66 3 .. 10 21 60 12
"
7 21
1960... 53 4 .. 13 30 43 18
"
10 29
June
1960 36 8 10 16 30 30 21 8 13 28
1975 22 12 12 12 42 19 20 14 13 34
1980 14 12 13 14 47 15 19 13 14 39
1982 14 15 13 14 44 9 20 17 16 37
1983 13 12 14 15 54 9 20 17 17 37
1984 10 14 16 13 47 9 20 21 15 35
1985 9 15 15 14 47 8 17 18 15 42
Source: New Zealand Yearbook, Department of Statistics, Wellington
It must be remembered that the depression environment in the 1930s
produced a rash of import restrictions and competitive devaluations in
many countries. Nevertheless, there are some qualitative differences
between typical short-term import restrictions and the full-blown, import
selection, industrial 'development' financial control strategy adopted by
New Zealand.
A crucial decision period for New Zealand came immediately after the
war. International relations had been badly bruised by our insulation
policies and reaction had been swift and harsh especially from the British
(Sinclair, 1976). The New Zealand economic platform was explicitly
bilateral, not multilateral in its international orientation. In short, as
New Zealand emerged from its position as a quasi-colony in the 1930s,
she was swimming against an emerging tide of world opinion that was
globally oriented. The war increased this momentum to the point that
multilateral thrusts, already referred to, mushroomed in the late 1940s to
aid, or to at least validate, a global approach in many areas of interest.
Was New Zealand too unsure of itself to change course at this stage?
Were the policies already too entrenched? Was the private gain to
particular groups in New Zealand too large to effect change? We may
never know.
Major policy strands remained in placed driving the New Zealand
economy and some aspects of international relations on a narrower and
different course from most other developed countries,
New Zealand trade relations have altered significantly since World
War II and some of these shifts can be seen from the data presented in
Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the rapid decline in the importance of
the United Kingdom as a source of imports and as an export market.
The United Kingdom's position was taken over by Australia and Japan
who had both been minor export partners in the 1950s . Perhaps the
surprising feature of these developments has been the continuing
importance of the United States throughout tne 40-year period since
1947.
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Table 2: Rank Ordering of New Zealand's Major Trading Partners
1947 1985
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Australia 4 3 1 (16%) 2 (19%)
United States 2 (6%) 2 (18%) 2 (15%) 3
Japan - - 3 1 (20%)
United Kingdom 1 (77%) 1 (43%) 4 4
Iran - 9 5
P.R.C. - 6
Italy 7 7 10
F.R.G. - 8 5
France 3 10 9 14
Korea, Republic 10
Canada 5 4 11 8
Hong Kong - 12 13
Taiwan - 13 12
Malaysia - 14* 14
Belgium 6 6 15
U.S.S.R. 8 16
Singapore - 14* 17 6
Fiji 9 7 18
Algeria - 19
Saudi Arabia - 20 9
Source:
Footnote:
New Zealand Yearbook, 1947/49, 1986/87, Department of
Statistics , Wellington
The percentages in brackets refer to the proportion of trade
occurring to that market.
The more detailed information in Table 2 shows the increased
diversification of New Zealand trade. In 1947, our two largest export
markets - the United Kingdom and the USA - represented 83 percent of
export earnings. In 1985, our two largest markets amounted to only 31
percent of earnings. On the import side, 61 percent of our imports were
sourced in the UK and the USA in 1947. In 1985, Australia and Japan
contributed 39 percent of import requirements.
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There has been a general drift towards Pacific Basin trade not just
with Australia and Japan but with the Peoples Republic of China,
Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Malaysia.
Another important facet of New Zealand international relations is
illustrated by Table 3. Over the post World War II period, growth in
New Zealand's exports has generally been much slower than in other
countries. This is perhaps mainly a reflection of the inward looking
growth strategy adopted since the 1930s. One of the side effects of this
import substitution strategy was a reduction in the need for exports by
constraining imports through selection, achieved by lowering the
relative incentive to produce for export.
Table 3: Growth in Real Exports for New Zealand, Developing and
Industrial Countries of the World, 1960-70 and 1970-81,
(US$1975 billion).
Year Percent Growth
1960 1970 1981 1960-70 1970-81
Primary Exports
New Zealand 1.454 1.660 1.905 14 15
Developing Countries 35.0 47.0 63.0 34 34
Industrial Countries 44.0 76.0 131.0 73 72
Manufactures!
New Zealand 0.102 00411 1.154 303 181
Developing Countries 6.5 22.1 89.2 240 305
Industrial Countries 100.0 249.0 505.0 149 103
Total Exports
New Zealand 1.556 2.071 3.059 33 48
Developing Countries 56.0 100.0 354.0 79 254
Industrial Countries 152.0 342.0 702.0 125 105
Excluding petroleum and products
Source: N.Z. Yearbook, Department of Statistics, Wellington and
World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends, 1983/84,
Washington D.C.
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As indicated in Table 3, New Zealand's total and primary exports
grew consistently slower than in all other countries, industrial and
developing countries. New Zealand exports of manufactured goods did
somewhat better (from a low base) in relation· to industrial countries
perhaps because the import substitution strategy was buffered after 1960
by counter-balancing export incentive programmes.
The key question concerns the relative importance of foreign and
domestic policy.
United Kingdom and the EEC
In a somewhat contradictory fashion, the continuing strong import
substitution policy probably kept the export base narrow. New Zealand
remained vulnerable as far as market access for farm products was
concerned. As world protectionism in farm products grew in the 1960s
and 1970s and protectionism for manufactured products fell, New
Zealand remained locked into the United Kingdom market. This had
broad implications. Decreasing international travel costs enabled even
closer cultural, social and political associations with other countries but
the New Zealand trade policy continued to focus attention on the United
Kingdom. This may have influenced New Zealand immigration policy;
it certainly restricted the technology and experience that immigrants from
a variety of countries can bring with them.
The UK's accession to the European Community in 1973 saw New
Zealand receive special access for farm exports through Protocol 18.
This cemented United Kingdom/New Zealand relations. The direct
effect of special access appeared to be positive especially for dairy
products. New Zealand export receipts for dairy products have probably
been higher with the Protocol. But the unanswerable question is. of
course, to what extent did the UK relationship preclude the development
of other markets and thus lower potential returns?
North America
Trade relations with North America had been weakened by the New
Zealand policies of the 1934-45 period. Even Canadian relations
suffered to some extent because the British preferential tariff
arrangements stemming from the Ottawa agreement (1932) had been
affected by the exclusion of Canada from the sterling area arrangements.
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In the area of defence arrangements, liaison with the United States
increased markedly after World War II with the advent of ANZUS, but
the relationship was weakened in 1985 by the disagreement over nuclear
ship visits.
The United States was in the forefront of technological developments
during the 1950s and 1960s, but there was a time lag made longer
initially by sterling restrictions and continuing import selection before
these advances reached New Zealand. A notable example was computer
hardware which had an implicit tariff of 40 percent until 1986. The
effect that such restrictions had on skill development and competitiveness
may have been important.
Export trade to North America developed quickly following the lifting
of sterling area restrictions. After it reached pre-war levels, growth
tapered off in the face of increasing protectionist agricultural import
policies in both Canada and the United States. However, had the New
Zealand manufacturing sector been more outward oriented from 1945-
70, it could be argued that trade would have grown faster as real income
growth in the region was high and trade barriers to manufactured items
were being reduced.
As Table 1 shows, trade (in both directions) with the United States has
remained very important throughout the period. The United States is
still the second or third most important trading partner. The United
Kingdom held the prime position after the war but that position has been
taken now by Australia and Japan. Relatively speaking trade with
Canada has deteriorated over the period.
Australia
Commercial relations with Australia have grown rapidly since the
1940s particularly with respect to exports (Tables I and 2). Part of this
growth may be attributed to the two bilateral trade agreements. NAFTA
(New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement) from 1965 involved a
managed expansion in commercial trade for particular items. This
outward looking move was tentative because the arrangement was
subservient to the import selection process in New Zealand (Holmes,
1986).
In 1983, the two countries signed a far more outward-looking trade
agreement, ANZCERTA (Australia New Zealand Closer Economic
Relations Trade Agreement) which provides, with a few exceptions, for
the elimination of all tariffs by 1988. The performance of this
arrangement to date has been most heartening in trade terms.
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Japan and Asia
During the 1950s, New Zealand relations with Asian countries from
Japan in the north to India in the south, developed rapidly, for security
and economic reasons. Transport costs were lower than to Europe, and
there was a high potential for trade with these high-population, land-
scarce countries.
Relations fell short of close union at this time for a number of
reasons. The Asian region, especially Japan, was highly protected from
increasing food inputs in spite of (or perhaps because of) local
production disadvantages. New Zealand itself was already highly
protected in the range of goods where Asia held a comparative advantage
and we had chosen security arrangements which built on wartime
alliances (ANZUS, SEATO). While these alliances were undoubtedly
useful in filling a gap left by Britain, they probably reduced New
Zealand's ability to open relations with the centrally-planned economies
like the Peoples Republic of China. Such reticence was quickly
overcome in the case of Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong
Kong by the acceleration of economic growth and later by the build-up
in technological competence in the region. Japan quickly became a
major trade partner in spite of our reluctance to expose New Zealand
manufacturing to competition and the lingering mistrust resulting from
World War II.
Chronological Approach
An alternative way to view New Zealand's developing international
relations since independence is to examine a brief chronology of the
establishment of New Zealand's diplomatic posts (Table 4). At times the
establishment of these posts followed, rather than led to, commercial and
cultural ties but the dates are generally indicative of strengthening ties.
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Table 4: Establishment Dates for Diplomatic Posts
Year
1935
Country
Britain
Principle Motivation
NZ Independence (Statute of
Westminister, 1947).
I940s US, Canada, Australia Allied War Liaison
1950s Asia Pacific relations and
(following ANZUS,
Manila)
Trade opportunities
Security
Treaty of
1960s Western Europe
1970s Pacific, PRC, Middle
East, Latin America
1980s Africa, India
(re-opened)
Quest for continued EEC trade
access
Trading Opportunities
(FORUM/SPARTECA)
General relations, trade
opportunities
At the end of World War II, New Zealand had posts in London,
Canberra, Washington and Ottawa. The first expansion was to Asia
during the' 1950s. As an aside, it is interesting to note that agricultural
attaches were not explicitly included as part of these developments in
overseas' posts. The Department of Trade and Industry has provided
virtually all the support for agricultural trade and the only posts with
agricultural counsellors are Paris (related to OECD) and London.
During the 1960s, most development centred on Western Europe
addressing the threat to traditional trade caused by UK/EEe plans to
expand the economic community. This led to intense efforts to bolster
bilateral relations and a multilateral response when New Zealand joined
the OECD. This was essentially a rearguard action given that there were
fairly strict limits on Europe's demand for imported agricultural
commodities. This created a dilemma for New Zealand and diverted
resources away from expanding markets elsewhere in the world. New
Zealand took further multilateral steps in this decade, finally joining the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The last-
mentioned organisation, in its first report on New Zealand in 1968,
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focused attention on the introverted nature of the industrial development
strategy - a comment that was not well received in all quarters.
During the 1970s, international horizons expanded in the aftermath of
British entry to the EEC, the rapid fall in agricultural export prices, and
the oil crisis. Pacific relations expanded with the South Pacific FORUM
agreement (Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Western
Samoa). In 1981. the FORUM sponsored a regional South Pacific trade
agreement. SPARTECA, providing non-reciprocal duty-free access to
New Zealand and Australia. By this time the FORUM had expanded to
include the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Niue, Turalu, Kiribati
and Vanuatu. with the Federated States of Micronesia having observer
status. Diplomatic missions opened in Chile. Peru, Iran, Iraq, Bahrain
and the Peoples Republic of China during the 1970s. Finally. in the
1980s, New Zealand diplomatic posts achieved continental coverage with
the opening of a High Commission in Zimbabwe.
The creation of posts provides only a partial view of the depth and
breath of New Zealand's relations with the rest of the world. They have
expanded continuously and apparently at an accelerating pace. Cultural,
sporting and educational ties have grown alongside commercial trade,
financial linkages and international airline landing rights. The thrust
has been bilateral, regional and multilateral.
The Future
New Zealand has come of age in international affairs. The diversity
of options involved provides a stimulus to commercial interests to
diversify marketing efforts and explore new avenues in a rapidly
changing world. There appears to be a strong continuing pull towards
bilateralism. Such relations are easier to develop and require fewer
resources to maintain. Multilateral approaches provide few opportunities
for New Zealand to exert an influence though there have been major
successes even there. The new GATT trade talks begun in Punta Del
Este will deal with agricultural protection in perhaps the most
comprehensive fashion since the inception of the organisation. This may
in part be due to a New Zealand initiative. In 1976, the then Prime
Minister. Sir Robert Muldoon, convinced the OECD to bring together
the mounting evidence against agricultural protection. This work, which
is still being completed, has already had effects around the world.
CurrelHIy" the CER arrangement with Australia has the potential to
deepen bilateral interests considerably without constraining other
bilateral, regional or multilateral policy. But there are potential dangers.
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The Australian economy is perhaps second only to New Zealand (among
the developed economies) in its protectionist strategy, although resource
endowments in that country have offset to some extent the worst of the
effects. It would perhaps be simplier and cheaper for New Zealand to
embrace an even broader CER arrangement but there are attendant risks
of trade diversion from other markets.
Information and communication technology have drastically reduced
the cost of a global strategy, lowering risks and widening opportunities.
CER and the South Pacific FORUM provide a broader base from which
to face the world. Our international relations have blossomed over the
last decade. Can the momentum be maintained or will we retreat back to
a narrower global perspective?
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Section IV
New Zealand's Farms
and Agribusiness
Chapter 10
Development of the
Agricultural Industry
Bruce Ross
AgricuItural Economist
Lincoln College
Development of New Zealand farming has always been tied closely to
the industry's prosperity. Prosperous times give farming people the
incentive to expand operations while at the same time their higher profits
provide the where-with-all to undertake new investment. Depressed
circumstances reverse the situation and provide little incentive to making
a new investment and greater difficulty in financing it. Fanners
sometimes react to a downturn in prices and incomes by trying to
increase production through harder work and more intensive use of their
farms. However, this can only go so far without additional resources.
Production increases obtained in this way are generally unsustainable
and therefore do not constitute the farming sector's true development.
The profitability of farming is affected by three main factors. General
economic conditions in New Zealand pretty much determine the prices
farmers pay for items necessary for production and the prices they
receive for that production; conditions of international trade affect the
prices received for all of New Zealand's exports; while technology leads
to changes on New Zealand farms, which influence the volume of farm
production, revenue and farm costs. There are many examples of these
influences affecting farm profitability, and hence the rate of further
agricultural development.
Along with most of the western world, New Zealand suffered from a
long depression between 1870 and 1895. However, the new technology
of refrigerated shipping partially offset the economic gloom. Exports of
New Zealand sheepmeats, beef, butter, and cheese were all made
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possible by refrigeration, and this paved the way for the intensification of
farm production. The number of land holdings, the area under
cultivation, and the number of livestock all increased rapidly after the
t1rst successful shipment of refrigerated meat in 1882. Within ten years
of this first shipment, 21 meat-freezing works and 104 butter and cheese
factories had been established.
At about this same time technological change was also affecting
transport with sail giving way to steam. The change was gradual, with
sail and steam competing on routes between New Zealand and the United
Kingdom for a number of years. Continued improvements in steam
technology allowing freight rates to be brought down led to the demise of
commercial sailing ships.
The decline in freight rates was a boon to farmers whose produce was
. being shipped from New Zealand in increasing quantities. In 1882, the
freight rate was two and a quarter pence per pound of meat, representing
about 80 percent of the New Zealand farmers' sheepmeat revenues. By
1894, the freight rate had fallen to three farthings a pound, less than 32
percent of the price of meat in New Zealand that year, despite the fact
that meat prices had fallen from their 1882 level. In addition, there was
a reduction in killing and freezing charges to New Zealand farmers.
Sharply falling prices on the British markets were thus moderated in
New Zealand by the reduction in costs, freight and processing. As a
consequence. fanning in New Zealand was not nearly as depressed as
that in Britain, and was therefore much better placed to take advantage of
the 1895 upturn in commodity prices.
From that time until just after World War L New Zealand farmers
enjoyed a period of widely diffused and increasing prosperity. A chain
reaction ensued: the prosperity begun in 1895 led to a surge of
agricultural development which spilled over, engulfing the whole
economy. Between 1896 and 1914 meat prices rose by 60 percent,
butter prices by· 36 percent, and cheese prices by 72 percent. In fact,
during this 20-year period, farm product prices rose about 30 percent
above their 1896 level and non-farm product prices stayed at almost
exactly their 1896 level.
The resulting development was dramatic as farmers responded to
economic opportunity. Land under cultivation rose by 44 percent. total
agricultural land occupied rose by 50 percent, dairy cattle numbers
nearly trebled to 750,000, dairy factories increased from 170 to 565,
butter production was more than quadrupled, and cheese output rose
more than ten times. While sheep numbers rose from only 19 million
to 24 million, their composition changed from pure Merinos to half-bred
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or Romney flocks more suitable for meat production. As a result, with
only a 25 percent change in flock numbers, meat production was
doubled. Large rural areas benefited as the rapid expansion of
processing and transport industries associated with agriculture quickly
spread the new-found prosperity to the whole community.
The 20 prosperous years around the turn of the century influenced
New Zealand's agricultural industry for decades to come. It was during
this period that the expansion of dairy fanning and the intensification of
sheep farming saw the growth and importance of the middle-sized
farmer. The number of land holdings in the categories from 200 to
5,000 acres rose from 25 percent of total land holdings to 32 percent
between 1896 and 1911, whilst the area of land in such holding rose
from 21 percent of the total to 45 percent. Over this period the total
number of land holdings rose by 25 percent.
The level of agricultural investment was high, as farmers sought to
develop their farms through land clearance, fencing, drainage and
pasture improvement. Investment was not restricted to physical assets
however, and many farmers showed they were prepared to invest heavily
in their children's education. The returns from this investment in
human capital have continued to be evident in the form of a fanning
population which is well-educated by world standards, and in the ease
with which many farm children have made the transition from farming to
urban professions and trades.
Although relevant statistics are skimpy for years before World War I,
it appears likely that incomes of the New Zealand farming population
first rose above those of the rest of the country. In fact, for most of the
half century beginning in the 1920s for which much information is
available, New Zealand proved· to be a notable exception to the almost
universal rule that agricultural industry incomes are below the non-farm
average incomes in the rest of society. Even up until the end of the
commodity price boom in the early 1970s, there were long periods when
New Zealand agricultural incomes were above the rest of society. Even
in years when they dipped below, they still maintained a level well above
that in other developed countries.
Looking back it seems that the foundations for New Zealand's
agricultural affluence were laid during that period of prosperity at the
turn of the century. Investment in farms and in farm people during that
time raised the productivity of New Zealand farms with the result that,
even when commodity prices fell, the greater volume of production
helped to maintain incomes. In addition, the move of farm children to
non-farm employment, eased by their relatively high educational
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standards, meant that the remall1l1lg farm income did not have to be
divided among an ever-growing farm population as was the case in some
other countries. It seems that Gunnar Myrdal's concept of 'circular and
cumulative causation' was at work in New Zealand agriculture: high
incomes lead to high levels of physical and human investment, which
help to keep future incomes high, which thereby help maintain
investlDent and the growth of the agriculture.
The period after World War I began with agricultural commodity
prices generally 70 to 80 percent above the average pre-war levels. The
steady price increases of the pre-war era were gone however, and prices
were much less stable. Price instability was evidenced by wool prices in
1921 being less than half their 1919 level. Dairy prices rose nearly 28
percent above their 1919 level by 1921 and then crashed to nearly 15
percent below in 1922. Farm prices continued to seesaw throughout the
1920s, leading both farmers and politicians to look to the establishment
of producer boards which they hoped would both stabilise and improve
prices. Despite the price fluctuations experienced, many farmers
anticipated a return to the golden years experienced before the war.
There was a period of speculation in land, with the high prices paid
greatly exacerbating the problems of the depression which was to follow
in the 1930s.
Investment in agriculture continued through the 1920s with the
number of milking plants and cream separators increasing by about 80
percent. Tractors were accepted and their numbers increased nine-fold
from 1920 to 1928. Production also continued to grow through the
1920s, with the increase being particularly marked in dairy produce.
Butter for export trebled between 1920 and 1923 and further growth was
recorded by 1930 for both butter and cheese.
The collapse of prices in the depression of the 1930s affected the
farming industries more than most. The price index of 1926 pastoral
and dairy produce for New Zealand (100) fell to about half in 1932 and
1933, and to 83 for wholesale and retail prices.
Differences in these reductions gives one indication of the transfer of
income from farming to the rest of New Zealand. Many farmers were
forced into bankruptcy during this period, and the experience of the
depression influenced the decisions of most of the farmers who survived
it for the rest of their lives.
Wool prices were particularly hard hit during the depression. Sheep
numbers grew little during the 1930s and traded increases and decreases
with dairy cows. Given the relative prices of sheep and dairy products
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this is understandable, but commentators also make much of the fact that
dairy cows provided a dependable monthly income to farmers, a welcome
supplement to the incomes of sheep farmers struggling to meet their
monthly outgoings.
Despite the upturn in export prices towards the 1940s, government
policies designed to stimulate overall economic growth and get the
unemployed back to work resulted in severe balance of payments
problems. These led to the imposition in 1938 of wide-ranging controls
on most goods imported into New Zealand. Although introduced
originally for balance of payments reasons, these controls were to exert a
major influence on the shape of industrial development in New Zealand
into the 1980s.
After World War II, there was some uncertainty as to whether a
repetition of farm price and income movements experienced after World
War I would occur. In the 1950s, a boom in commodity prices, sparked
off by stockpile purchases associated with the Korean War, gave a
tremendous boost to farm incomes. Government incentive programmes
encouraged the introduction of aerial topdressing, thus providing a major
technological gain. Large quantities of superphosphate were spread over
hill country farms. With this and other advances, farm production
increased over 30 percent during the 1950s.
The boom of the 1950s, coupled with some relaxation of import
restrictions, induced a high inflow of goods. The balance of payments
surplus of 1950 quickly turned to deficit, sharply intensified when
commodity prices slipped in 1957. In 1958, severe import controls were
reimposed, and serious efforts were made to use them as a form of
industrial policy encouraging import replacement industries. Import
saving was seen as being equivalent to the earning of foreign exchange,
and the Government held a national conference to promote the
development of manufacturing.
By the early 1960s, it was apparent that many import replacement
industries were also highly dependent upon the import of raw materials.
They could not, by themselves, be a significant source of economic
growth. The major constraint on the nation's growth was seen then to
be foreign exchange. Official attent!on turned again to exports, and
agricultural development conferences were held in 1963 and 1964. At
the ,conferences, projections were made of the imports (and export
earnings) required if the economy were to grow at a desirable rate. It
was accepted that most export growth would have to come from
agriculture and attention was directed to ways it could be achieved. The
setting of production targets committed the Government to introduc'ing
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incentives sufficient to call forth the desired production. Following the
conference total production grew by 50 percent through the 1960s. But
it is not clear whether the growth was due to improved wool prices, to
government incentives or to the greater farmer investment confidence
following the apparent agricultural commitment of the Government.
Despite a sharp fall in wool prices in 1967, against which the
Government provided no protection or compensation, farm production
grew until the comlllodity price boom of the early 1970s. After the
boom production of many commodities fell significantly. Concern over
the need to increase the country's export earnings led to a reassessment
of agriculture. Farm incomes were low and it was clear that they would
have to be improved if agricultural growth were to be resumed. One
option would have been to reduce levels of import protection which
tended to siphon income away from exporters, but instead, the policy
took the route of developing a wide range of incentive schemes for
agriculture.
At the end of the 1970s the Government introduced supplementary
minimum prices (SMPs) for a range of the major traditional export
commodities. SMPs were minimum prices set by the Government,
maintained where necessary by direct payments which supplemented
those provided by the producer boards. SMPs, together with provisions
allowing for substantial tax write-offs for agricultural development
expenditures, resulted in a sharp rise in land prices. Prices of farms
moved up sharply but, at the same time, world prices for many of the
products produced on those farms were falling.
The increasing costs of these forms of assistance to agriculture,
together with a range of export incentives for manufacturing industries,
helped to generate a series of large fiscal deficits. The rate of growth of
the official debt became insupportable, and the Labour Government of
1984 quickly moved to reduce a wide range of Government expenditures.
Their move to cut most forms of Government subsidy to industry had an
immediate and perhaps discriminatory impact on exporters from all
sectors.
Assistance to import replacement industries comes mostly in terms of
protection from competition by restricting imports. This protection
forces up domestic prices which have to be paid by New Zealand
consumers. Protection is regulatory, not a direct government
expenditure, and presumably this is partly why the Government has been·
slower to act on reducing this kind of assistance than it was in reducing
direct assistance to exporters. Action to reduce import protection has
been promised, but there is little doubt that lags in its timing have hit
hard at export industries.
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For agriculture, the combination of low international commodity
prices and the effective removal of support for agriculture, while
assistance is still being provided to other parts of the economy, has seen
a sharp fall in farm incomes and a 40 to 50 percent drop in farm land
prices. The situation facing heavily indebted farmers who produce New
Zealand's traditional export commodities, is the worst since the 1930s'
depression. It shows little sign of early improvement.
The current situation is not entirely one of gloom. The SMPs really
only retarded diversification into commodities having high export
demand. New Zealand's educated farmers still have the drive, the
technical· knowledge, and in many cases the financial resources to take
advantage of significant market-led opportunities which are appearing.
The hope must be that the food and fibre systems will respond fast
enough, the international commodity markets improve soon enough. and
the internal economic problems reduced quickly enough so that an
upward growth spiral can begin again.
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Chapter 11
Farming Enterprises
Gerald Frengley
Farm Economist
Lincoln College
New Zealand's present farming enterprises have been shaped by a
variety of factors. In the 1850s, settlers arrived with a heritage of
English pastoral farming transplanting it into a new environment capable
of growing European pasture species and being farmed with English
livestock. The remoteness of New Zealand and the three-month sea
voyage back to European markets precluded export of agricultural
products at that time. As a result farming enterprises evolved around the
production of animal fats mostly for industrial use, wool, grain and some
flax fibre. At this time sheep farms tended to be extensive grazing
properties producing wool and tallow. Intensive small dairy holdings
producing hand-made butter also came into existence.
The character of New Zealand farms altered rapidly after the
introduction of refrigeration in the early 1880s. Britain granted New
Zealand unlimited market access for meat and dairy products in return
for access provisions for British manufacturers into the New Zealand
market (including the remarkable proviso that the infant New Zealand
whisky export industry should cease).
Farm sizes changed quickly to take advantage of the new freezing
technology. Dairying changed from a cottage industry exporting
industrial butterfat to cooperative farmer ventures supplying small
manufactories of export cheese and butter. Dairy farms increased in
number but herd sizes remained small as cows were hand milked.
Mechanical milking machines was not introduced until the 1920s.
11-1
The opportunity to sell perishable export products affected sheep farm
sizes. Extensive pastoral holdings formerly producing wool only were
subdivided into smaller farms producing fat stock. Cattle changed over
from predominantly draught to beef animals killed for export at the
newly established freezing works. These plants for preparing frozen
meat for export were widely established throughout New Zealand. They
were as much a key to the evolution of the sheep and beef enterprises as
the small dairy factories were to the expanding dairy industry. The clear
division between large-scale extensive pastoral holdings and small self-
sufficient farms gave way to a range of farm sizes and varying
enterprises as the opportunity to export perishable products from all parts
of New Zealand arose.
The horticultural industry was slow to develop. Most horticulture was
confined to fruit and vegetable production for the domestic market until
the 1950s, when apple and pear plantings created exportable surpluses.
The advent of specialised transport services including air transport, has
promoted the export development of high-value high-quality horticultural
products. The development and export of kiwifruit has been the prime
example over the last two decades.
Horticulture has merged into some dairying operations, as some sheep
and beef enterprises have given way to expanded dairying operations. A
variety of livestock enterprises have also developed to supply specialised
high-value products to markets in Europe, Asia and North America.
These incl ude deer, goats, fitch and opossums.
In general, high-volume/low-valued products are glvIllg way to
enterprises producing low volume/high-value products which often
require large capital investments. The one-man farm is being slowly
replaced by multiple-owned and corporate firms with better access to
required capital and new technology.
From the time New Zealand was settled, the backbone of cropping has
been predominantly feed grains and cereals. Pasture seeds have had a
limited place. However, extensive pastoral development and seed export
took place in the 1960s-1970s. Ryegrass and white clover crops
increased. Specialised crops to provide raw materials for vegetable oils,
pharmaceuticals and industry were also introduced. On poorer cropping
soils, higher valued livestock opportunities now substitute for cereals and
grains. On better soils cash cropping of vegetable overlaps with the field
production of peas and beans.
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A wide variety of farming enterprises now exists. Starting with
enterprises which require the greatest investment per hectare of land and
the greatest labour intensity, an approximate ordering is as follows:
Laboratory horticulture (tissue culture,
special seedlings)
Mushroom farms
Fish farms and acquaculture
Glasshouses and floriculture
Poultry
Pigs
Fitches
Opossums
Rabbits
Plant nurseries
Intensive orcharding (kiwifruit, cherries, nashi,
persimmons, and berry fruits).
Extensive orcharding (apples, pears, stone fruit)
Exotic livestock (llama, alpaca, antelope, thar)
Deer
Dairying
Goats
Cash cropping
Intensive sheep and beef finishing
Agro-forestry
Forestry
Extensive sheep and beef
It seems almost paradoxical that the last seven categories account fot
more than 95 percent of New Zealand's land in primary production.
As market demands and product prices change, the order of these
enterprises can be expected to vary. Competition from other countries,
technical substitutes, changing fashions, medical needs and consumer
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preferences all contribute to changes in market demand. Farmers
respond to these price changes as fast as their knowledge, access to cash-
flow capital, fixed capital investments, risk assessment and environment
permit. However, there is a very real reluctance to change from familiar
profitable farming enterprises to something new unless the potential
payoff is high. In a general profit decline as in the 1985/86 season,
only some farmers responded by changing enterprises. The remaining
farmers, constrained by limited capital and their environment were
unable to avoid the bad income losses.
Pastoral farming of exotic livestock and deer are the most profitable
enterprises. Dairying, goats, intensive livestock finishing for slaughter,
then extensive sheep and beef farming follow in about that order.
Sheep farms predominate over much of New Zealand ranging from
large wool-producing high country runs to intensive stock finishing
properties on high fertility soils. Pasture growth varies markedly
between seasons throughout New Zealand, and it is this variation which
determines the sheep farming system and the seasonal schedule of stock
management.
Winters are comparatively short in northern areas of the country with a
daily grass growth rate of 8-15 kilograms of dry matter per hectare for
about eight weeks in June, July and August. In southern areas, daily
grass growth falls below 8 kilograms of dry matter per day for up to 120
days during May to September. The high country experiences little or no
growth from May to October in many districts. Peak rates of growth
occur between late October in northern areas and mid December in the
high country. On fertile soils peak growth rates may exceed 80 kg dry
matter per hectare per day.
Westerly winds ensure that the western coasts of both Islands are
rarely affected by summer drought. They experience constant summer
daily growth rates of 25-35 kilograms of dry matter per hectare. The
mountainous 'spine' of New Zealand converts the predominant westerlies
to a hot and dry wind on the east coast. These winds cause summer
droughts about three years out of five in many regions. These droughts
may last only 4-6 weeks, which is not too disruptive, or they may set in
as early as October and last until April or May with serious effects on
stock management. Droughts exceeding four months occur with a
frequency of about one year in ten in the most afflicted eastern districts.
The most common sheep enterprise is a flock of ewes breeding its
own replacements. It is also the least flexible when unexpected seasonal
conditions occur. The flocks typically produce crossbred wool .and
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lambs for slaughter often sold to other farms for finishing. The ewes
usually last for five or six lambings, averaging better than 100 percent
lambing and 4.5 kilograms of wool. They usually commence lambing as
two year-olds.
Beef cattle are complementary to sheep for pasture management on
many of these properties, and on larger hill country farms may exceed
half the stock units wintered. In southern areas cattle wintering is more
difficult and fewer cattle are carried. Although sheep numbers are
approximately equal for the North and South Islands, the North has
almost four times as many beef cattle. South Island farms average
approximately 2,660 stock units in sheep and 260 cattle stock units in
cattle, while in the North Island the farms average 2,635 sheep and 980
cattle (stock unit basis).
The average size of the New Zealand sheep farm is just over 500
hectares almost all of which is grazed. Size varies from 9,240 hectares
on South Island high country to 204 and 185 hectares respectively on
North and South Island intensive finishing farms.
Over the past decade the terms of exchange (Le. prices received over
prices paid) on sheep and beef farms have fallen. By the 1985-86
season the real net farm income of the average sheep farm had fallen to
21 percent of the 1975-76 level (Meat & Wool Board Economic Service
Estimate, 1987). The net income of the average New Zealand sheep
farm is shown in Table 1.
Expenditure has been restricted for two seasons. Fertiliser usage and
farm maintenance have been below maintenance level for this period.
Farm employment has been reduced and there is little possibility of
restricting farm expenditure further without affecting the long run
viability. Liquidity problems may force further reductions in labour,
fertiliser and maintenance to achieve short run cost savings. Long run
losses in productivity could outweigh the savings through pasture
deterioration, weed invasion, reduced stock numbers and output.
In the 1985-86 period, 28 percent of the sheep and beef farms showed
no net income and 58 percent had cash deficits after allowing for
drawings, tax and principal repayments (Meat and Wool Board, August
1986).
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Table 1: Income and Expenditure of the Average New Zealand
Sheep and Beef Farm 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87
Actual Provisional Estimate
Gross Income 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87
Wool 46,954 42,000 47,700
Sheep 44,411 25,300 25,000
Cattle 21,745 18,600 20,000
Cropa) 16,444 16,300 13,700
Other 3,069 3,200 3,000
132,623 105,400 109,400
Expenditure
Fertiliser 14,146 8,500 8,500
Repairs and
maintenance 9,387 6,400 6,500
Interest 17,736 20,700 21,000
Other 57,146 55,800 56,000
98,415 91,400 92,000
Net Income 34,208 14,000 17,000
Real Net Income
(Base 1975-76= 100) 833 300 321
a) Cash crop income shown was obtained mostly on South Island
finishing and mixed finishing farms.
The opportunities of sheep and beef farmers to increase farm income
by increasing output are limited. Forestry options which may offer
profitable opportunities in the long run are affected by short run liquidity
problems. But it is technically feasible on most farms to replace sheep
and beef cattle with deer, goats, exotic livestock, or with other sheep and
beef livestock systems. An indication of the potential profitability of
these alternative enterprises is shown by the comparative gross margins
which include interest on livestock capital (Table 2). The gross margin
is derived by deducting variable costs from the enterprises' gross
income. Capital cost differences in the livestock systems can be
accounted for by including an interest charge as the opportunity cost of
capital invested in livestock.
The seasonal livestock feed demand pattern, or changes in permanent
farm labour or farm structures are not accounted for in the gross
margins as situations differ among farms. The gross margins are
calculated as net dollars per stock unit. Gross margins per hectare are
estimated by multiplying by the stocking rate.
Livestock gross margins are affected particularly by changes in interest
rates and the exchange rate. The gross margins shown in Table 2 have
varied by up to 30 percent within the 1986-87 season. The demand for
female stock for less common livestock, deer and goats, has inflated their
gross margins beyond their eventual stable level. Exotic livestock gross
margins have not been established as the numbers are smaIl and prices
are dependent on private and often confidential sales.
Some livestock systems are complementary to each other within a
range of stocking rates and classes of farm. Both goats and cattle are
complementary to sheep and the sheep gross margins are improved when
this occurs. The gain may approach 10 percent of the gross margin.
Average gross margins for sheep per stock unit on sheep and beef
cattle farms for the 1984-85 season varied from $19.10 on North Island
herd hilI country to $33.12 on intensive South Island finishing farms.
Cattle gross margins per stock unit varied from $14.20 on South Island
high country to $47.33 on South Island mixed finishing farms.
Livestock enterprises are not universally substitutable although cattle
and sheep are easily interchanged on many classes of farms. Goats can
be grazed on most farms with additional fencing usuaIly costing less than
$1 per metre. However, deer can be grazed only if adequate fencing is
erected costing approximately $10 per metre for boundary netting and $5
for internal fences. Deer also require specialised yards costing up to
$400 per stock unit for small herds. This capital investment makes the
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Table 2: Approximate Livestock Gross Margins for the 1986-87
Season.
$/Stock Unit
Ewe flock, breeding replacements and
finishing lambs
Ewe flock, breeding replacements and
seIling store lambs
All wool: Merino wethers
Drysdale wethers
Breeding cows, breeding replacements and
seIling weaners
27.50
23.50
26.30
22.50
16.20
Beef finishing buy weaner steers,
sell 22 mths
buy I8 mth bull calves,
sell 30 mths
rear dairy bull calves,
sell 22 mths
35.00
56.00
65.00
Deer: Breeding replacements, seIling weaners
Venison, buy weaners, sell 27 mths
Goats: Angora breedin& herd, producing mohair
Cashmere breeding herd producing
cashmere
Exotics: Llama, Alpaca, Thar, Antelope,
others. Minimum
68.00
40.00
280.00
40.00
100.00
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deer enterprise highly susceptible to economies of size, increasing herd
numbers once the sheds and fencing are in place. Trying to build up
breeding herd numbers is one reason why deer prices have stayed so
high for as long as they have.
Exotic livestock also require specialised fencing and handling facilities.
To effect a change to less common livestock enterprises may require
additional capital of up to $2,000 per stock unit. Adjustment to long run
market preferences favouring lean meat or specialised animal fibres may
necessitate additional capital investments and will certainly involve
several production period time lags to effect any appreciable change in
numbers. A large proportion of deer breeding stock were obtained by
live capture and this opportunity no longer exists. It never did for other
livestock, apart from limited numbers of goats and a few hundred thar
and chamois.
Substitution with dairy beef livestock could be increased but dairy cow
numbers are lower now than in 1972 and calf rearing tends to be labour
intensive. Traditional beef breeds are favoured by sheep and beef
farmers. Prices paid for dairy beef stock have been too low to ensure
that all bobby calves have been. reared. For example, 44 percent of
926,000 dairy calves are now slaughtered as bobbies. Of this total, only
about 750,000 may be suitable for rearing and finishing.
Dairying is concentrated in districts with reliable summer grass,
principally in western and northern parts of the North Island, and on
irrigated or moist eastern soils. Dairy farm average gross incomes have
fallen 18 percent from $111 ,000 to $91,400 during 1984-85 to 1986-87.
While farm working expenditures have been reduced this has not offset
the decline in gross income. A comparison of the 1984-85 season with
the 1986-87 season is given in Table 3.
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Table 3: Income and Expenditure of the Average New Zealand
Dairy Farm 1984-85, 1985-86, and 1986-87.
Gross Income 1984-85 1985-86 ]986-87
Cattle sales 13,993 9,376 14,704
(net of purchases)
Milkfat 96,558 96,829 76,]46
Other 510 450 532
111 ,061 ]06,655 9] ,381
Expenditure
Breeding
Fertiliser
and weeds
Repairs and
maintenance
Interest
General expenses
Net Income
2,141 2,569 1,526
9,849 9,299 7,305
6,024 5,936 3,290
14,648 ]8,633 19,160
30,755 35,096 33,053
63,417 71,533 64,334
47,644 35,122 27,047
Source: MAF Monitoring Report, November 1986
The fall in net incomes from ]984-85 to the 1986-87 season is 43
percent in nominal terms. The net income here is the sum available to
meet drawings, taxation, debt repayment and capital expenditure. Dairy
farmers have not reduced general farm expenditure (dairy shed costs,
electricity, vehicle costs, etc) as these items are comparatively fixed.
It is not easy for dairy farmers to substitute more profitable
enterprises to offset falling milk fat prices, although some marginal
adjustments are possible in calf rearing policies, dairy beef and possibly
some cash crop production. While horticultural enterprises may be
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substituted by some dairying in the long run, short run capital
requirements for horticultural development make this option financially
risky.
Many dairy farms are not suitable for the production of export quality
horticultural produce anyway due to unsuitable location, climate, soil
conditions and expertise. Deer farming and exotic livestock production
could offer prospects as substitutes for dairying on these farms, but their
impact would be minimal in relation to the total number of dairy cattle.
By contrast, national dairy herd numbers could be expanded by up to 5
percent per year (l million stock units) if profitability and capital for
expansion was adequate.
Cash Cropping
Historically, cash cropping has been characterised by fixed rotations
centred on cereals. Pulse crops, brassicas and some seeds are also
grown. Cash cropping, apart from maize, is largely confined to east
coast regions, the Manawatu and Southland where summer conditions
are suitable. A wide range of crops are grown and flexible livestock
enterprises are integrated with these to best effect.
The fall of up to 40 percent in the wheat and barley prices in the
1986-87 season has affected the viability of cropping farms. Gross
margins for prime lamb production now exceed those of many traditional
crops. Cropping farms are the most versatile of farm types as most
crops and livestock can be produced. Additional costs for irrigation and
livestock structures may have to be incurred to effect some transitions.
Some cropping farms are not as flexible as others due to significant
amounts of equipment and rotations constrained by crop disease and soil
conditions. The advent of minimal tillage has improved crop substitution
and increased flexibility for most cropping farmers by reducing organic
matter losses and improving soil structure.
The high capital cost of the specialised machinery required for cash
cropping _. headers, drills and large tractors - establishes a fixed cost
which is not accounted for in the gross margin. Calculations for 1984
(Frengley, 1985) show that machinery costs total $350 per hectare, and
that machinery replacement costs were almost equal to fuel, oil and
repair costs. The gross margins (Table 4) account for all variable costs
but not plant replacement for any tractor or irrigation equipment. As
average cropping farm machinery replacement costs are approaching
$180 per hectare, some crops are no longer profitable.
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Table 4: Representative Gross Margins for Cash Cropping Farms
for the 1986-87 Season
$/ha
Ewe flock breeding replacements and
_ finishing lambs (17 SU/ha)
Two year ewes finishing lambs (17 SU/ha)
Dairy beef
Wheat, winter sown (5t/ha, $200/t)
Wheat, spring sown (4.5t/ha, $200/t)
Barley, malting (5t/ha, $180/t)
Barley, feed (5 .5t!ha, $130/t)
Barley, winter (2.5t/ha, $130/t)
Peas, vining (5t!ha, $220/t)
Peas, seed (3.5t/ha, $310/t)
Lentils (1 .5t/ha, $750/t)
Rape, oilseed (2.5t/ha, $320/t)
Ryegrass seed (900 kg M.D.lha, $1.20/kg)
Whiteclover seed (350 kg M.D./ha, $3.00/kg)
Grazing forage
Hay 220b/ha
467
486
1090
305
275
490
270
95
690
635
685
405
595
500
22
330
Source: Cropping and Livestock Gross Margins, 1986/87, Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries, Lincoln
When variable costs are a high proportion of any gross income, the
margin tends to be sensitive to relatively small changes in yield or
product prices. In years when yields or prices are low, losses are easily
incurred. Potatoes and some brassica seed crops are a case in point
and, although profits may at times be high, they are regarded as risky
crops. Additionally, the demand for some crops is limited especially
when tricky sales are confined to the domestic market. Thus, despite the
versatility of cropping farms, enterprise substitution is not as
straightforward as one might think since the changes by some farmers
attempting to improve profits are frustrated by other farmers following
suit.
Sheep may be substituted profitably for cash crops on many farms
depending on the then current prices. This is especially true for farms
whose yields fall below those given above or where crop quality is
inadequate to obtain the prices shown. The dairy beef numbers are
inadequate to support a significant expansion in traditional cropping
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areas. However, they could be freighted from dairying districts and
effect some crop substitution. Problems associated with rearing dairy
calves detract from this enterprise.
Opportunities exist for growing pharmaceutical crops, crops with
specialist qualities and export flowers yet they require capital investment
and established markets. For example, pyrethrum, rosemary and other
herbs, peonies, gentians, tulips, gladiolus, daffodils, gypsophila and
status offer prospects. Many crops supply thin markets, involve tight
delivery contracts or must be licenced and protected. For some,
technical requirements are demanding and investment in specialised
processing equipment may be necessary.
The overlap of cash cropping with horticulture on better soils is
exemplified by the opportunity to grow fruit trees on mixed cropping
farms. If adequate shelter and irrigation are present and frost risk is
minimal, orchards of apples, pears, nashi and stone fruit can be
established. Most of these farms are also suitable for berry fruits, nut
trees, and grape vines.
While the effect on total crop area may not be large as horticultural
crops are substituted, their profitability may at times be very high.
However, such diversification will require large capital investments, new
knowledge and additional labour. The riskiness of these ventures may
necessitate financial and ownership restructuring to attract the capital,
technical and marketing expertise required. The gross margins for some
of these crops may exceed $250,000 per hectare but they involve major
risks with crop quality and marketing.
When mixed cropping is in the doldrums, sheep and cattle may be
substituted especially on poorer soils. In the long run crop substitution
on better soils may offer more important opportunities but will involve
intensive agribusiness planning to create effective and manageable
specialised operations. Farmers who are reluctant to buy the knowledge
of others who have the appropriate expertise will delay enjoying profits if
the decision is made to diversify.
Horticulture
Horticu Itu ral enterprises wh ich supply domestic and export markets
include: orchards, fresh export produce, berry fruits, market gardens for
domestic markets, fresh and dried flowers, bulbs, glasshouse factories
(tomatoes, mushrooms), nurseries, and laboratories (tissue culture).
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Intensive margin horticulture involving advances in biotechnology and
genetic engineering will be limited principally by capital for research and
human ingenuity. Technological progress in these fields tends to be
punctuated by bursts of new technology dependent on some break-
through. While it is not possible to estimate the likely impact of new
technology on anyone farm, it is essential we become aware of the
opportunities it poses for New Zealand as well as the competition we can
expect. For example, a bovine growth hormone has been used
successfully in the United States. It causes profitable increases in milk
production per cow of up to 20 percent. Genetic engineering has
increased the size of beef animals, chickens, turkeys and ducks.
Embryo transplants are practical realities for high quality stock now, and
could even make major changes to commercial sheep farms in only three
to five years.
The principal development in horticultural enterprises over the last two
decades has been the emergence of the kiwifruit industry which by June
1986 was exporting $294 million worth of fruit annually. The crop was
introduced to New Zealand last century but extensive planting did not
begin until the late 1960s. The profitability of kiwifruit promoted a
land price boom in areas suitable for the orchards which displaced sheep
and dairy farms. Current high interest rates have affected the
establishment of new orchards as liquidity break-even now exceeds eight
years, and capital pay-back takes up to 13 years before tax.
Apple and stone-fruit orchards have been extending onto cropping
land, and plantings of nashi and persimmons are in their infancy. As
time lags of at least seven years occur before full production is reached,
capital inputs of $9,000 per hectare are commonly required to sustain
initial investments and working capital requirements.
Enterprise substitution is easily effected with short-lived horticultural
crops, but when the profitability of long run crops fails, invested capital
may be lost. In recent years the berry fruit growers (blackcurrants,
blueberries, raspberries) have been affected by falling prices. While the
technology to grow many horticultural crops is known, without adequate
market research and an appropriate agribusiness infrastructure the risks
of capital loss will be high.
Ultimately new enterprises will evolve and substitute profitably for old
ones for two reasons. First, to fill a discovered market niche, and
second, because an enterprise readily suited to the environment is tied to
an existing economically viable market. Future evolution in both
agriculture and horticulture will depend on intensive market and
technological research, the willingness of growers to buy and use the
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expertise of others, and the creation of satisfactory agribusiness
structures to attract both knowledge and capital.
It is likely that the swing away from the traditional owner-operator
farm will persist. There are many potential advantages. Multiple land
ownership through companies and partnerships makes capital more
accessible and spreads financial risks. Integrated production, processing
and marketing of high-valued products can be more easily ensured with
company structures which allow cross shareholding. Information
relating to producing and marketing these products is often restricted and
can be made more accessible through cross shareholding or cooperative
structures.
Finally, advances in farm management are promoted by better
information, management control and analysis. Demands for specialised
advice are increasing and will continue as product diversity increases.
Electronic advances affecting access to information and improved
computer software are changing the farmer's business orientation.
Demands for advice will follow the need for intensified production and
business information and the character of the management consultancy
services will change. The broad spectrum of technological training
provided at universities is at a crossroad. Greater specialisation will be
needed for future consultants. A distinctive role for farm business
management specialists has arisen apart from the technological
specialties.
In the future, improved farm profits will be allied to changes in
ownership structures, industry integration, business management and
knowledge. Policies which promote improvement in these areas will
strengthen New Zealand's agriculture.
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Chapter 12
Farm Income and
Policy
Tim Wallace
Agricultural Economist
University of CallfOlnia, Berkeley/Lincoln College
Farm income statistics tell a great deal about average farms of all
kinds but they do not tell much about how farm income relates to farm
size or ownership. As a result it is difficult to tell how many New
Zealand farmers actually create various proportions of the country's farm
production. and therefore how many farmers are imminently concerned
with agricultural policy. For example, one knows in the United States
that approximately 80 percent of the farm income is produced by less
than 20 percent of the country's 2.2 million commercial farms, and
therefore that most farm policy really only concerns about half a million
farmers.
Perhaps during 1935-1975, it was not essential to know how many
New Zealand farmers were affected by Government policy because one
simply knew that 'most were'. Several authors (Hawke, Pryde,
Lattimore, and Ross. Chapters 1,6 and 23,9 and 22, and 10
respectively) note and refer to a mindset of agricultural dominance which
pervaded much of Government's perspective and actions during that
time. However, since the mid-1970s worldwide forces have caught New
Zealand in a maelstrom of change. Using information on the major
farm types, and by allocating derived yields and prices to implied farm
ownership patterns, an attempt is made to determine how many New
Zealand farmers actually generate various shares of the country's farm
income.
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Dairy
The modern dairy system began in the late 1950s as farmers converted
to whole milk collection, sold their pigs, and became specialised milk
producers. However, relevant comparisons to current dairy farming
only go back to 1967/68. At that time the majority of dairy farmers had
less than 100 cows, about a quarter of the dairy farms had herds of 100-
150 head, and only about 15 percent of the herds were larger than 150
cows. In the 20 years since then the picture has reversed itself. Almost
three quarters of the herds have more than 100 cows, and over 40
percent of them more than 150 cows. It is not too uncommon for a
herd to have 600-800 millJng cows.
Income has moved in direct relation to the changes in size of the dairy
herd. In 1967/68, just over one third of the farmers produced about 54
percent of the gross dairy farm income; in 1985/86, about 42 percent of
the farms produced almost 60 percent of the revenue. Farms with over
200 milking cows produced only 3 percent of the country's gross dairy
income in 1967/68 compared to almost 33 percent in 1985/86. Herds of
less than 100 head comprised about 200 percent of the dairy farms in
1985/86 yet accounted for less than 10 percent of the gross dairy farm
income.
Sheep
Attempts to obtain a realistic estimate of the distribution of income
from sheep proved difficult indeed. There are eight different major types
of sheep farms recognised by the Meat and Wool Board's Economic
Survey. Income estimates from strictly wool farms proved somewhat
easier to get than for farms running mixed flocks.
In 1971, about 27 percent of the approximately 37,500 owners had
flocks larger than 2,000 ewes and exercised control over revenues from
about two-thirds of New Zealand's sheep. By 1984, one third of the
39,600 owners, which now included a significant number of small
'hobby farms', had flocks of over 2,000 head and accounted for over
three-quarters of the sheep. These numbers indicate that sheep were
profitable enough during 1971-1984 to attract almost 2,100 new owners
and add some 10 million sheep to the industry. There was still
considerable income stability for owners despite the industry's growth.
Beef
Little can be said of the ownership/income changes in beef, simply
because the data are not readily available. One can assume, however,
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that since joint farming of sheep and beef is the rule rather than the
exception, it is highly likely that the ownership situation has been much
the same for beef as it has for sheep although income for beef has been
more variable.
In 1983/84, about 65 percent of the beef farmers had herds of under
100 head yet they garnered less than 15 percent of the gross beef
income. Five percent of the herds, all over 500 head, accounted for
over one third of the income; about 40 percent of the herds, numbering
100-500 head, brought in about half the beef income.
The trend is perhaps clearer in beef than it is for sheep: large herds
held in a relatively few hands, a large number of small herds held by
many owners, and a persistent middle-sized majority accounting for
about half of the industry's income.
Wheat and Barley
A scarcity of historical data on wheat and barley growers in New
Zealand offers little hope of obtaining accurate information about
national trends of ownership related to farm size and income. However,
an economic survey of wheat and barley growers in 1984 estimated that
about 70 percent of the growers produced about 43 percent of the crop,
and about 8 percent of the growers produced about 23 percent. The
same trends were evident for barley with just over 6 percent of the
farmers producing almost 29 percent of the crop, and some 75 percent
of the farmers producing only 40 percent of the crop.
Another survey in 1985 confirmed these patterns. Wheat has not
historically been an important export crop and it is only since 1980 that
there have been any significant exports of barley. The downturn in
world grain prices has effected the profitability of both crops, and from
]986/87, many farmers have decided not to grow either wheat or barley,
even in pasture renovation programmes, because of the currently high
production and harvest costs and the persistently low returns.
What can be said authoritatively about these crops is that in 1931
approximately 100,772 hectares of wheat were harvested at an average
yield of about 2 tonnes. In 1984, wheat was harvested from only 68,680
hectares but the yield had risen to 4.6 tonnes, a 130 percent increase.
The boom in barley exports in the early 1980s resulted in a massive
increase in barley planted, from 7,377 hectares in 1931 to 166,000
hectares in 1984. Average yields for those acreages were about 2.0
tonnes in 1931 and 4.5 tonnes in 1984, rising almost as quickly as did
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those for wheat. It appears we know more about the physical attributes
of grain farms than we do their ten ure characteristics.
Horticulture
From 1978 to 1986, apple and pear growers have almost doubled their
export markets for both fresh and processed products. The domestic
market remained fairly stable over that time. Most orchards remain on
the small side with over 80 percent of them around 12 hectares.
The same general ownership pattern is also true for kiwifruit
producers. About two thirds of the growers have orchards less than 6
hectares, and over 80 percent have less than 9 hectares.
The story of kiwifruit exports is one of even more successful
international marketing than for apples and pears. Export sales rose
from 2,155 tonnes in 1970/71 to 39,04 I tonnes in 1982/83, and 86,454
tonnes in 1984/85 - an increase of over 40 fold! Many kiwifruit
orchards have been planted on the basis of this success. While one
knows that kiwifruit sales are high, information about numbers of
owners, yields and sales by orchard size is stilI difficult to obtain.
Considerations
The fairly stable and comfortable situation that was farming's lot from
1935 to 1980 permitted an inward farmer concentration on simply
producing quantity of product without much attention paid to its being
sold. Market forces had been dampened by either long term imperial
preference,· UK contracts or domestic producer subsidies. Low
production costs, no 'foot and mouth' disease, and ready access to US
and UK nlarkets meant farmers could sell all they could produce without
really much effort. There was little need for farmers to consider product
quality or how other world markets might react to New Zealand's
products. Many farmers were led to believe mistakenly, that the food
world revolved around producers not consumers. Even many consumers
were unaware of this situation since they, too, benefited by some lower
food prices.
Today's farmers, farm organisations and government officials are
increasingly aware of the market forces of product quality, value added
food items, consumer preference, market image and non-price
competition. The old 'increased numbers game' for farmers has become
untenable.
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If one takes a 50 year perspective on the sources of farm income one
finds the primary commodities of the 1930s are still the big earners now:
sheep, beef, wool and dairy. Although cheese exports were less in 1984
than they were in 1931, wool, sheepmeat and beef markets have all
grown. Despite subsidised production elsewhere, New Zealand's
comparative advantage in livestock production resulted in an increasing
volume of sales.
What gives cause for optimistism about New Zealand's role in the
world agricultural scene is the number of new commodities being
produced and marketed, many of them hardly thought of 50 years ago.
Kiwifruit is a good example of an industry really less than 20 years old.
Wood pulp and chips is another one. Deer for venison, hides, velvet
and recreational hunting is yet another industry barely a decade old.
Although goats were present in the 1930s, goat farming for fibre has
experienced phenonemal growth recently.
Along with the new products, beef and veal exports have increased 10
times over the last 50 years, dried and condensed milk exports about 40
times, casein about 25 times, and apples and pears about 16 times.
Other income opportunities include value added products like fruit juice,
pate. fresh and prepared seafood items. processed meats. glass-house
horticultural exports and specialty fibres like cashmere and mohair.
The last three years have revealed that many farmers while capable
managers in the physical sense of increasing grass, grain and livestock
yields. have not been equally competent financial managers. This is the
Achilles heel of a great many farmers throughout the world.
Foreclosures, bankruptcy sales, and special loan adjustment requests are
the result.
Yet many farmers will survive this downturn. How many? No one
knows. Certainly not all, and not all who would like to farm will be
able to do so. The requirements for successful farmers of the future will
be greater than for those of the past. While increased· technical
knowledge and market sophistication will dominate, a change of attitude
about the business of farming will also be necessary. Farmers will be
concerned about technology in different ways: soil and water
stewardship will be even more important than now; managers will need
to be more aware of quality than just quantity of production; and more
research into what consumers want and then trying to produce it will be
necessary. It will mean following a management system with better
knowledge about how one change on the farm will affect its other
attributes, and which managerial tools are the most useful to gain a
competitive edge. More time will be spent in reading, thinking and
12-5
managing; less time will be spent actually on the tractor or in the
paddock because, increasingly, that work will be hired out. Once a
certain level of farm size and maintenance is attained, most farmers will
find they can make more from being managers than they can from
shifting stock.
Let us take a closer look. New Zealand farmers have already learned
how a mass response to an official urging to diversify production into,
say, horticulture or deer can leave many producers gasping from effort
and just as low on funds as they ever were. Market awareness does not
mean mass awareness. It means careful selection, finding a niche,
producing and marketing for it on a scale sufficient to nuture and
develop it rather than drown it in instant productivity.
While there still will be much marketing effort directed at Europe and
the US markets, perhaps the more aggressive
producer/processor/marketeers will be attracted to the Pacific Rim
countries closer at hand. In many respects these countries offer more
opportunities for tactful and persistent marketing rather than continued
battering at the door through GATT. The information presented on
international trade (Lattimore, Chapters 9) indicate that the stability of
the US market is likely to continue and offer some growth potential, and
that the UK and EEC markets will continue to be difficult to access.
This also implies that the growth markets for New Zealand involve
relatively closer neighbours where there is population growth, more
people with money to pay for value-added commodities, and the ability to
service these markets becoming ever more technologically feasible.
In the future, government policy makers can sort out four main
farmer groups who will be asking for their help in different ways. The
plain survivalists in farming - those who have never spent anything on
their farms since they began farming, obtained the land freehold, have
chosen to remain independent of everyone and maintain a life style
geared to the income their land produces - will seek help to keep the
status quo against all intrusion.
Another group will be those who have kept their borrowing under
control, have a reasonable debt/asset ratio, and can finance their debt
repayment from current cash-flow. This group will produce the
agricultural entrepreneurs who will press for access to international
markets, lessened import restrictions, and help in fighting "too stringent
environmental and consumer health" proposals.
Then there are those who are already in trouble due to a reduced
cash-flow on top of an unmanageable debt load. These people will
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probably not succeed even with revised RBFC loans since most of those
readjustments take the form of revalued loans, not lowered repayment
bills. They will still have trouble meeting them from current sales.
And, finally there will be the large group of small and/or part-time
farmers who are not dependent on Government farm finance props
because they usually have sufficient non-farm income to live
comfortably.
Ultimately, the pattern will emerge of a sizable majority of the
production being in the hands of a relatively few farms, many small
sized farms operating because their owners approve of the life style, and
a shrinking group of medium-sized farms which will blend slowly into
one or the other of the two groups as time and inheritance dictate.
Many of the surviving farmers will evolve a different attitude about the
issue of ownership or control of their farms. In part it will be their
response to risk sharing, and in part it will be because they will need
access to capital in order to carry out their new management
programmes. While ownership of land is the dream of most farmers. as
the last five to ten years have shown, it can be a very expensive dream.
Land is an asset which can appreciate - and depreciate - in value. It is
one which farmers use all their lives but do not think about selling until
the end of their active physical work period when most land is passed to
the next generation; one which is fairly difficult to sell at short notice;
but one which is a major factor in a manager's ability to borrow and
repay capital.
If a farmer could farm the same land. with a certain lease and option
to renew. thereby turning the fixed cost of ownership into a variable cost
of tax deductible rent, then he/she would have more capital to work with,
be less vulnerable to land market forces which affect one's borrowing
ability, cause lenders to be more cognisant of managerial ability, and
spread the risk associated with farming. For example, if one borrowed
one million dollars today at 20 percent to buy -land, one would have to
bring in $200,000 a year just to pay the interest. On the other hand, if
one could lease the same ground for $100.000, the balance could be put
into renting additional land, extra inputs, or a variety of other
enterprises.
Depending upon the attitude of the farmer, some land could be owned
and some rented, the proportion of each being dependent upon the
individual farmer's attitude toward risk. Corporatisation is another
option. Here, shares in a farm could be sold to an investor who would
buy into the farm, sharing the risks of both production and marketing.
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This approach is more pertinent when value-added items are integrated
into a straight production enterprise.
A change in the way of looking at farming and of approaching the
farm use of land and water, however, does not necessarily mean that
there will be a change in the attitudes and values of those who actually
farm. Many renters have a more active concern about conservation of
land and water than do the actual owners who are not active on it each
day.
There is no denying the 'Kiwi ingenuity' practised by farmers. There
is much of it, inventive, adaptive and creative. However, this ingenuity
manifests itself mostly on farms, and does not extend past the farm gates
into marketing, or into actually moving a raw farm commodity into a
value-added package offered for sale. The potential promise of this on-
farm ingenuity seems not yet fully convinced it can extend itself to some
type of value-added production. Yet most of the managerial problems
are the same type, albeit on a different scale and with a different
clientele. Perhaps the obstacle is perspective on the kinds of value-added
products that might work.
Value-added products can attract a variety of different items. For
example, shredded and sliced vegetable packs in various sizes are
increasingly popular with restaurants, hotels and fast food service places.
This trend is compatible with the increased importance of tourism in
New Zealand and in the Pacific Rim countries close by which are
serviced by refrigerated air cargo planes. The horticulture industry
already grows many vegetables throughout the year, thus ensuring a
continuing supply to the market. One approach would be to conduct a
market demand cost feasibility study for: vegetable packs, transporting
the product, and distributing it to selected buyers emphasising delivery of
a combination of fresh produce with little or no chemical contamination.
If the venture seemed economically possible, then it would require the
management task of assembling growers of a variety of commodities to
participate in the venture. Payment could be for the commodity only, or
for a share of the value added pack as sold to the ultimate buyer.
Special markets such as that for processed baby food, could be
explored. New Zealand's contaminent free environment could be
capitalised on. Advertising campaigns could push the idea that since the
'cleanest' vegetables are found here, that therefore the processed fruits
and vegetables created here are naturally the world's "purest". Markets
would be not only for young people, but for the rapidly growing group
who are concerned about their diet and health, for hospitals and other
public health agencies concerned about their ability to provide
wholesome meals for both clients and patients.
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An important new development. accelerated by the recent hard times.
is a growing interest in bio-control of pests as being less expensive than
chemical controls, equally effective, and certainly more sustainable. As
such. they also bring in more net revenue to the producer when
introduced to consumers increasingly interested in less chemical
involvement with their food. There is also the possibility of producing
the various bio-control predator insects, and so on, for export.
New technology indicates additional ways to improve farm income.
With the ability to purchase and import strains of imported genetic
material, there is no reason why New Zealand's farmers cannot excel in
the embryo-transplant business for growing the best breeds of wool,
meat or exotic animals. Rather than considering a limited sheepmeat
and beef market, perhaps it would pay a grower to establish a mid-
eastern lamb breeding programme, a fine carpet wool breeding
programme, a North American fat lamb breeding programme, or even a
zoo replacement stock programme? The object would be to translate
culturally different market demands for animals into a responsive animal
breeding programme. This would necessitate improved ways of doing
business involving knowledge of contracts, leases and finance. It would
also require allowances for building up breeding herds to perform for
those markets, and for determining a salvage value for the herds when
the markets evolved into some other market opportunity.
Concerns about rural living, the 'way of life ethics', and the
maintenance of rural communities are currently evident throughout New
Zealand. There is no doubt that as farm income patterns shift so do
living patterns for rual communities. Fewer farmers means less
commercial activity for a community, and a likely decrease in
population. Yet many communities have responded to the challenge by
developing other sources of income such as recreational hunting, fishing
and farm visits. The magnificent horse industry and the attitude towards
horses and racing in this country must be viewed as an active and
positive force for rural areas.
The raising of exotic animals, apart from deer and goats, can also
hold promise for interested and capable persons. The breeding of
wildfowl for both domestic and overseas markets could develop into a
large industry. Ducks, pheasant, quail, guinea hen and peacocks could
be raised under domestic conditions in much the same manner as deer
have been domesticated. Markets for these birds could be found
overseas in Korea. Japan, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Indonesia and
the Malay peninsula. The limits could well be those imposed by the lack
of entreprenuerial imagination and drive rather than Government
regulations or physical boundaries.
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New value added endeavours could also prove complementary to the
sale of traditional commodities. For example. instead of selling grain as
only grain, various mixes could be packaged for 'wild fowl' feed, which
could then finally be sold in the form of processed chilled or frozen
birds on gourmet markets throughout the world.
New technology has also extended itself to fish farming located from
the North Island to Marlborough Sounds and Stewart Island. Although
a relatively new industry for New Zealand, it has already established
itself well for mussels and crayfish in Japan and North America, and for
several kinds of fresh frozen fish world-wide. In fact, when it comes to
a species like orange roughy, it is difficult to obtain a fresh serving here
in New Zealand!
One fact that cannot be escaped is that the commercial salmon farming
interests will clash with those of the deep sea trawlers, and both will
have to compete with the sports fishing people. Trout will also become
vulnerable to commercial interests of all kinds. There are many markets
abroad which would delight in obtaining fresh, or frozen New Zealand
trout. It already has a positive world-wide reputation.
Ultimately, the Government will have to make a decision about how
much it wants to appease domestic sports people and associated services,
or encourage employment growth and development in other kinds of
commercial fish markets. The issue will be one of equity: is it fair for
sportspeople to lock up one of the world's great salmon and trout
producing potentials without considering the ensuing employment
possibilities? Cannot the three industries be run simultaneously on some
basis? And isn't determining that basis, perhaps, the real issue?
Share farming perhaps may be worth another look. For example,
there is the possibility of lamb or beef producers sharing in the fat
animal price or carcass v.alue even though they do not have the grass or
grain to finish the animals. Hill country producers could place store
lambs in fattening areas with a grain farmer supplementing the grass if
needed for special markets. All three could then share in the final value
on some pre-determined basis, especially if the animals were sold to a
specific buyer selected because he paid for the quality of animal
produced. Care would have to be taken in determining the share
arrangement, but it could be done and it could reduce the cash-flow
problems that are now besetting New Zealand farmers.
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The Future
There is a future for many New Zealand farmers but it will be
different. Management outlook will have to change to meet a variety of
new forces including new products, new forms of value-added food
items, and new ways of coping with risk.
The recognition and change process has already begun. Farm income
will follow new forks in old paths. The better farmers will choose
correctly among those new options. Fewer differences will be evident
between the successful farmer and the successful urban business person.
Ultimately, we'll have to face the fact that most business people make the
same kinds of decision. draw on the same sources of capital, and sell to
the same kinds of people.
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Chapter 13
New Zealand's Agribusiness
Roger Juchau, Derek Newman
Financial Specialists
Uncolll College
Agribusiness, in its widest sense, comprises the entire agricultural
system (Figure I). These activities make up a complex interrelated
system, the principal elements of which are usually defined as the farm
input sector, the farming sector, and the product marketing sector. As
in any complex system the effective functioning of the whole depends on
each part efficiently servicing its dependent operations.
In early agricultural systems the farmer provided all input
requirements, grew a crop, undertook further processing where
required, and then transported it to a marketplace. But as agriculture
evolved the farmer found it more profitable to deal with agricultural
production allowing others to specialise in the input supply, processing,
distribution and selling activities. Lower costs, higher prices, and more
varieties of product were the initial on-farm results of this specialisation.
Today the farmer is a specialist producer of farm output, choosing a mix
of inputs and enterprises in an attempt to maximise profit, and adjusting
operations where the relative costs or prices of these factors alter.
The importance of agribusiness becomes evident when consideration is
given to its position between the farmer and the consumer. One global
estimate has major agribusiness companies processing and marketing
over two thirds of rural produce and they are often claimed to be a
contributor to the low prices paid to farmers for produce. On the cost-
input side of farming, agribusiness products and services (machinery,
marketing, chemicals, transport insurance, credit) influence at least half
of the input costs and can strongly affect cost structures in farming
through product differentiation and monopsonistic pricing practices.
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Outside the farm production sector, agribusiness has certainly
achieved oligopolistic powers in many areas of the input and processing
sectors. Oligopolistic agrifirms have collective purchasing and marketing
powers enabling them to wield influence over farmers who are not
concentrated in many supply and sale markets. On the other hand.
consumers and the owners of agrifirms have reaped many benefits -
consumers with product variety and lower prices, owners with
competitive returns on their investments.
Goldberg (1974), summarised the importance of agribusiness as
1/ employing over 60% of the world's economically active population ...
agribusiness involves all those individuals and organisations engaged in
the production, processing, transport, storage, financing, regulation and
marketing of the world's food and fibre supplies. In effect .agribusiness
is a seed-to-consumer system composed of a series of closely related
activities that together enable agricultural produce to flow frol11 the farm
to the marketplace ... 1/
INPUT SECTOR
Feed Ferti liser Chemical
Seed Machinery Finance
i ,.
AGRISERVICES FARMING SECTOR
Public ~ Livestock
Private Crops
Forest Products
1 Nursery ProductsIStorage
Processing
~
Distribution
MARKETING SECTOR
Figure I: Phases of Agribusiness
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The Farm Input Sector
The farm input supply sector emerged when farmers realised that, by
purchasing input supplies from those who held a comparative economic
advantage, they could increase their profitability. Recognition of this
comparative advantage increased as transportation difficu Ities decreased,
and resulted in the formation and growth of the substantial farm supply
businesses which today provide such requisites as chemicals, fertilizers,
machinery and finance.
Over the past few decades the mix of inputs supplied to farming has
changed dramatically. The major area of this change has been the
substitution of other inputs for labour. Not only has labour become
relatively more expensive (which alone would account for some of the
shift), but technological advances have made other inputs more effective
resulting in increased 'farm productivity. Good examples of this are the
seed supply industry where biotechnical advances have caused substantial
increases in productivity for very little extra cost, and the farm
machinery industry where technological advances have rapidly made
labour highly productive.
Farm inputs can be generally divided into four classes: energy, farm
maintenance, capital assets, and farm credit. Energy inputs include
power, fuel, and the labour provided by the farmer, his employed staff,
and assorted contractors. Farm maintenance inputs include supplies
such as animal health, weedicides, pesticides and other chemicals,
fertilizers, seeds, transportation and administration. Farm capital asset
inputs include livestock and machinery, fencing, water supply and the
land itself. Farm credit inputs include the long and short term farm
credit provided by trading banks, stock and station agencies, finance
companies and trade credit.
Much of the farm input sector is composed of small, local,
independent businesses such as the land agency, accountancy firm,
shearing contractor, veterinarian, and timber mill. However there are
also a handful of very large businesses dealing with farm inputs such as
chemicals, fertilizers, farm credit, and general farm merchandise best
characterised by the stock and station agencies. The major corporations
involved in agrichemicals in Australia and New Zealand are listed in
Table 1.
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Table 1: Major World Agrichemical Corporations
Bayer
Ciba-Geigy
Shell
Monsanto
Rhone-Poulenc
ICI
BASF
Stauffer
Du Pont
Cyanamid
Dow
Union Carbide
Eli Lilly
Kumiai
FMC
Schering
Hoescht
Rohn & Hass
D. Shamrock
Sandox
Corporation
Present in
Aust. & N.Z.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Base
Country
W. Germany
Switzerland
U.K.
U.S.A.
France
U.K.
W. Germany
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
Japan
U.S.A.
W. Germany
W. Germany
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
Switzerland
World Agrichemical
Sales 1976
Total US $111
1300
975
600
525
400
390
365
325
320
290
280
270
260
194
192
180
175
160
130
124
Source: OECD
The use of all farm inputs, except labour, has increased over the
years. The substitution of other inputs for farm labour has coincided
with fewer but larger farming units, and some decline in rural
population.
With increases in the range and quality of available inputs one would
hope for increases in productivity and a reduction of labour costs. But
one input item such as the cost of finance can alter the whole situation
and well lead to reduced profit levels.
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Table 2 shows the composition of farm costs in New Zealand
(including marketing costs), and groups the costs on the basis of the
proportion of relevant agrifirms' business which can be said to be
conducted with the farm sector.
Table 2: Composition of Farm Costs (Average Range 1984)
Proportion of
Firm's Business
with Farming
Cost Category Percent
Range
Most Machinery and Maintenance 15-20
Chemical and Veterinary Supplies 3-8
Fertiliser 5-8
Partial Marketing 5-10
Interest and Rent 7-12
Seed and Fodder 5-10
Contractors 5-8
Little Wages 10-15
Electricity and Fuel 5-10
The significance of the input sector is particularly evident in
developments in the agrichemical and agrimachinery industries. As
observed by Sargent (1985) these industries are firmly established as
"the principal architects of the 'second revolution' from which today's
industrialised system of agriculture has emerged".
The Farming Sector
The farm production sector, has been dealt with in detail in Chapters
10-12. Some summary observations are provided here. Table 3 shows
farm numbers by type and average size.
13-5
Table 3: Numbers of Farmers by Class, and Farm Size (1984)
Class Area
Farm Numbers Average Size
Farm Type No. Prop'n 1000 Prop'n Area/Farm
% ha % ha
Dairy 15711 20.7 1356 6.4 86
Sheep 28129 37.1 11859 55.8 422
Crop 2196 2.9 1421 6.6 575
Pigs 625 0.8 18 101
Horses 777 1.0 18 30
Deer 466 0.6 44 0.2 23
Other
Livestock 2786 3.7 821 3.9 295
Poultry 444 0.6 7 16
Market
Gardening 1737 2.3 37 0.2 22
Orchards 2520 3.3 52 0.2 13
Other
Horticulture 2510 3.3 52 0.2 21
Other Farming 3483 4.6 529 2.5 152
Plantations 791 1.0 2901 13.6 3668
Idle 5429 7.2 1947 9.2 3593
TOTAL 75745 21166
Source: Agricultural Statistics 1984
Recent events in the farming sector show a trend toward larger and
more specialised farming units, a decreasing input/output ratio, an
increase in productivity per labour unit, and, despite some recent trends
to the contrary, a general increase in both gross income and costs of
production.
The major reason for these changes is the improved management
skills of farmers. Concentrated efforts in the areas of production
management have enabled others to specialise in the supply of inputs,
and in the processing and marketing of outputs.
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The Produce Marketing Sector
In early agricultural systems the farm was located adjacent to markets.
As the geographical distance between the farmer and the consumer
increased due to urbanisation, traders collected raw farm products in
central locations and transported them to distant marketplaces for further
processing and sale. The farmer frequently found that the middleman-
trader exploited this situation by passing on high charges and setting low
prices, but realised the trade off: that allowing the trader to undertake
these functions also provided opportunities for specialised on-farm
activities.
Traders have developed into very effective, and in many cases very
large organisations with diverse ownership structures. This development
has affected farmers in three ways. Firstly, many have lost touch with
the needs of the consumer - the direct contact was broken. In other
cases, accurate market signals have not been conveyed because most
traders tend to protect their own competitive interests rather than the
farmers'. Secondly, farmers have become "price-takers" , accepting
prices offered for their product in the belief that competition between
traders provided an efficient commodity market. Thirdly, farmers have
increasingly believed that it is a sufficient business practice just to
produce, relying on the trader to find the best market for the product.
The eighteenth century heralded a modification to this system. In an
attempt to control the destination of product and the costs of marketing,
groups of fanners banded together and created their own cooperative
organisations. The entrepreneurial profit was now returned to the
farmer. Similar farm input supply cooperatives provided beneficial
purchasing power and economies of scale in the area of farm supply.
This new found "market power", which was particularly evident in the
United States, did in fact provide some rationalisation of product flow,
and did increase returns paid to the members of the cooperative in some
cases. However, it did not guarantee enterprise success. The farmer
still remained divorced from most markets. Employees of the
cooperative behaved very much as did the traders of old - i.e. their
allegiance was to the firm rather than to the farmers. Farm profitability
may have increased but farmers have had to contend with the self-
interest actions of cooperative managers. Cooperatives were not the
panacea many farmers expected.
In New Zealand this reliance has remained a bone of contention with
many farmers who believe that the only role of a marketing organisation
is to pay farmers more for their commodities than that which could be
secured from individual farmer involvement. It has been a concern by
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farmers that marketers have overstepped their role by trying to determine
the direction of an industry. This concern and consequent lack of trust
has been exacerbated by several factors: the lack of correct market
signals reaching farmers; price protection and smoothing schemes
supported by Government subsidies; and the general belief of farmers in
their own marketing infallibility. In addition. the fear of change,
especially where farm resources are both expensive and immobile, has
caused some farmers to resist change. The lack of business expertise
exhibited by some product marketers has also reduced fanner confidence
in the marketers' ability to undertake the marketing task. Government
policies, lack of expertise and lack of communication have sometimes
contributed to this state of affairs.
The marketing sector can be classified on the basis of either product
type or function. A general classification on the basis of product type
involves the following:
Product Type
Grain
Meat
Textiles
Fruit
Processed Food
Bio-tech
Example
Lion breweries
Waitaki NZR
Feltex NZ
NZ Apple & Pear Board
Wartie Industries
Genestock NZ
Classification on the basis of function includes:
Function
Transportation
Promotion
Retailing
Wholesaling
Processing
Diversified Service
Insurance
Example
Newmans Group
NZ Meat Producers Board
LD Nathan
Wilson Neill
Northern Roller Mills
Fletcher Challenge
Fanners Mutual
To exemplify this sector a case study of food processing in New
Zealand is set out below.
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CASE STUDY
The Goodman Fielder Ltd Group and Watties Industries
- Food Manufacturing and Distribution -
Goodman Fielder and Watties dominate food processing in New
Zealand. Through takeover activity they have proposed to increase their
control over large segments of the New Zealand food manufacturing
sector. They would also increase their share of food processing and, in
many instances, would have integrated vertically, both downwards and
upwards, to gain the full benefits of industry control. For example, the
involvement of Goodman Fielder in flour milling has extended to bread
making, stockfeed milling, starch and related products, breakfast cereals
and cakes and pastries.
These companies illustrate both oligopsonistic and oligopolistic power
in the food industry. A vast network of interrelated industries and
satellites - transport, insurance, packaging, selling, advertising, research
and development, finance, shipping, refrigeration, storage and retailing -
exemplifies the farm to retail spread of control which these firms have
gathered to themselves. Table 4 gives an estimate (1985) of where the
New Zealand food dollar goes, and shows the impact which a totally
integrated firm can have on that dollar.
Table 4: Destination of Consumers' Food Dollar 1985
(Percentage)
Farmer
Marketing Boards
Wholesaler
Processor
Retailer
25 - 30
5 - 10
10 - 15
25 - 30
25 - 30
Goodman Fielder, Ltd is currently seeking a merger with Watties
Industries, Ltd which, if successful, will put them into the mega food
industry class. At August 1986, the Goodman Fielder group had strong
links with a number of prominent New Zealand and Australian
companies (Figure 2). The proposed merger of Goodman Fielder (total
assets $1.8 billion) with Wattie would form a food conglomerate with
$2.2 billion in total assets and shareholders funds of $1.1 billion and
borrowing of $870 million. They would extend a strong position into
both Australian and New Zealand food markets.
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In ·New Zealand the structure of the flour milling industry is
characterised by a high degree of aggregation of ownership.
Approximately 68 percent of the present New Zealand flour quota is held
by Watties and Goodman Fielder. In addition Watties and Goodman
Fielder have ties with 27 bakeries which account for 60 percent of the
bread baking flour usage.
Watties' wholly owned subsidiary, Northern Roller Milling Limited
(NRM), has a dominant part in the stock feed industry. It is part of a
well (vertical) integrated industry. NRM sells 80 percent of its
production to the poultry industry. Wattie, through its 100 percent
shareholding in General Foods Poultry and its ownership of hatcheries
and processors, has a dominant influence over the poultry meat industry.
Harvey Farms Limited is the only independent poultry meat producer
providing any degree of competition to Wattie.
The current manoeuvring of Watties & Goodman Fielder is viewed as
a necessary tactic to make food production and distribution efficient, both
from a local and international perspective. Their approach to
rationalisation, driving down unit production and distribution costs, is
seen as necessary to bring low prices to consumers and to enable the
New Zealand food industry to become competitive, internationally.
Goodman Fielder, Australia's largest food group, can no longer expand
into existing Australian and New Zealand markets. Markets in the USA,
Britain and Asia are likely new targets. In the context of the New
Zealand food industry the question is to what extent do these market and
product concentrations result in low payments to farmers and high prices
to consumers. Debate on this issue could hold producer's and
consumer's attention for some considerable time.
As this case also illustrates, the farm sector of agribusiness is affected
by the level of food processing. Estimates suggest that over 90 percent
of everything we eat has been processed in some way. Even eggs are
collected, packaged and transported. As more processing and value-
added operations occur, pressures on containing payments to farmers
will continue. Table 5 illustrates the extent of major products raw
materials affected by this firm's food processing activities.
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Table 5: Major Product Lines
Goodman Products
Bread: Fresh Bake, Golden Bake, Granny Scott, Homestyle.
Pies: Bellamys. Cobblestone, Pampas (and pastry).
Flour and pasta: DialllOnd.
Jams: IXL.
Gelatine: Davis.
Petfoods: Rover, Tux and Tuxettes.
Textiles: Bonds, Legalong and Nightlites hosiery, Tree, Tampax.
Watties Products
Frozen and canned produce.
Tip-Top ice cream.
Irvines pies.
Crofters and Shrafts cheesecakes.
Tegel chickens.
Bluebird Chippies, Rashuns, Twisties.
Flemings rolled oats, flour, muesli bars.
Haymarket curry and rice rolls, Frying Saucers.
Jim Bull potato products.
Oak jams.
Betty Crocker cake mixes.
Sunshine jellies, cordials.
OXO beef and chicken stocks.
DYC vinegars.
Petfood: Chef, Felix, Gourmet, Biscats, K9.
On May 12, 1987, the Commerce Commission turned down the
proposed mergei' between Goodman Fielder, Ltd. and Wattie Industries,
Ltd. The firms promise an immediate appeal to the High Court.
The Commission's reasons for rejection were that in New Zealand's
currently limited growth economy, increased market share would result
from the new enterprise. As a result, the deregulated wheat and flour
industry could suffer independent plant closures and worker
redundancies, particularly in the South Island. The merged company
(which would be Australian, and its thirteenth largest by capitalisation)
would have controlled 90 percent of the flour milling in the North Island
and over 40 percent in the South Island; 52-60 percent of the bread
market with a greater share for sliced bread; completely controlled wet
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yeast production and all the bran and pollard for the poultry industry;
and likely more than 80 percent of the poultry meat industry. The
Commission indicated that while the merger would certainly bring about
production and market efficiencies, it was by no means clear that those
benefits would pass to the consumer through lower prices.
Legal Structures
Sole proprietors and partnerships comprise the largest proportion of
New Zealand's agribusinesses. In the farm input sector many of the
professional and labour providing businesses are of these forms as are
the majority of farmer-producers (Table 6).
Table 6 shows the ownership structure of the farm sector. The
dominant types are individual ownership and partnership.
Table 6: Type of Ownership - Farm Sector
At 30 June 1984
Type of
Ownership
Individual
ownership
Registered
private company
Partnership
Government
or local
authority
Registered
public company
Trust
Cooperatives
TOTAL
Area
Hectares
('OOOs)
5,614.7
3.136.3
5,485.7
5,252.7
349.4
1,185.0
200.5
21,224.3
Percentage
of Total
Occupied
Land
26.5
14.8
25.8
24.7
1.6
5.6
0.9
Number
of
Units
31,307
7.038
28,400
897
229
2,439
323
76,633
Percentage
of
Units
48.7
9.2
37.1
1.2
0.3
3.2
0.4
Source:
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'Agricultural Statistics', Department of Statistics, Wellington.
In recent times the use of "special partnerships" as a vehicle for
ownership in the farm sector has become popular. These have included
those formed privately, for small groups of investors to facilitate the
syndicated ownership of farm land, and publicly, for larger groups to
secure the ownership of large livestock (Kaipara Deer Partnership) and
horticultural enterprises (Agrisystems Partnerships). Recent taxation
changes may restrict the use of this vehicle in the future.
The use of cooperatives, has been restricted mainly to the input supply
and marketing sectors of the agribusiness system. Input supply
cooperatives are most commonly found in the areas of fertiliser supply
(Ravensdown) and general merchandise (Combined Rural Traders).
While in certain geographical areas the fertiliser cooperative may hold a
virtual monopoly, those involved in general merchandising control only a
small market share, and the usual philosophy of many members appears
to be to use the cooperative as a means of keeping the opposition
"honest". Because the supply cooperative rarely offers its members
credit facilities (other than normal monthly trade credit) their role is
likely to remain unchanged. The principal exceptions to this credit rule
are the dairy cooperatives which, by virtue of the fact that they also
control the majority of the income of their members, do allow some
credit facilities for purchases made through their retail merchandising
arms.
By far the greatest turnover of agribusiness is conducted by
corporations registered under the Companies Act (1955). Along with a
relatively small number of large publicly listed corporations such as
Wattie Industries, NZ Forest Products, Carter Holt, Fletcher Challenge
and Goodman Fielder all of which are among the top ten New Zealand
companies on the basis of market capitalisation, there is a myriad of
small public and private companies which effect much of the business of
the agricultural sector. Ten dairying cooperative companies are among
the top 250 (turnover) companies in New Zealand. The largest, NZ Co-
op Dairy, had art annual [1985] turnover of $812 million.
A sign of the importance of the agribusiness system to the New
Zealand Economy is the predominance of statutory authorities especially
in the marketing sector. Examples include the Dairy Board, the
Kiwifruit Marketing Authority, the NZ Meat Producers Board and the
NZ Apple and Pear Board. The powers of these bodies range from
advisory services and the setting of quality and hygiene standards, to the
compulsory acquisition (and thus marketing) of an entire seasonal crop.
All have, at various times, wielded immense power over the strategic
directions of the industries with which they are involved. Governments
themselves have not been immune from this influence.
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Support is also given to the marketing of agricultural products by
various Government departments such as the Departments of Trade and
Industry and Foreign Affairs. Due to the importance of foreign
exchange in the sale of agricultural products, politicians themselves
become involved. Indeed, some products are effectively negotiated on a
Government to Government basis. An example was the meat for oil
trade with Iran.
The Control Function
The control of agribusinesses in New Zealand can be regarded as
operating at two distinct levels, operational and strategic. At the
operational level, the aim of any agrifirm is to maximise profits by
creating a low cost high quality product which has great market appeal.
This, as in any business, requires that the management understands the
range of business tactics which may be employed to give the firm a
competitive advantage. For the agribusiness industry as a whole,
decisions made at an operational level are usually short term in nature.
For example, the survival of the firm is of primary importance to its
management. Even though it maintains an interest in the industry as a
whole, it does not regard itself as. being the indtlstry's keeper. Nor does
it see itself as having to be unnecessarily philanthropic towards other
firms. Under these circumstances long' run strategic decisions regarding
the future direction of the industry are left to higher management levels.
The strategic control of agribusiness in New Zealand can be divided
into (a) strategic competition within the industry, and (b) strategies
relating to the future of the industry as a whole.
As far as the input sector is concerned, strategies generally relate to
the capture of market share·. While some comment relating to
monopsonistic (e.g. fertiliser suppliers') or oligopsonistic (e.g.
agrichemical suppliers') behaviour may be appropriate, these are not
generally seen as major problem areas within the industry. The majority
of strategic decisions relating to the input sector are made by the
directors and/or owners of the agrifirms. While the number of totally
independent businesses has declined due to recent mergers and
takeovers, the number of cross directorships and holdings has grown.
To date these are not thought to affect adversely the efficient operation of
the sector as a whole, or to impose undue price increases upon the farm
sector.
The attitude of the participants in this sector towards the entire input
industry is difficult to discern. Without a healthy agricultural industry
the input sector not only fails to grow, but also, in some cases such as
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fertiliser retrenches and contracts. When this occurs, some participants
permanently leave the industry while others try to increase their market
share and profitability by engaging in increased advertising and
promotion.
Many of today's participants have diversified their activities to such an
extent that they have an uneasy "fit" within the agricultural industry, a
normal development in the business cycle. Some firms, especially in the
ru ral finance sector are reluctant to continue to depend on agricultural
industry which has caused them severe problems.
In terms of industry-wide strategies, it has largely been left to
government to determine direction. Policy instruments including import
controls, tariffs and the value of the New Zealand dollar have impacted
strongly on the direction of the industry and the competitive strategies
determined by individual firms.
Strategic competition within the farm sector is virtually non-existent.
For example, in the case of a sheepfarmer, it is restricted to the day on
which stock can be slaughtered, and in the case of a cropping farmer, to
competition for the supply of various cultivars and commodity market
contracts. In any case, there are so many farm enterprises that no
single operator can dominate the market.
However, in some cases strategic control is possible, especially where
valuable genetic material is involved. Examples of this are the egg
production industry (where production quotas were in place) and in the
thoroughbred bloodstock industry (which does not allow artificial
insemination of mares).
Strategies which relate to the industry as a whole usually form part of
the domain controlled by Government. In this environment, the role of
the farm sector is to provide an effective lobbying system to ensure that it
receives an appropriate share of the nation's resources. The lobbying
groups which make up this system, including those which have some
statutory basis for existence, are usually farmer controlled. They aim to
protect the status of the industry and guide its future direction.
However, as often happens in such circumstances, these representatives
become protectors of the status quo, and when this attitude is reinforced
by Government response, strategic changes in the direction of the
various industry elements become unpopular and difficult to implement.
Among the most difficult questions facing lobbyists today is the role of
the family farm. Is the one-man small scale unit an effective, efficient
and responsive tool with which to face the uncertainties of agricultural
prod uction in the 21 st century?
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Strategic competition is possible at the operational level for many farm
products, especially where sales are to the local market such as
vegetables, or supermarket meat supply contracts. But for the
commodity type products, with a history of controlled marketing (usually
by a Government approved single seller, or a restricted number of
sellers) strategic competition is not possible. In many cases slowness in
responding to changing market forces the result.
Sometimes the marketing of a product is effectively controlled through
ownership concentration which has evolved through normal business
processes rather than through regulation. Examples include: the broiler
chicken industry in which a few firms control the supply of the genetic
material which is then tied to a broiler supply contract; bread marketing,
the majority of which is controlled by two firms; and beer marketing
with two major firms. There is competition between these firms but with
recent merger proposals there is a suspicion that not enough competition
will exist to continue relatively low priced food items. In other cases
monopolies have been created by regulation. The powers of the New
Zealand Dairy Board to determine the product mix of the dairy industry
and to allocate that mix between competing dairy cooperatives, are
extremely wide ranging. These powers have been effective in an
industry which is constantly battling surplus production overseas and the
regular imposition of trade barriers in its markets.
The Commerce Commission is empowered to review monopolistic
practices. It has suggested" '" 30 percent (to be) a market share
ensuring effective competition ... ", and in the recent Wrightson NMA-
Dalgety hearing before the Commerce Commission (1986) the following
information (Table 7) was disclosed illustrating market concentration in
livestock and fibre auctions. The Commission directed that regional
competition was critical for the public good.
Government has become increasingly involved in overseas marketing.
While at first glance this situation may offend free-marketers, it must be
remembered that New Zealand is a small economy reliant to a large
extent on export earnings from agriculture. Its markets are often
countries which have high levels of internal agricultural protection, and
where the regulation of agricultural production and marketing has long
been recognised as a political and economic tool. If New Zealand is to
be successful in overcoming these barriers it must seek reform of
protectionist policies of major agricultural producer countries. Such
actions pose considerable challenges both to industry and to politicians.
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Table 7: Percentage Market Shares - Auction Sales
Auctioning Auctioning Auctioning
Wool Sheep Cattle
Wrightson/ Other Wrightson/ Other Wrightson/ Other
Dalgety Dalgety Dalgety
North Aklnd 68 31 73 27
Auckland 72 28 79 21 79 21
Waikato 81 19 65 35
King Country 80 20 82 18
Taranaki 50 50 50 50
Hawkes Bay 72 28 63 37 60 40
Wanganui 81 19 95 5 88 12
Manawatu/
Wellington 78 22 99 1 96 4
Wairarapa 100 - 100
Marlborough/
Nelson 66 34 71 29
Canterbury 71 29 70 30 75 25
Sth Canty 73 27 67.5 32.5 71 29
Otago 68.5 31.5 66 34 63 37
Southland 60.5 39.5 64 36 73 27
- National 71 29 75 75 72 28w
.:..
00
Concluding Observations
Agrifirms are major agents for promoting economic and social change
in rural New Zealand. They have changed the nature, economy and
scope of agricultural production and have profoundly affected the
population's access to food and fibre products. The last two decades have
seen a strong trend for agriculture to be part of a wider set of
commercial interests ranging from agricultural inputs (machinery,
finance, seeds, fertilizers. feed/stuffs) to the processing, distribution and
retailing of fibre and food products.
Both vertical and horizontal forms of agribusiness have moved towards
unitary corporate control, from seedling to supermarket. In Britain, for
example, Spillers has interests in seeds, agricultural machinery,
pesticides, fertilizers, feedstuffs, agricultural production, food processing
and food wholesaling/retailing. In New Zealand, corporations
concentrating on food processing and distribution have so dominated the
food production system that a large number of farmers have become the
modern day equivalent of factory outworkers. Watties and Goodman
Fielder provide excellent examples of this domination of food production.
New Zealand consumers see the apparent benefits of these trends in
an increased range of processed foods especially in convenience and
long-storage foods. Agribusiness firms claim that they can continue to
deliver competitive prices and improve the lot of the consumer. But
although New Zealand consumers and the shareholders of large
agrifirms have benefited fro111 their efforts, the farm production sector
has not always done so.
Farmers have claimed that product proliferation in the agrichemical
industry has led to costly duplication, confusion and inappropriate
applications. The monopoly position of marketing boards is believed to
contribute to overpricing of marketing services. In the highly integrated
industries of poultry and processed vegetables, farmers contractual
obligations reduce their bargaining strength and preclude adequate
returns on investment. In effect, many farmers find that they have
become drawn into a web with a highly concentrated agribusiness sector
controlling, in some cases, both the supply of farm inputs and the
disposal of farm output.
A more jaundiced view of agribusiness has been put by Sargent who
lists a number of its disadvantages. "Firstly, its re-investment in
agriculture is minimal. Much of the profits go to the urban based
shareholders, rather than to farmers or rural communities. Secondly, it
squeezes farmers from both ends, selling expensive inputs and paying as
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little as possible for rural produce. This contributes to the cost-price
squeeze, concentrating land ownership and consequently wealth.
Thirdly, because of intense competition between global corporations with
a constant need to expand markets, it encourages unnecessary product
proliferation in agricultural inputs and food products. Fourthly, the
heavy foreign ownership introduces questions of fidelity. Fifthly, by
fostering corporate farming rather than family farming, agribusiness
helps promote short-term farming practices which are linked to
environmental problems such as soil exhaustion and erosion."
Crystal-ball gazing is not a very profitable occupation at the best of
times, and with the present economic and political uncertainties facing
agribusiness in New Zealand. it is likely to be even less profitable.
However, some future trends may include the following:
The Input Sector:
fewer, larger supply firms
increasing use of cooperatives as supply firms
fewer firms relying solely on agriculture for business
fewer professional practices devoted to rural interests
less financial dispensation for rural producers
increased technical quality of inputs
The Farming Sector:
larger farming units with some vertical integration
increased absentee ownership of on-farm resources
increased productivity per labour unit
increasing substitution of capital for labour
increasing on-farm diversification
decreasing input/output ratio
The Marketing Sector:
limited competition between firms
decreasing Government involvement/assistance
increased local processing content - value added operations
increasing range of product options for farmers
increased manufacture and market concentration
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These changes do not necessarily imply adverse consequences for
farmers and consumers. Government regulation may limit the actions of
some firms to prevent the kinds of problems outlined by Sargent. It is
critical that policy makers consider the economic and social
consequences of such changes, and be accountable for their positions
and determinations to the communities of New Zealand.
References
Goldberg, R. (1974) Foreword in Austin, J., Agribusiness in Latin
America, Praeger. N.Y.
Sargent, S. (1985), The Foodmakers, Penguin, London.
13-21
~U!l~~.Iewpue
Sl~~.Iews,pueIe~zM~N
AU0!l;l(}S
Chapter 14
The Structure of Markets
Wayne Cartwright
Marketing Specialist
Ulliversity of Auckland
It has become a cliche that the key to marketing success. is to have a
sound understanding of the needs and requirements of consumers, and to
ensure that the offered products have features that will meet those needs.
Many enterprises in the New Zealand food and fibre industrial areas
have struggled to achieve this aim, and some have still not done so.
However, this formula is naive because it does not go far enough.
The meeting of customer requirements is necessary for success but will
not guarantee it. For example, many fine products that household
consumers would enjoy are not offered because they cannot compete
successfully for space on the shelves of supermarkets. Similarly, the
production and offering of an industrial food material that meets a
manufacturer's specification at an affordable price may not sell because
the manufacturer is loyal to other suppliers and has no incentive to
switch vendors.
Even when customer requirements are being met and sales are being
made, the commercial success of the enterprise is not assured unless the
marketing outlets it uses are organised and managed so as to capture a
satisfactory share of the value added. Competitively strong distributors,
retailers, or manufacturers can easily capture most of the available profit
margin thereby sometimes leaving producers with returns below the
levels they need for survival.
If they are to provide sustaining returns to producers, and are to make
a worthwhile long-term contribution to the national economy, New
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Zealand food and fibre enterprises must be managed to achieve and
maintain a competitive advantage in their markets.
Competitive market structures and the choice of strategies will
determine success in: consumer markets for fresh food products;
consumer markets for processed (extended life) food products; and
industrial markets for food products and fibre products.
First let us consider the competitive structure for food products that
have a limited shelf life such as fresh fruit and vegetables, fresh or
chilled meat and eggs (Figure I). Competitive structure is determined
strongly by the kind of retail store that is involved. The two main types
of retail stores are:
I. Large supermarket and department store chains like Foodtown and
Woolworths in New Zealand, Coles in Australia, Safeway and
Ralphs in California, Sainsburys and Marks and Spencer in the
United Kingdom.
2. Smaller specialist fru it and vegetable retailers and butchers shops
which retain sizable niche markets in most regions but are steadily
losing out to supermarkets.
When supermarkets are present in fresh food marketing they dominate
the competitive structure. Within each local market area, there is
typically a relatively small number of large supermarket retailers.
The corporations that operate supermarkets are large by comparison
with the producer groups that supply them. For this reason alone, they
are able to exercise substantial bargaining power. Moreover,
supermarkets regard their produce and fresh meat departments as
'flagships' for the entire store. There is a strong tendency for
consumers to judge stores by the range and quality of products in these
departments. Consequently, supermarket buying managers insist on
high and consistent levels of product quality, and that deliveries be made
on time in full. Any vendors who fail to meet these requirements are
usually abandoned. Supermarket buyers bargain strongly on price, but
they recognise that the income levels of established suppliers must be
maintained at levels that will continue to support the quality of their
operations. They have a substantial preference for price stability.
Stability of prices and continuity of supply is often more important than
hard bargaining on each shipment.
Supermarkets arrange supply in a variety of ways. In some instances
they have ensured reliability of supply by taking an equity and
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managerial interest in production operations. For instance, a Californian
supermarket chain has vegetable production interests in Mexico. In
other instances, they deal directly with producer groups. In yet other
cases, and particularly when the value of products supplied is relatively
small or when producers are distant from the retail store buyers,
supermarket buyers will prefer to deal with local distributors. These
companies take delivery of products from several sources, consolidate the
supplies into the required type and quality assortments, and supply the
supermarkets to meet their day to day requirements.
Different distributors have a variety of functions: merchant
wholesaling, agency selling, arrangement of shipping, and the possible
arrangement of sales and purchases through auctions. The auctioning of
fresh fruit and vegetables is still significant in New Zealand, the United
Kingdom and some other countries. It has virtually disappeared in the
United States. Wherever possible, supermarket buyers prefer to
purchase by private treaty to avoid the price variation inherent in auction
systems. For this reason, open auctions are handling a declining
proportion of the total trade. Growers in New Zealand have tended to
support the continuation of the auction system because they believe that it
dilutes· the price-determining power of large buyers such as
supermarkets. While this belief has some substance, the same growers
often overlook the countervailing approach of organising into large
united selling groups that can bargain strongly in private sales
negotiations.
The majority of New Zealand suppliers to offshore supermarkets use
the services of intermediary agents or wholesale distributors for two
reasons. Suppliers need local representation on a day-to-day basis, but
often their operations are too small to support financing a branch office.
Therefore, agents operating on commissions or distributors on margins
can provide the needed representation in an affordable manner. The
other reason is that supermarket buyers are disinclined to accept the risk
and costs of dealing with small and distant vendors. Agents and
distributors are most effective when handling volume shipments of
products already established in the supermarket. By contrast, most of
them are not highly motivated or expert in the process of new product
market eval uation. The use of overseas distributors for this purpose by
New Zealand suppliers can be a serious marketing weakness.
It is clear that producer groups should move towards more direct
trading relationships with supermarkets, with reduced reliance on full-
service agents or distributors. This strategy has the advantage of
providing more control over marketing, increasing differentiation from
competing suppliers, and capturing a greater market return for growers
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~ Figure I: Consumer Markets for Fresh Food Products
through reducing intermediary costs. The New Zealand Apple and Pear
Marketing Board has successfully followed this approach in Europe,
differentiating New Zealand apples in terms of quality and supply
scheduling. The New Zealand kiwifruit industry has also successfully
differentiated on a similar basis, although the use of multiple exporters
has resulted in greater reliance on agent distributors.
In the case of the growing trade in exported chilled lamb cuts. direct
supply to supermarkets or other market outlets, success depends upon
achieving maximum shelf life and product presentation. Since chilled
cuts compete with fresh products, New Zealand suppliers must provide
strong merchandising and promotional support to their overseas
marketing efforts.
Specialist retailers tend to have even higher product quality
requirements than supermarkets. especial1y in Japan and West Germany.
Most have a strong preference for purchasing product fr0111 stocks held
by merchant distributors, and in some countries, including New
Zealand, these retailers are strong supporters of the auction system.
Except in the case of local New Zealand direct supply arrangements,
New Zealand producer groups as yet have not developed alternatives to
supplying through traditional distributors.
The third channel that appears in Figure I indicates direct supply
from producers to consumers. This channel is restricted to fresh fruit
and vegetables on the domestic market, and includes roadside stalls,
pick-your-own operations and mail-order delivery. Although this method
provides significant convenience and recreational benefits to consumers
the volume of trade conducted in this way is small.
It is easy for new producers and producer groups to enter fresh food
markets which means there is always a threat of entry by new
competitors. Examples of this form of competitive entry that have
affected New Zealand include Chilean apple producers, kiwifruit
producers in both Northern and Southern Hemisphere regions, and the
early entry of Australian producers offering chilIed lamb cuts to the
United States and Europe. On the domestic market, local producers of
citrus are now increasingly exposed to strong competition from imported
oranges. Australian growers also might be able to supply certain types
of fresh vegetables to New Zealand markets at competitive prices.
The entire structure is also subject to competitive entries from new
types of products using new technology. For example, the introduction
of controlIed atmosphere storage in Europe has made it possible for
French Golden Delicious apple producers to carry forward their supplies
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0\ Figure 2: Consumer Market for Extended-Life Food Products
to compete in the seasonal niche market previously occupied solely by
Southern Hemisphere supplies, especially from New Zealand.
Extended-life products are those that are processed and packaged so
that they have a shelf life of months or even years: packs of frozen
foods. canned products, jams and preserves, honey, and consumer packs
of dairy products such as butter, ice-cream, yoghurt, and milk powders.
Figure 2 summarises the competitive structure of these markets. By
comparison with the structure for fresh food products, the competitive
strength of retailers and their suppliers are more in balance. Large
retail stores (supermarkets and department stores) also dominate this
market. However, smaller specialty stores such as delicatessens, and
convenience stores such as corner dairies and small grocery stores,
continue to hold a substantial proportion of the trade in most countries.
The packers, processors, and manufacturers that deal with
supermarkets and department stores also tend to be large corporate
organisations. Typically, the large retail stores are offered more
varieties of branded food products than they can stock despite the fact
that many would be popular with consumers and sell well. This
situation results in fierce competition between processors and
manufacturers for shelf space on supermarket shelves. Essentially,
supermarkets now rent space on their shelves to suppliers whose
products can generate the best financial return per unit of shelf space
over a given period. Except in some of the specialty departments that
handle items with low turnover, manufacturers will gain access to
supermarket distribution only if they can offer a sizable line of products
that establish a sufficient area of shelf facing. Small product lines
simply get . lost' , and supermarket managers are unlikely to be interested
in them.
Moreover, manufacturers are expected to promote directly to
consumers, as well as supporting supermarkets in co-operative
advertising and sales promotions. This situation makes it extremely
difficult for small new companies to gain access to the retail market,
even with products that are attractive to consumers. While this situation
is less intense in New Zealand, competition is strengthening rapidly. In
other markets, particularly in the United States and Western Europe,
manufacturers must develop well-planned marketing programmes
consisting of a product line with appropriate and attractive packaging,
competitive pricing, and backed by consumer advertising. and sales
promotions.
Even when entry to supermarkets has been achieved, successful food
marketers of packaged food must fend off other suppliers who compete
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for the same supermarket shelves. There is always constant competition
from new, and possibly superior, product formulations or packaging.
Most large food processors and manufacturers distribute directly to
retail stores. However, significant volumes of business are undertaken
by specialist wholesaling distributors. each of which handles an
assortment of products for several smaller manufacturers.
In most instances, specialist retailers of packaged food products are
supplied by distributors. Competition for access to retailers is less
intense here in supermarkets. On the other hand, demand is also less,
and specific product features are usually required.
The major competitive battles in these markets are waged between
manufacturers who seek competitive advantage in dealing with powerful
retailers. The operators of farms, orchards, and gardens who supply
raw material for processing and manufacturing must recognise that they
have a vested interest in supplying high quality materials that enhance
their manufacturer's opportunity for competitive advantage. Producers
must supply products that conform to the specifications of the processors
and manufacturers. There is simply no place in this marketing system
for farmers or growers who believe that the market should accept the
standard or grade of product that they choose to produce. The
successful development of the New Zealand Dairy Board as a major and
successful multinational food marketer is due in large measure to strict
adherence to these principles.
In industrial markets the raw material from farms, orchards, and
gardens is sometimes processed to an intermediate stage and then sold to
industrial manufacturers who in turn use these products in their own
operations to develop products for their own markets. The essential
difference between consumer and industrial markets is that the identity of
the original product is lost. Examples are block-frozen berry fruit mixed
with other fruit in the manufacture of jams; milk powders used as
ingredients in baking; caseinates used as sophisticated ingredients for
foods, in drinks, and for the formulation of certain plastics: bull beef
ground and used in manufacture of frankfurters; and crossbred wool
used to manufacture carpets.
In this type of market structure (Figure 3) the industrial buyers tend
to be large sophisticated enterprises. There is a tendency for close and
loyal associations to exist between marketers and the industrial
manufacturers that buy from them. The reason for this is that the
marketing companies must understand in considerable detail the
manufacturing operations of their buyers and the specifications of
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Figure 3: Industrial Markets for Food and Fibre
products they require. They also often assist with technical service to
ensure that products are used efficiently. When this kind of business
association develops it is sometimes quite difficult and risky for the buyer
to change veridors. Similarly, individual buyers often account for a
substantial proportion of the sales of a manufacturer, who is
consequently quite reliant on the customer. These influences result in
relatively stable buyer-seller relationships that require considerable
investment and expertise to establish.
In industrial markets, processors and manufacturers who aim to be
competitively strong require substantial financial strength, management
skills, and technical support services. The United States subsidiaries of
the New Zealand Dairy Board were established with this objective. and
successful business development has resulted. In other instances, New
Zealand suppliers to industrial markets are much smaller than their
buyers and suffer as a consequence of weaker bargaining power and lack
of financial resources. An example is provided by the grower
cooperative and exporting companies in the horticulture industry that
supply bulk frozen fruit products to large manufacturers of yoghurt
flavour bases and jams in the United States and Western Europe. The
New Zealand suppliers are too small (at least in these enterprises) to
maintain a presence in the market, and therefore work through brokers
and agents. The suppliers have little or no direct contact with industrial
buyers and offer minimal technical support to them. Their marketing
role is reduced to price-accepting order-taking and therefore,a substantial
proportion of the value generated is captured by intermediaries.
The history of wool marketing provides further salutary evidence.
One of the fundamental weaknesses of the New Zealand wool industry in
the 1960s , as it faced new competition from synthetic fibres, was its
inability to provide equivalent technical support to manufacturers of
carpets and fabrics. The activities of the International Wool Secretariat
were subsequently directed towards this problem, but serious competitive
weaknesses still exist in the lack of management control over pricing and
distribution.
As is the case in consumer market structures, farmers and growers
must recognise that they have much to gain from supplying raw material
products to specifications that meet the requirements of the ultimate
industrial manufacturer. Again, there is no place in a competitively
successful enterprise for raw material suppliers who do not or will not
supply a product to specifications. Similarly, manufacturers must try to
be responsive to the product attributes required by their industrial
buyers. Accurate and timely flows of technical information are critical
to the successful management of these supply linkages.
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This brief review of the structure and management of marketing
channels for New Zealand food and fibre has identified several general
concl usions:
I. Marketing channels must be managed to maintain competitive
advantage. This requires products with features preferred by end
users; access to markets; and bargaining strength.
2. Markets for fresh food products are dominated by supermarkets
which place exacting requirements on their suppliers. Competition
for access to supermarkets is intense. High levels of marketing
sIU lis are mandatory. Small supplier organisations are at a
disadvantage and development of larger marketing enterprises
should be encouraged.
3. Markets for extended-life food products feature even more fierce
competition between manufacturers for supermarket space.
4. Industrial markets for food and fibre products have sophisticated
buyers who expect their suppliers to be financially strong and able
to provide technical marketing support. Small and fragmented
marketing operations are inherently weak.
5. Producers must recognise that their chief marketing role is to
provide raw materials to required specifications within costs that
allow packers, distributors, processors, and manufacturers to
compete strongly in the markets that they face.
Given the criteria proposed in this chapter, the marketing performance
of the New Zealand food and fibre industry is highly variable. Those
enterprises that are strong and successful indicate clearly the factors that
lead to competitive strength. The weaker operations are deficient in
ways that public policy and internal management can address directly.
The real question for policy makers is how much, if at all, weak
operations should be helped - for how long and with what IUnd of
policies.
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Chapter 15
Advertising and Promotion
Rod Brodie and Andy van Ameyde
Marketing Researchers
University of CanterbUlY
Advertising and promoting a food or fibre item is a complex business.
The market position of the firm doing the advertising is one major
factor; others are the firms' business goals, the timing of its hoped-for
sales, the experience and training of its management, the availability of
communication media, and the relative costs. Increasingly, markets are
not ruled by the old 'buyer beware' ethic, but by a host of government
regulations or self-imposed business guidelines.
A consumer usually thinks of advertising and promotion in terms of
one business firm competing with another, each trying to increase its
share of the market. However, advertising and promotion can also be
part of an overall industry marketing strategy where the aim is to
increase the size of the total market. For example, individual woollen
carpet manufacturers could try to expand the size of the total carpet
market in an attempt to reduce the market share of synthetic carpets.
In the last decade a decline in the size of some traditional markets for
New Zealand food and fibre products has led to some industries giving
more attention to advertising and promotion programmes. A number of
statutory producer boards involved with fish, cheese, milk, butter, eggs,
pig-meat and wool, have become increasingly active in the domestic
market.
Recent advertising campaigns by the boards which appear to have been
successful include: the Dairy Board's 'Bigger Block of Cheese'
campaign, and its defence against margarine to maintain butter's market
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share; the Apple and Pear Board's 'Fresh Up' and 'Just Juice'
campaigns; the Pork Industry Board's 'Trim Pork' brand and its
campaigns for ham and bacon; and the Wool Board's promotion of
woollen carpets to counter the increasing competition from synthetics.
The main motivation behind any advertising or promotion campaign is
to make profit by improving the public image of what is being marketed,
and by achieving continuing sales. Influencing demand is difficult.
Many firms spend vast sums of money on expensive brochures about
their products only to find from a little market research that the actual
buyer paid no attention to the pamphlets but, instead, relied on some
other factor completely overlooked by the advertiser - such as simply
seeing what the neighbour bought and whether or not it worked.
Advertising is only one element of the marketing mix and needs to be
evaluated in conjunction with the other elements such as the quality of
the product, packaging, pricing, and distribution. Media advertising is
also only one element of a promotion strategy which can include public
relations, publicity, and personal selling. At the industry level, public
relations and publicity are particularly useful in creating a favourable
environment in which to market food and fibre products. These efforts
can be directed at target audiences such as specific groups of consumers,
educational institutions, the media, policy makers, government
departments, and other firms involved in marketing the industry's
products.
Because society has become aware that some people will try to sell
anything to anyone, most governments impose some regulations. In
New Zealand the best known are the laws governing the production of
food. For example, slaughter animals have to be healthy and animal
carcasses are required to be inspected by someone not benefitting directly
from their sale. Quality standards apply in many industries. Wool has
long been sorted and sold according to internationally accepted standards
and the same applies to fruit and vegetables and most other products
designated for export. This means that they must also be advertised or
promoted according to strict specifications about the contents and the
processing procedures.
The promotion tools can play different but complementary roles.
Media advertising can be used to help build a long-term product image
as well as to trigger short-term sales. In contrast, sales promotion
techniques tend to be used only in the short term to help build stronger
and more rapid sales. Personal selling is particularly important in some
cases and public relations is best used to complement longer-term
activities with short-term product promotions.
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Advertising is not the same as promotion. Advertising is usually
based on providing specific information about a product to a particular
audience over a fairly long period of time. Promotion tends to be
shorter-lived. dealing with events such as a week's sale of canning fruits.
Both advertising and promotion rely upon providing information and
presenting it to capture the public's interest.
The question of who pays and who benefits from advertising and
promotion is a good one. When there are relatively few firms
(suppliers, processors, and large retailing chains) with a range of
products, it is likely that the cost of advertising will be less than the
increase in sales they cause. On the other hand, when there are large
numbers of producers, each with about the same type of product (e.g.
wheat), there is little hope of capturing profits by individual advertising.
That is why most farmers do not advertise.
However, this leads to the question of who should pay for advertising
at an industry level. In order to overcome the 'free rider' problem,
most of such advertising is done under regulations which compel
everyone producing that item to contribute in some equitable manner.
Marketing activity at an industry level has usually involved heavy
media advertising funded by producer levies. For example. in the last
few years, New Zealand pig-meat producers have contributed between
$500,000 and $1 million towards industry advertising expenses. Two
questions arise:
(I) its economic effectiveness, and
(2) the extent to which it complements the marketing activities of
individual firms within the industry.
Since advertising is only one of many factors which can affect sales
and market share, conclusions about success and failure need to be
interpreted with caution. For instance, during the 'Bigger Block of
Cheese' campaign, the price of cheese, as compared with that of most of
its protein substitutes, declined. So it is difficult to say how much of the
increase in consumption was due to the reduced price and how much it
was due to the campaign itself.
A clear distinction needs to be made between promotion activity which
is directed at final consumers (a pull strategy) and one directed at the
trade or distribution system (a push strategy). While media advertising
is the visible part of any marketing activity it is quite often only a small
part of the organisations' total marketing effort. For instance, a recent
survey of marketing expenses for supermarket items in the United States
found that, on average, consumer-directed media advertising made up
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only 15 percent of the promotion expenses. Two-thirds of the promotion
activity was directed to the trade and only one third to consumers.
Personal selling and sales promotion made up the largest proportion of
the total marketing expenses. One reason for this seeming imbalance is
the changing role of wholesalers and retailers in industrial countries.
Competition for shelf space in supermarkets is intense. Therefore a
manufacturer first has to sell the product to the retailer in order to sell it
to the consumer. There are many different ways to promote through a
distribution channel, including providing promotional assistance,
personnel training, sales and merchandising assistance, and special deals
and allowances.
In advertising and promotion it is important to know the specific
audience to which an effort is directed - for example, the ages, sex,
occupations, educational backgrounds and income brackets of the people
at whom the campaign is aimed. What are the spending habits of the
particular group? Is the effort directed more towards people who buy by
impulse, or to those who make a study of price and quality before they
buy? Is the shopper a child, a teenager, or a woman whose children
have already left home? Many market researchers have found that
certain food items are subject to considerable peer pressure: 'I always
give my children ', and they pursue that thought with the implied
message that only good mothers and/or fathers get product X for their
offspring.
Increased use is being made of joint advertising, the makers of one
product joining with another in sharing costs. For example a finn
which makes salad dressing may join forces with a firm offering garden-
fresh vegetables. or a firm advertising only one fruit type may join in a
general promotion for several types of fruit which may be seasonally
available.
Recent emphasis on 'one stop shopping' has led many retail
establishments to make a practice of advertising or promoting both food
and non-food products in the same store: eggs and picnic baskets,
gourmet foods with paper napkins. A fairly recent trend is towards
providing more information about what is used in the actual preparation
of the foodstuffs. More consumers want to know what actually is inside
the can or package before they buy it.
Promotion at an industry level is usually referred to as generic
promotion while the activities of individual firms are referred to as brand
promotion. Generic promotion is directed at stimulating demand for the
entire product category and focuses on the attributes common to all the
brands in that class. By contrast, branding involves identifying a
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particular product. Promotion of a brand item concentrates on the
qualities which make it different from other brands in the same class.
There is a continuing debate about which type of advertising, generic
or brand, generates more sales. Does it pay more to advertise 'Butter'
or 'Brand X' butter? Some commodity groups have stressed that it is
necessary to keep advertising continuously in order to keep the product
in the public eye: kiwifruit, milk, tobacco, and fruit juice for instance.
Other commodity groups have decided that this is not true for them and
that they would rather spend their advertising or promotion budgets on
more timely specific tactics.
In practice, brand promotion by firms and product promotion by
industry organisations are often difficult to separate. In some cases
brand promotion may also stimulate industry demand. If there is a
campaign for major brands of say chicken or fruit juice, the total market
might expand with each firm obtaining a larger share.
Most promotional campaigns by industry organisations are not purely
generic. Most use branding techniques to help identify a particular class
of product. Examples include the 'Trim Pork' and 'Q-mark' campaigns
for pig-meats, the Dairy Board's 'Bigger Block of Cheese' campaign,
and the Apple and Pear Board's 'Fresh-Up' and 'Just Juice' were brands
of fruit juice marketed by the Apple and Pear Board.
What is known as 'umbrella branding' is sometimes used when food
and fibre products are exported. This means using the country or region
of origin as the brand name, e.g. New Zealand lamb, apples and
kiwifruit. The same idea is being used by some manufacturers and
retailers to market a variety of food products under a common brand
name. Recently the term generic has also been used to refer to items
which do not have any clear brand identification, are not supported by
promotion, and usually come in large sized portions. Examples are
some common medicines such as aspirin, and paper products like paper
towels.
In the past two decades many studies about the effectiveness of brand
advertising have been published. They show that, while there are
considerable variations, advertising, in general, tends to be less effective
than factors such as changes in price, retail promotion and product
quality. While many food advertisers would dispute this conclusion
because of differences in types of products advertised, it was confirmed
in a recent study of brand competition in three New Zealand markets
(Brodie, 1984). That work found that a 10 percent increase in
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advertising was likely to have less effect than a one percent decrease in
price.
Other studies about the effectiveness of advertising at the industry level
lead to the same conclusion. In a study of the UK milk market it was
estimated that a 100 percent increase in advertising would be expected to
increase sales by only one percent in the short-term and three percent in
the long term (Strak and Gill, 1983).
Studies about the effectiveness of advertising between competitive
brands and between industries still leave many unanswered questions.
Little is known about the effectiveness of various forms of media
advertising, of how it compares in different types of markets with other
forms of promotion; what is the effect of advertising among the firms
within the industry; and what repercussions is advertising likely to have
throughout the entire product marketing system?
A first step in assessing promotional opportunities for either a brand
or an industry is to identify where the potential increases in sales and/or
market share might occur. This involves identifying substitute brands or
products. not an easy process in some cases because many food and
fibre products have multiple uses and the use of the substitutes may vary
by such things as meal situations. For example: cheese is consumed by
households between meal times, at snack times, and in cut lunches.
Food substitutes for these situations also can vary considerably.
A broad perspective which takes into account the entire marketing
system is necessary when planning for increased market opportunity.
Any food or fibre market system can be described as consisting of three
subsystems (Figure 1). The core marketing system. is made up of
suppliers, producers, processors, distributors, retailers and consumers.
Surrounding this core are the immediate .forces (the business and
financial community, media, government, pressure groups, general
public and trade associations), and outside that again are the external
forces (demographic, economic, political, technological and cultural
influences). The distinction between the immediate and external
environments is that factors in the immediate may be influenced by
participants in the core marketing portion, while forces in the external
environment usually cannot. This means that the forces in the
immediate environment and operators in the central core are potential
target audiences for the marketing effort.
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Figure 1: The Food and Fibre Marketing System
Certain factors are pertinent to each of the three systems. For
instance, in the external environment, seasonal, climatic and economic
factors are important in the short term. Over longer periods,
demographic shifts and cultural, political and technological influences
may arise. In the immediate environment, the role Government attempts
to play is often the most important factor. Government intervention may
restrict competition and upset the power balance among producers,
processors, retailers and consumers. In the core portion, aspects which
need to be accounted for explicitly include:
1. Pifferent market trends (consumer, industrial and institutional) in
those markets where the industry's product is competing.
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2. Marketing activities of industries and firms with substitutes which
compete in these markets.
3. Different elements of competitive marketing activity, including
advertising, promotion and the rest of the marketing mix of
consumer and trade-directed promotional strategies.
4. The consumer's previous experience and attitudes towards the
industry's products and its substitutes.
5. Factors which deterl1line the bargaining power and the terms of sale
between any operators in the central core.The bargaining power
between producers and processors may be determined by the: kind
of products produced, the extent of product differentiation, the
relative costs of producers and processors, the presence of
substitutes, the volume and continuity of supply to processors from
producers, the product quality, the use of credit, and the relative
ability of producers to move forward in processing and/or
marketing.
6. Supply response from producers may increase if promotion raises
demand. The ,response may cause an oversupply which might
swamp a market thereby decreasing producer and processor returns
through lower prices.
7. The ability of management to control the entire process. This is
more difficult at an industry level than at the brand level because
coordination is required through the entire marketing system. In
some cases the type of intervention required may be politically
unacceptable.
Market Power
Farmers have often been portrayed as the key figures in the food
system. What they brought to market dictated what was sold, therefore
they were in control. If that was ever true, it was long ago. Processors
of raw food products soon moved into a major 'control' position. For
example, when the ships began to move frozen carcasses from New
Zealand to Britain in the late 1880' s, it was the works people who told
the fanners when to have their animals in, and it was the works people
who coordinated the slaughter/freezing functions with the transport to
available ships.
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By the early 1900's, New Zealand lamb had attained a highly
respected position world-wide. However, as the market has matured,
consumers have become more sophisticated and more aware of nutrition
and food alternatives.
In the last 25 years market power has moved from the processors to
the retailers who cannot afford to carry items which are not sold quickly.
If their promotional efforts are not successful they cannot continue with
a slow-moving or low-margin item. There is simply too much
competition within the range of foods available now for the retailer to
waste time on an unprofitable item. Shelf-space is at such a premium
and inventory turnover is such a necessity that the retail food store
manager must keep fresh, high quality food items before the store's
customers at all times otherwise competition will draw them away.
Critical Factors for Success
The above discussion has isolated a large number of factors affecting
the demand for food and fibre products which need to be accounted for
especially when examining the opportunity for industry level promotion.
In summary,· the following conditions need to hold if a
promotion/advertising effort is to succeed:
I. There exists considerable opportunity to take away market share
from substitute products.
2. There are favourable trends in the external environment affecting
the marketing of the product.
3. There is an ability to influence factors in the immediate
environment and in the core portion of the system.
4. The industry has sufficient marketing control to coordinate
production and marketing activities.
5. The industry has the resources to counter competition and sustain
its competitive advantage.
6. The promotion activity is cost-effective.
Any research programme which aims to identify opportunities for
promoting products at the industry level needs to:
1. Arrive at a clear definition of the markets in which the various
forms of the industry's products have potential.
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2. Differentiate between factors in the external environment which
have important positive and negative effects on the marketing of the
product.
3. Assess the competitive advantage the various products could have in
each of the situations/markets.
4. Analyse the immediate environment and core portion in order to .
understand how different factors can be influenced to create a
favourable environment for marketing.
5. Develop an understanding of how the production and marketing
activities in the core portion can be coordinated.
6. Assess the potential retaliatory action from competing products.
7. Assess the relative profitability of the different market opportunities
and focus expenditures on the best ones.
In order for New Zealand to be successful in a competitive worldwide
food and fibre market it will be essential to identify market niches and
exploit them through advertising and promotion. Media campaigns will
need to be linked with appropriate publicity, public relations and
personal contacts. Packaging, pricing and the use of effective
distributors will be critical to success.
With more people eating away from home, institutions such as
restaurants, hotels, airlines and hospitals will become as much potential
customers as traditional consumer families. This will be true at home
and abroad.
The keys to future success will be to hunt for cost-effective methods to
identify and exploit potential markets, find new food products, discover
new ways to gain and keep market niches, and provide incentives for
increasingly effective management.
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Chapter 16
The Case for
Producer Control
Allan N. Rae
Agricultural Economist
Massey University
The marketing scene has changed radically over the last few years.
These changes can be traced to the actions of both our own and foreign
governments, to general shifts in demand, and to technological changes.
Uppermost today are the results of the 'more market, deregulatory'
philosophy of our current government set against a rising tide of
protectionism from abroad. A new macro-economic and foreign
exchange policy has led to increased instability in exchange rates and
hence in prices and incomes received by exporters and their suppliers,
and uncertainty over firms' competitiveness in foreign markets. Then
the Government's reduction in border protection and deregulation of
various sectors (e.g. transport, wheat, imported fruit) have stimulated the
competitive environment at home. The behaviour of foreign
governments in support of their farmers and the subsequent disposal of
their output, has led to increased competition in foreign markets, too.
Technological advances continue to be made, and especially relevant
here are those in the areas of biotechnology and information. Finally,
food demand changes have occurred including more emphasis on value-
added products, and changes in preferences due to health considerations.
The distribution of power has changed in some channels, especially
where power was formerly based on legislation which has now been
modified (e.g. statutory marketing legislation and import protection).
Concentrations of power will continue to evolve as firms react to the
more competitive environment.
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The evolution of a different structure could simply mean the adoption
of new mechanisms for making transactions and the emergence of new
leadership and control. For example, increased uncertainty may
encourage firms to integrate. Biotechnology may allow the production of
consumer-specific products for which current market systems are
inappropriate. Advances in information technology may allow traditional
commodity markets to respond more quickly to price and quantity
signals. And changes in statutory legislation will certainly create
opportunities for different leadership to emerge.
No matter what mechanism is used within a new marketing channel, it
will involve costs in both time and money. Examples include a food
processor seeking to control crop production through his contracted
growers, or a corporate manager attempting to monitor activities within
the individual divisions of his firm. These costs could involve
managerial incentive payments and monitoring and control expenditures.
Costs. could also occur due to a lack of control.
Restructuring benefits include reductions in some of the above costs,
and efficiency gains associated with improved functions. Risk may be
shifted to those best equipped to absorb its effects. Restructuring may
also improve access to finance and information. In the presence of
uncertainty and information deficiencies, continuous flow economies in
product assembly, grading, packaging and processing might be better
realised under systems that place less reliance on market-based
exchanges. Restructuring may provide benefits when profitability is
influenced by the harmonisation of the processing system.
Further benefits could come if the new structures led to reduced
spoilage of perishable products, or to a greater ability to handle products
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such as chilled meats without risk of spoilage. Benefits will result if
restructuring will allow market failures to be overcome, for example
through the ability to avoid weak selling or problems associated with
variable quality. Finally, restructuring might also increase the ability of
New Zealand members of our export marketing channels to control the
activities of foreign firms from whom they purchase inputs or to whom
they sell products, and therefore to maximise export receipts.
Agricultural marketing channels are often characterised by large
numbers of farmers. In the absence of government intervention
processors and wholesalers may be able to use their power to control the
marketing channel in their own interests.
This is a naturally-occurring power structure. When large numbers
of farmers are coupled with the potential diseconomies of attempting to
manage and control larger farms, and these are dependent on only a few
processors, it follows that individual farmers have negligible power to
influence events. Governments, from time to time and in various
countries, have responded to this situation in the belief that the 'natural'
power balance was inequitable. Hence the creation of statutory
marketing boards and the encouragement of cooperatives.
Farmers and their organisations need to consider what degree of
control they wish to exert in their marketing channels. Current
government policy appears directed at reducing producer control through
statutory means. At the same time the numbers of firms further
downstream are becoming smaller due to merger and 'rationalisation'
activities. When the mechanisms that gave farmers such countervailing
power in the" past are dismantled, what mechanisms might be developed
to limit the power of the processing/marketing sector?
Contracting covers a variety of arrangements as a means of co-
ordinating activities. Vertical integration differs from contracting in that
it refers to the ownership of marketing functions located in at least two
separate stages of the channel. Contracts generally serve at least three
purposes: to specify product characteristics, including price; to provide
performance incentives; and to distribute risk. Risk, in this context, has
two broad dimensions - unknown outcomes of future events (e.g. crop
yields and prices) for which insurance may be available, and uncertainty
over whether one partner to the contract will perform to the other's
satisfaction.
Contracts cannot be expected to achieve all three purposes perfectly,
hence tradeoffs have to be considered. For example, a harvesting
contract that specifies wage rates per kilogram picked provides the
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contractee with a greater incentive to work, but more of the risk
associated with variable yields than if the contract specified an hourly
wage.
A good example of alternative contract design concerns broiler
production in Thailand. The inexperienced grower starts with a wage
contract, with the contractor providing all supplies and expertise, and
assuming all the risk. After gaining experience, the grower may move
to a guaranteed price contract, where the contractor supplies inputs at a
specified price, and purchases the final product at a guaranteed
minimum price. The risks shouldered by the farmer are those relating
to bird mortality and growth rate. Finally, the grower can become
independent and have no contract, assuming the responsibility to
purchase all inputs and find his own markets, therefore bearing both
price and quantity risks.
With vertical integration the exchange process becomes internal to the
firm. While we will likely see more use of non-market co-ordination in
the future, it is not clear whether the current environment will
encourage further vertical integration. Deregulation has disturbed the
industrial status quo and much merger and take-over activity is occurring
as firms redefine their boundaries. Deregulation has also, however,
removed or reduced many price distortions that were present in the
economy, which, in the past, have encouraged integration as a means of
avoiding them.
Vertical integration may also arise from the power distribution within
the marketing channel. One firm may integrate into another level of the
channel to discourage other firms from entering and controlling that
leveL or to ensure that its products are used in the subsequent stage.
Such a firm might also be able to sell to a range of markets so as to
maximise returns. A firm may even integrate backwards to allow it to
bypass higher prices charged by a monopolist supplier.
Conditions in the meat industry seem particularly conducive to
increased coordination by contract or independent vertical integration.
These include instability and uncertainty, slow or negative market growth
for traditional products, inability or lack of desire to reward quality
production, strong competition overseas, and financial stress faced by
farmers and processors. At present processors appear to be integrating
horizontally so as to achieve better utilisation of processing capital. The
increased concentration of power at the processing stage may then add to
other factors associated with meat market characteristics to encourage
greater reliance on non-market transactions, such as contracts. How
well such mechanisms perform will depend in part on how effectively
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processors can monitor production, and on the incentives that can be
offered to farmers. Advances in information technology should help in
any case.
For example, the efficiency of livestock and wool markets improves
when electronic trading - sale by description and objective sampling (i.e.
grades and standards) - is adopted. Electronic sorting has led to
efficiencies in quality measurement and the grading of fruit. New
information technologies might also help improve forecasts of crop
quantity, quality and price through the adoption of more accurate and
timely crop reporting systems. Advances in technology will also enhance
the ability of managers to monitor contract production, or to control
production decisions within integrated firms.
Biotechnology or genetic engineering may encourage product
differentiation in agriculture and horticulture, by allowing the production
of items designed for a specific target market. In such cases commodity
markets may not be required in order to locate a buyer, and contractual
sales or integration could become the norm.
The two statutory marketing boards in New Zealand involved in export
trading deal with the processed dairy products and the apple and pear
industries. Both these boards enjoy the sole right to export.
In defence of this distribution of property rights, it is important to
remember that market-based transactions can fail. Whether or not it was
the intention of past Governments, the sole exporting rights given to the
boards may allow these market failures to be overcome. For example,
the boards can avoid weak pricing, they can plan product distribution
and the timing of sales, they can define and enforce quality standards
and they can invest in market and product development in the knowledge
that the benefits will not be stolen since competing New Zealand
exporters do not exist. The boards are also in a situation of power when
negotiating with foreign members of the channel, such as shippers,
wholesalers, retailers, or government agencies. Critics will say that the
export monopoly marketing board is not the only solution to market
failure problems. However, until the research has been done, we cannot
be sure how the alternatives rank.
Not only have past Governments given these trading rights to the
export boards, they have also decided that they should be controlled by
producer representatives, probably to overcome farmers' traditional lack
of power in privately-managed channels. For this reason, one is less
concerned about the criticism that there exists no competitive check on
prices paid to growers in these industries, than in other sectors where
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such control lies out of producers' hands. Further, advances in
information technology should make it possible for producers to gain
information on comparative prices in order to obtain some countervailing
market power.
The export-marketing channels for pip fruit and processed dairy
products exhibit a range of exchange mechanisms with which
transactions are made. The New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing
Board has integrated into product assembly, grading and packaging for
the local market, cool storage and processing; it has contractual
arrangements with shipping companies and its wholesale agents; it uses
competitive markets to sell fruit to some of its customers; and has
verbally-agreed programmes to supply some supermarkets over specified
future time periods. The Dairy Board is also well-known for its wide-
ranging contractual and integrative activities.
Changes to the channel's power structure and environment suggest
that new transaction mechanisms will emerge, and that the evolving
power structure is likely to mean even less power held by farmers than
now. Perhaps a case can be made for public assistance in strengthening
the farmers' power base, but this will surely be debated.
Since market-based exchanges can fail under certain conditions, some
people will suggest that New Zealand firms may benefit through greater
control over the marketing channels. Others will argue this way lies
counter to a more competitive freer market approach. In addition, the
characteristics of agricultural and horticultural products, production
processes, and markets all encourage contractual coordination and
vertical integration, all of which can be obtained through negotiation
outside of Government influences.
While advances in information technology will improve the efficiency
of markets and overcome some market failures, the ability of managers
to monitor and control marketing processes will also improve. Changes
in biotechnology are likely to favour the use of contracts and integration.
Considering all the possibilities, it appears likely that in New Zealand, a
greater use of non-market coordination will be observed in future.
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The structure and performance of agricultural marketing organisations
has long been a topic of debate in New Zealand. Like most other major
agricultural countries New Zealand has many organisations which
influence marketing of agricultural products. Although some of these
institutions are long lived, their nature and activities have varied
considerably as they have responded to changing economic and market
conditions.
Attention is frequently focused on the larger organisations which have
a high profile at national and international trade levels. Changes in
these organisations have been the cause of considerable debate. For
example, the wool acquisition debate in the early 1970s led to
polarisation of farmer and politician opinion about the efficiency of and
the most appropriate tasks for farmer- controlled marketing
organisations. The more recent controversy surrounding the Meat
Board's control of the export marketing of sheepmeats raised similar
concerns amongst farmer and taxpayer groups, because that activity has
resulted in a financial deficit which will be funded from general public
revenues.
The apparent success of some of these institutions has also been a
source of pride to New Zealand producers. The New Zealand Dairy
Board, the Apple and Pear Marketing Board and the Kiwifruit Authority
are now internationally recognised trading organisations. Organisations
of this type are frequently held up as examples to be followed by other
industries, but unfortunately the discussion is often' focused only on the
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structure of the organisation. It is commonly felt that because a
particular structure appears to have been successful in one industry it
can work equally well in another industry. Such reasoning pays no
attention to the important differences which might exist between
industries, and the markets which they serve.
The rapid development of new industries, such as deer and goat
farming and the diversification in horticulture, has led to a proliferation
of new smaller marketing organisations. The changing economic climate
makes it appropriate to consider their role in marketing.
It is crucial at the current stage of development for these industries
that attention should not be focused on structures and organisations
which have been used in the past. It is essential to develop institutions
which address the specific requirements of industries, and reflect the
characteristics of the industry and its market place.
In this chapter we attempt to explore the reasons for the development
of existing structures and organisations for marketing New Zealand's
agricultural and horticultural products. The background to the
development of farmer marketing organisations is outlined, and then an
alternative approach to marketing is proposed which looks at the need for
increased producer cooperation and institutional development.
Although it is fairly common for marketing firms to become vertically
integrated, it is uncommon in most non-agricultural industries for firms
to form horizontal linkages. In many instances such behaviour results
in the joint handling of product and finances and could be viewed as
collusion and unlawful in some countries. Such behaviour however,
quite uncommon in agricultural and horticultural marketing where many
such organisations exist. These range from simple voluntary producer
cooperatives to large marketing organisations which have extensive
powers and rely on legislative authority for compulsory producer
participation.
Organisations possessing legislative blessing are common in
agricultural industries throughout the world. The reasons for such
support include the fact that agricultural industries have a large number
of very small producers each of whom has little or no control over the
prices received for the products. It is also argued that agricultural
industries are prone to much production instability associated with the
weather, biological processes involved, the lags which exist in the
production cycle, and the special characteristics of demand for food
products.
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Thus, it is not surprising that, at times when prices are low or
unstable, producers seek a means by which they can control the prices
they receive for their products. The need for 'orderly marketing' in
agricultural marketing channels has been frequently identified in the
agricultural marketing literature over the past 100 years.
The growing awareness and use of marketing management techniques
in all aspects of business has changed the emphasis somewhat and, in
recent years, it has become more common to find producer groups
identifying the need for more 'coordinated marketing' which includes the
development of industry-wide strategies.
Approaches to these persisting problems have varied widely throughout
the world. For example, in the United States and Europe there has been
extensive use of Government-sponsored market orders, quotas and
cooperatives to protect farmers from the instability of the international
commodity markets. Fixing prices, storing products, controlling
production, diverting products into alternative markets, and controlling
trade flows are also used to curtail market fluctuations. In Canada,
Australia.the United Kingdom and New Zealand an alternative strategy
of allowing producers to have more direct control over their own
industries is employed. In these countries legislation has allowed
producers to form marketing boards and similar institutions. From a
government point of view such a strategy is desirable because it is an
inconspicuous form of intervention involving less government activity and
use of taxpayers' funds. This does not mean that these policies have no
social impacts. In many cases the powers granted to the marketing
institutions enable producers to influence consumer prices and the
profitability of other firms in the agricultural industry.
Like many countries, New Zealand has allowed statutory marketing
authorities which perform a variety of marketing functions. Some of
these organisations have been in operation for more than 60 years.
These institutions were set up following World War I. Prior to the
war, unsuccessful attempts had been made to regulate marketing in the
meat and dairy industries. During the war, however. the free enterprise
system which had operated in the meat, dairy and wool industries was
suspended, and an Imperial Commandeer of major primary products was
in force. Under this arrangement, the United Kingdom bulk-purchased
products at fixed contract prices which were perceived to be both high
and stable.
After the war free markets were associated with low commodity prices,
and it soon became clear that producers associated high, stable prices
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with controlled export marketing. Consequently, the New Zealand Meat
Producers' Board and the Dairy Produce Control Board were set up in
the early I 920s. Both boards had wide-ranging powers to deal with the
export market.
However, these two Boards chose not to utilise many of their
marketing powers. At first the Dairy Produce Control Board took
control of the entire marketing process. However. much producer
unease about acquisition, pooling arrangements and minimum price
levels soon led the board to abandon its attempt at controlled marketing
in favour of less interventionist activity. It fell back to only using
promotion, research and co-ordinating shippi ng arrangements. The new
Meat Board behaved in a similar fashion, restricting its activities to
market surveys. grading, freight negotiations and maintaining a watchdog
attitude towards meat slaughtering and export costs.
During this period, another major statutory body, the Fruit Export
Control Board, also came into existence. In this case, however; the
pipfruit industry moved rather rapidly towards a high level of statutory
intervention with the Board exporting fruit on growers' behalf. The
reaction of the wool industry to post-war stockpiles was entirely different.
Rather than allowing this wool to enter the market in an uncontrolled
manner, New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom formed an
international cartel, the British Australia Wool Realisation Association
Ltd (BAWRA), to dispose of stocks in an orderly manner. This was
achieved by 1924, and BAWRA was wound up. The New Zealand wool
industry then returned to a free enterprise system until World War II.
The Depression and World War II heralded a major change in
attitude towards statutory marketing of agricultural products. In 1936,
the Government stepped in under the auspices of the Primary Products
Marketing Department and acquired all dairy produce at a guaranteed
price. During the war, a bulk purchase agreement with the United
Kingdom was in operation and the Primary Products Marketing
Department administered this for dairy products, meat and wool. A lack
of shipping space precluded the export of pipfruit, which the department
disposed of on the domestic market. The bulk purchase arrangement
with the United Kingdom continued until 1954. After the war,
fruitgrowers saw the need for an appropriate marketing organisation. As
a result the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board was formed
in 1948.
Fledging statutory organisations had begun to emerge in the wool
industry. Falling prices during the 1930s once again led to international
cooperation with the formation of the International Wool Publicity and
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Research Secretariat. A national counterpart, the New Zealand Wool
Council. was set up to collect levies for the secretariat, and to stimulate
research into wool production, and promotion of wool. This council was
replaced by the New Zealand Wool Board in 1944. Growing wool
stocks at the war's end resulted once again in an international cartel.
New Zealand's part of this process was administered by the newly-
formed New Zealand Wool Disposals Commission.
At the conclusion of the bulk agricultural purchase agreement in the
early 1950s. the direction of statutory involvement in the four major
agricultural industries diverged. Marketing of dairy products and
pipfruit was dominated by statutory boards which were required to
purchase product at set prices and market the output on behalf of the
industry. With minor modifications these arrangements remain in force
today.
On the other hand, the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board
essentially reverted to its pre-war role of watchdog of the private
enterprise system. In addition, however, it administered the new
minimum prices scheme which was backed by the now substantial meat
industry reserve funds. Attempts to diversify away from the United
Kingdom market were also made at this time with the setting up of
Devco and the introduction of diversification targets along with associated
penalties and bonuses.
The 1970s brought a marked change to statutory behaviour in the
meat industry. The board began to intervene selectively in the market
in response to low prices. In addition, it consolidated its power to
control selected conditions of export. Finally. after a difficult year in
1982. it intervened and took overall control of export marketing. This
arrangement continued until 1985/86 when the board handed the
responsibility for sheepmeats marketing back to the private sector in the
face of criticism of its activities by both exporters and government.
Currently, much of the board's activity appears to centre around
promotion and research.
In the mid-1970s, concern over the structure of the wool marketing
system emerged. and the so-called 'acquisition debate' gained
momentum. However. support for more major statutory involvement in
~vident and the New-Zealand--Wool Board has
continued to intervene in a modest way through promotion and research
activities. and intervention on the auction floor. Board activity is now
aimed at stabilising prices rather than propping them up.
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In recent years a new statutory style has emerged with the New
Zealand Kiwifruit Authority. Kiwifruit production began to expand in
the 1960s. Fears that current markets could not absorb the projected
production led to attempts to increase demand through promotion
activity. It was financed by a voluntary levy on growers and exporters
and administered by the Kiwifruit Export Promotion Committee. The
success of these promotion efforts boosted prices which. in turn.
attracted new growers and exporters into the industry. This led to
concern by existing producers about free-riding and lower quality
product hurting growing markets. As a consequence, an industry
demand for a marketing board emerged and culminated in all parties
agreeing to the concept of a licencing authority.
This authority came into operation in 1977. Its predominant role was
to license exporters with the object of promoting orderly marketing so
that quality was maintained and exporters did not undercut each other.
It continues to do this, as well as emphasizing promotion and setting
sales targets in individual markets. In recent years it has encouraged
diversification away from traditional markets and is increasingly involved
in production research and product development.
A number of points emerge from the development of New Zealand's
agricultural marketing authorities. First, different structures have
emerged in different industries, despite the similarity of the problems
perceived in the individual industries. For example, dairying and
pipfruit adopted highly regulated marketing structures in response to low
prices. On the other hand, the wool industry, which initially regulated
due to perceived low prices, reverted to private enterprise marketing after
international wool stockpiles had been cleared. In more recent years,
the kiwifruit industry instituted licencing of exporters, partly in response
to the threat of oversupply and low producer prices.
A second observation, is that statutory structu res have changed
direction at different points in their history. Despite initial attempts to
highly regulate dairying, the 1920s were characterised by low levels of
statutory involvement. This changed with the Depression in the 1930s
and, by World War II, the marketing of all major agricultural products
was tightly controlled. At war's end, the dairying and pipfruit
industries opted to continue with these highly regulated structures which
remain today On the other hand. the wool and meat industries reverted
to lower levels of regulation.
A final observation which emerges is that the economic policies
adopted by statutory marketing institutions have changed over the years,
despite the fact that institutional objectives appear to have remained
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stable. Initial policy emphasis was on generic promotion aimed at
increasing demand, and on trimming supply costs through research
aimed at lowering production, processing and marketing costs. By the
conclusion of the World War II, however, guaranteed pricing schemes
had been in operation in all four major industries. After the war, the
emphasis again changed and market diversification programmes were
forerunners to the more sophisticated market segmentation policies
eventually adopted in all industries. For example the wool industry has
moved towards targeting promotion and product development to specific
market segments. Kiwifruit marketing has likewise moved straight into
demand management policies with promotion activity, product
development and the marketing direction which are implicit in licencing
arrangements.
The major feature of the sophisticated marketing programmes which
have been developed by these agencies is the level of coordination and
control developed over handling in New Zealand and in overseas
markets. In cases such as the Dairy Board this control tends to be
absolute and has extended to the ownership and control of firms in other
countries which handle products other than those from New Zealand.
For example, in recent years the board has acquired ownership of
several firms in the United States which allows them increased control
over the marketing of domestic dairy products and imported products in
that country. These, plus similar strategies in other countries have
extended that board's role beyond simply being a marketer of New
Zealand's dairy products. It is not difficult to see how such changes
could benefit New Zealand producers. It also implies considerable
change in the organisation and complexity of ownership structures.
The degree of control which is required to implement such strategies
relies heavily on the statutory powers granted to these organisations. In
the meantime the changing economic climate in New Zealand since 1984
has raised considerable doubts about the continuation of such powers.
Although the powers of these larger organisations have not been
threatened at present, it is significant to note that no similar power has
been granted to any industry in recent years. There has already been
considerable deregulation of some marketing organisations and
arrangements in such areas as the egg and wheat industries, town milk
marketing and the fresh fruit distribution system.
The proposed Horticultural Export Authority Bill which was intended
to provide licencing powers over a wider range of horticultural products
similar to that used in the kiwifruit industry appears to have been stalled
in the legislative process for a number of years. These recent
developments imply that in the future agriculture and horticulture
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producers are unlikely to be able to rely on statutory powers to provide
compulsory membership of marketing organisations and control over
export marketing channels .
The rapidly changing economic environment provides an opportunity
to consider the nature and structure of marketing organisations which
might emerge in a deregulated economy. Because the fundamental
characteristics of our agricultural and horticultural industries will not be
affected by deregulation, the problems and concerns of the individual
producers will continue to exist in the future. This is probably not as
dramatic as it sounds because the industries which have emerged in
recent years such as deer farming, goat farming and a wide range of
newer horticultural industries have all developed in the free market
system. It does not mean that marketing institutions and organisations
will not exist to influence marketing, but they may utilise powers in a
manner different from that which is seen in the largest statutory
organisations today.
The key to understanding how new institutions and marketing
structures might emerge is to consider the motivation and benefits which
are likely to occur for producers who participate in cooperative activity.
In almost every industry in the New Zealand economy some form of
cooperative activity exists. Within industries other than agriculture this
is often in the form of trade associations which perform useful functions
such as monitoring legislative changes which are likely to influence the
industry, provision of market research and information about trends and
developments in the industry and, perhaps most importantly. providing a
forum in which problems can be discussed. Because membership of
such institutions is voluntary, each individual firm must be able to assess
benefits which they are able to obtain from membership. The fact that
such a large number of these institutions exists indicates that there are
obviously benefits from voluntary membership. Often these benefits are
in the cost savings from .collecting and distributing information, and in
the ability of the organisation to provide a united approach to common
problems.
Because of its fragmented nature there is probably an even wider
range of voluntary associations in agriculture and horticulture industries.
Each of these in their own way will have some impact on the
performance of individual farms and the marketing system. Common
examples include farm discussion groups at which farmers exchange
information about prices they have received. farmer cooperatives which
directly handle and market the produce from their members, and
institutions such as the goat fibre warehouse which facilitates the
exchange of produce between producers. and users of that product.
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Although these specific examples are very different their common
feature is that participation is voluntary, and that it provides some
financial benefits for users.
The sources of financial benefits fall into several major categories.
(I) Information transfer. It can become very costly for individual
producers to accumulate all the required information· about
production techniques and market inforniation on their own behalf.
Thus, it is not uncommmon for producers to share -this task and
pool information. Each individual member is able to benefit from
the pooled knowledge and information. When new information
must be collected, the cost can be shared.
(2) Economies of Size. Producers frequently use voluntary
associations to capture the benefits which are associated with
economies of size. Producer cooperatives are probably the major
type of institution used for this purpose and they are evident in
almost every agricultural economy in the world. Their functions
and purposes vary widely but all have the common feature of
attempting to maximise the participants returns, or to minimise
costs by handling the producer's product. Again, such
organisations vary markedly in size from jointly-owned packing
facilities to very large marketing cooperatives which handle the
producer's product through to the final consumer markets. Many
of the functions which are carried out by cooperative organisations
could also be carried out by private firms and the relative
advantages of these alternatives have been widely discussed in the
agricultural marketing literature. Perhaps the major point to be
made is that such organisations provide producers with
considerable flexibility tb intervene in the marketing and the
handling of their products. They provide a strategic mechanism
by which producers can contest the performance of private
companies which may seek to perform similar functions.
(3) Joint Promotional Activity. Because of the size of individual
producing units it is seldom economic for an individual producer
to promote their own products. However, it is felt that in many
industries it is profitable to undertake some form of promotional
activity which would benefit each individual producer.
(4) Research and Product Development. Although producers can
benefit individually from the adoption of new technology or the
production of new product forms, historically this has been a
major area of government involvement through the Ministry of
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Agriculture and the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research. It is usually argued that such government involvement
is necessary because the costs are high and the benefits which
result cannot be captured by individual farmers and may even
benefit the economy as a whole or consumers in overseas markets.
The changing economic structure in New Zealand. and
particularly the 'user-pays' approach to research, raises some
major issues in this area. With the removal of government-
sponsored research there will be an increased dependence on
industry sponsored research. Although New Zealand has some
conspicuous examples, such as the Meat Industry Research
Institute and the Wool Research Organisation, it is notable that
these are themselves funded from the statutory requirements of the
boards. Therefore planning will be required to identify methods
by which research can be carried out and benefits obtained for
users in industries where involvement is voluntary.
(5) Provision of Marketing Facilities to Aid Exchange. Although
such action is not particularly common within New Zealand,
producers in many overseas countries have acted together to
provide facilities which can minimise the costs associated with
selling products. Obviously examples include cooperatively owned
clearing houses or auction facilities. Selling costs are minimised
by providing a venue for sellers of the product to be exposed to the
maximum number of potential purchasers. In other cases they
may facilitate the aggregation of product into shipment sizes which
are suitable for the appropriate user. A major benefit of such
institutions is their ability to provide clear price information to
both buyers and sellers without the need for the organisation to
actually own the produq. Perhaps the closest examples in New
Zealand are the goat fibre warehouse and the Wool Board's
involvement in the marketing of wool.
Although these options are seen to be quite extensive there are limits
to which the activities of voluntary associations can achieve benefits to
the industry as a whole. The most obvious difficulty is commonly
known as the free-rider problem. Simply, this is the inability of the
participants, who pay the costs, to capture the benefits which may accrue
from their activities. Perhaps the most obvious examples are in joint
promotional activities and research and product development. If it is
possible for producers to achieve benefits without contributing to the
costs, it can be extremely difficult to raise funds for such activities.
The key to successful voluntary cooperation in marketing activities is
the ability of industry planners to identify groups who can both pay the
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costs and achieve the benefits associated with activity . Perhaps one of
the major needs in this area is a much better understanding of, how
these organisations can influence the profitability of the individual
producer.
Free-rider problems are probably the major reason that there is
frequently considerable pressure for legislation to ensure compulsory
membership of marketing organisations. Such a move obviously
overcomes the problems of raising funds and can also considerably
enhance the possibilities for increasing producer returns. Many of these
activities such as price stabilisation and pooling returns have been widely
used in New Zealand. While the ability of marketing organisations to
aid producers may be increased through such activities it is also
recognised that there can also be major costs.
The most frequently cited problem is that the compulsory participation
in marketing board activities can preclude producers from using
alternative marketing channels. In such cases, it can be difficult to
monitor the performance of the boards. For this reason many
commentators have identified the need for competitive private marketing
alternatives to exist alongside the board-controlled activities. While an
arrangement of this type would appear to work satisfactorily in cases
such as the wool industry it may not be appropriate in other
circumstances. This will again depend on the nature of the benefits
which the marketing organisation attempts to gain. With the dairy or
apple and pear industries there are obviously major benefits in adopting
market segmentation strategies which rely on differentiating products and
prices among markets. The presence of private firms in such industries
would not allow those benefits to be achieved, since it is the competitive
firms who seek to sell in only the high-price markets.
It is clear that careful assessment has to be made of the benefits which
might be obtained from carefully controlled marketing systems as against
the efficiency of resource allocation and opportunity-seeking which might
be seen in a competitive market.
The changing economic environment provides an ideal opportunity to
reassess the directions of marketing developments in both new and older
industries. For new industries it will be important to consider the need
for legislative authority, then to carefully consider the full range of
alternative structures which might perform similar tasks at an acceptable
cost.
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Chapter 18
Politics and Agriculture
JolIn Kneebone
Farmer. Tirau
The political changes impacting on farmers in 1987 have their origins
in the 1930s, the time of the Great Depression, and of the election of the
first trade-union based Labour Government. Today's farmers are being
adversely affected by the removal of policies initiated to help their
grandparents. Policies which, when combined with World War II and
its aftermath, produced 40 golden years of prosperity for their parents
who not unnaturally used every political expedient to prolong that
economic security.
The year 1984 saw the election of a new-look Labour Government
composed of young, liberal, middle-class, professional and urban-
oriented individuals determined to avoid the reputation of previous one-
term Labour Governments for being kind-hearted, with a social
conscience, and a bit naive economically. The preoccupation with
economic reform, the determination to free New Zealand from its 50-
year accumulation of controls has achieved a remarkable turnaround and
three years later still enjoys considerable support from the better
educated in the higher socioeconomic groupings.
The urban unskilled and the rural dwellers, who have financial
commitments, are now in a serious state of depression. but rural
dwellers with capital who are free to invest in urban development, the
financial sector or off-shore are anxious to see no political change. New
Zealand is on the brink of a return to the bitter debates which formed
the New Zealand Labour Party and which eventually caused the demise
of the Farmers' Union organisation .. The debate is as old as civilisation
and recycles continously through societies. The differing names and
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titles confuse the casual viewer of history, but the underlying objectives
never change. It is simply a choice about controls versus freedom;
intervention as opposed to hands off.
Superimposed on this issue was the long-delayed transition of power in
New Zealand from the rural to the urban sector. The gradual shift was
artifically delayed by the 1930s rigidly controlled foreign currency
regulations.
It is difficult for most of us to understand the influence of experiences
we ourselves have not been exposed to. The best we can do is try to
imagine. But even that is no substitute for the actual experience of not
having enough money to feed and clothe one's family properly; to fail in
the eyes of one's wife and children; to be sold up, to walk off, or to be
too poor to help a sick child.
It was such experiences that prompted our grandparents, against
advice from economists and affluent land owners, to form cooperatives;
to keep operating the dairy factories that proprietary companies
abandoned; to form farmers' insurance companies, rural trading stores,
bobby calf pools, fruitgrowers' associations and meat companies.
Government intervention was as dirty a word in the 1930s as it is
today. The debates were bitter, but private enterprise free trade could
offer no solution to the Depression misery. Collectivism and
Government intervention could, and they did. Fundamentally, the world
and world trade has not changed. Farmers, still at times produce more
than a finite market can absorb. Dairy and fruit farmers, the less
affluent ones, accepted the challenge and as a result are better placed
today than, for example, the sheep fanners whose efforts to do the same
thing were less successful (probably because of the greater economic
disparity among them). Dairy farmers and orchardists are more uniform
in their economic holdings than sheep farmers, and in times of duress
have recognised they had little option but to co-operate or go under.
On the other hand, most of the larger, better and longer established
graziers have been able to survive. Dairy farmers, always more
politically active and pragmatic, were able to punch through legislation
making the New Zealand dairy industry a compulsory co-operative.
Walter Nash helped obtain Reserve Bank credit for them and the
promise of a guaranteed price. Ironically, the guaranteed price (which
attracted thousands of dairy farmers' votes and helped ~ao6ur gain office
in ]935, and saw a Waikato dairy farmer, Mr W. Lee-Martin, installed
as Minister of Agriculture) was repudiated in ]957 by a Labour
Government when it was called on to compensate for low prices.
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The Depression, World War II and the post-war shortages ushered in
policies which guaranteed security through the sale of every kHogram of
New Zealand's production, irrespective of quality. At the same time
policies protected industry and thus guaranteed urban full employment.
Two results were that rural interventions were capitalised in increasingly
overvalued farmland, and dismal productivity levels persisted in most
service industries.
The security of these 40 protected years produced a uniquely New
Zealand egalitarianism where we had few obviously rich people and no
really poor people or slums. No large houses were built in that era,
although they were built prior to 1935 and after 1975. The 1935
Labour Government and their subsequent policies redistributed wealth
both for rural and urbati dwellers.
A phrase which is rarely heard these days is 'the Land Question',
except in reference to Maori land confiscation. Historically the 'Land'
has always been seen as the key to wealth and security. The control of
the 'Land' was synonymous with power and export generation, from
which flowed New Zealand's standard of living. Socialist reforms
historically have manifested themselves in redistributing land ownership
to a wider cross section of the community. However, there is a school
of thought which suggests that today technology and the possession of
specialised knowledge and managerial skills have replaced land as the
tangible evidence of power and control. This implies that land
ownership will no longer ensure security and sustenance for its owners.
It may be that a share portfolio will replace a rural estate as the ultimate
kiwi achievement.
It may, perhaps, be helpful to recall that the pattern of high, short-
term prices and land values, followed by long- term recessions has been
a consistent one in New Zealand since European settlement. Our
current situation is similar to the late 1920s following the post war
boom. It was in this period that the New Zealand Meat and Dairy
Boards were formed. High interest rates combined with poor market
returns, initiated the birth of Social Credit (then known as Douglas
Credit) in North Auckland.
Minute books of the Farmers' Union recount the misery being caused
to returned soldiers given access to farm land with high interest rates,
which eventually forced the Government to legislate for the quite
draconian and compulsory write-off of farmers' mortgages based on the
farm's productive ability, irrespective of mortgagor's position or
circumstance. The difference at today's farm finance meetings is that
discounting is voluntary albeit with a fair degree of peer pressure.
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The pressure for the Government in 1930s to intervene further came
not only from the electorate, but from off-shore creditors, especially in
the United Kingdom. The U.K. Government agreed to provide loans,
on the condition that future purchases of farm produce be assured to
them. Currency export and import controls as well as the licencing of
imports of all raw materials and manufactured goods, were also
instituted. The State Advance Corporation was set up to advance money
at concessional rates to first home and farm buyers.
The 1930s brought changes many of which were promoted by farmer
pressure groups, especially the Farmers' Union. The debates on
intervention were intense, with splinter groups moving- off at tangents.
So fierce did the debates become that the Farmers' Union eventually
collapsed and was replaced by a federation of specialist product groups.
The original Federated Farmers grew from the United Wheat Growers
which formed the basis of the Arable Section. The Sheep Owners'
Federation formed the Meat and Wool Section, while the Dairy
Producers Association became the Dairy Section.
In the old Farmers' Union the small-scale farmer, anxious to co-
operate with his neighbour, clashed directly with the large-scale graziers
who wished to retain absolute autonomy. Today, as revealed in New
Zealand Meat and Wool Boards Economic Service data, the sheep
farmer is much less in debt than the dairy farmer (i .e. 70 percent of
New Zealand sheep farms are unencumbered). If the Dairy Section of
Federated Farmers were to have a joint meeting with the Meat and Wool
Sections it would find itself locked into an intense and probably pointless
ideological debate. Dairymen still want collective effort; sheep farmers
still want autonomy at all costs.
It must also be remembered that the majority of farmers do not go to
Federated Farmers' meetings even though they do renew their
subscriptions. Consequently, Federated Farmers' leadership always has
the dilemma of being pushed by the farm activists who attend meetings,
and pulled by the generally informed but politically inactive majority
which is capable of becoming rapidly active if the leadership adopts
unacceptable policies. We witnessed this situation in the 'Great Wool
Debate' in 1973 on the issue of compulsory acquisition of the national
wool clip. Dairy farmers and apple and pear growers, who for decades
had had their crops compulsorarily acquired, were quite bemused by the
furore of sheep farmers refusing a greater security option.
The Federated Farmers' structure allows quite dichotomous debate to
take place. The Produce Sections allow specialists to sort out their own
particular industry problems and seek their own individual answers. My
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belief is that the bitter debates of the ]930s are yet to emerge in 1987 is
based on the fact that the farming industry has not yet entered fully into
the current depression, and unlike the 1930s the urban sector is still
affluent and likely to stay that way. The public marches staged in
Wellington and provincial towns indicated that there is a widespread
problem, one which has been slow to manifest itself because it is just
beginning to bite into farmers' bank accounts. The recent farmer action
at forced farm sale auctions was an indication of what is yet to come
since there are about 5000 farmers, (by Rural Bank estimates) who will
not survive the current economic downturn.
Farm mortgage discounting and finance restructuring meetings,
combined with Dairy Board action to lessen the impact of the recession,
are reducing the magnitude of the problem, but there is much worse to
come. The dairy and lamb markets may have bottomed out, but the full
impact of poor prices have not yet hit the 'cocky' on the land, and soon
he will face a very low advance payment, no residual of any consequence
from last season's returns, and massive cost increases, especially
electricity, and interest charges, will wipe out profit margins. Lower
stock numbers, higher killing charges and no fertiliser will compound
sheep farmer debt.
The ability of the various farming sectors to retain their former vigour
in this new order will depend on the degree of vertical integration that
has occurred in each one. The meat industry would seem to be the most
vulnerable and the least likely to get its act together to return producers a
greater share of meat's ultimate retail value.
The retailer of a fashion wool or leather garment will refuse to display
it unless he or she can obtain a 100 percent mark-up. The sheep farmer
traditionally accepts this; the dairy farmer does not. Dairy farmers are
political activists. Sheep farmers are, by nature, highly individualistic,
confident traders. They operate their business for months with no
income, and no assurance of exactly what that income is likely to be.
They seek individual rather than industry solutions to their problems.
The grazing industry with its high risk. unpredictable, free life style,
attracts people who seek this particular challenge. They are not going to
change or alter the very things which attracted them to sheep farming.
They have the option of selling or not selling livestock. Had they not
been risk takers they would not be self-employed, had they not been
traders they would have opted to work in a large company on a salary.
Had they needed the security of regular, more predictable income they
would have invested in a more integrated industry. The wool debate was
a classic example of attempting to impose on a group of people a
philosophy which was in essence, an anathema to them.
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Sheep farmers as a group are close-knit and friendly. Commercially,
however, they remain fiercely competitive both in the saleyards and the
wider market place. They compete with each other and benefit from
each other's adversities in the store stock market.
Established sheep farmers are able to make money in adverse times at
the expense of their less affluent neighbours. This happens, and it has
done for centuries, without rancour. Dairy farmers all get the same
prices for their milk. They all must sell their milk daily. They do not
usually separate the commercial from the social. Sheep farmers do and
therein lies the source of the political dichotomy.
Most established sheep farmers will have some off-farm investment as
a hedge against a poor season. Those with lesser resources are
tenaciously independent and will go to tremendous lengths to maintain an
outward calm and appearance of stability. Dairy farmers, because of
daily milk collections and judicious cross-examination of tanker drivers,
know what their neighbours' incomes are. Sheep farmers, like many
fishermen, are generally less than precise about exactly how big their
wool and bank cheques really are. Sheep farmers facing adversity
become silent; dairy farmers will make loud noises at just the hint of a
downturn.
The past 40 years of prosperity are slowly being erased from people's
minds. The realisation is beginning to dawn that farmers' incomes are
not going to be supported, that interest rates are not going to come down
to fanner levels, and that a low New Zealand dollar, although
theoretically possible, is unlikely to become a reality, at least not for
some time.
Those with portable capital are benefiting from this new regime.
Farmers, especially the encumbered ones, have their capital not only
locked into their farms, but see farm values are still declining. The
have-nots will emerge and become more vocal. More militant activists
will emerge in Federated Farmers. It, in turn, will reflect a less
'establishment' view of economic theory than it does at present.
. The only reason that the trade union movement, Federated Farmers
and the Labour Party exist is to intervene. Only the trade unions are
currently fulfilling their fundamental objective. The total system in New
Zealand was long overdue for a massive change, but the promise of
utopia in the farming community, after a short period of pain, will prove
to be a bitter disappointment.
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The idea of returning farm profitability by eliminating protection and
allowing competitive market forces to operate is an old and well-
canvassed theory. It is advocated, however, mostly by those who have
never experienced the rigours of rural poverty.
Time will reveal the vulnerability of our miniscule economy and of
pastoral farmers in particular with their longer term investment cycle,
which cannot compete on equal terms with that employed by currency
traders and the like.
The shift of power from the provinces to the city centres is no more
than has occurred in every other society. The truly amazing thing is
that it has taken so long, but this again is most probably related to the
pecularity of our European settlement, our narrow-based primary
economy, and our insulation from the population centres of the world.
Our new relationship with Australia has ended all that, for no longer can
we seek or implement a solely New Zealand solution. We are so
interwoven socially and financially with Australia that unilateral action by
us to contain either our people or their capital would prove futile.
Forgotten by many, for example, is the arbitary purchase by the
Government of farm land for the settlement of returned soldiers from
World War II. Land was compulsorily acquired at values determined by
the Government not by a free market. Land sales legislation controlled
land prices while agregation laws, still on the statute books today, limited
farm land ownership to one economic unit per person. This legislation
is currently circumvented by the ability to form a ten-person company.
Interest rates were rigidly controlled, while institutions such as life
insurance offices and trustee savings banks were required by
Government decree to allocate a proportion of their total lending to
farmers at concessional rates. On the other side of the ledger there were
several occasions when market returns took a spectacular upward turn
and the governments of the day intervened and froze a proportion of
farmers' income, then denied them the right to spend it, in a move to
curb inflation.
When New Zealand entered the butter purchase arrangements with the
United Kingdom, initially to provide collateral for loans, we agreed to
freeze the prices of meat, wool and dairy prices as a contribution to
Britain's war costs. New Zealand farmers were consequently not given
the opportunity of benefiting from world price rises brought about by
war-time shortages.
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After the war was over, the British Government did make ex gratia
payments to New Zealand in recognition of their action. However. those
payments were not passed on to farmers, but were allotted to the
Producer Boards and became the basis for their Reserve Accounts. The
dairy reserves were the first to be paid out in 1957 when world dairy
prices collapsed and the Labour Government of the day refused to
honour Walter Nash's guaranteed price. The Wool Reserves were the
next to go, but the Meat Reserves lasted more or less intact and have
been used to finance farmer co-operative meat works. fertiliser
manufacture and other industry benefits.
The past 40 years show continuous Government intervention. The
Government provided finance at one percent for the dairy industry to
trade. It financed, through its shareholding in the British Phosphate
Commission. decades of cheap superphosphate. Government decree
controlled our business, our lives and our welfare. It was deliberate
intervention to protect us from the miseries our grandparents had
endured.
No other nation settled such a high proportion of its citizens into their
own homes or onto their own farms. New Zealanders enjoyed
considerable security but the glasshouse atmosphere became increasingly
restrictive as a younger generation, free from the doctrine of security at
all cost, began to flex its entrepreneurial muscle.
The first sign of their impatience was the flow of urban capital into the
kiwifruit and deer industries. Burgeoning urban affluence had exhausted
most urban domestic investment. The urban investor, unable to export
capital for investment. focused on the tax avoidance potential (as well as
the development potential) of kiwifruit and deer. The ripple effect of this
surge of capital played no small part in the escalation of rural farm land
prices. SMPs have been blamed. but land prices had in fact peaked and
were falling when SMPs reached their zenith. Forestry became another
safety valve for' frustrated urban investors. While helping to escalate
land values this did provide a buyer for the marginal pastoral farm.
Such buyers are no longer there and reversion back to scrub, especially
in the North Island, is likely be that land's fate. It is ironic that much
farmer spleen was vented on forestry companies. They were accused of
depopulating regions, of being unfriendly neighbours and a blot on the
landscape. Farmers used political pressure through local authoi'ities,
town and country planning and central Government to keep forestry
companies from buying land.
Freeing up currency exports (advocated by many 'establishment'
farmers) has changed all that. Only the Dairy Board fought a rearguard
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action. But only the Apple and Pear and Dairy Boards are real
exporters and operating in the real marketplace, with direct vested
interests in actions from the land to the supermarket.
Only milk and apple producers own their own processing, do their
own shipping, market their own products and do their own financing.
Only they, the most reluctant of Labour Party admirers, have fulfilled
the socialists' dream. History indicates that 1935 should have heralded
the shift of power from country to town. However, the failure of
secondary industry was undoubtedly the major reason why it didn't
occur.
Farmers, after the fall of the Fraser Labour Government, still
continued to dominate all the major decision-making bodies from Cabinet
to Caucus. Until the mid 1980s the Wellington Airport at rush hour on
almost every business day was reminiscent of a Young Fanners' Club
reunion as folk of farming origin on every conceivable Government body
from the Reserve Bank Board to a temporary committee on some
obscure conservation issue, greeted and farewelled each other.
Today the airport crowd is just .as large but it has become a University
Students' Association reunion as union secretaries, laywers, accountants,
academics and urban activists greet each other in transit. The nations'"
steering wheel is now firmly in the hands of academic suburbia at all
levels of decision-making. The traditional blue collar trade unionist, like
the farmer, is now no longer a force in the land. Technology has played
a large part in that transition for no longer is human muscle a scarce
and valuable resource.
Trade unionists are very like farmers in their outlook and philosophy
though neither would admit it. They both believe in and trust
conservative economics; they understand the sale of labour and the sale
of goods; they do not trust the manipulation of 'fiscal invisibles'; and
they do not understand or trust social experimentation, moral liberalism
or sexual deviation.
I recall a visit to Auckland in the late 1930s - the hustle and bustle of
tramcars, the railway station. the wharves. My father (a dairy farmer of
miner/wage earner origins) explained that Auckland, a vibrant city even
then. owed its existence and its prosperity to the milk from our little
farm and those of our neighbours. That may have been true then. It is
not today. The Auckland waterfront and the loading of ships was
Auckland's lifeblood then; today it is a playground. The multi-storied
glass towers are now Auckland's income earners. Busy young men and
women flood into the central city in droves from 6.00 a.m. onwards
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having already been for a rigorous run or physical workout. They wait
impatiently at traffic lights in their SAABs, Volvos and BMWs, anxious
to get to those telephones or screens where they will trade with the world
till 6.00 p.m. without a break, too busy and absorbed even for lunch.
These new young. motivated kiwis are not a short-term phenomenon.
They are here to stay. They now run the cutter and no Waikato cocky
or Canterbury runholder will get within a bull's roar of the tiller, for
these 'yuppies' now earn the exchange to buy the cars, and French
wine.
Ten short years ago a downturn in fertiliser usage would provoke
rapid Government intervention to keep topdressing aircraft aloft. Less
grass meant fewer lambs, a lowered wool clip and a balance of payments
crisis. SMPs were the last of those interventions, but those in charge
today will look to such a rural-based solution to any problem.
What then is the new order for farmer politics and farmer influence?
The future will be very, very different, but not too obscure if we think of
where we have been, where we are now and where we might be
tomorrow. The most difficult truth for a politician to accept is that
politics do not initiate or even motivate. Instead, politicians react and
facilitate. Social and economic change is constant, politicians only
interfere and may perhaps speed up or slow down an inevitable change.
They cannot take the credit, nor do they deserve the blame, for all the
changes which effect us.
Federated Farmers will not change its structure, nor its system of
representation, unequal though it is. The principal benefit of such a
body is that it can accommodate a wide range of disparate groups. Even
though their economic circumstance may be diverse, farmers tend to be
price takers. Seeking the elusive goal of becoming price makers will
continue to be their common objective. Federated Farmers is a
federation even though those in it will forget from time to time and get
sidetracked into commodity problems.
The statutory Producer Boards are in general not well understood
particularly as they all tend to get lumped together in the assumption that
their statutes are similar. They are not. The Meat Producers Board was
formed originally to co-ordinate export meat shipping and ensure an
orderly flow of lamb into the U.K. market. It has always had the power
to acquire and trade, but has rarely exercised it. The Dairy Board is
one of the SOllthern Hemisphere's larger multi-national traders, an
extension of the dairy farm, retaining ownership and control of the
product to the final consumer. The Apple and Pear Board is smaller but
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probably the most successful of New Zealands' producer organisations in
that it operates well with little taxpayer help and public criticism. The
Wool Board, despite the common linkage with the Meat Board, is in fact
extremely independent and shares little common ground either politically
or commercially with its fellow boards.
Tagging along behind are a large group of farm-oriented statuary
groups representing town milk. pork, honey, vegetables. deer, kiwifruit
and wheat, to name a few, all of which have much less authority than
their titles imply.
The power and function of the Producer Boards is rarely understood
even by their members. The general myth is that a statutory Producer
Board is an autonomous body. It is however, nothing more than' a
statute-authorised subcommittee of Government.
The Dairy Board. in essence, is very little different from the National
Water and Soil Authority which co-ordinates and supervises Catchment
Authorities' spending of taxpayers' money. Many dairy farmers, dairy
company directors, and even some Dairy Board members would take
strong exception to this assertion.
But what of the sensitive issue of the relevance of Producer Boards in
New Zealand's future? How essential are they? Treasury has raised the
question and has been severely criticised. Established conventions,
especially those as entrenched and ingrained as the Meat, Wool and
Dairy Boards become sacred in many people's eyes, and any questioning
of their relevance is regarded as a heresy.
Yet, whether we like it or not, Producer Boards are responsible to
Government, not to individual farmers and very few farmers realise that
salutary truth. They exist because a group of farmers have asked the
Government to exercise control over them generally through quality
control. co-ordinated shipping, or orderly marketing regulations.
Because it is the Government that ultimately exercises that authority, any
individual appointed to a board or authority is responsible to and serves
only at the pleasure of Her Majesty, not his or her farmer peers.
The new order in our economy, the shift in emphasis from
intervention to independence, inevitably raises questions of the relevance
of structures put in place 50 years ago. If reviewed, many will
inevitably prove to be in need of change. For some the changes will be
"minor, for others they may prove terminally traumatic. For a small,
autonomous island, almost totally dependent on primary exports, having
Producer Boards makes sense. But for a small island off-shore from
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Sydney and Melbourne (and Auckland now looks there rather than to
Wellington for economic signals), will a Meat Produce~s Board perform
the functions its original planners conceived, for it?
The sheep farmer, who can delay trading for weeks in order to
bargain the harvest of his annual lamb or wool crop and who makes his
income from his buying skills in the saleyards, has no real interest in
commiting himself to a contract to supply a vertically integrated industry.
The meat industry has dabbled with single seller ideas but now appears
to have given them away. That being the case, the Dairy Board could
take over our cull cow exports and give the Meat Board a decent funeral.
The world of arable crops, now that we have free trade with Australia,
would seem to have a difficult future with private sector processors
apparently willing and able to import grains, vegetables and fruit. They
need not commit themselves to domestic contracts.
I was born in 1935, a child of the welfare state. From the cradle to
the grave the future was assured, or so I had smugly assumed. That
dream is now shattered. I see looming on the horizon the horrors which
haunted my parents of land values being less than one's debt, of a sheep
realising less than the value of transport and processing, of being locked
into the drudgery of milking cows well into my 60s because labour is
just too expensive, and of the realisation that the value of my farm would
buy me only a very ordinary house in Auckland.
There will be change, but not to my advantage. It will favour those in
power. just as the interventions of the past 40 years benefited those who
owned the rural land and were therefore powerful. Yet I will survive, in
a modest house in a less affluent place than Auckland, with a second-
hand car and friendly neighbours.
The human animal, especially the kiwi farmer variety, is an
irrepressible optimist. However, the optimism abroad today is based not
on fact, but on the fantasy that the post-war commodity shortage still
exists, that food security is still a political issue, and if all else fails Bob
Geldorf will lump us in with the Ethiopians and all will be well.
The reality is that agricultural and food processing technology is now
so advanced, with so many exciting developments emerging, that the
world needs fewer and fewer hectares to produce more and more food.
India, from being a food importer, is now an exporter, while China will
be a net exporter before the end of this century.
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As farmers we love to think that the land is still the basis of security
and affluence. The fact is that high technology and information and the
possession of knowledge, be it financial or technical, is the basis of
power now and will be in the forseeable future.
The basis of farmer affluence in the past decade or so has been the
capitalisation in land values resulting from the multitude of Government
interventions to stimulate and give confidence to the export-earning
capacity of our farming industry. The political structures farmers
evolved were designed to protect and promote those interventions,
especially the measures related to foreign exchange-earning.
The new generation of New Zealanders have discovered new Meccas
in Sydney, Hong Kong, New York and London. Sydney is closer,
cheaper and more convenient to fly to than Invercargill for most New
Zealanders. Wellington may still be important to some politicians but it
is of little significance to the new foreign exchange generators situated in
Auckland. The farmer political machine will need to adapt rapidly to the
new priorities which dictate political thinking.
Nowhere in the world does any industry of any significance survive
without political investment. Speculative investment for quick profits is
still in vogue. New Zealanders investment horizons show no signs of
retreating back to Aoteoroa. The modest returns which agriculture can
promise are unlikely to appeal in the immediate future while other more
remunerative alternatives exist.
Many farmers, where they are financially able, have adjusted to this
new lower plateau of prices and values. The longer the new regime
continues, the greater the difference between standards of living,
aspirations and achievements will become. The success of New Zealand
farming in the past has been achieved because of the quality of the
people engaged in it. If farming as a vocation cannot compete on equal
terms with other avenues of endeavour, offering the same rewards and
intellectual challenge, it will decelerate at an alarming rate.
The whole purpose of any political body is to intercede and intervene
on behalf of its membership. The current craze of 'look Mum no
hands' has been a refreshing change from the straightjacket suffocation
of the past. Yet a firm grip of the handlebars is called for if New
Zealand is to get back on course and become a significant rather than a
passive member of this new Australasian community to which we are
now inextricably committed.
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Agricultural politics can be a significant contributor and we hope they
will. But they must also adjust, and adjust very rapidly, to their greatly
eroded power base and declining rural equity, and realise their potential
in the total Australasian farmer lobby.
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Chapter 19
Government and the Farmer
Robin Johnson
Agricultural Economist
Massey University
Government Intervention 1880s - 1960s
There is a long history of Government intervention in New Zealand
agriculture. From the earliest colonial days, agriculture was the
principal activity of the new settlers, and Governments were committed to
allocating unused land, encouraging settlement and building up trade.
The advent of refrigerated transport in 1881 transformed this simple
colonial settlement activity into a national, trade-oriented growth
objective. From that date it became clear that future growth of the
economy and the prosperity of the people would be aided by building a
strong agricultural base geared to the export of refrigerated commodities.
The United Kingdom provided a virtually guaranteed market for New
Zealand exports right up to 1973, when its entry into the EEC put an
end to its free trade policy developed after the repeal of the Corn Laws in
1846.
From the last century, therefore, there was active Government
intervention in agriculture. Government enacted measures to break up
large estates built up in the colonial era; it encouraged immigration and
settlement to develop new areas (such as the Ninety Mile Bush in
southern Hawke's Bay); it built up the railways, roads and ports system;
it established large soldier settlement schemes after both the world wars;
and it established excellent advisory services to see that scientific
advances were available at no cost to the livestock farmers.
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The Great Depression was a major shock to this export-led growth
philosophy. In 1932, the United Kingdom partially abandoned its free
trade position as far as New Zealand was concerned and introduced
Commonwealth Preference. World demand for primary products was
severely depressed, and the impact on New Zealand was exaggerated by
the long transport distances involved. The newly-elected Labour
Government therefore changed its stance on export-led development in
1936. Protection of industry and import licensing were introduced to
provide some insulation from world economic trends, and to encourage
national growth from an industrial rather than an agricultural base.
Henceforth, the growth strategy had dual objectives: the pastoral sector
continued to be encouraged to provide the export earnings the country
needed for its further development while the emerging and protected
industrial sector was intended to provide for internal growth and full
employment.
The early 1960s called for a major review of the overall growth
strategy. National growth was not reaching expectations and the country
was beset by recurrent balance of payments difficulties induced by
fluctuations in export earnings and high import demands. The
resolution of these problems was seen to lie in greater export
encouragement and diversification. Pastoral agriculture was to be
assisted by input subsidies and concessionary development loans;
manufacturing exports were to be encouraged by a system of incentives
based on tax rebates. In effect, growth would once again be export-led,
even though many of the existing tariff and licencing procedures were
not phased out; the dual economy remained in place.
In the period up to 1984, when the most recent overhaul of the
growth strategy took place, the agriculture sector benefited from
numerous Government interventions that sought to strengthen the export
position of farm producers. This has been the period of greatest direct
intervention in farm production decision-making, and is the basis for the
rest of this chapter.
The Policy Framework 1963-1984
The concept of export-led growth has dominated agricultural policy for
the last 25 years. However, some care is required in using the term
'export-led'. In this context it means that explicit policies were enacted
to encourage positive export growth. It does not mean that the overall
balance of industry policies favoured the export sector. Indeed, evidence
analysed later points to the contrary.
19-2
Growth of exports was translated into growth objectives expressed in
livestock numbers in the 1960s. The underlying philosophy was that
growth in livestock numbers and performance required new investment
by farmers, extending the boundaries of improved grassland and taking
up new technology. If new investment were to take place, a stable and
predictable economic environment was required to encourage producers
to make the necessary sacrifices, and see a return for their efforts. In
addition, sufficiency of income was also desirable as it was recognised
that most new investment came from ploughed-back earnings and not
from borrowed capital. It was also recognised that state services could
playa large role in this process, and generous provision was made for
credit advances. increased research activity and wider agricultural
advisory services.
At the same time the requirements of the agricultural sector had to be
integrated with the needs of the total economy. While agriculture was
thought to have a dominant role in the promotion of export earnings,
Government was also concerned with such things as full employment
objectives, the growth of national income, and the control of inflation.
Clearly, policies introduced for these purposes could potentially conflict
with the relatively transparent objective of export growth. Protectionism
and inflation, particularly, had adverse impacts on farmers' costs and
competitiveness, and hence could have considerable effect on the
attainment of the export growth goal.
Policy Developments 1963-84
At the beginning of this period, there were very few direct income
transfers from Government to farm producers. There were minor
payments to farmers under the Stock Act for compensation and
tuberculosis control, a herd testing subsidy, and provision for emergency
expenditure as the result of fire, drought or snow storm. Advisory and
research services were still provided free by Government. Farm
incomes were largely market determined, and farm investment depended
on the propensity to invest of individual producers. Research at the
time showed this tended to fluctuate with levels of farm income and
hence was largely determined by fluctuations in overseas returns for
primary products. Internal cost inflation was only two or three percent
per year.
The Agricultural Development Conference in 1963 endorsed a plan to
greatly increase livestock output in the period to 1971-72 and suggested
to Government that additional incentives to farm investment would be
justified. Government subsequently introduced an enhanced loan
programme for farm development to be administered by the State
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Advances Corporation (now the Rural Bank); subsidies on phosphatic
fertilisers to encourage their use in hill country development; and a
special taxation allowance for approved farm development expenditure (a
100 percent write-off against income). Provision was also made for a
standard system of stock valuation, which had the effect of delaying
income earned for tax assessment purposes. Finally, a tax equalisation
fund, to be administered by the Department of Inland Revenue, was
created so that producers could deposit before-tax income in the fund,
avoid current tax, and draw on the fund in a later period when perhaps
investment needs were greater. These were measures that largely
avoided direct income transfers from taxpayers, but which relied on
indirect fiscal incentives to bring about the desired national objectives.
(Such measures not only lack transparency, but they also are difficult to
assess in retrospect in terms of amounts of taxation foregone.)
As the new expansion programme developed in the 1960s, further
assistance from Government was sought in particular areas. In 1969, a
subsidy was introduced on weedicides and pesticides (an obvious
bottleneck in land development); in 1970 came a dairy beef subsidy (to
encourage retention of dairy stock for beef); and in 1971, a stock drench
subsidy.
In 1971, a sharp fall in overseas sheepmeat prices brought about a
further intervention. To protect pastoral farmers' incomes and hence
investment, Government provided a grant of $1 per head of sheep
retained on farms (at 30 June 1972) as a direct income support measure.
The cost of approximately $50 million was to be shared by Government
($35 million) and the Meat Board ($15 million). While overseas prices
recovered sharply in the following season and removed any further need
for direct assistance, the mechanism was again drawn on in the 1974-75
and 1978-79 seasons. In 1975, $50 million was paid into the Boards'
stabilisation accounts ($35 million to the Meat Board and $15 million to
the Wool Board) to provide for underpinning of market prices of
sheepmeat and wool. In 1979, in response to a massive drought in all
the eastern districts of the country, an additional cash payment of $60
million was made available to farmers for maintaining incomes and
continuing development programmes.
Such ad hoc response to overseas fluctuations in prices, as well as
hardship conditions, led to the introduction, in 1978, of a Government-
funded floor price plan for livestock products known as the
Supplementary Minimum Prices Scheme (SMPs). This scheme was to
be administered by the marketing boards, who were to operate it in
conjunction with their own minimum price schemes. Floor prices were
to be set at the beginning of the production season, and the marketing
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boards could draw on Government funds if board-assisted prices fell
below these levels. During the period, 1981-84, the annual cost of this
programme exceeded $300 million.
During the mid-1970s and prior to SMPs, Government introduced
new legislation dealing with the marketing board minimum price
schemes. New Zealand has a long history of intervention in agricultural
marketing. National marketing boards were introduced in the 1920s to
provide some control over overseas marketing, with individual
commodity boards granted differing market powers according to their
circumstances. Both the Dairy Board and the Apple and Pear Board
have had minimum price schemes operating from the 1930s. These
schemes set minimum prices in advance of the season, and trading
surpluses were paid into a reserve fund for later payouts if required.
The funds were designed to be self-balancing and were funded by the
Reserve Bank at one percent interest when in deficit. The New Zealand
Meat Board operated a non-balancing floor price scheme prior to 1976,
using war-time trading surpluses to fund the scheme. The New Zealand
Wool Board operated a similar scheme introduced in 1985.
In 1974, the Government appointed an Advisory Committee (the
Zanetti Committee) to investigate the need for greater price stabilisation.
The committee reported in 1975 with recommendations to establish a
complete financial buffer system for all commodities with basic prices set
at the beginning of the season, and replenishment of the buffer accounts
funded by levies on producers. The Government adopted the
committee's recommendations with some minor variations.
The new arrangements did not materially alter the Dairy Board and
Apple and Pear schemes, but introduced a full buffer account system for
sheepmeaL beef and wool. The dairy and apple schemes provided a
basic price, over which trading surpluses were to be distributed on a
50:50 basis to producers and the reserve account. In the case of meat
and wool. the basic price was treated more as a floor price (with specific
criteria on how it was to be established), with another higher price, the
trigger price, above which surpluses were to be put in reserve. For
wool, replenishment was also by way of an annual levy on all wool
sales.
In theory, therefore, these price stabilisation schemes were designed to
be self-funding and to even out domestic impacts of price fluctuations in
world markets. The sole Government contribution was providing
continual Reserve Bank support when the stabilisation accounts were in
deficit. While charging only one percent interest on overdraft, the funds
also received only one percent in credit.
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Both the enhanced producer board floor price schemes and the SMPs
were adopted by Government to reduce the impact of overseas commodity
prices on farmer investment decision-making. Given the ranking of the
floor prices. the board floor prices tended to provide a safety net
mechanism, while the Government floor prices provided a level of
income -sufficiency. Both board and Government floor prices were
thought to be necessary to sustain the farm income momentum required
by the official programme goal to expand exports as fast as possible.
These changes in stabilisation arrangements were in part a response to
a falling-off in agricultural growth in the period 1969 to 1975. The
period from 1963 to 1968 had been one of unprecedented growth in
agricultural output, when favourable terms of trade combined well with
the new program me of fiscal incentives. However, despite the
commodities boom of 1972-74, growth was not resumed until much later
in the 1970s. Hence, throughout the 1970s there was considerable
discussion and many proposals made on the need to get agricultural
growth going again.
Thus, the Government moved to update the concessionary development
loan schemes first introduced in 1965. In 1976 the Livestock Incentive
Scheme was introduced. This gave farmers an interest-free loan to
expand livestock production which could be written-off if certain targets
of stock number increases were reached.
There was also a variant of the scheme which gave tax write-offs if the
targets were achieved. Some 14,693 loans were arranged between 1976-
77 and 1982-83 with a total value of $144 million. In 1978. the Land
Development Encouragement Loan Scheme emerged. This programme
gave farmers suspensory loans for land development and improvements
and was aimed at bringing readily accessible unimproved land up to its
full productive potential. If the farmer carried out his programme
satisfactorily any interest accumulated was written-off and only half the
loan was made repayable from the fifth year. Some 6,7 I3 loans were
made between 1978-79 and 1982-83 at a total value of $152 million.
It is clear that over the period from 1963 to 1984, there was
increasing Government intervention in the agricultural sector. From an
early reliance on loan schemes and fiscal concessions, the apparatus of
intervention slowly built up to include input subsidies, subsidised loans,
subsidised stabilisation credits and direct income support. This degree of
intervention must be examined against a background of increasing
frustration with the earnings derived from the market. The agricultural
sector was observed as not quite reaching the production and export
targets demanded; a lack of incentives was diagnosed as the reason; and
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ad hoc policies were introduced as the cure. Further reflection (in
hindsight) would reveal that more direct ways of improving the price of
exportables were not feasible for the Governments of the day. Hence,
the patchwork of ad hoc policies which eventually resulted. In the early
1980s, the cost of these policies grew very high indeed, and a retreat
from interventionism followed soon after the election of a new
government in July 1984.
Intervention and Farm Incomes
The national income (SNA) system of accounts provides a reasonable
framework in which to analyse the impacts of Government intervention
over this period. National income conventions do not provide a
framework for assessing indirect measures of assistance (such as tax
income foregone), nor do some measures often interpreted as support for
agriculture appear as a debit against agriculture (as in the case of
fertiliser subsidy which is paid to the manufacturers). However, national
accounts do asssess direct price measures of assistance and these include
all forms of income supplementation, input subsidies paid directly to
farm producers, emergency expenditures, and grants made to producers
(such as the herd improvement subsidy). Payments to producers, and
levies on producers, for statutory stabilisation schemes are not shown in
national income accounts, nor income equalisation payments, and these
must be analysed separately. Where Government takes over debts
created by statutory stabilisation schemes, then in theory, these should
be shown as direct price subsidies.
Trends in gross domestic product (GDP) generated in agriculture are
shown in Table 1. GDP is composed of compensation of employees,
farm operating surplus, depreciation, and indirect taxes less direct
subsidies. Thus operating surplus approximates what farmers actually
receive while GDP is a measure of unassisted or unsubsidised factor
income (that is, GDP is what the industry earned if SMP's and other
direct supplements are excluded). An apparently contradictory situation
is shown in that while GDP in agriculture expanded in real terms
between 1977-78 and 1985-86 (real income increased by 42 percent), it
is declining as a percentage of national GDP.
The policy issue from the 1960s to mid-1980s was one of income
adequacy. This was not expressed in terms of incomes comparable with
other sectors, or in terms of absolute levels of income, but in terms of
new farm investment as shown by trends in livestock aggregates. Thus
improvements in GDP, as earned in agricultural production, would be
taken as helping to achieve the desired export targets, while a fall-off in
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Table I: Trends in National Income, Agricultural GDP and Selected Agricultural Subsidies, 1960-84, Gross
Domestic Product, current $ m.
GDP
March Year
Economy Agriculture % Agriculture
Agriculture
Operating
Surplus
Direct
Agricultural
Subsidy
Agricultural
Subsidies
% GDP
1960-61 a 2813 410 14.6 289c 15c
1965-66 4012 560 13.9 386 19 {4.5
1970-71 b 5832 590 10.1 395 22
1975-76 11668 1071 9.2 755 40 {3.5
1980-81 23002 2161 9.4 1450 81
1981-82 27841 2248 8.1 1643 98
1982-83 31149 2117 6.8 1611 114 {1O.5
1983-84 33967 2413 7.1 1769 120
1984-85 38729 3542 9.1 2671 131
-\0
I
00
Sources: a 1960-61 to 1970-71
1960-61 to 1970-71
b 1971-72 to 1984-85
c 1960-61 to 1970-71
"Macro Trends in New Zealand Agriculture 1961-82". M.A.F.
Discussion Paper
Consolidated National Accounts. Reserve Bank Research Paper 32.
1981.
Monthly Abstract of Statistics. November/December 1986.
"Sector Accounts for Agriculture, 1960/61 to 1972/73." M.A.F.
Research Paper 4/76.
GDP earned in agriculture indicated the investment/export plan could be
in jeopardy.
In practice, policy makers in Wellington tended to make judgments on
these matters in terms of farmer incomes rather than GDP. Table I
shows trends in 'operating surplus' which is the nearest national income
equivalent to 'net farm income'. These data demonstrate that operating
surplus is the residual income category when overseas farm receipts
move up and down, and hence it tends to fluctuate more than other
factor rewards. When policy-makers scrutinise sheep farm and dairy
farm income accounts and forecasts, it is these fluctuations and trends
they take as indicating the relative need for compensation and/or changes
in policy.
There is one further policy instrument available to Government that
has not yet been discussed, the exchange rate. While it could be said
that the Governments thought of the exchange rate as a measure of last
resort, there were times in the period under review when unilateral
changes in the exchange rate were used as an instrument of agricultural
policy. Devaluations of the New Zealand dollar took place in 1967,
1974. 1975, 1976, 1979 and 1984. Revaluations took place in 1973
(twice) and late in 1976. Between 1979 and 1982. a crawling peg
adjustment system for the exchange rate was followed, and this reflected
a slow but steady devaluation trend. The GDP and operating surplus
income statistics in Table I, therefore, reflect income trends after the
Government had made its policy decisions on the exchange rate. Such
decisions were prompted by a number of external factors, of which the
domestic value of agricultural exports may not have been the most
important in every case. However, once the decision was made, the
income flow to agriculture was changed considerably.
Since 1974. the farmer's actual terms of exchange have deteriorated
by 25 percent; without exchange rate adjustment the decline would have
been 50 percent and fa.rm incomes would have been much lower.
By adjusting the exchange rate in the way it did, the Government was
giving a message to producers on the directions it thought desirable in
farm policy. i.e., maintaining farm incomes suftlcient to provide for
investment, primarily in increased livestock numbers, as a way of
increasing export growth. As will be seen later, such a policy may not
be the right one if it means getting out of alignment with the real returns
obtained in world markets, especially if accompanied by heavy t1scal
transfers fr0111 taxpayers to producers.
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Direct income transfers to the agricultural sector are also shown in
Table I. In the 1960s, there were very few of these instruments, and
the value of the transfers (agricultural subsidies) was very small. about
0.4-0.5 percent of GDP. In the 1970s, there were a series of ad hoc
income transfers, particularly in 1971-72, 1975-76 and 1978-79. This
intensified intervention, together with other direct grants amounted to
only 3.5 percent of GDP for the decade. In the 1980s, a sharp
downturn in overseas commodity prices brought the supplementary
minimum price scheme into operation, with consequently much larger
transfers of income. Over the first five years of the decade, these
transfers averaged 10.5 percent of GDP earned in the sector.
The 1970s also saw a more widespread system of compulsory savings
through the producer board stabilisation or price-smoothing system.
Arrangements were introduced to smooth meat and wool commodity
prices, in addition to the existing schemes for milkfat and apples and
pears. Table 2 sets out the net withdrawals from and payments to
producers from 1960 to 1985. In the 1960s, there were some
significant changes in farm incomes as a result of these provisions -
incomes were highly supported in 1960-61 and again in 1966-67.
Apples required support in 1965-66. These amounts were self-funding,
and withdrawls from the Reserve Bank had to be repaid from subsequent
years' export income.
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Table 2: Net Stabilisation Payments in New Zealand Agriculture ($
m. current)
-
Seasons Apples1 Dairy2 Wool3 Beef4 Sheepmeat4 Total
1960-61 0.3 14.2 14.5
1965-66 1.8 1.0 2.8
1970-71 -0.2 - -0.2
1975-76 2.2 43.8 33.5 7.1 86.6
1976-77 -10.2 -23.1 -36.0 7.2 -3.6 -65.7
1977-78 -6.3 -0.8 8.0 - -3.6 -2.7
1978-79 -5.1 25.1 -12.5 -39.7 0.7 -31.5
1979-80 -5.4 -61.3 -17.0 9.5 - -74.2
1980-81 12.0 -97.0 -9.4 23.3 - -71.1
1981-82 -11. 1 -122.8 9.3 4.5 59.6 -60.5
1982-83 -4.4 -114.2 2.1.4 -1.9 288.0 188.9
1983-84 -13.6 16.1 -19.9 -5.6 150.4 127.4
1984-85 -8.9 -45.9 -18.9 -0.9 357.7 283.1
Notes:
Sources:
A minus sign means payment by farmers into the account,
no sign means a payment to farmers frOII1 the account
2
3
4
N .Z. Apple and Pear Marketing Board, Sept years, Retained earnings.
N .Z. Dairy Board, May years, Transfers to and from Reserve
Account.
N.Z. Wool Board, June years, Minimum Wool Prices Funding
ACCOll nt, Net Change 1976-78 incl udes Wool Income Retention
account ($15 million was paid into the Wool Income Stabilisation
Account in 1975).
N.Z. Meat Board, Sept years, Meat Income Stabilisation Account Net
change, Account established with Government grant of $35 m. in
1975.
In the 1970s, the movement of these funds into agricultural incomes
was amplified. Higher contributions to dairy reserves were made in
1971-72, 1976-77 and 1979-80, while large payments were needed in
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1975-76 and 1978-79. The Apple and Pear Board added largely to its
reserves in this period. The wool and meat payments were funded by
Government at the start, but the later years of the decade were
characterised by net additions to the reserve accounts.
In the 1986 Budget. the I'vfinister of Finance announced that provision
would be made in the Supplementary Estimates for the cost of repaying
major producer board debts. This included compensation to the Reserve
Bank for the loss of $600 million that it had incurred on a $750 million
sub-ordinated loan to the Dairy Board to repay the Board's trading
account with the Bank, and compensation to the Reserve Bank for the
write-down of $850 million outstanding in the Meat Income Stabilisation
Account. In an announcement in February 1987, the Government said
that it had been agreed with the Meat Board that the total debt written off
would be $1.029 million (presumably the losses of 1985-86 were now
coming to account) on the understanding that the Meat Board paid the
Government $100 million out of the Meat Industry Reserve Account.
This period concludes with the Government decision to treat the meat
industry stabilisation advances in the period 198 I-86 as income transfers
(straight subsidies) and not loans from the self-funding accounts in the
Reserve Bank. Treated in this light, income transfers to the agricultural
sector in the period 1981-84 were to a level equal to 30 percent of GDP
in 1982-83, and over the first five years of the decade have averaged
14.3 percent of GDP.
Table 3 sets out changes in the balances of the Farm Income
Equalisation Account held at the Department of Inland Revenue. Again
relatively small amounts of income have been put aside by individual
producers over the years. Considerable pressure was placed on farmers
to use the account in the 1972-73 season, but otherwise it has remained
a voluntary system of saving, with the incentive of tax relief for the
amounts put aside. The policy issue in this case is whether farmers
would have used the voluntary system more if there had not been
collective compulsory systems in place?
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Table 3: Net Payment by Farmers into the Income Equalisation
Account ($ m current)
March years March years
1965-66 -1.7 1976-77 -6.7
1966-67 -1.4 1977-78a -11.9
1967-68 -0.6 1978-79 9.2
1968-69 -0.2 1979-80 -10.4
1969-70 -0.8 1980-81 -12.4
1970-71 -1.4 1981-82 7.9
1971-72 -0.4 1982-83 -9.2
1972-73 -4.4 1983-84 -5.4
1973-74 -84.6 1984-85 -3.0
1974-75 50.3 1985-86 -27.7
1975-76 17.8 1986-87b -10.1
Notes: A minus sign means payment by farmers into the account, no
sign means a payment to farmers from the account.
a
b
From 1977-78 includes interest accumulated at 3 percent,
At 28.2.87 the Account stood at $106,988,000
Source: Department of Inland Revenue (pel's .comm.)
Intervention - The Future?
The period from 1960 to 1984 was one of increasing Government
involvement with the agricultural sector in New Zealand. The
involvement was rationalised around the theme of export-led growth.
For most of the period, the growth objectives of increased production
and exports were achieved. And yet the experiment has been called an
economic and political failure. Why?
In the wider context, the growth of the national economy has been
disappointing over the same period. In spite of growth in export income.
the inflation rate was deemed excessive, overseas borrowing increased,
·and budget deficits widened. Generally, the country as well as
agriculture, enjoyed a standard of living beyond its income. Subsidies to
the export sector were part of the ad hoc policy programme employed
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throughout the period. It is therefore plausible to conclude that the
general total policy mix was a failure rather than only the particular
component that affected agriculture.
Secondly, insulation of the export sector from international trends
always carries the risk that world market reality rapidly changes while
the domestic economy does not. This appears to have happened after
1980 in the New Zealand case. Consequent drains on Government
expenditure then ran into the budget deficit constraint. As has been
discussed. accumulated debts in the producer board stabilisation schemes
have also been taken over by Government as the likelihood of repayment
diminished .
Thirdly, continued intervention has encouraged the build-up of
investment in facilities and property which the industry cannot sustain.
This applies particularly to land values, debt size and distribution of
processing plants and input services. In this sense, such investment was
unnecessary in retrospect, and should have been avoided.
Decisions have now been taken to dismantle the system outlined and
assessed in this chapter. Input subsidies, subsidised credit, stabilisation
accounts and guaranteed floor prices have been discontinued. In
addition, fi nancial markets have been decontrolled and the exchange rate
floated. These changes represent a new policy approach to agriculture in
New Zealand. The outcome is greater exposure to market forces, fewer
inbuilt collective stabilisation measures and greater exposure to individual
risk. Emphasis increasingly lies on the individual producer to make
his/her own arrangements with regard to risk management and
stablisation of income. The behaviour of exchange rates and interest
rates has become critical to the agricultural sector's future prosperity.
At this stage of the experience, the indications are for a tighter, leaner,
and smaller agricultural sector in the total economy. As such it will be
able to respond more readily to world market prices, and, with increased
efficiency and flexibility will develop new mechanisms to deal with
change.
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Chapter 20
Regulation
Tony Rayner
Agricultural Economist
Lincoln College
Agriculture in New Zealand has been one of the most regulated
sectors of the economy and this is very much the norm for the developed
countries of the world. Why? Part of the answer lies in the need to
protect consumers from food products that might be injurious to their
health. But that applies to only a few of the multitude of regulations that
governments use. Most of them have been initiated and justified on
economic, rather than health, grounds.
The explanation for these regulatory controls can be found in two
major attributes of agriculture in developed countries. Firstly,
agriculture tended to lag behind the rest of the economy during the
process of industrialisation. Interventions were then undertaken to
alleviate the resulting relative depression of agriculture. These
interventions often led to overproduction, which in turn had to be
countered by further interventions.
The second major explanation arises from the form of the industry
itself. It has little or no possibility of controlling its own production
levels. prices, qualities, marketing and research, without some kind of
regulation enacted on its behalf. There are simply too many people
involved in farming to make such control practical. In this discussion
both regulation and intervention will both carry the connotation of the
use of government controls which alter the behaviour of the industry.
Here, we will focus only on those interventions imposed domestically for
econom ic ends although there are many regulations within this country
and overseas which also affect the farm sectors.
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Specific economic regulations for agriculture reached their highest
level around the years ]982-84, the climax of a period of almost 20
years of the policy of compensating agriculture for the costs of import
protection and of maintaining an over-valued exchange rate.
The interventions in place at the time were bewildering in their variety
and number. A reasonably exhaustive listing of them is given in
Economic Management, Land Use Issues, published by the Treasury in
1984. There is no need to examine all of them here, but a list of the
main varieties together with the more significant examples of each, will
give some indication of their nature and extent.
Type of Intervention
Input subsidies
Production subsidies
Development schemes
Research and services
Producer board subsidies
Tax expenditures
Industry control
Producer board legislation
State ownership
Chief Example(s)
Fertiliser subsidies
Interest rate concessions
Irrigation subsidies
Electricity subsidies
Supplementary minimum prices
Livestock incentive scheme
Land development loans
MAF health and research
Interest rate concessions
Investment allowances
Export incentives
Town milk industry
Egg industry
N .Z. Meat Producer Board
Dairy Board
Apple and Pear Board
Rural Banking and
Finance Corporation
The Treasury's 1984 estimate of the fiscal cost was $547 million in
direct subsidies, $230 million in support services, $290 million in
revenue foregone, and $20 million in indirect energy subsidies. The
total of $1,087 million should be compared with that year's GDP of
around $34,000 million, which means that the fiscal cost was 3.2
percent of GDP, a figure which contributed to the substantial budget
deficit at the time.
The fiscal cost differs from the real cost to the economy of the likely
inefficiency in resource use engendered by interventions on this scale.
It was the realisation of these economic losses, both by the Treasury and
by the incoming Labour administration in July 1984, that led to the
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major policy switch that then took place. Regardless of the efficiency
issue, the fiscal cost of the pre-1984 policy was, in any case,
unsustainable. Hence in November 1984, the first Roger Douglas
Budget contained a swinging attack on these many faceted interventions.
The net effect was to shift the agricultural industry from the most
regulated form in its history to a position where it was subject to fewer
interventions than had been the case for many decades.
Economists are fond of stressing the efficiency of the market system.
They point out that an economy made up of many producers and buyers
- so many that none can influence price or cost - will, theoretically,
result in a system where no person's welfare can be improved without
another person suffering in consequence. This is the ultimate concept of
efficiency. The mechanism that ensures this ideal is free exchange
through the price system. Hence anything that interferes with prices or
transfers will almost certainly lead to something less than maximum
attainable welfare. Therefore, the simplistic argument goes, all
interventions are bad.
Of course, life is not so simple. In a real economy we can be sure
that not all of the economist's assumptions about markets will hold.
However. the basic idea of the desirability of non-intervention should not
be simply discarded. Even if it is not possible to prove that avoiding
interference with the price system is the best course, there appear to be
many examples of inefficiencies resulting from interventions.
The ideas which have been briefly expressed here are well covered in
a number of economics texts (Stiglitz, 1986 and Varian, 1987). The
dangers of intervention were also explained in the Land Use Issues
Treasury book (Treasury, 1984), although that gave insufficient attention
to the possible cases where intervention can be justified.
With this background we can now examine the regulations and
interventions that Governments have used in agriculture, to see the kind
of inefficiencies that they appear to have led to. While there is no proof
that the outcomes are in fact inefficient, in most cases that seems to be
the only realistic conclusion.
Subsidising inputs can lead to the most blatant examples of apparent
inefficiency in resource use. In general, the reduction in price to the
farmer of particular inputs will lead to their over-use at the expense of
others. In addition. because costs are reduced by the amount of the
subsidy, there will be a tendency to produce at a higher level of output
20-3
than is economically desirable, given the real resource costs of
production.
Fertiliser subsidies gave rise to a number of examples of these
problems. In part the subsidies were made on the basis of weight,
rather than on chemical composition. As a result farmers did not move
into using lighter, more potent fertilisers as rapidly as efficiency
demanded. Another part of the subsidy was based on transport costs, so
that the further the farmer was from the source of fertiliser, the greater
was the subsidy component - economic efficiency requires the use of
fertiliser to fall as the distance increases, since its full cost includes
transport. Thus low cost fertiliser and subsidised transport were part of
the reason why marginal land, at a considerable distance from fertiliser
sources, remained in production, when the real cost to the economy was
greater than the value of its production.
Irrigation subsidies had similar effects, and some development
schemes could not be justified if one uses real efficiency arguments.
This may be illustrated by research done on the Amuri Plains scheme
(Greer, 1984), where the difference between the return to the farmers
and the economy was estimated to be 23 percent. The absolute level of
the return to the economy, which was estimated to be 9.77 percent, also
shows that the scheme should not have gone ahead if real efficiency was
the aim, since this fell below Treasury's 10 percent guideline for
investment (assuming this guideline to be correct).
A more important example of the problems raised by input subsidies
can be seen in some of the effects of low interest rates for farmers. The
resulting increased demand for farm land was in part cause of its over-
valuation in the early 1980s, to levels of the order of twice those which
could be justified by earnings (Taylor and Davison, 1986). It also helped
lead to over-investment in machinery and land development during the
same period. The combination of these two effects became one of the
main causes of the financial difficulties of farmers in the mid-1980s, as
land prices fell to sustainable levels and interest rate subsidies were
reduced.
Similar problems can be seen in the Livestock Incentive Scheme and
the Land Development Encouragement Loans. The former led to the
increase in stocks of specific types of livestock at a time when it was
becoming ever more difficult to sell the meat they produced and when
diversification of farming was becoming more and more important for its
continuing viability. Thus the scheme worked in exactly the reverse
direction from that required. The Land Development Loans, in like
fashion, encouraged the development of marginal land at precisely the
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time when falling product prices meant that marginal land should instead
have been taken out of production.
A final example of the problems raised by intervention can be seen in
the use of Supplementary Minimum Prices (SMPs) to subsidise some
outputs. To the large sums of money involved in these subsidies should
also be added the cost of those occasions when the government wrote off
the accumulated losses on the Meat Industry Stabilization Account. The
effect of this latter move was essentially the same as that of SMPs. Both
activities resulted in producers receiving more for those commodities
covered by the schemes than their value in the market. Consequently
increased production of these products occurred at a time when market
prices were. already very low. A second consequence was that these
subsidies countered the market-led pressure to diversify into other
products. Hence the intended incentive for the production of one product
became a very efficient disincentive to produce others.
A third effect of SMPs was the overseas reaction and the imposition of
countervailing duties in the United States. While this is not an example
of economic inefficiency resulting from intervention, it is still important
as an indication of the fact that interventions cause changes in behaviour
which are frequently undesirable.
Given all these examples of the problems caused by regulation and
intervention, the question must be asked as to why New Zealand
governments set up these numerous programmes? It would be good to
be able to answer that it was for satisfactory economic reasons.
However, it is more likely that it was a combination of an ill-directed
attempt at tariff compensation, a certain amount of vote buying, and a
belief that the government was able to foresee the future better than the
industry. In the case of the latter motivation, the downturn in traditional
commodity prices may have been believed to be temporary, with future
movements likely to show an improvement. This belief may have then
led to the introduction of input subsidies, output subsidies and
development schemes in order to halt the decline in production that
might otherwise have taken place.
The danger of a government trying to outguess the market is well
illustrated by the fact that prices continued to fall. This meant that the
increase of some production and the reduction of actual farming
diversification that followed the use of these schemes was exactly the
opposite to what the industry required for efficiency. This activity is
sometimes referred to as the problem of the Government picking
winners. It is a problem because most Governments are not well placed
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to make commercial predictions since they tend to be isolated from the
market signals. Hence winners most frequently turn out to be losers.
Given all these reservations about the costs of interventions and about
their motivation, can there be any economic justifications for them?
There are two main matters to be examined.
The principle that intervention is bad is no longer correct when the
full set of economists' assumptions. required for the existence of
maximum welfare through open competition. do not all hold. When
there is a breakdown in these assumptions, a compensating intervention
may be required in order to achieve the second best outcome. But it is
always better to remove the breakdown in the competitive system if
possible, rather than trying to compensate for its effects. If removal is
not possible, then the greatest care is required to ensure that the
intervention used dees not cause more inefficiency than it cures.
Can any of the interventions in agriculture be justified as appropriate
compensations? Although there are a few specific instances which may
be interpreted in this way, the great bulk of the interventions cannot be.
The closest one can get to an economically acceptable justification for
them in general is as a compensation for the inefficiency in resource use
resulting from import protection. If this was the aim of the subsidisation
policies, then they were not well targeted. For example. a more attractive
possibility might have been to give identical subsidies to all exporters.
Differentiating between products. as SMPs did, caused producers to
make incorrect choices of output mixes. contrary to what the markets
were indicating. A second approach could have been to subsidise either
all inputs, to reduce costs of the whole sector. or else to subsidize the
specific inputs which suffered from price excesses due to the protection
regime. The specific, and differential, set of input subsidies which were
in fact used did not work in that way.
In any case, a better policy than carefully calculated compensation is
one of removing the need for the compensation, where this is possible.
In this case it would have meant the removal of import protection. This
was both possible and would clearly have been more advantageous to the
New Zealand economy than any set of output or input subsidies.
What situations are there where compensation is required. because the
breakdown of the competitive assumptions cannot be overcome? In fact
there are many instances of problems of this nature, although their
relevance to actual intervention in agriculture may not be great. Two
will be considered here: those of public goods and of externalities.
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Public goods are commodities where the cost of excluding someone
from consuming them is very large and/or where the cost of adding
another consumer is very small. Such goods and services are under-
provided by a market based system. The chief example in agriculture is
expenditure on research and development. Individual farmers are
usually not willing to pay for research, since the results will become
known to all and everyone will benefit at the individual's expense.
Alternatively, a case can be made that once research is done it should be
made available to all, since costs of publication tend to be low.
For both these reasons, allowing individual farmers to fund research
without any form of intervention, is likely to lead to little research being
undertaken.. The solutions to the problem are either that Government
fund the research directly, or the industry fund it through compulsory
levies on all producers. The latter has better justit1cation in economic
terms. What is certainly not wise is to move to a user pays system for
research. Agriculture would then fall increasingly behind in the use of
technology, and thus become less competitive on the world markets.
Externalities occur whenever the actions of one individual impinge on
another. There are a number of instances of such problems in
agriculture. Irrigation schemes are good examples and require
legislative support to ensure that a joint plan is made for an entire area.
A more controversial example concerns the marketing of horticultural
products. It is frequently claimed that some producers wait until a new
market has been established and then dump sub-standard produce on it,
thus damaging the market for others. Indeed, even the initial
establishment of a new market may not be feasible unless all potential
suppliers jointly fund it. For both these reasons it is argued that there
should be compulsory marketing authorities regulating market flows.
The problem with these examples of desirable market regulation and
provision of research, is that there is difficulty in avoiding further
inefficiencies resulting from the interventions which were used to try and
overcome the initial problems. For instance. marketing authorities may
prove stultifying to new developments in product lines or marketing
techniques. The difficulty is that the removal of the negative effects of
competition in markets can well overcome its benefits.
The conclusions are then: firstly. few of the specific interventions used
by New Zealand in the agricultural sector recently had sound economic
justification and likely led to substantial inefficiency. . Secondly. even in
those few situations where intervention could have been justified, it is
probable that the particular form of intervention chosen often did as
much harm as good.
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What can be said about the optimal level and kind of economic
intervention in agriculture? In the first place it is important to realise
that the sooner protection of import substitution industries is removed the
better off the whole economy will be. Import licencing and tariffs
should both be eliminated. This would ensure that resources are used in
the import substitute and export industries so as to maximise growth and
job opportunities. In addition, a reduction in the size of the fiscal deficit
would reduce the likelihood of the exchange rate overshooting its
equilibrium value for any substantial period of time. With both these
policy changes in place, exporters would face a neutral trade
environment and there would be no need for the Government to
undertake any compensation of agriculture for the costs imposed by
protection.
It goes without saying that the Government should also not indulge in
any attempt to pick winners, but leave this activity to the market place,
where it belongs.
One question often raised is whether New Zealand should adopt
agricultural subsidies, given that they are so widely used by her trading
partners. The answer to this is clearly 'No'. Either the other countries
will continue to support their agricultural sectors, in which case this is
simply a part of the trading environment in which New Zealand must
operate; or, alternatively they will reduce the level of support in due
course. Suc!1 a reduction may be predicted by the agricultural sector
itself in this country. which will lead it to take the appropriate action. If
the Government's predictions differ from those of the sector and if it
were then to use interventions to attempt to alter the latter's behaviour, it
would have fallen into the winner picking role again, with all its
attendant dangers.
The conclusion. therefore, is that there should be no use of
interventions unless these are very specifically related to particular
competitive failures. Even in these cases the aim should always be to
attempt to mirror the working of the market.
Problems raised by externalities should be resolved only by those
directly involved, whenever possible. However, legislative support
should be given to situations where group action and decisions are
required. The arrangements should be such that the control remains in
the hands of those affected by the decisions. Yet safeguards are also
required to ensure that the group is not placed in a position to nullify
valuable competitive pressure from individuals either in the group or
outside. In other words, the group must not become simply a protected
environment which is used to kill competition.
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There is often a fine line to be drawn in establishing controls. For
example, giving an organisation incentives to develop a market does
indeed lessen the danger of its under-development, yet those development
rights also remove the fear of competition and so could make the agency
likely to be less innovative in the longer run.
In the case of public goods a similar approach should be adopted.
Rather than the Government itself determining the extent of research and
the matters to be investigated, why not leave it to industry control, while
at the same time providing legislative support to overcome the public
good aspect of research? The Australian system of funding agricultural
research is a good model. Compulsory levies can be set on all
producers, the extent being determined by the industry. They need to be
compulsory to overcome the problem of producers free riding on the
research results, without contributing to their cost. The determination of
matters to be researched could be under the joint control of industry
nominees and a panel of scientific experts, to ensure both that the
research is targeted to the industry's short and long term needs and that
it is has satisfactory and broadly applicable scientific content.
The intervention scene is much different today. All that remains is
minimal legislation to allow the industry itself to overcome the problems
created by market failure, together with certain health and hygiene
regulations which, of course, are not strictly economic in intent.
This situation may appear as unfavourable to the welfare of farmers.
That would not be the case if the Government had also provided a
neutral trade environment. It would certainly be to the benefit of the
country as a whole if such a policy were pursued. Farmers might gain
in the short run by interventions. However, even they would be likely to
gain more in the long run from the extra growth engendered by trade
neutrality. Trade neutrality is both a practical and realistic policy aim.
It would be better than even the best-planned set of compensating
interventions. It would also be far better than the badly-planned set that
were actually used in New Zealand in the early 1980s.
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Chapter 21
Let's Return to the 1950's
Wolfgang Rosenberg
Ecollomist
Christchurch
The Reserve Bank and Treasury provide the theoretical justifications
for the present Government's economic policies of 'deregulation', the
popular name for which is Rogernomics, This is really a misleading
term. because it places too much responsibility for the policies on the
present Minister of Finance.
In fact the policies carried out by the New Zealand Administration are
at present implemented worldwide under the name of 'Liberalisation'.
The Reserve Bank and Treasury, which have strong international
connections both through their research departments and through their
daily contact with international financial institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund and international banking institutions in
general, are the most competent theoretical expounders of the policies of
'liberalisation', which is the acknowledged policy of international
financial institutions.
Indeed Mr Douglas himself at the New Zealand Society of
Accountant's luncheon on 26 November, 1986, said:
The measures we have taken are in line with
recommendations made by the OEeD and the
IMF.
Therefore it can be assumed that an article in the December 1986
Reserve Bank Bulletin (RBNZ, 1986) on the theoretical case for
Liberalisation can be taken as outlining the official theory behind
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Rogernomics. The article starts with acknowledging the negative effects
which liberalisation has had on employment and growth in New
Zealand. It then turns to assert that the removal of all protective devices
will in the end have a favourable effect on employment and output.
But why should liberalistaion increase absolute growth figures and
remove unemployment in conditions of international payments
equilibri um and stable prices? And that is what we are after.
The Reserve Bank argues that the benefits of free trade (liberalisation)
can be appraised by 'looking at a simple hypothetical economy, with one
sector which produces an export good and one which produces an import
competing good'. .
The absurdity of taking an economy with one export and one import
competing good, without even specifying if these are industrial,
agricultural or service outputs, is beyond belief. Obviously, if one starts
to base logical (behaviour) consequences on so unrealistic a model. one
must obtain false predictions.
The fallacious reasoning is made worse if the behaviour assumptions
which are superimposed on this inadequate model are as undefined and
in fact as false as the underlying two-sector model itself. The Reserve
Bank authors make such false behaviour assumptions:
If a tariff is imposed on the imported good the
domestic increases and resources flow into the
import competing sector, increasing output and
jobs.
Due to the economies of scale and the process of 'learning by doing' the
proposition that prices of import protected goods increase is in a great
number of cases false. for instance truck tyres made in New Zealand
under heavy import license protection fell from a price of $NZ78. 15 in
1951 to $NZ66.15 in 1971; refrigerators. similarly protected, fell from a
price of $NZ250 in 1954 to $NZ190 in 1971. (Rosenberg, 1972).
The authors of the Reserve Bank theoretical justification of
Iiberalisation, after having made these false assumptions, continue:
The impact on the export sector is, however,
quite clearly negative.
For one thing the authors do not say that the negative effects on the
export sector, even if they did exist, outweigh the positive employment
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and production creating effects of import controls. Yet this is vital for
policy determination.
For another thing the arguments of the authors that the impact on
exports is 'quite clearly' negative are based on their naive and grossly
over-simplified assumptions concerning the nature of New Zealand
export industries. The authors explain the negative effect of import
controls and protection by saying:
to the extent that importables are used as inputs
in the production of 'the' export good, exporters'
costs will go up and their competitiveness on
international markets will fall.
There are inputs into exports which may be exempt from protection,
such as fertilisers and heavy farm machinery etc. Of course, if there is
only one import good as proposed in the Reserve Bank's silly model, no
such discrimination in favour of exporters is possible.
There are other considerations which the authors ignore in terms of
'factors' with absolutely predictable (usually unrealistic) behaviour
patterns. When there are thriving regional industries (based on
protected full employment as existed in New Zealand from 1938 to 1975)
farmers and farm workers can often find work in nearby industries and
thus maintain their incomes.
The authors of the Reserve Bank article further assert that the increase
in the consumer price index and production costs will lead to a reduction
in export profitability and output. The facts of the New Zealand
economy are that improved management of farming (and presumably
other export industries) can and has compensated for increased costs.
Farming output has constantly increased. The point is not that output
has not increased, it is rather that it has increased even faster than
markets could accommodate our growing production.
The article then produces more unrealistic and indeed false
arguments. If exports are subsidised, it says, in order to compensate
exporters this 'would lower the profitability of the import competing
sector' . The only reason given for this statement is that the subsidy
'would be raised from the import competing sector'. In the real world
of New Zealand life this is not necessarily the case at all. But the
Reserve Bank authors, having first assumed that New Zealand had only
two industrial sectors, producing only two goods, must then assume that
any Government revenue used to assist exporters must come from
importers. Even then no reference is ever made to the question of: to
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what extent the required subsidies are greater or smaller than the growth
of income and production admittedly created by import controls.
Instead the article expands on the question of how difficult it is to
measure these relative costs and benefits. T\1at economic phenomena are
complex and their analysis presents difficulties should be no reason to
abandon policies which clearly increase employment and thus the welfare
of the community.
The authors then make a further jump. They assert that, after
production has been abandoned, 'free trade will lead to an efficient
allocation of resources which will maximise income'. Seeing all around
them decline and rising unemployment in the wake of liberalisation - be
it here, in Australia or Latin America - even the authors of the Reserve
Bank theory on Iiberalisation do not tell us that the process will bring
full employment immediately.
While the standard theory predicts that free trade
will maximise income, it needs to be noted that
this is a proposition about the long run outcome,
when all resources can be assumed to be fully
employed.
The cat is out of the bag! There is no theory which sliows that
Iiberalisation creates full employment, or how it could achieve that
miracle. In fact, all 'liberalised' countries suffer from rising (although
fluctuating) mass unemployment and all the consequences of crime,
social conflict and degeneration which go with this cancer of society.
The only explanation for the Iiberalisers' optimism is that full
employment can be 'assumed'. Indeed the whole theory of free trade is
based on consequences of re-allocation of resources in a two-sector
economy which is fully employed. No wonder that no State interference
is required in the minds of these phantasts for the achievement of full
. employment, They have assumed it to be there.
The authors of the Reserve Bank article agree that income increases in
the wake of Iiberalisation will not be distributed evenly. But, tell us
these well-paid and securely located Iiberalisers. this is less a source of
concern if it is accepted that individual winners and losers are an
inevitable outcome of any growth process.
When they come to the costs of 'adjustment' our authors lose their
sure touch. Having first established in their own minds to their own
satisfaction on the basis of entirely unrealistic assumptions that
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liberalisation is 'good', they have now to deal with the actual social costs
(catastrophic as they may be) without having their lovely theory to fall
back on.
Liberal economic theory is very weak on short-term prediction and
analysis. That must be so, because liberal economic theory has no other
short-term proposition than that 'what business does in the pursuit of
profits is good for the economy' - so everything is left to business. And
since business is unplanned and chaotic, speculative and unconcerned
with the social consequences of its activities, prediction of the outcome of
free trade liberalised economic activities in the macro-field is impossible.
You may just as well try to predict the outcome of a horse race.
Sure. the expert punter (economist) is liable to win more often than the
layman, but that is only in the short run, in the medium and long run
the expert punter (economist) is as much in the dark about the future as
the man in the street. But where the economy is planned for full
employment, balance of payment equilibrium, growth and reasonable
price stability. prediction and control becomes possible, depending on
the degree of control society has over its resources.
So. although our Reserve Bank authors assume that there will be full
employnient in the long run, when they come into the real world they
say:
Job creation is a difficult problem which cannot
simply be dismissed by the assumption that
somehow resources will all be employed in the
long run.
Indeed when they forget about their economic model and refer to the
real world their analysis no longer assures us of higher incomes and full
employment.
Acknowledging that New Zealand's external debt situation is serious
(albeit in gobbledegook language, 'weaning the economy of an excessive
reliance on overseas savings') they admit that 'the large interest bill on
the accumulated debt must inevitably detract from the economy's
potential growth rate for a period'. That leads our authors to reflections
on the exchange rate which neo-c1assical economists consider the
instrument available to achieve balance of payments equilibrium -
although neo-c1assical authors have no model which includes huge fixed
-interest payments to foreigners as part of the 'import' industry.
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In spite of the fact that liberalised and de-regulated finance has led to
a situation in New Zealand, USA and Australia where, in spite of
enormous balance of payments deficits, the exchange rate refuses to
devalue, Reserve Bank authors assert:
In the longer run, theory suggests the real
exchange rate can be expected to adjust to ensure
that the right level of resources are channelled
into the traded goods sector to maintain internal
and external balance.
So. again. 'in the long run', when we are all dead, things 'can be
expected' to work themselves out, but, the authors agree 'in the short
run the exchange factor maybe unfavourable'. So the exchange rate
'instrument' does not work. Our authors then fall back 011 the popular
pastime of trying to blame unemployment on the wage earner.
By this time their 'model' no longer gives certain answers.
While there is considerable debate about the
degree to which real wages are related to
employment there is a widespread consensus that
some reasonably strong relationship does exist.
However, wage levels are easy and popular targets for liberalising
economists, who essentially serve business interests ('supply side
economics'), that there is a clear undertone that wages must.be reduced
in the 'adjustment process'.
Since the adjustment process has now been revealed as a process
towards permanent unemployment with no certainty as to the balance of
payments and the exchange rate, there is little left of the optimism of the
first part of the article which promised us 'maximised income and long-
term full employment'. It was a mirage. The thirst traveller remains
thirsty, once the mirage has disappeared.
There is a last view into the future: showing that the manufacturing
labour force in New Zealand between 1974-84 has fallen by only 1.3
percent (while Australia's has fallen by 22.8 percent, Britain's by 29.3
percent, the USA had no change, and Japan rose about I percent).
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Our authors conclude:
New Zealand has tended to lag behind
developments in the industrialised countries:
ongoing protection has meant that a
disproportionate share of resources has been
devoted to producing goods.
The Reserve Bank's remedy for unemployment: let's all become
futures traders, accountants and corporate, not to speak of criminal,
lawyers.
The proportion of labour employed in services in
New Zealand is well to the lower end of the
international range. This would tend to suggest
that there is still further scope for growth in the
absolute and relative size of the services sector.
In my book 'The Magic Square, What every New Zealander should
know about Rogernomics', I have explained that the free market
economy cannot achieve full employment, balance of payments
equilibrium, growth and price stability (the four sides of the Square)
simultaneously without using at least four different instruments of control
and regulation.
The Reserve Bank article clearly shows the inadequacy of the
alternative analysis. Indeed it implicitly foreshadows the instability and
social conflict into which we must move if our ship of State is
commanded by people who think they can navigate the stormy seas of
national and international social and economic development in a drifting
de-regulated ship without a chart.
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Chapter 22
Farmer Politics
John Pryde
Agricultural Economist
Lincoln College
One can never be too far separated from politics and government no'
matter how much one decries the intervention of politicians in
agricultural policy. From the early recorded minutes of the New
Zealand Farmers Union it is evident that the farm sector sought freedom
to operate to best advantage. It adopted a virtual doctrinaire stance
against any form of tariffs on imported inputs.
However, at the same time, as today, they looked to Government to
resolve most of their problems and provide the network of services
necessary for a fast-developing industry. They sought assistance for
market access, communications, law and order, a land registration
system, technical and scientific advice, research, education, transport,
land settlement, finance, climatic disaster relief, and trade concessions
for their products.
In a young country where foreign exchange earnings were a major
determinant of living standards, farming occupied the centre stage as the
industry that 'brought home the rent'. It is little wonder that farmers,
although they professed strenuous independence, were often labelled
'socialists in riding breeches'. Nor was it considered, necessarily, that
consistency was to be counted a virtuous characteristic. In the early
1960's Government was asked to deal with the threat to agriculture of
opossums. The annual conference resolved that 'as Government was
responsible for the introduction of opossums to New Zealand it must be
financially liable for their destruction'! The resolution was carried
unanimously and it was demanded that it be conveyed to Government
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forthwith! Meanwhile, some research into the topic had shown clearly
that an earlier Government had agreed to the introduction of opossums
only after the Farmers Union, around 1919, had pleaded with it to do so
to help farmers offset the falls in income from traditional products. The
resolution was discreetly buried.
Government intervention in the New Zealand farm sector has always
been considerable regardless of the political party in power. It is true
that between the main farm industries there have been important
differences. For example the decisions taken in 1936 set the dairy
industry on a path much closer to Government than, say, the sheep-beef
producers. But although there were initially some wide gaps between
these two industries they narrowed during World War II and in the post-
war era. The main differences were in the organisation of the
processing of the products and in their marketing. Nevertheless
Government remained very involved in both industries. If an analysis
were carried out of resolutions adopted by farmers' pressure groups one
would likely find around 80 percent of the resolutions destined to end up
on the desk of a Cabinet Minister or the Permanent Head of a
Government department. The cries of 'Less Government in business'
were hardly applicable to farming. Participants in agriculture wanted to
be able to hold the hand of Government in a multitude of ways. They
believed that what was good for agriculture was good for New Zealand.
Even the most extreme 'free enterpriser' farmers had little hesitation in
approaching Government for a solution to their problems.
However, the closeness of farming and Government on most matters
did not prevent farmers from disagreeing, at times strongly, with policies
adopted by Government. For instance, following the imposition of
across-the-board import controls in 1938 the farm sector expressed its
fears on the impact on costs of its inputs. It was saved by the onset of
World War II, and the prosperity enjoyed by the farm sector in the
period of almost 20 years following the war further obscured the real
effects of the controls. It was not until the latter half of the 1960s that
the farm sector really became alarmed at the impact on their costs of the
autarchic policies being pursued by both political parties.
By the early 1970s internal inflation reached double-digit levels and
sheep farm incomes were reducing significantly in real terms, while
levels of farm investment were not recovering sufficiently, despite a mass
of Government incentives introduced after the Agricultural Development
planning exercise. The farm lobby made a valiant attack on industrial
protection and indications were that at long last a break-through would
be made. The then Government, which had a large number of fanner
cabinet ministers out of all proportion to their numbers in the
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community, stated in its 1971 Budget that 'It is the Government's policy
to replace import licensing by tariffs as the main measure of protection.
The Government has now decided to institute a major review designed to
accomplish this objective within 5 years ..... '
In the early 1970s the farm sector came close to achieving its goal of
liberalising New Zealand's industrial protectionist policies. But the
manufacturing lobby once again showed they could outwit and out-
manoeuvre the farmers. Confronted by a sophisticated campaign on the
part of shrewd and determined industrialists the farmers' efforts
withered.
The Government's plan to replace import licensing by tariffs was
again laid aside and the agricultural sector continued to endure the
consequences of industrial protectionism. A message was clearly but
obliquely conveyed to New Zealand's general-purpose farm organisation,
that it should ease up on its hard-hitting attacks on the protected
manufacturing sector.
After the relatively short-lived world-wide commodity boom in 1973
the problems of the New Zealand's sheep-beef sector worsened. In
1976 Government said, 'It is clear that farm support policies such as we
have had in the past while maintaining the fanner in business, have been
unsuccessful in stimulating increased production'. The 1976 Budget
contained a decision to introduce the Livestock Incentive Scheme. Just
two years later the Supplementary Minimum Price Scheme (SMPs) was
born. Its introduction was to be 'no more than an interim measure.
For the longer term Government said it was 'prepared to discuss changes
in the present price-smoothing arrangements with the producer boards'.
However, the SMPs had a stronger desire to survive than the then
Minister of Finance had contemplated. They were not killed off until the
conclusion of the 1984/85 season - seven years later.
If the farmers were becoming increasingly in need of more
Government subsidies their clamour for a more realistic exchange rate
was not so evident, certainly prior to 1984. In 1948, when the New
Zealand pound was revalued upwards by 25 percent, largely on the
insistence of the then President of the Federation of Labour, there was
only a murmur from the farm sector. During subsequent changes in the
New Zealand exchange rate the farm lobby was again not vocal. Indeed
it appeared that again many of the older farm leaders recalled the
devaluations of the 1930s. They believed that the farm sector was
'blamed' for bringing these about and had incurred a great deal of
hostility from other sectors. One prominent leader once said to me,
'After that experience I shall never again advocate a fall in the exchange
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rate on behalf of the farm sector'. Many took the view that a change in
the exchange rate was an admission of defeat by Government. They
were also obsessed by the view that the export sector could not gain from
an exchange rate change. They insisted that costs always overtook any
short-term increases in receipts.
For its part the Government after 1975 was opposed to a deliberate
devaluation of the New Zealand dollar, despite all the evidence that the
rate was considerably over-valued. Instead i various subsidies were
ladled out to compensate some farmers for the additional costs incurred
through having to purchase locally made inputs, and to compensate them
for an over-valued exchange rate. Some leaders considered the exchange
rate too 'blunt' a weapon. In the memorable words of the then Finance
minister, 'A devaluation would reward exporters such as kiwi-fruit
growers who are already receiving good prices'! As a result many
industries, including new ones with considerable export potential, were
denied some of the incentives given traditional products. This use of
subsidies was tantamount to a differential exchange rate, or a system of
multiple exchange rates. The reaction of an outstanding young hill
country farmer perhaps typified the understandable response of many
farmers: 'I have long believed that goat farming was more appropriate
for my land but I delayed switching to goats while Government was so
generous in handing out subsidies for sheep production'.
By the 1984 Election the farm lobby had formulated an exchange rate
policy. It asked for the establishment of a realistic exchange rate
incorporated with a package of policies to obtain the maximum economic
benefits from the movement in exchange rate. It encouraged the
continued adjustment of the exchange rate to reflect the value of the New
Zealand dollar through the adoption of a managed float exchange rate
policy exercised through the Reserve Bank buying and selling exchange.
Government adjusted the New Zealand exchange rate downwards on
20 July 1984. This pleased the farm sector but the subsequent decision
announced on 5 March. 1985 to float the New Zealand dollar has not
generally proved helpful to the farming export sector.
Government's decision in 1984 to discontinue various farming
subsidies was accepted by the farm lobby. However. because of the
appreciation of the New Zealand dollar, it has had a traumatic impact on
farm incomes and investment at a time when world prices for many of
our major agricultural commodities have declined. In May 1986,
farmers were told by the Prime Minister that 'no longer could it be said
that a collapse of the farm industry would bring about a collapse of the
New Zealand economy'. Few who heard these words would ever have
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believed they would have application to this country. If the contention is
valid, it represents explicit recognition of a major turning point in the
role of farming in the New Zealand economy.
If we look back at the Budgets in the post-war period we see that
almost all of them emphasised the key role of the farm sector which was
inextricably linked to Government economic policy-making. If an
enquiry were conducted into why the industry today finds itself in such
an unsatisfactory position, past Governments and their policies would
have to bear a large portion of the blame.
But recriminations are unproductive. We must look ahead and
consider some of the conditions under which agriculture can again
prosper. For what irs worth the following paragraphs provide a
'shopping list'.
It is often alleged that the farm sector is one of our 1110st disunited
industries. When it is realised that there really is no such person as
'The Farmer' the reason for disunity is understandable. After all, there
are really a whole range of different types of farmers; the Southland
lamb producer, the Canterbury arable farmer, the Central Plateau hill
country farmer, the Taranaki dairy farmer, and so on. Then there are
farms of widely varying size and farmers of different ages. Given such
differences it is perhaps remarkable that any agreement in policy has
been achieved. But compared with other sectors there are massive
differences not only in the situation but also the outlook of farmers.
Opponents are fast to seize on these differences. Ranks must be closed
if the sector is to survive the threats to its future.
Many industries, trades and professions comprise the vital· sector that
has the responsibility of servicing farmers and farming. Some of these
are efficient; others are not. No doubt increased competition will raise
standards, although inadequate demand on some areas could have the
reverse effect. However, at Lincoln and Massey increased emphasis is
being placed on raising the efficiency of the agribusiness sector which
many graduates are likely to join.
In the centres which process and transport farm Olltput there appears
to be evidence of shortcomings in efficiency. The decline of regulation
and the increased competitiveness in the freezing industry should effect
great improvements.
Modern management techniques have been used with success in firms
in the industrial sector and there is scope for a greater transfer of these
concepts, techniques and principles to the farm sector. For example, in
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the control and development of the key human resource factor, some
agricultural sectors are 'light' years behind modern management
standards. If the farm sector wants to achieve greater success both in
the farming firms or its own producer organisations it will have to be
prepared to accept and adopt modern management principles.
If the leaders of New Zealand's farm organisations are to be more
effective they should have the assistance of a first-class economic analysis
team. This group would be concerned not only with research on
immediate problems but also issues on or beyond the horizon.
Meanwhile the accounts of our general-purpose farm organisation who
set the expenditures on research for the years 1983, 1984 and 1985 as
$6,248, $1,607 and $11,713 respectively, showed a total of only
$19,568 in three years or 0.7 percent of the amount brought in by the
'all farmer' levy. That amount spent on research could hardly be
expected to yield any shattering findings.
In a more market environment is the need for stabilisation schemes
greater or less? One might think it has now increased, but I detect a
reduction in farmer desire for such arrangements, at least in their
present form.
Government played a major role in assisting and persuading the farm
sector to establish the stabilisation arrangements. Perhaps the time has
now arrived for the farm sector to evolve its own arrangements? It is
also possible that individually-based schemes structured on the income-
equalisation concept should be given more encouragement.
Since the Government's market measures were introduced,
agricultural economists have pleaded for a more neutral environment for
the industry. It has a virtually incontrovertible case for such treatment.
This is the goal that the farm sector should adopt.
Is it now time for the establishment of something akin to a 'Subsidies
Commission'? This body could have the task of assessing and revealing
the extent of subsidisation and its incidence in the main sectors in the
total economy. It would have to be completely independent of
Government and, like the Judiciary, be able to give its judgement
fearlessly. If the farm sector is to operate on a relatively fair basis in
the future it must seek this type of neutral environment.
The crisis through which the farm sector has been passing over the
last year has revealed several deficiencies, including the financial
business management of many farms. The more-market environment in
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the future will demand that farmers spread their risks much more than
in the past. This will require a dramatic reappraisal of some of their
long established practices in financial management. The universities and
extension authorities must assist the industry urgently to meet the new
financial situation confronting farmers.
It is acknowledged that our fanners have achieved enormous advances
in terms of technical production achievement. They are very successful
in producing meat, wool, dairy products, etc., of high quality and
expanding quantities. Regrettably this has not been paralleled by
advances in areas such as sophisticated leadership skills, marketing and
agribusiness.
In 1978 I decided that a special scheme should be launched to develop
leadership skills in future rural leaders. Thanks to a philanthropic U.S.
Foundation (Kellogg) a leadership training scheme was begun at Lincoln
College in 1979. Appropriately Mr W.K. Kellogg's intention when he
set up the Foundation was 'to help people to help themselves'.
So far more than 200 rural men and women have undergone the main
course at Lincoln College and an even greater number have taken part in
the mini-leadership courses held in rural districts throughout New
Zealand. Already Kellogg Scholars are taking an increasingly influential
role in leading rural-based organisations in the country.
Within the ranks of the New Zealand farm sector are some of the
most effective entrepreneurs in this or any other country. Past efforts by
the Government to seduce them with subsidies has not, fortunately, done
irreparable harm. They will flourish in a more market environment.
But we have to ensure that the innovative and risk-taking qualities of the
minority are spread to the majority of farmers. More effective
leadership in the rural sector will help achieve this crucial aim.
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Chapter 23
What Course New Zealand's
Tariff Policy?
Ralph Lattimore
Agricultural Economist
Lilleolll College
During the Great Depression, New Zealand introduced a policy of
high iinport protection. That protection had two elements: import
licensing and tariffs. This 'beggar thy neighbour' policy was at that
time part of a global response to the seemingly hopeless economic
environment that existed. An important part of that policy was a
programme of high (30-100 percent tax) tariffs on imported items
especiaIly for products that were produced here in New Zealand. The
import licensing restrictions have begun to be dismantled, but there is no
definitive plan to remove high tariffs.
These tariffs, with only minor modifications, have remained in place
ever since. Over the last two years there have been some small across
the board cuts but the New Zealand tariff remains very high by
developed country standards. In fact New Zealand tariffs are typically
three to four times their counterparts in the countries of Europe, North
America and Asia. Only Australia, amongst developed countries has
tariff levels which rival New Zealand's.
The protective effect of the New Zealand Tariff on the manufacturing
sector is shown in Figure I. The bulk of manufacturing production is
protected by tariff rates in excess of 30 percent. Forty-five percent of
manufacturing activity has tariff protection between 31 and 40 percent,
and over 10 percent receives more than 41 percent. This raises an
important question of public policy. The Government is committed to
reviewing tariffs in 1988 with a view to reducing this form of regulation
of the private sector. At least some elements of the Manufacturers
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Federation are opposed to this move. The question then is, what should
New Zealands' future tariff policy be? Should we opt for a high or low
tariff? Should we have a common tariff for all types of imports or a
tariff based on the 'needs' of particular industries?
This chapter addresses these questions from a technical view point. In
this context one cannot provide a single resolution to the questions. That
is clearly beyond the scope of economic science. However, it is possible
to point out clearly the trade-offs that exist between the various options,
and in so doing attempt to dispell a number of myths that have been
created in the tariff debate.
Some Historical Perspective
The customs tariff on imports is one of the oldest forms of regulation
by the State with its origins going back into antiquity. The New Zealand
tariff was introduced in 1840 and, in common with initial tariffs in other
countries. its purpose was to raise revenue to finance the operations of
the Colonial Government. In a less organised commercial environment
the customs tariff is a relatively efficient form of Government revenue
collection. As Government organisation improves, however, the tariff
loses its comparative advantage in this taxation role.
It quickly becomes apparent to firms and farmers producing import
competing goods that the tariff has great potential to improve their
competitive position. This increases the value of the tariff as a tool of
industrial development rather than a revenue collecting device. Towards
this end import competing interests in New Zealand were successful
persuading the Government to raise the tariff to an average tax of around
15 percent in the 1860s and 1890s. The tariff applied to a broad range
of products encompassing what we now call the clothing, textile,
footwear, metal fabrication, machinery and food-stuffs industries.
What is important, however, is that each of these industries was
already flourishing before the tariffs were raised. The tariffs themselves
added only modest encouragement to the 'natural' protection afforded
import competing activities in the colony by virtue of our distance from
overseas sources of supply. In short, transport costs for imports coming
to New Zealand provided the greatest stimulus to the development of
import-competing manufacturing production (Castle, 1966).
It is also worth noting that New Zealand tariffs at this time were lower
than in many other countries, and that the period before and around the
turn of the century was our period of maximum growth of import-
competing manufacturing.
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Figure I: Tariff Rate Breakdown by value of production. 1985
The incidence of the New Zealand tariff did not change significantly
until 1934. and the manufacturing sector continued to expand and
flourish up to this period. It represented about 20 percent of economic
activity and employment in the economy by the 1930s (Hawke, 1985).
In 1934, tariffs were raised following the Ottawa conference (1932),
and additional support was granted to import competing manufacturing in
1938 when the Government introduced blanket import licencing
arrangements. The main stated reasons for these policy moves were in
sympathy with isolationist or insulationist sentiments of the time. Import
licences were supposed to protect the balance of payments on the one
hand and bolster industrial and employment growth of import competing
manufacturing on the other. This industrial policy regime remained in
place for 45 years.
Analysts examining New Zealand's economic performance have cast
considerable doubt on whether import licencing improved the degree of
import substitution and the balance of payments. Suffice it to say here
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that chronic balance of payment problems persisted, the growth of living
standards in New Zealand fell progressively behind those of other
developed countries, and, in relative terms, the import competing part of
the manufacturing sector (i.e. those industries receiving subsidies
through import protection) shrank rather than grew from 1938 to 1981.
The whole manufacturing sector remained at 20 percent of total
economic activity and employment over the period. This belies the fact
that some of the largest manufacturing industries received no tariff
protection at all because they were producing mainly exports.
It is not a coincidence that the 45 year experiment with import
substitution is coupled with poor job and wealth creation in the protected
sectors. A simple economic model would have predicted that outcome.
Indeed the theory and actual experience with import substitution policies
in a wide range of countries around the world clearly shows the classical
tradeoff between growth in employment and living standards on the one
hand and tariffs on the other. High tariffs will tend to encourage growth
in the industries directly affected at the expense of lower living standards
and slower job growth in the community as a whole. There is no free
lunch when is comes to tariffs.
But the theory and practice of high tariffs also serve to dispell a
number of other myths. In some cases tariffs have proved to be a very
inefficient and expensive way of achieving certain community goals. In
other instances tariffs can be seemingly perverse and result in the
opposite effect to that which was intended.
There is a contrasting view which argues that the high import
protection of the 1950's resulted in low rates of unemployment. That
view can be questioned on a number of grounds. First, we did not
measure true unemployment over those years. What we measured was
the number of people (mainly males) who managed to register as
unemployed through a somewhat arbitrary, sexist administrative
procedure. Second, if import substitution was a solution to employment
in the 1960s why wasn't it a solution in the 1970s? Import protection
didn't change that dramatically.
A Theory of Tariff Incidence
When a tariff for a particular product is put in place its initial effect is
straightforward. The tariff raises the price of imports of that product
(actual and potential) by the amount of the tariff, and allows industries in
New Zealand producing competing items to raise their prices by a
similar amount. The initial reaction of investors and managers in the
New Zealand industry is to expand output and increase employment,
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because New Zealand industry will find it remunerative to increase its
market share, vis a vis imports. Likewise, offshore investors will find it
is more profitable, than before the tariff, to establish subsidiaries in New
Zealand. The net effect is an increase in investment and jobs in the
protected New Zealand industry and an increase in the degree of foreign
ownership of the industry. This is demonstrated in figure 2. The
diagram portrays the fortunes of the two halves of the tradable sector of
the economy (primary, manufacturing). The import protection subsidy
pushes the see-saw up on the right hand side transferring income to
primary producers and manufacturers protected by tariffs (and/or import
licensing) .
The extra jobs and wealth are created at the expense of New Zealand
consumers or firms who must buy the new higher priced products. That
is. pushing on the right hand side automatically pulls the left hand side
of the see-saw down. Firms in the export business are made worse off.
From 1934-1976 the see-saw was much steeper than is shown in the
diagram for circa 1984. Furthermore, it can readily be shown that the
extra costs to consumers or users of the items protected by the tariff are
greater than the benefits derived by employees and owners of the
protected industry involved. This difference can be substantial. In the
U.S. and Europe for example, studies have shown that the cost to
consumers of creating an additional job in the textile industries by
raising tariffs, is of the order of $200,000 to $400,000 per year. Of
these amounts, the worker receives only $10 to $20,000 per year in
wages. The rest is dissipated in higher margins, Govern ment reven ue
and profits; it is mostly a net loss of wealth to society in terms of wasted
resources. Export sector resources are being exploited and under-
valued. The creation of additional jobs is highly desirable. The
question is, is the tariff the least cost way of providing jobs?
The consumer (or user) cost of the tariff will usually be spread widely
throughout the community. This means that the cost of the tariff to each
consumer amounts to only a few dollars per person per year. The
benefits of the tariff however, are far more concentrated, amounting to
tens of thousands of dollars per additional employee or per firm protected
or subsidised. In terms of political lobbying, the balance of political
bargaining strength favours the firm which gains rather than the
consumers who lose. The reason for this is that the smaller the number
of people involved, and the greater the perceived benefits they receive,
the cheaper it is to muster lobbying support. For this reason, there
appears to be a built in bias towards high and uneven tariffs in a
democratic society.
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A second important point concerns the distribution of tariff costs
amongst consumers. In New Zealand there is some tendency for the
highest tariffs to be placed on everyday goods like footwear, clothing,
crockery, some foodstuffs, cars and other consumer durables. The cost
impact of these highest tariffs will fall most heavily on those segments of
society which spend the highest proportion of their budget on these
items. It is highly likely that the greatest cost falls on the lower income
groups and therefore that the tariff is, in effect, a regressive tax. While
this research has not been completed for New Zealand, we can gain
some impression frol11 a V.S. study which has a similar tariff structure
to our own. Figure 3 shows the impact of the V.S. tariff on people of
different incomes, and is measured as if the tariff were a surcharge in
income tax. The poorest people in the V .S., earning less than
NZ$18,000 pay an income tax surcharge of over 60 percent to pay the
tariff. Persons earning over NZ$80,000 per year pay a surcharge of 10
percent or less.
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Figure 3: Income tax surcharge equivalent of the cost of tariff
protection in the United States. 1984
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The story for a single item tariff essentially stops at. this point. The
New Zealand tariff is, however more pervasive than is described above
because virtually every industry which must compete with imports
receives tariff protection, and most commonly at rates in excess of 30
percent. These protected industries make up at least sixty percent of all
manufacturing output and a smaller proportion of primary sector output
(Figure 1).
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In this broader context it is insufficient to consider simply the gains to 
firms directly protected by the tariff, and the costs to consumers and 
other end users of the products involved. This is because wide ranging 
tariff protection has wide ranging effects which diffuse throughout the 
whole economy and must be evaluated. 
To examine the wide ranging effects of a tariff it is desirable to 
distinguish between the internationally traded goods sector on the one 
hand and the non-traded goods sector on the other. The traded goods 
sector comprises all firms and industries that either produce goods for 
export and/or must compete with imports. In the economy of today 
many firms produce both export and import competing products. Many 
primary. manufacturing and service industries belong to the traded goods 
sector either as exporters or import competers. 
The traded goods sector in New Zealand is smaller than the non-
traded good sectors, making up perhaps 40-50 per cent of measured 
economic activity and paid employment. Furthermore, the export and 
import competing portions of the traded goods sector employ about the 
same number of people. This is contrary to popular belief. Export meat 
works, the carpet industry, some electronic industries, tourism and many 
other large export oriented manufacturing industries are at least as, (or 
more) labour intensive than their import competing counterparts. It is 
also worth reiterating that all manufacturing industries such as clothing, 
textiles, whitewear, engineering, plastics and furniture have a role in 
exporting as well as in import competing production, though in part this 
has been aided by export incentive programmes. 
The largest sector of the New Zealand economy produces non 
(internationally) traded goods and services, and includes large parts of 
the construction, financial, government and personal services industries. 
We will use this traded/non-traded classification to examine the pervasive 
effects of our wide ranging tariff (Figure 4). 
The institution of a general tariff initially raises prices in the import 
competing segment of the traded sector. The combined attempt by these 
import competing industries to capture higher initial profit margins flows 
through to the non-traded goods sector in higher resource prices, 
markups and profits in an observable way. That is, we can actually 
measure the effects of the changes in import competing prices 
throughout the non-traded goods sector. In terms of Figure 2, the whole 
see-saw drops without changing its degree of tilt. 
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This flow-on-effect immediately begins to reduce the benefits of the 
tariff to the protected industries. This is because the traded goods sector 
buys the bulk of its inputs from the non-traded sector. 
The flow on effect of import competing prices on to the price of non-
traded goods has been estimated for a range of countries including New 
Zealand (Lattimore, 1986). These estimates are similar for different 
countries and average 70 percent. This means that 70 percent of the 
increase in import competing product prices is passed on in non-traded 
goods prices. Another way of expressing this is to say that the internal 
cost structure of the economy as a whole is raised seven percent for a 
ten percentage point across the board increase in tariffs. Another way of 
thinking about it is that the exchange rate rises to accommodate an 
increase in the tariff. 
Lattimore [1986] estimated that the protective effect of existing tariffs 
and remaining import licencing in New Zealand is equivalent to a tariff 
of 30 percent. This means that the general cost structure of the 
economy, in terms of non-traded goods prices, is approximately 20 
percent higher than it would be without the tariffs and licencing. 
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The effect which the tariff has on a firm's cost structure eliminates most 
of the original benefit of the tariff to an import competing firm. On the 
surface a firm receiving a 40 percent tariff protection appears to be 
receiving a very large subsidy, when in fact the firm is probably only 
receiving 10 percent protection after the higher cost structure is taken 
into account. 
Export oriented firms suffer from the full flow-on effect of tariff 
protection in their costs. A 30 percent tariff reduces the profitability of 
producing for export by 20 percent. This is a direct consequence of 
import protection. As a result tariff protection causes a contraction in 
production and exports of primary and manufacturing products and 
services. This is particularly serious because the export market has 
greater long term potential for growth than the local market simply 
because the local market is relatively small. The gains from tariff 
protection ill profits and jobs in the import competing sector are thus 
more than offset by losses in profits and jobs in the export oriented 
traded goods sector. For this· reason it has been shown (Krueger, 
1985), that countries adopting import substitution programmes involving 
high tariffs tend to grow more slowly in terms of jobs and wealth than 
countries with more open policy stances. New Zealand's economic 
performance since World War II is a classic case in point. 
Tariff Compensation 
The framework described in the previous section is also useful in 
explaining why export oriented firms favour export incentives, SMPs and 
other subsidies. Such Government interventions in the presence of high 
tariffs compensate them in part for the higher flow on costs. In the past 
export incentives have partly offset the negative cost effects of the tariff 
and were at least partly responsible for the expansion and development of 
the export sector in New Zealand from 1964 onwards. 
It needs to be clearly understood that these two sets of policies, tariffs 
and export incentives, are counteracting one another. The see-saw in 
Figure 2 is being pushed from both sides at the same time. Two wrongs 
don't make a right. The export incentives lower the benefit of the tariff 
to import competing firms, by raising the price of exportable items which 
are used in import competing production and simultaneously push up the 
cost of non-traded goods. 
Many people do not appear to understand the close connection 
between these two sets of opposing policies. In an extreme case a policy 
of tariffs coupled with equivalent export incentives would benefit neither 
the import competing nor the export sector because the policies offset 
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each other. It is better for the community to have neither policy than to 
have both. This is because Government regulation has a cost. The 
offsetting arrangement of tariffs and export incentives produces no 
benefit to the traded goods sector, much regulatory cost to society and a 
waste of resources. 
Cost of Tariff Removal 
The symmetry between tariffs and export incentives helps to visualise 
the adjustment costs involved in removing tariffs. Import competing 
firms with tariffs removed face similar adjustment costs to exporting 
firms with exported incentives removed. 
When both tariffs and export incentives are in place, the removal of 
either one or the other, but not both, results in larger adjustment costs 
than would be required if both were removed together. For this reason 
most economists recommend the execution of policy reform in a 
balanced way. 
The balanced removal of tariffs and export incentives will involve job 
creation on the one side faster than redundancies are created on the 
other. In reality even this description is too stark. Most large New 
Zealand firms in the traded goods sector are involved in both import 
competing and export production. Changes in tariffs and export 
incentives then require marginal adjustments within the same firm. 
For example, a Christchurch firm making toasters may be supplying 
the New Zealand and Australian market with an almost identical product. 
A balanced change in policies simply requires a change in marketing 
orientation and little change on the shop floor. A balanced reduction in 
both tariffs and export incentives in these cases would involve fewer 
changes in tooling, marketing and job training than would be required 
if, say, export incentives were removed first. The removal of export 
incentives initially will result in a severe contraction in the firm's export 
activities especially if management remains unconvinced that tariffs will 
also be removed promptly. Plant closures and staff redundancies are far 
more likely to occur in this setting than in a balanced policy reform. 
Countervailing Tariffs or Duties 
Another argument that is used to support the retention of high tariffs 
and countervailing duties is that New Zealand firms need to be 
compensated for subsidies that foreign governments provide to their 
industries. Foreign subsidised imports are a gift to consumers in New 
Zealand. From New Zealand's point of view subsidies paid by foreigners 
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are a net transfer of resources to us by an international Father 
Christmas. If the foreign subsidy persists, any New Zealand 
Government regulation to stop the 'gift' by some countervailing tactic is 
a direct loss to New Zealand. It is indeed possible that the regulations 
of foreign Governments can destabilise our market and result in 
fluctuating import prices to New Zealand. Furthermore, it is possible 
that the export pricing policies of dominant foreign manufacturers may 
be designed to create a poor environment in New Zealand for the 
establishment of a competing domestic industry. 
It is easy to exaggerate the prevalence of these malevolent policies of 
foreign Governments and multinational corporations and hence over-
react with countervailing duties. Nevertheless such reactions are usually 
considered necessary to distinguish between predatory practices of 
overseas institutions and longer term foreign subsidies beneficial to New 
Zealand. Countervailing and antidumping programmes can be designed 
so that they are semi-automatic and swing into action rapidly. They 
should also have rigid time limits to force regular appraisal of the market 
environment. If jobs and growth are the objective, every effort must be 
made to ensure that New Zealand consumers have the opportunity to buy 
imports at the lowest possible sustainable prices. This ensures that the 
maximum number of new commercial opportunities are open to New 
Zealand firms. 
Rate of Tariff Removal 
There is a certain intuitive appeal to the argument that major policy 
changes, like tariff reduction, ought to be announced well in advance so 
that firms can adapt gradually to the new business environment. The 
basis for this argument is that time is required for staff to be retrained or 
redeployed and for redundant employees to seek jobs. It also takes time 
for firms to re-tool and to make new investments. These arguments are 
incontrovertible, but the real question is how much time does it actually 
take to adapt and to what extent does the knowledge that a competitive 
environment lies some years ahead result in firms doing nothing about it 
on the grounds that "something may turn up"? 
An analogy which might be worth considering is the process of 
moving from the imperial to the metric measurement system - a 
conversion that a number of countries have attempted in recent years but 
in different ways. New Zealand opted for a quick comprehensive 
change, while Canada, for example, used a more gradual piecemeal 
approach. The gradual approach involves using dual measurement 
systems (yards and kilopascals) and confusion for a long period of time. 
The quick conversion technique involves confusion and cost for some 
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days or weeks but a more rapid learning process. The gradual approach 
also tends to lead to strong political pressures for exceptions and other 
self defeating actions to be granted. The quick approach appears to be 
far less susceptible to such tactics. The gradual approach may not be 
more satisfactory or less costly. 
Returning to tariff or export incentive changes, the affect of 
announcing their removal means that firms halt immediately investment 
in production operations which are not expected to be competitive at the 
end of the adjustment process. The capital value of the firm's plant and 
equipment will adjust immediately to the final expected value. They will 
not create new jobs, and indeed staff positions becoming vacant are not 
likely to be filled by replacements. Furthermore, firms might encourage 
pOtentially redundant staff to leave in order to minimise future 
redundancy payments. In short, from the firm's owners and employees 
viewpoint, a great deal of adjustment will occur immediately the 
announcement is made whether or not the policy adjustment is to be 
immediate or gradual. 
The gradual approach does benefit owners if now useless plant and 
equipment can be operated for the remainder of its productive life. 
However, the immediate depreciation of the value of such machinery can 
also mean that the enterprise is now competitive again under the new 
final tariff policy regime. 
The gradual policy of phasing out old protective policies may reduce 
future redundancy payments. But it may also increase them. This can 
happen if staff who would have normally left due to attrition now opt to 
stay on to collect redundancy payments. 
The problem of adjustment is not simply an economic or commercial 
one - it is in large part psychological. On both counts there is some 
evidence to suggest that the main costs of adjustment are associated with 
accepting that the change is going to occur. Once that acceptance has 
been made, the gradualist approach may have little or nothing to offer as 
an adjustment mechanism. 
That conclusion may sound callous, but it is difficult to justify the 
gradualist approach in the light of practical experience. The closure of 
manufacturing plants in Mosgie!. Patea and Shannon are past examples. 
There have been a number of other examples of alternative approaches to 
major policy changes like tariffs. Changes in import licencing, industry 
plans, SMPs, export incentives and other production subsidies have been 
carried out at different rates. It is not clear that the slower adjustments 
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have involved less cost to employees or owners than the more rapid 
changes but this evidence has still to be analysed. 
Needs - Based Tariffs 
A gradualist approach to tariff change also tends to encourage 
industries to lobby for the watering down or the reversal of the 
announced policies. This is one part of the political economy of tariffs 
which has received considerable attention overseas and increasing 
attention in New Zealand. 
Tariff changes are subject to political pressure from lobbying groups. 
However, as pointed out earlier the lobbying effort tends to be biased in 
favour of those affected directly even though the lobbying groups cut 
across the traded goods sector. The New Zealand Manufacturers 
Federation and many trade unions have members from both the export 
and import-competing industries. So, too, does Federated Farmers. 
Now the benefits from lowering tariffs to the export oriented parts of 
each industry are great in terms of wealth and jobs. However, because 
these benefits are indirect it makes it difficult for lobbyists to put forward 
a position with positive net benefits to their members. As a result, 
lobbyists usually have to support the interests of those members affected 
directly. 
The rent-seeking behaviour of these groups is more likely to bias the 
resulting policy programme if consumers and other end users have less 
bargaining power, and if the Government's policy is designed to 
recognise explicitly the 'needs' of different industries. This socalled 
'needs-based' approach to tariffs encourages inter-industry rivalry and 
provides a justification for widely different settlements in tariff levels 
amongst products. From a community viewpoint, the issue is how the 
differential needs will be determined. If it were possible to ensure that 
'needs-based' tariffs were based on providing jobs and stimulating 
regional production in cost-effective ways, for example, there would not 
be a problem. This is the most unlikely to occur. Rather 'needs' will 
tend to be based on the degree of concentration of lobbying efforts, 
marginal electorates and a host of other considerations which are usually 
highly inefficient from the standpoint of the community. This is 
especially true when one remembers that the highest tariffs will usually 
act as regressive taxes on society. 
Wage Rates, Regional Development and the Tariff 
One of the principal objectives of our sbciety is to ensure that 
commercial benefits are widely spread in terms of higher real wages and 
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regional development. It is highly unlikely that either is achieved in the 
import competing industries through the maintenance of high tariffs. 
To a large extent wages are determined on a relativity basis in the 
economy as a whole. There is little evidence that wage rates paid in 
high tariff protected industries are higher than elsewhere and casual 
observation would suggest the reverse. If this is accurate, it might well 
be that high tariffs produce a type of 'poverty trap' locking some sections 
of the New Zealand work force into jobs with little or no incentive for 
skill development. In fact, many such occupations may be on a 
downward slippery slope as it becomes increasingly impossible over time 
to sustain edifying jobs in the face of rapid technological change, 
particularly in the less developed countries. Tariff reductions provide an 
escape for workers from this 'poverty trap' environment. This is quite 
the reverse of what is sometimes argued. This effect would be 
compounded if low paid workers were also paying for most of the tariff 
in higher household prices. 
The tariff tends to stifle required regional development rather than 
enhance it. This is because it provides a smaller effective subsidy to 
firms away from the major New Zealand markets and a larger subsidy to 
firms in the metropolitan areas. Given the limited scope of the local 
market, the tariff probably squeezes firms out of business in provincial 
districts. This is also contrary to popular belief. Indeed it may be 
possible to explain a large part of the concentration of import competing 
manufacturing in Auckland by the high tariff policy. Enduring regional 
development efforts arise from the exploitation of local resource 
advantages and the absence of subsidies in the metropolitan areas. 
Tariffs tend to frustrate this process. 
Future Options 
Concentrating our focus on one aspect of Government intervention, 
like tariffs, can be a disheartening process if we choose to make it so. 
But it need not be. The two broad options are tariffs or not. The right 
choice is important but it is not cataclysmic. If New Zealand persists 
with high tariffs and industry plans, it is most unlikely that this factor 
alone would cause our standard of living to plummet or for the 
distribution of income to become more skewed. Indeed on the positive 
side, less adjustment might be required in the future, and living 
standards might be judged adequate by the community at large. 
Ultimately that is a choice for society and politicians to make. Some of 
the probable negative social features of import protection may be 
buffered in other ways through education and public awareness. 
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The removal of tariffs will mean adjustment costs to employees and 
companies but it will also mean higher material living standards on 
average, wider commercial opportunities and the other benefits discussed 
earlier. 
Collectively, which option do we want to choose? 
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Chapter 24 
Can Farmers Market? 
Tony Lewis 
Business Manageme111 Specialist 
Massey University 
The economic environment has, for some time, been thought of as the 
overwhelming force that influences the production and marketing of 
agricultural and horticultural commodities. Prices have been regarded 
as the outcome of the interaction of supply and demand and their 
function is to clear the market and signal to producers, consumer wants. 
A rising price indicates that demand is increasing faster than supply, and 
gives producers an incentive to produce more. A falling price indicates 
that consumers want less, and encourages producers to produce less. 
Efficiency plays an important role in this model by being good at 
informing producers about changes in demand, and not wasting 
resources. There is a heavy emphasis on producers to improve 
efficiency and on producer oganisations to use an efficient system. 
Market power is the principal means by which producer organisations 
can increase revenue for individual producers, an efficient price 
mechanism is needed to exercise it, and an efficient organisation is 
needed to keep costs down. 
More recently, the idea has been advanced that marketing management 
principles, developed for branded products, can be applied to 
undifferentiated products such as raw wool, lamb cuts and vegetables. 
In particular, if prices and distribution channels are regarded as 
management decisions rather than the result of market forces, then the 
'industry will benefit. It is claimed that consumers will benefit too, 
because market research, an essential ingredient of the marketing 
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management approach, gives producers more accurate information than 
the price system. 
Most of the many farms or horticultural units are small. Most 
processing and distribution firms of agricultural and horticultural 
products are large and there are few of them. These are two important 
characteristics of the present structure of the food and fibre industry. As 
long as the small, one or two person farms or horticultural units remains 
the norm in raw material production, then these characteristics will 
dominate the development of the industry and the result of any action by 
participan ts . 
Whatever changes farmers and consumers might seek the eventual 
outcome for them is usually the same. At either end of the food and 
fibre system are producers of a raw material, farmers and 
horticulturalists, and buyers of the final processed product, consumers. 
They are many in number, operate independently, cannot influence 
prices nor decide on the final destination of their product. There has 
been little change in this condition for many years. 
In between are local processors and distributors, they are few in 
number, large in size, and often operate with implicit agreements not to 
compete on price. Over recent years their numbers have dropped, they 
have grown larger and they have become more interested in non-price 
competition. 
As long as farmers cannot influence price nor decide on the 
destination of their products then, except during times of rapid market 
expansion, most will make just enough profit to cover their costs, 
including the cost of maintaining their investment, and a reward for 
taking a risk. The dynamics of change cloud this situation. Farmers 
who do get in early on a new crop or who anticipate a promising market 
development, can make substantial extra profit. Often the prospects for 
continuing high' profits look so good that the demand for scarce 
resources such as breeding stock and suitable land, causes their price to 
increase even beyond that justified by the current high profits. 
Later, when investors anticipate that the growth in production will 
outstrip the growth in demand for the final product, investment slows or 
ceases, resource prices drop and many investors can suffer a capital loss. 
This has happened recently in the livestock industry with deer, exotic 
cattle and goats, and in horticulture with kiwifruit, berryfruit and 
asparagus. If early developers are solely concerned with making money, 
they can capitalise on their foresight by selling out before the downturn. 
After a few ups and downs the industry settles down and those who have 
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been able to stay in production during the downturn find it marginally 
profitable to maintain their herd or crop in good condition. If the 
market expands again, farm gate prices and profit may increase enough 
to make a modest investment in new capital stock worthwhile. 
Farmers can form grower organisations to co-ordinate their end of the 
industry. In some cases grower organisations merely attempt to gain 
market power by bargaining with processors collectively. The more 
ambitious try to cut out the middleman and set up co-operative 
processing and distributing operations. These organisations may achieve 
short term success and raise farm gate prices for their members and for 
others, but higher prices and profits attract new growers into the 
industry and, without control over supplies, it becomes, again, only 
marginally profitable to continue in operation. Or it may be "rescued" 
by an existing processor who no longer runs it as a co-operative venture 
but who, even so, may retain the words "Farmer" and "Co-operative" in 
the name. 
The local processing and distributing sector is also dynamic. Large 
firms merge to form larger firms, and small firms briefly emerge to 
either collapse or be taken over by large firins. The result, often 
obscured by retaining the name of the taken-over firm, is that the control 
in the processing sector is becoming more concentrated. 
In the discussion that follows three industry descriptions illustrate that 
money conditions seen as problems by growers are the inevitable result 
of the industry structure. They do not stem from changes in aggregate 
consumer demand nor from costs incurred by processors or other 
participants. If one accepts this situation, then other important 
considerations follow. One is that attempts by growers to influence 
aggregate demand will not necessarily gain them an advantage. Another 
is that cost reductions in the processing sector will not necessarily affect 
returns to growers. 
Let us turn to the examples. First, a horticultural crop illustrates the 
effect on growers and processors when a small industry grows and 
participants anticipate a continuing increase in demand. Next, the 
structure of the sheep and beef cattle industry is used to show the effect 
of attempts to improve the lot of participants in an industry where 
processing is done locally. Finally, the wool industry is used to point 
out what happens when most of the product is exported in raw form. 
Both the meat and wool industries are examples where demand is not 
changing markedly. Though ownership of the dairy processing sector is 
nominally with the growers its structure is such that the general 
conclusions drawn here will apply to dairy farmers also. 
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The Asparagus Industry 
The structure of the asparagus industry is that fresh asparagus for 
domestic consumption is sold through the vegetable auction market 
system and accounts for about one third of total sales. About 200 
farmers supply one major cannery and two smaller ones with most of the 
remaining crop. The major cannery is also the largest food processor in 
New Zealand and either owns or has links with distributors and retailers. 
The pricing decisions of this processor dominate the asparagus industry, 
as they do in the rest of the process vegetable industry. 
Two exporters take most of the asparagus destined for fresh export, a 
number of smaller ones follow their lead in obtaining supplies from 
farmers. Some farmers export their own asparagus. Careful and costly 
post-harvest procedures must be followed for asparagus that is to be sold 
fresh and for frozen asparagus. The price for fresh export asparagus is 
closely related to the canning asparagus price and the cost of the post 
harvest treatment. 
It takes six years from initial soil preparation until an asparagus bed is 
in full production. For the first three years there is no marketable 
production, in the fourth year a small amount is picked. In the fifth 
year, at current prices, the return to a grower selling to a cannery just 
covers direct costs such as the cost of cultivation, of weed and disease 
control and of picking. It is not until the sixth year that growers can 
expect a return on their investment. Growing asparagus is a long term 
investment. 
Asparagus has been grown commercially in New Zealand for at least 
one hundred years but for a long time production was limited and 
asparagus remained a high priced luxury vegetable. Large scale 
production was considered difficult because of problems of weed control. 
With the development of chemical weed control methods there were 
some increased plantings in the Hawkes Bay and in Canterbury in the 
I 960s ; high yields were achieved with good profits reaped, though its 
production was still mainly a sideline operation. 
Most process asparagus is canned. Post harvest treatment is not 
critical for canned asparagus; quality is measured against standards of 
length. thickness and compactness of the seed head. Labour is a major 
cost component of canning asparagus. Proper post harvest treatment is 
critical to its successful fresh export and freezing. 
In Canterbury, a canning firm attempted to develop an integrated 
asparagus growing, canning and marketing operation but it was 
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unsuccessful. In Hawkes Bay area, asparagus that had been planted on 
poorly drained sites developed root disease, yields dropped below that 
required for economic production and many stands were uprooted and 
replaced by more conventional crops. Asparagus production declined in 
the early 1970s, but plantings resumed towards the end of the decade. 
In 1982, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries calculated a gross 
margin for asparagus. Asparagus production gave the highest per 
hectare gross margin of all the crops considered. That result was 
circulated throughout New Zealand by the New Zealand Press 
Association. 
The dominant processor began encouraging growers to establish 
asparagus beds by arranging establishment loans on favourable terms in 
return for contracts to supply. Plantings began to increase. 
In 1984, some MAF advisory officers noted and publicised the rapid 
growth in the rate of plantings. A group of growers in the Waikato, 
where most of the increased plantings were taking place, formed the 
Waikato Asparagus Growers Association and commended their action to 
growers in other districts. The result was the formation of five other 
district grower associations. A co-ordinating body, the Asparagus 
Council, funded by a voluntary levy was set up with headquarters in the 
Wellington office of the Vegetable Growers Federation. 
The council made plans to promote the product locally and to collect 
and disseminate technical information and information about the market 
and the industry. However, an article in the Farmer magazine expressed 
scepticism about the value of the scheme and suggested some things that 
might be done. 
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"The New Zealand Council spent about $35,000 on promotion 
last year and it is money down the drain. Now that is just my 
opinion and in the ordinary course of events the Council could 
refute my statement with evidence that it had researched the 
market, studied the distribution system, found out about 
consumers, slotted the promotional campaign into a carefully 
designed marketing plan, monitored its performance and 
modified the campaign and the plan in the light of the results. 
All these activities are necessary to be successful in the market; 
without them any campaign is doomed to failure. 
Unfortunately for asparagus growers, the Council has done 
none of those things and that fact confirms me in my opinion 
that it has wasted its efforts and growers money. Probably it 
will go ahead this year with increased spending on promotion 
and pour more money down the drain." 
Lewis, A.C. (March 1984) 
The NZ Farmer 
In 1985. the dominant processor announced a price nearly 20 percent 
higher than the 1984 price and more than 50 percent above the 1983 
price. The Asparagus Council took some of the credit for the 
negotiations. Asparagus was a very profitable crop, even taking into 
account the long time lag between the initial investment and the eventual 
return. Plantings continued to increase. 
About two months prior to the opening of the 1986 season the 
dominant processing firm dropped their price by about 20 percent. they 
also announced restrictions on their intake. Asparagus Council pressure 
was to no avail and the season progressed with all growers supplying 
processors and getting paid the announced price. In the event the season 
was late in starting because of a wet, cold spring, and most growers 
could not meet their quotas and processing firms could not meet their 
processing targets. 
The Asparagus Council hired a marketing expert to advise on market 
development and to prepare an industry plan. Council members, the 
marketing expert and some of the exporters, took a trip around the 
Pacific to investigate market potential in that region. 
During 1986 and up to the present, groups of concerned growers have 
met to discuss the prospects for the coming season and to plan to ensure 
that they receive a fair price for their 1987 crop. In some districts 
growers intend to invest in processing plant and equipment. In others 
they are discussing the option of refusing to supply processors unless the 
offered price is satisfactory. Many growers are questioning the value of 
the promotion campaign for domestic sales, and of the production and 
market information collected by the Council and provided free of charge 
to the processors. 
It is unlikely that the efforts of the Asparagus Council, funded by the 
growers, have increased the average profits of asparagus growers. The 
Council has attempted to apply marketing management principles to the 
industry without putting in place the controls on quantity, product 
characteristics and distribution necessary to reserve the benefits for the 
participants who fund the operation. 
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The Meat Industry 
For poultry, the production and marketing system is a highly 
integrated operation, from the provision of genetic material for livestock 
breeding and the manufacture of feed, to the retailing of the final 
product. Negligible quantities of chicken meat are exported or imported. 
The dominant firm in the industry controls over 75 percent of the 
production and processing of chickens, and is also the largest stockfeed 
producer in New Zealand. 
In the Waikato and Auckland regions most producers supply on 
contract to one of two major processors. The processors supply the 
stockfeed and the chicks. Further south, producers are more likely to be 
independent, though they are limited in their choice of outlets. The 
poultry industry is often held up as an example, to the meat industry in 
general, of the benefits that can be achieved by adopting a marketing 
approach. There is no evidence that poultry producers and processors, 
on average, achieve higher returns to capital or labour than producers 
and processors of other meats. 
The pig meat industry is integrated to a lesser extent. In some cases 
pig producers, like chicken farmers, are contracted to supply processors 
or must buy their feed from stockfood manufacturers, who may also be 
processors. In the South Island it is more common for producers to be 
independent and to make their own feed mixes. The Pig Industry 
Council, paid for by levies on producers, co-ordinates industry activities, 
funds research and promotes the product. There is no evidence that 
these activities enhance the profits of producers. 
The main difference between the sheep and beef cattle industries is 
that most sheepmeat is exported and most beef is consumed locally. The 
Meat Producers Board, funded by a compulsory levy on producers, co-
ordinates and regulates exports, gathers and disemminates statistics and 
promotes lamb and beef. 
The system has hardly changed this century except that there are 
fewer farmers and the processing sector has become more concentrated. 
In 1983, two major and five smaller firms dominated the processing 
industry. Now there is one major processor. 
In 1974, a commISSion of enquiry into the meat industry reported to 
the government on whether or not the export marketing system operated 
in the 'best interests of New Zealand'. The Nordmeyer Commission 
concluded that the marketing of meat was best conducted by a 'controlled 
form of private enterprise'. Control should be exercised, through 
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licencing, on the construction and location of processing facilities so as 
to avoid capital waste, and on exports to ensure 'orderly marketing'. 
In 1977, a marketing academic saw the problem as one in which the 
industry did not sufficiently consider consumer wants; it tried to get rid 
of something one happened to grow rather than growing something one 
could sell well. In 1978, a recommendation by a DSIR scientist 
concentrated on efficiency of production and processing to solve the 
problems of the meat industry. In 1980, another marketing academic 
proposed a New Zealand Lamb Marketing Company. The purpose was 
to enable the industry to co-ordinate the pricing and distribution of its 
meat throughout the world. These examples illustrate that the practice of 
addressing the problems of an industry is widespread even though an 
industry has no common objective and has no structure for making 
decisions and taking action. 
It might be thought that if, by Government legislation, the price for 
the final product could be increased then all participants in the industry 
will be better off. But this is not necessarily the case. For instance, 
when implementing a licencing scheme for export meat the licencing 
body may give one firm the exclusive right to sell meat in one region so 
that New Zealanders would not compete with one another in that market 
and drive the price down. If the meat marketing company restricted 
supplies to the market where it had control and achieved a higher price, 
then it might not want so much meat from farmers and, presumably the 
price to farmers could go down. Also, other exporters would lose that 
lucrative, now exclusive, market. It is difficult to think of a situation 
where an industry, meaning all participants in the industry, will benefit 
by giving one participant an advantage. 
There are also past. present and future participants in the industry to 
consider. For instance, an activity like promotion, funded by meat 
producers, which achieved the purpose of raising the retail price, may 
not in the long run provide any benetlts to the farmers who contributed 
to the cost of the promotion, even if some of the increase was transmitted 
back to the farm gate price. A temporary participant, such as a land 
dealer, could make the most money out of the situation by buying land 
and livestock after the promotion was paid for and before the promotion 
took effect; and selling after the promotion raised prices and before the 
extra production, brought forth by the higher prices, drove prices down 
again. 
Current participants may receive a temporary benefit from any 
industry action. but may in the long run not benefit, or they may even 
suffer, depending on when they sell their enterprise and how much extra 
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production is induced by the temporary higher price. Future 
participants, if they buy when product prices are high, will always suffer 
when the product price declines. 
When non-farm manufacturers plan a market development programme 
they normally invest in new technology, plant and equipment so that 
production matches anticipated sales. Primary product processors have 
no direct control over production and their form of investment is likely 
to be payment of premiums to induce farmers to change farm 
management practices so that future requirements can be met. But since 
they cannot secure that investment, other processors, who have not paid 
the premium, can just as easily procure the product. 
The Wool Industry 
Raw wool goes through many transformations and changes of 
ownership before the final product is sold to the ultimate consumer. 
The processor is unlikely to know the producer; the raw material 
producer is unlikely to know the processor. It is left to the price 
mechanism to transmit information on desired characteristics from one to 
the other. 
If the price mechanism is working as it should a high price for wool 
with a desirable characteristic will alert producers to the fact that it is 
much in demand, and make it profitable to produce wool with that 
characteristic. However, in the wool industry, the price mechanism is 
not good at transmitting information. Seasonal and short term 
influences, such as changes in exchange rates, levels of stock holding 
and numbers of buyers at a particular auction, have more effect on 
prices than wool preparation and presentation. A wool producer cannot 
tell whether a price change has been caused by one of the outside 
influences or by the characteristics of the wool, such as fibre colour, 
length or strength. 
The wool industry in New Zealand has been the subject of various 
investigations aimed at overcoming the shortcomings of the price 
mechanism and thereby increasing returns to the industry and New 
Zealand. To date, none of the recommendations have been implemented 
nor would they have been effective had they been implemented. 
In 1971, the Batelle Report echoed the findings of the Wool 
Marketing Study Group's Report and listed problems of the wool 
marketing system, such as fluctuating prices, uncertain delivery, 
variation in quality and poor financing facilities, and suggested ways of 
overcoming these problems. Late in 1972, the New Zealand Wool 
24-9 
Marketing Corporation was established to implement the suggestions 
contained in the two reports. The Corporation was to be 'marketing 
oriented, commercial in outlook, profit seeking and flexible in planning 
and operation'. It was given legislative powers to acquire and dispose of 
all the wool produced in New Zealand. 
In 1976, most contributors to a wool marketing seminar spoke of the 
need for the wool industry to adopt a more businesslike approach. The 
industry should plan for the future, draw up marketing objectives and 
embark on a promotional campaign, drawing attention to wool's qualities 
and changing consumer's attitudes towards wool. 
Now, in 1987 wool is produced, distributed and sold in much the 
same way as it was in 1971, and as it has been since sheep were first 
introduced into New Zealand. The industry cannot be judged to be 
either better or worse off than it was since there is no criterion for 
judging nor any real basis of comparison. Had the Wool Marketing 
Corporation been able to use its powers of acquisition and use market 
power or marketing management skills to increase the price to 
processors as had been recommended in the reports then it would still be 
impossible to determine whether the industry was better off. 
The participants that the Corporation replaced would have been worse 
off. Farmers mayor may not have been better off depending on whether 
the Corporation distributed its profits to farmers, or retained them for 
growth. Local manufacturers may have been worse off if they had to 
pay more for the raw material. A 'commercial in outlook, profit 
seeking' organisation normally answers to its shareholders, not to the 
industry at large. The shareholders of the Corporation, meaning all the 
participants in the industry, would not be of one mind when it came to 
distributing profits. 
In the event, the Corporation did not take up its brief to acquire and 
market all the wool produced in New Zealand. Opposition was strong 
from 'the Trade' who could see their functions being taken over, and 
from growers who were not convinced that they would benefit. 
There are convincing arguments for the adoption of marketing 
management principles to the production and disposal of wool. A farmer 
could benefit by joining with others to develop and market a brand of 
wool. To achieve the benefits the organisation would have to have 
complete control over the quantity, product characteristics and 
distribution of all the wool sold under the brand. Yet given the present 
structure of the wool industry, any attempt to improve the lot of all 
farmers in the industry will not be successful. 
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Conclusion 
The general structure of the agricultural and horticultural production, 
processing and distribution industry in New Zealand gives rise to a 
rather conventional thesis: that a recommendation addressed to an 
industry cannot achieve identifiable results. For a recommendation to be 
effective it must specify an objective and be aimed at a decision making 
entity, such as a farmer, an organisation of fanners, a processor, a 
cartel of processors or the Government. An industry cannot make a 
decision. nor can it really have a common objective. A recommendation 
for an industry, therefore, cannot achieve an objective for all participants 
at once, and cannot be carried out, for there is no-one to direct the 
action. 
When farmers and horticulturalists talk about problems they refer to 
low prices for their products and to uncertainty about future prices; they 
refer to the high cost of fertiliser, agricultural machinery, animal health 
remedies, and to difficulties of meeting their mortgage commitments. 
These problems are the same problems producers of agricultural and 
horticultural products have always faced. Few fanners talk about 
marketing problems. This is insightful because it is doubtful whether a 
particular farmer will overcome any problems, or really benefit from, 
contributing to a fund for product promotion. research or other of the 
activities commonly thought· of as functions of producer organisations. 
Nor is it likely that a farmer will gain from co-operating to form a 
processing organisation in an attempt to cut out the middle man. 
A particular farmer is more likely to benefit by using proven 
technology effectively. A farmer may also benefit from joining others to 
produce a product that is distinct enough to be branded. The objective 
should be to control the product characteristics and the quality that is 
sold under the brand; to gain some control over price and distribution. 
These are not recommendations to all raw material producers of the 
same commodity. If they all took them up, none would benefit. 
When processors talk about problems they refer to the high price and 
low quality of raw material, and to uncertainty about future raw material 
prices; they refer to the high cost of shipping, labour, machinery, the 
problems of financing further investment, and of keeping their 
shareholders satisfied. Their problems are the same as those faced by 
any business. 
A processor will not need to join forces with other processors but will 
best be able to gain an edge by developing, maintaining and controlling a 
brand. A processor will have to invest in market developing of the 
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brand and secure the market so that other processors cannot cash in on 
the development. 
When the Government talks about problems they refer to low and 
unreliable overseas earnings; they refer to the cost of subsidies, and of 
the cost. of publicly funded research, education and information services. 
The Government is also concerned with the social effects of change, 
especially when unemployment results. 
For individuals and firms the objectives of any action will be clear and 
the results easily measurable. They may be expressed in terms of profit 
and growth, and sometimes of lifestyle. Governments have welfare 
objectives that are not so easily expressed in terms of money. 
Governments can reduce the cost of subsidies and research by not 
making the funds available, and make more money by adopting good 
business practices. But the effect of such actions, or of any other 
Government actions, on the welfare of the people of New Zealand, is 
much more difficult to measure. 
If all participants of the various sectors of the agricultural and 
horticultural industry took up the recommendations contained here, none 
would benetlt. It is not certain that the New Zealand economy as a 
whole wou Id benefit either, or be able to overcome any problems. It is 
reasonably certain that a particular participant will benetlt. 
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Chapter 25 
A Woman Farmer's 
Perspective 
Robyn Grigg 
Farmer 
HickOlY Bay 
The role of farm and rural women has been changing apace for the 
last 15 years, the process having been speeded recently by the downward 
turn of New Zealand's farm economy. It is these changes, the forces 
behind them, and their possible outcomes that I plan to deal with here. 
For this chapter some data have not yet been formalised except 
piecemeal in the press and other sources. As a consequence, reliance 
has been placed upon personal interviews and notes taken from meetings 
with women's organisations and other political entities. People from 
Northland to Southland were canvassed for inforamtion. Past studies 
have been used, as has my personal experience as a farmer, wife, 
community leader and advocate of increased involvement of women in 
the many aspects of rural living. 
Although I am writing specifically of New Zealand farm women, the 
issues covered are relevant to all rural women. I would also point out 
that mine is a pakeha's viewpoint, and I urge that full attention be paid 
to the role and views of Maori women in New Zealand agriculture. 
Throughout, my goal is to recognise the role of farm women as 
respected and effective partners in the management of their farms' and 
their families' future. They contribute many on-farm skills as well as 
other skills economically and politically recognised in the community and 
in off-farm employment. Recognition may come in many forms 
beginning with self-confidence, their husband's and family's 
acknowledgement and inclusion, and the community's awareness of their 
potential contribution. 
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The Rural Women's Movement 
In 1970, a new wave of New Zealand women's liberation groups 
emerged, but it was not until 1976 that rural women are recorded as 
putting in an official appearance when a small group in the Wairarapa 
surveye~ the women in the Tinui district and presented a paper to the 
United Women's Convention 1975 entitled 'What is a Rural Woman?'. 
That study described her many attributes and competencies but, at the 
same time it acknowledges that while the nation could not get along 
without her, it also regarded her as the cheapest unit of labour in the 
nation! 
In 1976, the Women's Division Federated Farmers (WDFF), in 
conjunction with the University of Canterbury, undertook a national 
survey of rural women. Those were heady days when farm women 
suddenly moved from being just somebody's wife to the status of a 
recognized national statistic. 
A prime motivating force behind women who came forward in the 
] 970s was the need for better rural services. As one woman reflected: 
'it was the injustice of it all. Why should our children have a second-
best deal at school? Why all the red tape surrounding school bus 
services? Why can't our business have a phone that works?' As a 
result of these concerns, women collected data, wrote letters, lobbied, 
and learnt to work the political system effectively. 
Danna Glendining formed TREC (Towards Rural Equality of 
Citizenship) in 1976. This was the beginning of a rural women's 
network throughout New Zealand. Rural women, aided by the 
conviction that the country did indeed ride on the sheep's back, caused 
many rural services to improve. 
The object of the rural women's movement was to increase women's 
awareness of their rightful place in society. However, just to become 
aware and effective lobbyists was not sufficient. Next came the 
realisation that to effect change women must become part of the decision-
making process. At that time few women sat on county councils, and 
even fewer attended Federated Farmers' meetings. 
The successful Women in Agriculture (WAg) was launched in 1981. 
WAg is a network of women who wish to increase women's participation 
and reward in agriculture because in order for women to succeed in 
their on-farm and off-farm roles many would have to develop new skills 
and confidence. Seminars and workshops are held with the support of 
REAP organizers (Rural Education Activities Programme), the Ministry 
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of Agriculture and Fisheries, and various community colleges throughout 
the country. WAg seminars are held in all corners of New Zealand, 
usually in the local hall or woolshed. The topics may be practical or 
political, and are varied to suit the needs of local communities. They 
can range from instruction in tractor driving to self-awareness sessions. 
WAg is said to be the fastest growing rural organisation in the country 
with over 3500 current members who keep in touch through a newsletter 
put out under the auspices of the Ministry of Women's Affairs. WAg 
has done a superb consciousness-raising exercise among rural women. 
It has been able to do so because energy is concentrated on the cause 
and not expended on an internal bureaucracy. WAg's strengths are its 
network of committed women, flexibility to meet local needs, and 
openness of membership. Its weakness comes from a lack of finance 
and, perhaps, from a lack of a formal structure even though most 
members do not yet feel the need for a head office or 'top dogs'. Some 
formal organisations find a semi-formal group of motivated women 
difficult to comprehend and even a little alarming in its potential power. 
WAg could also play an increased communication role as the rural 
crisis deepens. For example, there is a continuing need to provide an 
awareness among farm women of their legitimate place in rural society 
and its economy. This awareness will help provide much of the base 
from which to effect future change such as continual improvement of 
rural services. 
The 'Rural Women Stepping Out Workshops' provide an excellent 
example of a self-help situation. Run under the auspices of Lincoln 
College's Extension Centre. with rural women providing the 
organisational and leadership skills, the workshops are almost invariably 
overbooked. In tune with the times and bowing to the advent of the 
user-pays concept, sponsorship has now been provided by a progressive 
meat company (C.S. Stevens, Ltd.) after the traditional stock and station 
association declined to give financial support. This move indicates new 
linkages between progressive farm women and the enlightened 
management of certain 'value-added' processing companies. 
In the past. two traditional formal structures have served rural women: 
WDFF and CWI (Country Women's Institute). However, both were 
created in times of differently perceived rural need and are now 
maintained by a predominantly older membership. While both 
organisations still have roles to fill in our communities, there is a 
growing indication from younger farm and rural women that these 
established organisations do not fill today's needs. Many women feel 
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that existing rural, social, economic and political structures are at odds 
with inevitable changes in the wider community. 
Perhaps the solution is more complex than a simple remodeling of 
these existing organisations, which, it seems, prefer to have power and 
recognition for farm women come in the form of traditional nurturing 
and supportive roles. The feeling among many women is that this does 
not fully address the issues of what women's future economic base is to 
be, or the reality of achieving recognition as competent and reliable 
political partners. 
Attempts may be made to keep women to one side by asking them to 
form 'ginger groups'. Another suggested alternative could be to form a 
national group based on a British model of the Women's Farming 
Union. However, neither of these is likely to come to grips with the 
desired integration of power. This leaves only benign neglect of the 
existing structures or their usurpation - neither is desirable. 
A more contemporary approach to attaining these feminist goals. i.e. 
real equal economic and political opportunity with men, is through 
education about what sex role integration means and how it can be 
brought about. Part of the problem is that many women exhibit a lack 
of esteem as a direct result of sexism in our society. This is 
predominant in rural New Zealand as much role stereotyping and 
prejudices are held over from the past. Many farm women have become 
aware that there is an alternative, and they strive for a respected place 
alongside their men in the rural power structure of producers' 
organisations, county and regional councils, as well as in rural services 
such as education, communication and health. 
Increasingly, it is seen that the farming organisations of the future will 
have to shed the historical baggage of 'old boy' networks and adopt a 
flexible infrastructure to ,meet the fast-moving needs of the emerging 
generation who will require leaders aware of the totality of farm and 
rural needs, and who can implement positive changes based on the use 
of upmarket attitudes and professional skills. To date, much of the 
energy and the finance of existing organisations is used in maintaining 
the 'fraternity' of farming's political prowess. Most farm women will 
expect to share in the revamping of these power structures, contributing 
their skills, their insights, their professionalism and their experiences. It 
is time to forge new partnerships, a new and different way of managing 
our farms and our rural resources, and a heightened respect for 
women's role in resolving the problems of today. 
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Legal Changes 
A significant force behind the change in farm women's roles has been 
two legal changes which have done much to raise the status and effective 
self-esteem of farming women. They are: 
(I) The Matrimonial Property Act of 1976 entitles both marriage 
partners to an equal share in their matrimonial property, making 
for a equal division of that property should the marriage end. 
(2) The 1983 Income Tax Amendment Bill, which enables the 
formation of farming partnerships between spouses without 
incurring taxation, gift or stamp duty, thereby minimising the cost 
of redistributing legal ownership of resources within marriage 
partnerships, and spreading income tax and estate duty liabilities. 
The 1976 Matrimonial Property Act was launched by the Labour 
Government in 1975 with an explanatory booklet in the belief that public 
reaction and input should decide its final composition. Ruth Richardson, 
a young rural woman employed in the Justice Department, was to 
become strongly associated with this Act. A Justice Department 
employee when it was initiated, she then moved to Federated Farmers as 
a legal adviser just as the impact of this law hit the conservative farming 
community. Was 'the wife' perceived to be a full and equal partner in a 
family farming business, or was she to continue primarily as an unpaid 
hausfrau often discussed socially in her presence without name and 
referred to simply as 'the wife'? 
The 1976 legislation covered the situation when a marriage dissolved, 
but did not adequately cover the situation of the majority who remained 
happily married and wished to form a legal and equal business 
partnership. By 1983, Ruth Richardson was a member of Parliament 
and took a crucial part in the passing of the 1983 Tax Amendment Act. 
The cynics referred to this law as a tax dodge, yet in reality this new 
found legal status did much to improve the self-perceived worth of farm 
women. 
While the Matrimonial Act gave a fairer resolution between marriage 
partners, it has also encouraged fairer provision for daughters in wills 
and estate settlements than had previously been the case. Parliament has 
yet to consider a third leg of these legal changes, that of disputing the 
payment of any death duties by a surviving spouse. 
Alongside Ruth Richardson in the National Government was another 
rural M.P., Marilyn Waring. Marilyn talks freely of the difficulties she 
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faced in getting the National Party caucus to take women's issues 
seriously. Only history will give true weight to the changes these 
brilliant women have made to New Zealand's macho society. It is also 
important to reflect that these two women were able to achieve these feats 
in a National Government dominated by Sir Robert Muldoon, an 
extremely forceful political personality who at times chose positions 
which were antithetical to those of the women's movement. 
Elected Representation 
Few leadership positions are held by rural and farm women. The 
percentage of rural women on most county councils is increasing at a 
lethargic pace despite the fact that most who have stood have been 
successful. The upward trend did not begin until 1977, much later than 
in urban areas which have seen rapidly increasing numbers of women 
stand for election since 1962. For example, the level of women's 
involvement in rural counties and districts in 1980 was about the same 
as it was in cities and boroughs in the mid-1960s. That puts rural New 
Zealand light years behind. Until rural women are encouraged to have 
the confidence and then take the initiative to put themselves forward for 
decision-making positions, they are likely to continue to be ignored. It 
is discouraging that, although women are at least 50 percent of the road 
users, over 80 percent of the shoppers, and form the majority of users of 
community facilities, they have so little influence on siting, design, cost, 
maintenance, or growth decisions. 
A number of women standing in the 1986 local government elections 
viewed with concern the increasingly strong influence of the 
fundamentalist or moral right. Part of their agenda appears to be the 
return of these motivated women to the kitchen and bedroom, their 
designated place in society. Another block is the negative attitude of 
some women towards those women who seek leadership roles. 
A summary of the 1983 elections in terms of women's seats, finds that 
county councils fall into three groups: about half have no women 
members, about one quarter have between 1-19 percent female 
membership, and the remaining quarter have more than 20 percent. 
Two women stood for Catchment Boards in 1983, and were successful. 
However, there were no women on Pest Destruction Boards, and only a 
smattering represented rural districts on Electric Power Boards. The 
proportion of rural women appointed by Government to quangos is no 
better. A 1983 analysis of the 57 boards and committees under the 
agriculture portfolio shows that of the 464 positions available, only seven 
were held by women. 
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Although the 1986 triennial election statistics are not yet available, 
some facts are quite clear. Several large counties such as Ashburton and 
South land still have no women on their councils. However, one county 
has taken a quantum leap. In Golden Bay County four of the eight 
councillors are women, and they have New Zealand's only current 
county chairwoman. 
While the question of female/male ratios on boards and committees is 
important, there is also a need to reassess the entire spectrum of public 
board roles and objectives. It is highly appropriate that in this 
reassessment, the portfolio of potential issues is addressed as well as an 
analysis of the sex composition of the boards. It is not enough to simply 
have one or two women at the top. Even if they are elected en merit, 
there are also others well qualified to fill a range of positions. Tokenism 
is unacceptable today. 
Why are women not standing for public office more often? One factor 
must be that the effort required to break down all the stereotypical 
barriers that have entrenched us for generations is, for anyone 
individual, almost overwhelming. The task ahead is to create an 
awareness of moving many rural and farm women into accepting their 
leadership responsibilities - as iIldividuals and as members of rural 
communities in which we live. It is important to impress upon the wider 
community the inherent value of having feminist viewpoints expressed 
round the various board and council tables, and to ackllowledge that 
more and more women are making important investment and business 
decisions in addition to their usual 'taken for granted' handling of the 
family budget. 
While the main thrust of the Women's Movement in rural New 
Zealand is an attempt to raise. the consciousness of the entire rural 
female population, the cry of 'we've no role models' is often heard. 
Yet, while the official record of office holders in county councils and 
with organisations such as Federated Farmers is abysmal (acknowledged 
so even by them), there have been some notable rural women in 
leadership roles. The 1986/87 leader of the National Council of Women 
is a farmer, Jocelyn Fish. Three women have achieved the presidency 
role of the Young Farmer's Club since the amalgamation of the Young 
Farmer's Clubs and Girls Clubs in 1971. WEL (the Women's Electoral 
Lobby) also has many rural ties. Both Ruth Richardson and Marilyn 
Waring were founding members, and the present National Coordinator is 
a Wairarapa farmer, Pauline McLeod. Since much of its strength today 
is in provincial counties, we can only take that as an indication of the 
potential available and the necessary work to be done there. 
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At another level, the 1984 election saw the number of women M.P.s 
representing rural provincial seats rise from two to four. Future 
representation is unclear for a number of reasons. While rural New 
Zealand would likely traditionally support the return of the National 
Party, political pundits should consider the impact which the vote of 
rural women had in the last election. Feminism is a philosophy which 
in New Zealand fits more comfortably with Labour traditions, and 
consequently ideological shifts by rural women may well have 
contributed to the success of Labour in provincial seats in 1984. To 
date. the National Party has done relatively little to woo back that 
independent female rural voter, and the Labour Government is 
attempting to maintain its attentive concern. 
On-farm Decision Making 
Two main factors have encouraged farm wives to participate in 
management decisions about their farms more fully than in the past. 
First are the changes in the law providing women with the opportunity to 
move alongside their husbands as legal partners; and second is the grave 
economic situation in which most farm families now feel embedded. 
The 1975 Survey of Rural Women in New Zealand indicated that on 
the whole, farm women had more years of formal education than their 
husbands, and that they often brought a keener sense of business to 
decisions. Increasingly, the idea of farm women being only bookkeepers 
and/or unpaid family/farm labourers is giving way to their being full-
fledged members of a management team. The pendulum is swinging in 
favour of women's recognised and rightful place at the planning and 
decision table. 
During the production driven period of the 1970s, farm women did 
not have first claim on the farm dollars to be spent. Today, that 
situation has changed, the priorities are different, and more farm women 
are sitting beside their husbands and accountants as financial planners. 
Younger women especially are defining where farm spending ends and 
family spending begins. Farm women are asking that economic and 
social considerations be also weighed up when decisions are made. Off-
farm investment decisicns, the possibility of off-farm employment for one 
or more members of the family, and identification of time spent working 
only on the farm versus time spent only with the family enter the 
decision-making process more and more. 
Increasing numbers of women are attending the Kellogg computer 
courses at Lincoln College. Share groups are flourishing in rural areas. 
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These are all indications that in the future women with new found 
financial skills will be the effective managers of off-farm investments. 
A Rural Bank officer summed up the situation with, 'Women are 
becoming involved in management to a far greater degree; they are not 
accepting a second-class partnership' . 
A third-generation woman dairy farmer put her finger on the 
difference in comparing her role with those of her mother and 
grandmother (both of them also the 'owner's wife') 'there were no 
expectations of past generations of women except as physical workers in 
the shed. Now 1'm expected also to make decisions about the herd and 
be responsible for acting on them'. 
Another woman said 'I had to earn my credits as a financial decision-
maker off the farm first before I became accepted in the role of equal 
farm partner'. 
Yet despite these advances, there are husbands who still believe that 
keeping the books, but not signing the cheques, is involvement enough. 
However, it is clear that, in the last few years, greater numbers of 
women consider themselves actually involved with their husbands in 
making economic decisions about the present and future of their farms. 
There are also indications that when financial pressure is placed on the 
small one/two labour unit properties, women have increased their 
management involvement. The involvement of women on larger 
properties has not increased to the same extent. But there is still a need 
for greater emphasis to be placed on coordinated family discussions of 
farm and family goals and objectives. 
Off-farm and On-farm Employment 
In the last. decade an increasing number of farm women have sought 
off-farm employment. The 1975 National Survey of Rural Women 
reported that only about 11 percent of farming women had off-farm 
employment. However, in 1985, the Southland study found that that 
number had risen to approximately 21 percent. Present indications are 
that it has increased significantly since, and that many women are 
driving considerable distances to off-farm employment. 
One accepted way to stem the tide of farm people seeking alternative 
ways to supplement their incomes is to expand income opportunities on 
their existing farms. Diversification was the catch-cry of the early 
1980s. The motivation for it was simply that additional farm enterprises 
were expected to increase incomes, thereby offsetting disappointing 
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traditional income (due in part to falling prices) or establishing a base 
for future farm investments that would lead to increased income also. 
Women were a part of this integral plan. 
However, a study of the impact of horticultural development on farm 
women in Canterbury paints a very sombre picture. While most of the 
women had been involved in the decision to diversify into horticulture, 
providing work for these women was not a significant factor in that 
diversification decision. In most cases, the expected income was not 
realised. Increased returns did not cover the extra costs incurred in the 
venture. Women had to increase their hours of work without offsetting 
compensation, and, indeed, the financial success of the enterprise often 
depended solely upon the voluntary input of women and other family 
members. 
Farm women who live near urban centres and choose to seek full or 
part-time off-farm employment have relatively few problems in finding 
jobs but for those women who live in the backblocks it is much more 
difficult. Research undertaken in the Taranaki hill country in 1986 
provides a pattern of female employment which might apply to the rest of 
New Zealand's hill country. The study reports that the proportion of 
women who are employed off their farms, as recorded in the census, is 
well below the national average (not surprising since the local work 
options are predominantly agriculture or hunting). However, of the 
women who did find work a far greater proportion than the national 
average worked part-time, and 50 percent of all the women who took 
extra employment worked in agriculture. Economic hardship was also 
evident for the study indicated that over 80 percent of all respondents, 
female or male, said they had an interest in obtaining off-farm 
employment. 
A serious effect of this situation has surfaced. The 1975 National 
Survey of Rural Women indicated that 73 percent were involved in 
physical on-farm work. The Southland Survey of 1986 gave an estimate 
of 87 percent. All indications are that most women who remain on 
farms have increased work loads. Concern must be voiced that as their 
work may be unpaid and not explicitly recognised in a farm partnership, 
the compensation paid would not be adequate to cover their 
responsibilities in the home and on the farm, should they be involved in 
a serious accident. The reason is that they are not designated as part of 
the labour force. The economic contribution of farm women will always 
be difficult to quantify since their roles and work responsibilities are so 
varied. It may be anything from answering the phone to managerial 
responsibilities if her partner is involved in exercises such as agricultural 
politics. 
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Money Isn't Everything 
What was initially perceived as a simple decision for farm women to 
gain off-their-farm employment has many implications. In the short run 
it is relatively easy for women to consider the pay packet as 'ours'. The 
consideration of whose it is in a longer term situation is one not yet fully 
addressed by many farm families. 
Women who have decided to go out for a short-term job and who have 
a definite target for their earnings, have had less conflict within 
themselves and with their husbands than those women who have opted 
for long term off-farm employment. 'The power of the pay packet is 
substantial', not only for the dollars it contains but for what the dollars 
represent to the woman who earned them and the family who sees her go 
to work. 
Some of the questions to be resolved are: How much of a say in the 
spending of her wages does the woman have? Do her earnings get lost 
in the ongoing farm expenditures? Does she have independent control 
over all or even a portion of the money brought in for purchases she 
thinks are important to her life? 
The concerns are real. If the woman's wages or salary is continually 
used to prop up a failing farm business, an inbuilt resentment eventually 
arises. On the other hand, if the woman works with a mutual 
understanding that her income will pay the school bill or go for a house 
remodeling, then there is a different feeling. 
Generally, when there is a family financial crisis, there is usually no 
difficulty in sorting out everyone's priorities to focus on resolving the 
problem in hand. It is when the adjustment period extends itself into a 
seemingly never-ending contribution by one whose independence seems 
to be lost that real troubles are encountered. It involves complex 
feelings of self-worth, valued by someone outside the family who is 
willing to pay for the woman's professionalism. It integrates feelings of 
effective involvement in decisions with her partner about where, how, 
and when that money she brought in should be spent. 
Another potential issue to be confronted can be the divided loyalties 
created by the off-farm job. No longer is 'the wife' around to help with 
the chores or farm emergencies: 'until I returned to off-farm 
employment, I had not realised how important I was on the phone', said 
one. No longer can her presence be assumed. 
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Further, as a good business employee, she may begin to develop goals 
for herself in the new opportunity, and begin to support her employer's 
interests and management techniques. The job can also be intellectually 
stimulating, drawing on innate talents not touched by farm work. One 
teacher who went back into the classroom to help pay the mortgage said, 
'I missed the fal"m but it was great to be back in the classroom where 
my skills lie. Since coming back (to the farm), I'm suffering the most 
awful withdrawal symptoms. Thank God for an understanding husband'. 
Another woman who had been very involved on the farm before she 
took her present full-time teaching position (in order to pay their 
children's education bill) is already concerned that the recognised 
responsibilities that she had on the farm may not be available for her 
when she returns to the farm full-time next year. 
When both partners seek off-farm work the complexities increase. 
One woman suggested, 'Our roles are not unlike those of cohabitors 
who share a family and a household to run, but who are separate 
breadwinners. The farm is now our capital investment that we need to 
discuss and make decisions about - it is no longer 'our life'. 
The people interviewed had many pertinent observations about how 
their community viewed their efforts. Many involved crippling notions 
of stereotyping that limited self-esteem and confidence. For example, 
one community's perception about changing roles for a farm woman and 
her husband was reported as: 'If a woman is employed off-farm they are 
still farming. If the man works off-farm, the woman is looking after the 
farm. If both work off-farm they have abdicated their right to be 
farming! ' 
With the changes in employment, other aspects of rural life are also 
affected. The traditional church fellowship groups are already almost 
non-existent. The Red Cross Society, the Plunket Society, and even the 
mid-week Ladies' Golf days no longer receive the patronage they used 
to. One consequence has been a rise in the number of community jobs 
that are now paid; for instance, the work covered by community 
recreation officers may well have been voluntary a few years ago. It 
used to be considered essential to our status and standing in a rural 
district to be active in voluntary groups. That is no longer true. In fact, 
one suspects that paid employment is now the status symbol or is it 
merely that a crisis such as a war or the present economic downturn 
gives women permission to seek off-farm employment? 
Whatever the motivating force to seek off-farm work, rural 
communities are no longer self-sufficient islands even though many 
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relish that nostalgia. New rural social concerns will have to be faced, 
be it the replacement of essential voluntary work in the district and 
community, or the consequences of many farm partners spending endless 
working days alone. The changes are numerous. One must 
acknowledge them and turn them to our families' and the community's 
advantage. 
While I have talked as a woman regarding these issues, I must 
concede that men may also feel locked into their 'provider' role. Studies 
have shown that many male farmers may not be able to understand why 
their spouses might feel differently about the money they earn than the 
farm income he works so hard to achieve. These studies also indicate 
that men may not be able to express their feelings about the 
issues/conflicts that arise during these debates as their wives. The point 
is that they may not be fully aware of, or able to express, their feelings 
about (I) being trapped into a situation of shrinking farm income with 
the inability to provide as well as they want to for their families, and (2) 
that throughout their lives they have naturally directed all energy and 
expenditures to the farm. There are few farmers, for example, who can 
honestly conceive of money earned from the farm as being their own to 
spend 'freely' although by their actions of controlling the money and 
spending the vast majority of it on their farms, they are doing just that. 
Conclusion 
In the past, physical effort has been the prime factor in our 
agriculture production and acknowledgement of physical ability has been 
the prerequisite for its leadership. Not so tomorrow. The prerequisite 
for New Zealand's future leaders of agriculture is that they be more 
highly trained, more market aware and more competent managers. 
Communication and information access will be the keys to on-farm 
profitability and informed leadership. It will be essential that rural 
women become familiar with new learning concepts and new 
communication systems. 
Women and men must make decisions together about the challenges 
that face them. 
The traditional barriers of discrimination against women and their 
role stereotyping can no longer be accepted in rural society. 
New political structures must not only include women leaders, but 
adequately reflect women's perceptions of what the policy agenda 
should be. 
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Rural development, a conscious effort to develop the countryside, 
should involve women and reflect their considerations about what that 
development is or should be. 
To achieve these goals women will draw on their own individual 
strengths, and gain confidence and courage from the collective 
networking of rural women. Increasingly, our farm women of today 
will be the farm, rural and civic leaders of tomorrow. 
An almost unidentifiable but potent thread ran through the interviews 
for this chapter. It was perhaps best described by one woman who 
referred to her marriage as a three-way partnership: the man - the 
woman - the land, and to thrive all must be kept in balance. 
Many of the conflicts identified by those seeking off-farm 
employment were acknowledging these links, while those seeldng a 
recognised role in the farm business were also acutely aware of those 
ties. 
This triangle defies any computer analysis, is incomprehensible to 
Treasury economists, and baffles politicians. New Zealand will 
prosper if the worth of farm women in that vital triangle is 
recognised, sustained, and given equal economic and political 
opportunity with men. 
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Chapter 26 
Maori and Pakeha: 
Land and Fisheries 
Ron Sandrey 
Agricultural Economist 
Lincoln College 
All New Zealanders know that almost 150 years ago the Waitangi 
Treaty· was initiated ending an isolated way of life for an indigenous 
people forever. Let us take a closer look at one core issue: property 
rights. This issue affects access to and rewards from both land and 
fishing concerns. By hindsight, it may prove to be that since both are 
strongly inter-related, the resolution of the fishing rights issues will 
provide keys to unravelling the even thornier problems associated with 
property rights questions of land. 
The Treaty essentially concerned the ownership, transfer and 
protection of property rights in the lands and waters of the old (new) 
living place - Aotearoa (New Zealand). The arguments today concern 
these same property rights and a mutual desire of each culture to share 
equitably in the tangible and intangible rewards they offer. 
The first point to consider is: who controls how much of New 
Zealand's land and water? There are at least two different perspectives 
when looking at this question. To the Maori of any tribe the spiritual 
essence of one's being comes from the land and sea, and involves deep-
seated feelings of custodianship. While tribal carvings vary, the legends 
they portray do not. Collectively used, land, sea and streams were 
created for the Maori by providing and caring ancestor Gods. 
Then boats came bringing Europeans, pakeha. There were not too 
many of them and they brought attractive trinkets, guns, and money 
which were exchanged for land. There seemed to be enough land for 
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all; it was all right. Yet more pakeha came, and more. The newcomers 
moved out onto the plains and into the hills having 'bought' the land. 
The newcomer's view was often tempered by recent experiences with the 
clearances of ordinary people from the British landscape. Perhaps, 
unknowingly, many were perpetrating the same deed under a different 
name on the Maori. 
Most settlers saw land as the key to ending their deprivation. Land 
ownership promised a home place forever, a chance to earn a livelihood, 
and in some cases unabashed wealth. It promised self-sufficiency for 
people with families. It promised security. Backed by English law was 
this not so? 
Collective/individual, spiritual/economic - it seemed inevitable that 
misunderstanding, greed, corruption, imperialism, nationalism and 
therefore violence would develop. 
Good farmers and fisher people for the pakeha, was it so curious that 
the Maori felt pushed aside. denied access to enjoy the 'progress' they 
saw rising about them as the best lands, theirs for generations. were 
taken away and they were told to move on? One can certainly 
understand the frustration and fear a late European arrival might feel 
when, after buying land from a 'reputable representative of the Crown 
and Government', he found a group of Maori hostile and sullen because 
'his' ground was 'theirs'? Good people on both sides came to sharp 
differences of opinion, and blood was shed. 
Peace, and a treaty, came at Waitangi in February of 1840. Never 
fully understood or accepted, never ratified, deficiently translated and 
doubtfully implemented, the Treaty stands as an uncertain monument to 
good intentions and protocol. In its aftermath came the land wars of the 
mid-1840s and 1950s, and eventually the tribes were subjugated 
although they never admited defeat. 
In 1846, Governor George Grey abolished the protector's Department, 
set up in 1841 by the Colonial Secreatry primarily to look after the land 
rights of the 'Aborigines'. He grandly took over the task of fending for 
the best interests of both cultures, pakeha and Maori. Shortly afterward, 
he appointed a 'Commission for the Extinguishment of Native (land) 
Claims' with an implied directive of getting Maori land rights as cheaply 
as possible. These actions were disclaimed by many pakeha who saw 
them as blatant land fraud, but not enough of them spoke up. 
Although there were more land problems in the North Island where 
most of the settlers and Maori were, the South Island situation distils the 
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problems and are also well documented (Evison, 1986). In 1868, the 
South Island Ngai Tahu took their claim to the newly established Native 
Land Court and then to the Supreme Court. The case was never fully 
heard. However, it is on record that the Maori phrase "makinga kai" 
used in the Otago-Nelson land purchases in the 1840s, meant 'all those 
places where the Maori have gone for their traditional foods' (assuming 
anywhere - field, stream, hill or sea). But H.T. Kemp, a key land 
buyer for the Crown, who actually made the final sale to a private 
company, translated the phrase as simply 'cultivations'. 
From this superb indifference to language meaning, the Wasteland 
Theory of land grew. Backed by Governor Grey, the feeling arose that 
only if the land was cultivated did one have the right to hold title to it. 
All else was declared idle or wasteland and therefore open for settler 
occupation. This was done with full knowledge that Maori custom and 
tradition provided little encouragement for tilling the soil except for 
minimal food and defence requirements. Despite Kemp's own admission 
of intent to fraud, and the appointment of Royal Commission in 1879 (a 
response to a Maori fighting fund of six thousand pounds raised in 1875) 
which ultimately substantiated Kemp's testimony, 'The Claim' was 
ignored. 
The background noises of pakeha economic progress and land 
settlement were harsh to the Maori. In t 886, the New Zealand Census 
found only 41,432 Maori people. Their further economic withdrawal 
was enhanced by the 1890s depression, which led to their increased 
isolation. It was not until 1907 that another resurgence of Maoridom 
carried on the pursuit of 'The Claim'. 
Throughout this time more settlers bought land in good faith, obtained 
title, established farms and businesses, worked hard and prospered 
accordingly. The opposite was true for virtually all Maori people. 
Another Royal Commission on Maori land claims in 1921 led to 
nothing. Then came the Settlement Act of 1944 which offered the N gai 
Tahu a small amount of money for their claim, but no land settlement or 
property rights. 
Under the Waitangi Treaty, the Crown (Article 2) guaranteed the 
Maori possession of their lands, and (in Article 3) that those rights 
would be equal with those of British subjects. Yet even under the Land 
Act of 1948, the Crown tended to ignore those rights. It issued Pastoral 
Leases which granted the right to occupy and graze high country lands 
with a perpetual right of lease renewal every 33 years. 
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Another surge of interest among Maori people gained momentum in 
the 1960s and 1970s. By now, many had been to University, travelled 
widely, and fought well in two world wars. They mourned their cultural 
and property losses, and in ] 975, some 25-30,000 people marched on 
Wellington with the slogan 'Not an acre more'. Their action stopped the 
sale of land for a housing development and returned the Raglan golf 
course to Maori ownerShip. 
Perhaps a pivotal point has now been reached. In 1986/87, an official 
committee of inquiry chaired by W.G. Clayton recommended that the 
Crown dispose of Crown pastoral lease lands by making them available 
for freeholding by present leasees. Further, under the State Owned 
Enterprises Act of 1986, these Crown lands were to be transferred to a 
new Government corporation. In both instances, specific reference to 
any obligation of the .Crown to Maori interests has not been heard, and 
'The Claim' has come to life again despite the fact that over 70 percent 
of Maori people now ive in urban areas and only 6 percent in the South 
Island. 
It was clear from the beginning that the pakeha would never 'go 
home', that the Waitangi Treaty was both a political and economic 
document, that while the rules for living were different for the two 
societies the pakeha's were more enforceable, and that despite their 
being people of good intent on each side, the sea had brought a catch 
which would forever change what had been. 
The economic question is: How can such a situation evolve into 
legitimate debates about 'efficient resource allocation' and 'equity' if 
some of the people involved have never been allowed freedom to: buy 
and sell property, equal political and economic power, information and 
technology, understanding of and training to use the complex rules of 
working within a dominating foreign culture? 
There are several factors that have aggrevated this land question. For 
example, the Maori adapted quickly to European farming techniques, 
perhaps too well since the new settlers found they could not compete 
with them in arable farming and therefore turned to pastoral farming of 
which the Maori had no experience. This required more land, and thus 
ironically, the Maori success as arable farmers only contributed to the 
further loss of much of their land. 
After the land wars of 1845-70, even more land was taken from the 
tribes. Increased pressures were put on them to individualise land titles, 
commonly held by tribes with the chiefs granting particular areas of land 
use. Land speculation again reared its head to such a degree that by the 
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beginning of the 20th century almost all fertile lands had been 
transferred to the pakeha. 
However, to place undue emphasis on land ownership as a cause of 
the wars is rather simplistic. There was also a contest for authority. 
The early struggle for power was not restricted to Maori vs Pakeha, but 
within each group there were sharp fights for leadership. In the pakeha 
group this was clearly seen in legislation where coalitions between 
business and landholding interests, the greatest beneficiaries of territorial 
power, excluded all others from their associations (Simpson, 1984). 
Political power in both the Provincial and General Assemblies from the 
mid-I 800s to the early 1900s was under the control of large European 
landholders. Land holding Maori were simply excluded from the vote. 
During the struggle for power, another important. but secondary, 
factor arose: Who was a Maori? Increasing social/political attention was 
paid to the process of racial and cultural alignment from the late J 800s 
to the 1900s. Since many people were of mixed blood, could separate 
lines be drawn. and even if so, how did they relate to sharing property 
rights? This question was underscored after World War II when Maori 
ex-servicemen were settled back on the land. One consequence of this 
settlement was the establishment of corporations to manage land blocks 
with a large number of Maori owners. There were also proposals to buy 
out people with small interests to enable others to run the farm 
businesses more efficiently. However, such a policy was found to run 
contrary to the traditional Maori attitude towards land and the concept of 
efficiency. Consequently, considerable areas of Maori land have 
remained undeveloped and are likely to remain so for some time. 
A third factor concerns the value of land. During the 1960s and early 
1980s. the price of sheep and. beef farms in New Zealand increased 
rapidly. From 1962 to 1983, the fattening and grazing land price 
indices increased at an annual compound rate of 12.4 percent compared 
to 8.6 percent for general inflation. Much of the actual dollar increase 
in land prices occurred in the 1979-82 period, and nominal capital gains 
for those years are estimated to have been some $9.3 billion for the New 
Zealand meat and wool sector (Seed, et aI., 1986). This increase is 
almost double the Reserve Bank's estimate of $5.2 billion for total loans 
outstanding to the whole agricultural sector as of 31 March 1982. 
However, since 1982, land values have declined. When adjusted for 
inflation, the fattening and grazing index is only about 40 percent of the 
1982 level. 
The value of land, and therefore the ownership wealth, often is 
reflected in the capitalised flow of income and expectations about that 
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income's continuity. Agricultural subsidies have played an important 
part in determining land values and rents because: (1) there are direct 
commodity and land development subsidies, (2) from 1975-82 there was 
farmer expectation of continued subsidies, and (3) Government deficit 
funding considered both the absolute and expected level of subsidy which 
in turn added to the inflation of land values (Seed, et. a!., 1986). 
Another feature of the current land market has been the virtual 
moratorium on mortgagee sales of farms despite the serious eroding of 
equity and the ability of the farmers to service their loans. This implies 
a different societal attitude toward property rights in land as compared 
with the ownership of shares and other commodity assets. Despite 
arguments about whether or not it is 'fair' to have a moratorium, 
experiences in the United States during the 1930s and the 1980s have 
indicated that many farmers really only postpone the inevitable sale of 
their property. This temporary reprieve usually comes at the expense of 
creditors and prospective farmers who were not allowed to buy. The 
wealth and cash-flow implications are large to say the least. 
The role of a democratic Government in intervening in a wealth 
property rights issue is complex. Realistically, it is largely determined 
by those who hold the wealth at the time the issue emerges. To change 
this position of political power depends much on the potency of the voter 
block which brings the issue to the fore. It also depends to a great 
extent on the receptivity of the uncommitted voting public which might 
be able to be persuaded by information. 
Throughout all these changes and the various influences on land 
values and wealth accumulation. the Maori interests have been much 
neglecled. The Government, backed by law, has pretty much seen fit to 
protect existing wealth rather than offer the protection of property rights 
offered by the Waitangi Treaty. 
If the major issue with Maori land claims is to redress past injustices 
and set right the economic and social implications of those injustices, the 
first thing is to establish whether in fact there were injustices. and 
document what they were. If the evidence confirms that Maori land was 
'sold' by other than free persuasion and with a full knowledge of the 
consequences, then the land claims would appear to have economic 
validity under the terms of the Treaty. 
Fishing Rights 
Two major property rights issues confront New Zealand's fishing 
industry. The first involves the individual transferrable quotas (ITQs) in 
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the in-shore fin fishery. They became operational 1 October 1986. The 
second is the Maori fishing rights issues which loom ever larger in New 
Zealand's politics. 
Management of a commonly held resource like a fishery poses a two-
fold problem: (I) finding the biologically (or economically) best 
sustainable harvest level, and (2) finding a scheme to enforce it for each 
species. In recent years there has been excessive harvesting in the fin 
fishing industry, and fish stocks have been reduced below desirable 
levels, threatening future regeneration and imposing increased harvest 
'costs' on future fishers, and on consumers through higher prices for 
the fish they do get. Governments around the world have used a variety 
of policy options to restrict fish harvest. These have included annual 
and seasonal catch limits, season closures, gear restrictions, taxes, 
licence schemes and quotas. The use of quotas has attracted a lot of 
attention with ITQs being viewed as essentially a property rights 
solution. Once the initial allocation of quotas is made, equity ceases to 
be an issue because the market operates freely for buyers and sellers 
with anyone being able to buy or sell their rights to fish. 
Another issue is: What should be the rentals or 'costs'? Fishers 
contend that rentals should be low and accure to owners of the quotas 
(Bevan, 1987). At the other extreme, is the view that the fishery 
belongs to the citizens of all New Zealand, and that rentals should be 
raised and go to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) as the 
citizen's agent. 
The legal and moral claim for Maori ownership of the New Zealand 
fishing resource is based upon the Waitangi Treaty. In a predominantly 
coastal society the Maori placed great reliance upon fishing. In a 
spiritual sense the oceans were also of great significance. Under the 
domain of a deity (Tangaroa) the fish were his children, and a complex 
set of rituals governed the relationships between the fisher and his catch. 
These rituals included a set of ethics providing for fish conservation 
through prohibition (rahui) of harvesting at certain times of the year. 
This combination of respect and reverence for the sea and its produce 
endures today, and underlies much of the Maori's concern. 
An historic national meeting (hui) to consider Maori fishing rights 
was held in November 1985. All the Maori tribes of New Zealand were 
represented for the first time in the country's history. Following this 
hui a submission was made to the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Fishing. A Maori position was made clear: "The Treaty of Waitangi 
maintains ownership of fisheries to be the sole domain of the Maori, and 
any impact which results in financial gain/return must be negotiated 
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between the Government and the Maori". Whether or not this position 
will be agreed to is likely to become an important issue politically. 
What are the implications should the Maori view be adopted? The 
Maori claim is for all fish resources in New Zealand, including species 
which have only recently been commercially harvested, i.e., orange 
roughy. It is generally recognised that their claim to shellfish like paua, 
kina and cockles is based on historic use, but the present claims are 
much wider than that. Licencing or fee arrangements would 
undoubtedly have to be worked out for an economic settlement. 
Problems also exist in the allocation of fish between recreational and 
commercial fishers. Price rationing by licence and quota in the 
recreational fishery and ITQs in the commercial fisher would, in theory, 
be best in an economic efficiency and equity sense. 
However, 'traditional fisheries' introduces a third user group. The 
] 983 Fisheries Act provides for a more integrated approach to the 
management of fish through management plans to balance the needs of 
different user groups. These groups are considered by MAF to include 
'recreational, commercial and traditional user', but the term - traditional 
user - while explicit in much of New Zealand's law is not defined nor 
even mentioned in the 1983 Act. In the National Goal for Fisheries 
Management the aim is: 'To ensure that the fishery resources of New 
Zealand are conserved and managed for the maximum benefit of the 
nation' (MAF undated). It is now proposed that a separate policy on 
Maori fisheries be developed with the goal: 'To respect the cultural value 
of fishery resources to the Maori people and provide for traditional 
Maori fishing' (Cooper, 1986). 
The issue facing New Zealand's managers is how to incorporate 
'traditional fishing' into an operational plan. Legal interpretation of the 
Treaty of Waitangi will be important. But ranking the goals is a political 
issue, and any change in objectives will have distributional effects among 
everyone interested in fishing. The two polar positions of the Maori 
fishing issue are (1) complete ownership of the resource at one extreme, 
and (2) a recognition of only certain rights to harvest kaimoana in 
selected areas at the other. Some intermediate position is also possible, 
but it has yet to be stated. 
Complete ownership of all fish can be accommodated within the 
framework of ITQs and licence fees. That is the situation currently 
existing between the Government and the Tuwharetoa tribe on Lake 
Taupo. Rights to the resource were declared to be the property of the 
Crown in exchange for one half of the fees over and above an 
administrative allowance. 
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The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Indian 
treaties must be interpreted now as they would have been understood by 
Indians at the time they were written (Blumm and Johnson, 1981). This 
same consideration is being asked by the Maori in their own country: 
'They want their own experiences, traditions and values to occupy an 
honourable place in our society' (Finding of the Waitangi Tribunal on 
the Manakau Claim, 1985). 
While property rights may be conferred because of economic 
incentives, it is essential to recognise that such matters also have a 
cultural base. It is not only the physical revenue that needs recognition, 
but also the spiritual and psychic beliefs. 
The property rights issue with respect to Maori fishing rights and 
ITQs raises the fundamental question of the right of the Crown to 
interfere with fishing rights which the Crown guaranteed to Maori people 
fully, exclusively, and with undisturbed possession (Muriwhenua Claim, 
1986). The hui submission in 1985 draws a parallel between the Maori 
tribal lands and fishery issues. While Governor Grey seemingly had no 
scruples about this question in the 1840s, the present Government seems 
more enlightened. Individual ownership was initially a factor in the 
alienation of Maori land. In that same sense ITQs run contrary to the 
concept of communal guardianship of and access to the fisheries. 
Additionally, the Muriwhenua Claim resents 'the fragmentation of a 
communal resource through the creation of individual property rights 
that have been based on only three recent years of catching history, for a 
traditional harvesting of the sea and foreshore that goes back many 
generations'. Many Northland fishers and small fishing units of both 
cultures have been arbitrarily discriminated against by the ITQs rulings. 
Currently the Ngai Tahu claim for a large area of the northern part of 
the South Island is being presented to the Waitangi Tribunal. More 
claims are awaiting the Tribunal's decision. Given the major problem of 
open access to fisheries resulting from a lack of clearly defined property 
rights, it should be no surprise that fisheries have become the focal issue 
in attempts to seek recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi. Once that is 
achieved many of the land ownership claims may be adjudicated. 
These are stressful times for Maori-pakeha relationships. The issues 
of the past linger, and are of urgent concern for many of the present 
generation. Land and fishing rights as well as language will become 
ever more important social and economic grist for the political mills. 
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Chapter 27 
Personal Values in Land 
and Water Use 
John Hayward 
Natural Resources Analyst 
Lincoln College 
New Zealand is dominantly a well-watered, pastoral land (Tables 1 
and 2). However the numbers shown in the tables obscure the reality of 
land use patterns which have evolved in response to regional variations 
in soils, climate. economic, social and historical factors. In recent times 
there has been no shortage of information on the changing patterns of 
land use in New Zealand, or on speculation as to the competing uses to 
which our land and water might be put. 
The Origins of Conflict 
There was a time in New Zealand's history when we accepted Horace 
Greeley's injunction to: 'Go west, young man, and grow with the 
country'. With axe, fire and swamp plough, European settlers created a 
pastoral industry fro111 forest and tussock grasslands. Agriculture 
continued to expand, albeit in a series of surges and slowdowns, for the 
first 50 to 80 years of European settlement. In the 1920s and 1930s 
exotic forests were planted over large areas of 'bush sick' land in the 
central North Island. In the 1950s and 1960s new knowledge about 
plant and animal nutrition, and new technologies for fertiliser spreading, 
fencing, weed and pest control, brought a new era of land development. 
These were indeed frontier days. A time when there was little 
perceived conflict for the use of land or water. Where conflict was 
recognised it was for the most part swept to one side in the drive for 
greater prod uctivity. 
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Table 1: New Zealand land lise, 1976 
Area Per cent 
Class (000 ha) 
1. Occupied fat;lll and forest land 
(a) Total pastoral use 13,924 51.8 
Improved grassland 8,979 33.4 
Tussock and native grassland 
used for grazing 4,945 18.4 
(b) Land in field crops, garden, 
and orchard 430 1.6 
(c) Plantations of exotic trees 806 3.0 
(d) Land in fern, scrub, bush, 
and second growth, or 
otherwise unproductive 6,065 22.6 
Total occupied 21,225 79.0 
2. Land in cities and boroughs 368 1.4 
3. National parks, reserves, and 
domains 2,656 9.9 
4. Other land including bare rock, 
water surfaces, roads etc. 2,621 9.8 
Total area 26,870 100.00 
Source: Anderson 1980. 
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Table 2: Water balance for New Zealand. 
Average annual rainfall 
Annual river discharges to sea 
Ann ual evapotranspiration 
Water abstractions 
(projected to 1980) 
Total loss 
Net loss 
Estimated volume 
(km3) 
540.0 
400.0 
160.0 
2.1 
562.1 
22.1 
Source: Department Scientific & Industrial Research 1980. 
However, quite suddenly, it was found that proposals for new land 
uses, be they for horticulture, viticulture, recreation, forestry or their 
associated processing facilities, needed land and water which were 
already committed to other uses. 
As the Land Use Advisory Council (1983) noted, 
As the area of land not committed to a specific use gradually 
diminished, conflict was inevitable with various interests 
competing for the same resource. These conflicts have not 
only become apparent between productive and non-productive 
uses but also between competing productive uses. There have 
also been stronger demands in the last decade for conservation 
of native flora and fauna, ... 
For the moment we shall leave aside the matter of 'productive' versus 
'non-productive' uses. The point is that today there is unlikely to be a 
single user of land or water who has not, or will not, encounter 
competition for the resources which, until quite recently, we had 
believed to be available in abundance. How is such competition to be 
resolved? Are we to rely on 'market forces', the rules of a planned 
economy, or some combination of both? 
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For better or for worse we have, in New Zealand, adopted procedures 
for land use and decision-making that are now contained in more than 
45 Acts of Parliament. In addition national policies concerning, for 
example, indigenous forests, pastoral land, coastal lands and wetlands 
also influence the way in which land and water are to be used. The 
result is that our procedures for planning and decision-making are 
complex and, for the most part, poorly understood. This leads to 
regular calls for simpler procedures and less 'red tape' from those who 
see themselves as disadvantaged or limited in their endeavours. For 
some, solutions are to be found in a greater reliance on the market. For 
others they are to be found in simplifying legislation (as for example in 
the now discredited National Development Act). 
However, before we adopt a new set of rules let's examine present 
procedures to identify the basic problem. If we fail to do so, we might 
well devise new rules which result in the loss of both baby and bath 
water. Simple solutions are tempting but as 'Murphy' has warned; 
'There is, for every complex problem a solution which is neat, plausible 
and wrong'. 
With this advice in mind I should like to consider briefly the two most 
important sets of rules that influence our uses of land and water - the 
Town & Country Planning Act (1977) and the Water & Soil 
Conservation Act (1967). 
The Town & Country Planning Act (1977) has its origins in the 1926 
Town Planning Act which required borough councils of more than 1000 
people to plan. In the 1953 Act all local authorities were required to 
prepare planning schemes. Standards for rural planning were raised in 
the 1973 Amendments and broadened in the 1977 Act. It is an 
important piece of legislation for it gives local bodies authority to plan 
and manage for: 
... wise use and management of the resources in such a way as 
will most effectively promote and safeguard the health, safety, 
convenience, and the economic, cultural, social, and general 
welfare of the people ... 
While some might argue that this goal is so all-encompassing as to be 
meaningless, most would support the ideas contained within it as 
laudable. The real question is, how do we achieve these seven objectives 
and at the same time? 
For the last 50 years the answer, in New Zealand and elsewhere, has 
been to zone, licence or otherwise regulate. It is the plethora of 
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regulations which have led to the many complaints currently voiced 
about this Act of Parliament. 
Among those complaints, Ackley and Collins (pers comm., 1987) 
identify: 
Developers and entrepreneurs feel that there is an inordinate amount 
of red tape involved in making applications, in uncertainty about the 
Iikeljhood of success, in mUltiple decisions involving delays, in 
negotiations with planners and councils - all of which are costly and 
time""consuming, with the ever-present threat of objections leading to 
lengthy appeals. 
Land owners,.feel that a district scheme, however well set out with its 
host of details, offers no security of tenure, stability and enjoyment 
because of the many changes which seem to be constantly taking 
place around them, be it road widening, unacceptable new land uses, 
the taking of land for public works, or other developments. 
People who in their minds are affected by changes, particularly 
through specified departures but also by public works, feel 
intimidated by the complexity involved in trying to understand what is 
happening and why, and are especially inhibited when they realise 
the possible costs involved in making an objection and taking it to 
appeal. 
These and other complaints have led to repeated calls for reform. As 
Wheeler (1986) notes, some seek reforms to the practices of planning. 
Others seek clearer statements about the direction and purpose of 
planning. However, Proctor (1985) questions the very existence of, or 
need for, the entire enterprisel 
Ackley and Collins and others acknowledge that at best the present 
system is complex, cumbersome and inefficient. At worst it may be 
unjust. They also recognise that planning, in some form, is here to 
stay. However much one may sympathise with a desire for less 
regulation and more reliance on market-related decisions, we should not 
forget the conditions which led to government regulations in the first 
instance. It was not a desire for bureaucratic control but a desire to 
ensure that, in the competition for resources, community well-being was 
not jeopardised by individual greed. 
The Town & Country Planning Act has, I believe, failed to deal 
adequately with the problems of conflicting uses for land and water. 
However, I also believe that solutions lie not so much iIi reforms to the 
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Act but in changed individual and community attitudes to its 
implementation. The present legislation could make a much greater 
contribution to social well-being if we looked at it positively and dealt 
explicitly with the different preferences and priorities of individuals and 
groups within society. 
For example. in many rural counties 'new' land uses, be they rabbit 
farming or forestry on large or small holdings, are termed 'conditional'. 
They have been so designated because existing land users, plallllers. and 
councillors have wished to retain a region's existing character. As 
Tremaine (1980) has reflected, this reaction to new enterpris~s in the 
1980s is comparable to the restrictions placed on motor cars by the 
former Motor Car Regulation Act of 1902 and by the bylaws of many 
boroughs and counties who sought to retain the dominance of horses and 
horse-drawn transport. 
The Water & Soil Conservation Act 1967 exists to: 
make better provision for the conservation, allocation, use, and 
quality of natural water and for promoting soil conservation 
and preventing damage by flood and erosion, and for 
promoting and controlling multiple uses of natural water and 
drainage of land, and for ensuring that adequate account is 
taken of the needs of primary and secondary industry, water 
supplies of local authorities, fisheries, wildlife habitats, and all 
recreational uses of natural water. 
This Act replaced a complex system of earlier statutes and common 
law rights with a system which vests all rights to use water with the 
Crown. Any water user must first obtain a right to do so from either the 
National Water & Soil Conservation Authority (NWASCA), or from one 
of the 20 catchment authorities that have much of the responsibility for 
promoting the objectives of the Act and for reconciling conflicts between 
competing uses and users. 
There are two important features of that legislation. The first is that 
the Act enables catchment authorities to control land uses for the 
purpose of preventing soil erosion. For instance, although goat farming 
is expanding rapidly as the value of their products and their ability to 
control woody pasture weeds is increasingly recognised, goats can also 
cause soil erosion. Catchment boards have the authority to limit their 
use in such circumstances. 
The second is that water boards grant water rights. Although, in 
generaL the law deals separately with land use and water use, regional 
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water boards by granting water rights have a direct influence on land 
use. For example, water in the Ahuriri river was required by two user 
groups - farmers who wanted to abstract it to irrigate crop lands and 
anglers and others who wanted it in its natural channel to provide for the 
needs of fish and other in-stream values. In that case a committee of the 
National Water and Soil Conservation Authority recognised the in-stream 
values and placed limits on the quantity of water which could be taken to 
enhance agricultural production. 
In a similar fashion a water board, by granting or not granting rights 
to drain wetlands, has a direct influence on land use and the choice of 
enterprise. 
If the goal of water resources management is to enhance social welfare 
then the major problem that we face is not a lack of scientific, 
information, nor a lack of capital, but the devising of a set of rules that 
will facilitate land uses that will promote social justice. 
The problem facing catchment authorities (and ultimately the courts) is 
that they operate within an Act which requires balanced use but gives 
little guidance as to what that balance is, or how it is to be achieved. As 
things stand at present, conflicts which cannot be resolved between the 
parties directly involved are passed to the courts which face the 
monumental problem of attempting to deal in law with issues which are 
in reality, the competing preferences and values of individuals or groups 
within society. 
Again the point is that, while the Water and Soil Conservation Act 
may be in need of amendment. we should recognise that the main 
problems we face in making allocative decisions lie in dealing with the 
preferences of individuals and groups within society. Deficiencies in 
legislation seem to be a lesser problem. Dealing with personal values in 
either the case of land or water uses is the key issue. How to work 
among often conflicting goals and objectives presents real problems. 
We have many options for the use of our lands and waters. For each 
option we have much information about profitability, management needs, 
and climate requirements. However as we seek to answer the question, 
'Which way?', we must remember that each land or water use has 
important implications for today's society and for the society that we 
might become. Because we are a country with divergent views as to a 
preferred social order it is inevitable that the values of individuals or 
groups will play an increasingly important role in determining oUf 
preferences for land use. 
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For some, the solution to choice between competing alternatives is the 
clear specification of property rights; the market, where these rights may 
be exchanged; and the courts, where the validity of such exchanges 
might be tested. 
The problem with this approach as a general solution is that it fails to 
recognise that some groups within society do not accept the values that 
are implicit within its assumptions about the nature of land and water. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the matter of Maori attitudes to 
land and water. 
For most pakeha people the right to use land carries with it the 
obligation for stewardship; sound management that will ensure that the 
land is passed to the next generation in good, and preferably improved, 
condition. But stewardship is also compatible with the belief that land 
can be owned and traded in a market economy. I believe that for most 
pakeha it is difficult to truly understand the intense spiritual relationship 
between Maori people, the land and the water. 
As Asher and Naulls (1987) note: 
To the early Maori, land was everything. Bound up with it 
was survival. politics, myth and religion. It was not part of 
life but life itself. Taking culture in its widest sense, there was 
no part of early Maori culture that was not touched by the 
land. The continued occupation of a piece of land was the 
most obvious sign of a link between generations - between 
those dead, those living and those yet to come - in a society 
without written records. 
The same intensity of emotion exists for water. Water was created 
from the union of Papatuanuku (earth mother) and Ranginui-etu-nui (sky 
father) and is therefore an integral part of the earth, land (Williams, 
pel's comm.). 
Those who believe that such values belong to a former period of time 
should note that in recent years a number of legal and other 
developments have reinforced the trend toward an accommodation of 
Maori rights and claims within pakeha law, and institutions. This trend 
makes the need all the more urgent to devise systems which deal 
explicitly with the values that are central to the choices between 
alternative uses of land and water. 
There are at least three existing institutions that we might make use of 
in this effort; parliament, the courts and local councils. Parliament is 
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one result of our previous attempts to devise institutions to make social 
choices for and on behalf of the community. Some might therefore 
argue that competition for the use of land and water should be resolved 
by Parliament (as for example in the Clyde dam case). While 
Parliament should provide guidelines and criteria to ensure that equitable 
decisons are made the suggestion that Parliament decide would be both 
centralist and unworkable. 
Some might suggest that decisions should be made by the courts. 
While the Planning Tribunal and other courts have played an important 
role in resolving matters of choice their judges have also repeatedly 
warned that courts should not be making political or value judgements 
(see, for example, Timmins, 1982). The courts can ensure that value 
judgements have been properly considered in a decision-making process 
(as for example with Mr Justice Casey's opinion in the Clyde dam case), 
but value judgements themselves are not amenable to judicial 
determination (Turner, 1982). 
As things stand at present most decisions on choice between competing 
enterprises are made by local councils and regional water boards. If 
future decisions by the councils are to be both socially acceptable and 
socially just, perhaps the most important need is for a greater public 
involvement. This will allow for new attitudes from those who service 
and serve on the boards and councils. It will encourage new approaches 
that give earlier exposure to the processes of analysis and thereby reduce 
the dependence of council members on their professional staff. And, 
finally, it will permit more willingness to recognise that because the 
decisions will result in winners and losers, adequate provision should be 
made for those who lose. 
New Zealand is not a homogenous society. We are a nation of 
identifiable groups whose culture, experience, age, sex and education 
result in ollr holding differing priorities and preferences for the way in 
which land and water is to be used. Until sllch time as these values are 
dealt with in a systematic and explicit manner our land use choices will 
result in something less than social justice. 
We will make many mistakes as we try to develop a fair but efficient 
decision-making process. Many will become frustrated and call for 
simple solutions. However, we should remember that we live in a 
complex society and that the choices that we mllst make are becoming 
ever more complex. It would be naive to believe that they could be 
"amenable to simple solutions. 
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Chapter 28 
Do We Need a Rural Policy? 
Tim Wallace 
Agricultural Economist 
University of Cal({ornia, Berkeley/Lincoln College 
Should there be a rural policy. for New Zealand? It's not an easy 
question to answer. Even if one wants rural and urban areas to have 
equal standards of living there are different ways to achieve that goal, 
some of which might hinder the very development process one is trying 
to achieve. 
What are the pol icy choices? They range from: (I) having a separate 
rural policy aimed specifically at rural people and areas, through (2) 
creating an effective rural component of certain national policies such as 
job creation, education, health, resource development and 
communications, to (3) attempting some combination of the first two, to 
(4) having no special policy for either sector. 
To elaborate. if one of New Zealand's national goals is for increased 
unity then perhaps there may be no need for separate policies for rural 
and urban areas. Public officials may decide that since the same type of 
problems (unemployment, poor health, bad housing, etc.) exist in both 
rural and urban areas, a national policy would be more effective than a 
series of individual area requests with each one demanding separate 
policy attention. The risk of trying to make a separate rural policy is 
that it clearly establishes rural areas as a political minority. Even 
though rural areas have been a minority, they haven't necessarily acted 
as one. This proclamation would subject rural areas to all the pressures 
any minority group must face: finding funding, inventing political 
coalitions to get what it needs, and the crucial problem of how to 
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establish its legitimacy and 'credentials' with groups who do possess the 
political majority. 
On the other hand, the risk in rural areas attempting to become more 
effective recipient/participants in on-going or new programmes relevant 
to them is that they may lose out to urban residents. City people, as a 
majority, could decide that under increasing budget pressures, public 
investments in rural areas may simply not offer urban interests as much 
benefit potential as if those same expenditures were made in urban areas. 
Rural areas would have to take their chances on being recognised as 
effective partners on non-farm issues dear to urban hearts in order for 
urbanites to be persuaded to act for rural interests. This is sometimes a 
difficult task since history shows a trail of considerable disregard by 
rural dwellers for the plight and concerns of city folk. 
Are there any first steps one should make before a decision is made 
about rural policy? Yes! one should be able to: (1) document that 
important differences between rural and urban areas actually exist, (2) 
decide if the differences can be modified, and (3) decide if the 
differences would be better changed by public policy intervention or 
private sector involvement. The first point simply involves reviewing 
published data to see if there are differences. The second point calls for 
some analysis about what is, in fact, possible. The third point calls for a 
value judgment about whether New Zealand's general welfare would be 
improved if public policy were focused on only a part of its citizenry. 
If, after surveying the available information, one decides that no 
important differences between rural and urban areas exist (or if they do, 
they are not deemed important enough to warrant much public attention) 
then one accepts the status quo and whatever it may bring. In effect, a 
person with this view of the world would say there is no rural concern 
more urgent than urban concerns. 
However, if one decides that there are important differences, and that 
some type of rural policy could beneficially change the status quo, then 
one is forced to come to grips with the questions of strategy and tactics 
of how to formulate and implement such a policy. 
During this pre-policy formulation period several pieces of information 
will emerge. One will be the fairly clean separation of income (welfare) 
questions from resource development questions. Another will be 
identification of areas which survive mostly as a result of continued 
underpinning by subsidised government programmes. And a third will 
be identification of places, people and activities which could respond to 
world market conditions if given policy/programme incentives. 
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Against this background of options, let's review the situation that 
currently exists. Are there any real differences between New Zealand's 
rural and urban areas? The answer appears to be an unqualified yes. 
Authors of preceding chapters indicate that rural communities are losing 
population, have relatively less income per family, often have fewer and 
lower quality community services, have fewer cultural activity options, 
and have relatively less chance of finding reasonable non-farm jobs or 
business opportunities than their urban counterparts. 
Do these findings make New Zealand the 'odd man ouf? Not at all. 
In fact, these trends seem to be inevitable, international, and despite the 
pain they cause, they are evidence of both social and economic progress. 
As an economy develops it evolves into three main employment groups 
(Figure 1). The evolution can occur rapidly or slowly. In New Zealand 
it has occurred quickly with a peak of rural labour force occurring 
around 1900. In the beginning, almost everyone is employed in 
production farming and lives on their farms. As the economy matures it 
adopts increased amounts of technology, and people move from farming 
into crossroad areas which eventually become urban centres where 
manufacturing can function. As these two trends continue a n"eed for 
various services arises. Eventually people in these service jobs come to 
dominate the total employment of the economy. This new and different 
employment base for the nation is an expanding area - hastened by the 
information and communication industries. It is also more sensitive to 
economic pressures and employment cycles worldwide than the more 
recently industrialised and more insular type of economy. 
This economic maturation process is not spread evenly over the 
country because the geographically sited resourees available for 
development vary as do the desires and capabilities of the people living 
there. The point is really not whether New Zealand will be able to 
escape the consequences of the process, but rather how she can benefit 
from its evolution. Thus, a normally active development process results 
in an uneven distribution of income, jobs, wealth and population 
concentrations throughout a nation. 
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A policy which helps rural areas match stride with urban area growth 
aims at lessening the 'natural' growth gap between the two, generally 
through some type of public investment. In Figure 2, two rates of 
economic growth are shown: one is for a poorly endowed rural area, the 
other is for an area with a relatively rich resource base. Initially, there 
is a difference between their rates of economic growth (a). This is to 
be expected. However, as time progresses, the difference, or the 
development gap between the two areas widens (b). The purpose of a 
resource development programme is to lessen the gap (c), and achieve a 
more rapid rate of growth. 
Even though one is aware of these ideas, the magnitude of these 
differences in New Zealand as it shifts from a predominantly 
pastoraJ/agricultural economy to a more diverse one, leads to concerns 
about the distribution of benefits during the process. People who have 
been relatively well off can harbour resentment about change when the 
area they live in is faced with economic downturn. This feeling is 
usually more pronounced when part of the area's economic and social 
well-being has been built on an artificial foundation, such as 
unrealistically high levels of government aid rather than worldwide 
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market values and recognised patterns of trade. This condition is true 
for New Zealand farmers just as much as it is true for European, 
Japanese or American farmers who have built many of their fanning 
hopes on the basis of unrealistic commodity subsidies. 
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It is natural for people living in hard hit rural areas to ask for an 
improvement in their situation through some type of political solution. 
This kind of request is what drive most of a democratic governments' 
policy-making. i.e., responding to a need voiced by some part of the 
nation's voting population 
However, despite the differences we've noted between rural and urban 
areas, we must also acknowledge a commonality of need. High rates of 
unemployment, low family incomes, low levels of formal education, 
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inadequate housing, and poor access to health facilities and sources of 
risk capital are as common to certain urban groups as they are to rural 
groups. In all cases, however, it is perfectly legitimate to raise the 
question of whether a political response to these needs should be through 
creating separate policies or through an attempted generic policy 
resolution. 
In the case of rural New Zealand. past policies to alleviate low 
economic conditions have usually come through direct commodity or 
resource development incentives of one kjnd or another. Other 
responses have included off-farm policies such as education/training 
programmes, rural health programmes, subsidised petrol prices, creating 
new non-farm employment opportunities, and fostering closer 
rural/urban cultural ties and political coalitions. 
Rural residents need to make a decision about how much they wish to 
try to control their own fortunes either through encouraging local 
leadership development or by simply accepting 'top down' direction. 
The history of New Zealand shows mixed reactions to this question, yet 
events within the last five years seem to point increasingly toward the 
locally determined problem/solution route. Increased exports of chilled 
cuts of meat processed by private sector firms is one example. In any 
case. there will be long debates on the relevant performance criteria for 
evaluating any policy programme as well as the priority of the projects 
initiated. 
If a protectionist route is chosen to help a rural area develop, i.e., 
provide a subsidy to initiate a project and then protect it against 'outside' 
competition, one must realise that the toughest part of the development 
decision is still to come: when to withdraw the protection thereby 
releasing the industry to the forces of the free market. Part of the 
reason for this difficulty is that if the project is even partly successful in 
terms of generating jobs and income, those who benefit will not want to 
be released, and, indeed, are likely to protest that to do so will be the 
ultimate ruin of the area. To put that argument in worldwide 
perspective, however, it is exactly those industries and business firms 
which do survive without subsidised productivity that last the longest. If 
a development project is too protected it tends to breed management 
deficiency and performance inefficiency, precisely those things which are 
not wanted in such circumstances. 
Given the choice between (I) quickly obtaining a short-run 
(opportunist) development project, or (2) possibly getting a longer-run 
project, acknowledging that competition for it will be more intense -
which way should a policy maker choose? Experience says that 
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involving the local people in the decision is the best method regardless of 
which choice they make. Getting people to take the initiative about their 
own areas almost always provides maximum benefits in the long run. 
However, turning the decision-making process over to lay citizens is 
often viewed by policy makers as a threat to themselves and orderly 
government. Yet it is essentially the extent of personal acceptance of 
responsibility and commitment to local leadership development that will 
ultimately determine the fate of a rural community. The exception to 
this generalisation would be where an area might have to conform to 
national wishes or law despite its own value judgments, e.g., taking land 
through the Public Works Act (eminent domain) for building a road, a 
hydro development, or a recreation site. 
Another advantage with a policy that encourages local initiative is that 
it is more likely to offer a wider base of creative economic diversification 
than if the development alternatives come from 'outside'. (No creative 
ideas will necessarily spring unbidden out of a rock). Given a positive 
forum for exploring development options, and expecting thoughtful 
professional work levels from everyone involved, community after 
community has discovered ways to feel better about themselves, provide 
more jobs locally, and continue in that area with a better life offering 
than before. 
Perhaps it should go without saying, but too often the point is 
overlooked: leadership development does not mean that all projects have 
to be done under one leader. Men and women have differing aptitudes, 
skills, dreams and abilities about what they want to or can do for 
themselves and their areas. It takes skill and patience to draw the best 
from people - and there is always a best side to everyone. 
One goal for rural New Zealand probably should be to begin to build 
firm bridges with urban areas. The reason is that, in time, rural areas 
will need the understanding of urban areas to get what they need. Now 
is a good time to form positive coalitions with other diverse groups -
even if such a joining may appear inconceivable now, it will payoff 
later. For example, farmers often consider consumer groups and 
environmentalists as their adversaries. Ways should be found to forge 
ties with these groups on issues affecting rural areas. 
Rural people have a tendency to strike a bargain or persist in a way of 
doing business as though they expect it to last forever. Often the world 
will not let these arrangements stand, no matter how wonderful they may 
seem at the time. Changes will have to be made eventually. These 
changes in the way people conduct themselves and their businesses do 
not mean betrayal, compromise, or loss of personal integrity. They 
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simply mean making business-like decisions when the conditions so 
warrant. Farmer coalitions with consumer and environmental groups 
are currently in evidence on some issues in the United States, whereas 
even five years ago such liaisons were viewed as heresy. The key is that 
the working coalition depends on the particular issue at hand. Integrity, 
respect, dignity and honour can all remain as they were even through a 
series of policy switches as long as people understand the reason for the 
changes. 
For example, urban dwellers have helped rural people in their battles 
against unrealistic property zoning on city fringes. Consumer groups 
have sided with farmers and processors against unreasonable food 
product labelling requirements, while they continue to fight sloppiness 
and unsanitary conditions in food processing plants whenever they find 
them. Environmental groups in the U.S. have joined farmers in 
conserving water, the water saved then being sold to urban residents. 
Some environmental groups have even aided farmers who use burning as 
a way to control unwanted scrub, provide better grazing, and offer better 
vegetative watershed management for everyone. The list gets longer 
daily. 
Too often rural people think of urban areas only as pot-holes of 
pollution, human congestion, false values, and unbelievable people -
while some urban residents think of farmers as wealthy naive breathers 
of fresh air who eat too well, clomp around in gumboots, and are not too 
helpful in giving accurate directions to city drivers when they're lost. 
Probably one could find examples of both these stereotypes somewhere 
in New Zealand. But it's closer to the truth to say that urban residents 
benefit from using the countryside which is conserved and tended by the 
agriculturists acting as stewards of the natural resources as much as 
rural people use and benefit from the commercial and cultural 
opportunities offered in urban centres. In addition, urban areas usually 
benefit from rural people who come to town hunting for jobs since they 
bring the investment in their education with them. The differences 
between living in rural and urban areas are becoming less. For 
example, it is not uncommon in many areas of the world for farmers to 
live in town, commute to their farms to work during the day, enjoy 
television or attend cultural events in a large city in the evening, buy 
milk from stores, and meat from the butcher. . 
Questions about rural policy or a policy for rural areas will never 
cease as long as the development process continues. However, from 
time to time the answers will change. 'Think Big' has had its day in 
New Zealand, while 'Small is Beautiful' went through a phase in the 
U.S. Subsidised, petro-chemically dependent farming was the cry of the 
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1960's and the 1970's, while today many farmers round the world are 
asking questions about the sustainability of an agriculture founded on 
those premises. Perhaps the fundamentals of development for all areas 
are meant to be continually relearned: the questions remain the same, 
only the answers change. And the response to the questions is best 
when informed and curious local leadership, locally assumed 
responsibility, and cooperation on all levels are involved in the 
development decisions. 
The future of New Zealand's rural areas will depend to a large extent 
on what the people living there decide they want, and how skilful they 
are in obtaining articulate and persuasive spokespersons for their causes. 
The rural areas are in for a massive reshuffling of their agriculture - the 
better the soil, the climate, and the labour skill pool, the greater the 
potential for change. New technology will force new ways of producing 
and marketing raw farm materials. Bright management will figure new 
ways to add value to those materials. Ownership and tenure patterns of 
farming are due for a shake-up through business and inheritance 
changes. Women will be increasingly effective, well-spoken partners in 
the development and management of rural areas. A more complete use 
of New Zealand's rural resources will be attempted through development 
of its tourism potential. This 'outside' influence in rural areas will itself 
cause other changes to adapt to it and enable rural people to take 
advantage of it. 
Perhaps most significant limits to effective rural policy are lack of 
creativity, lack of imagination, and poor judgment. Rural residents have 
proven they are creative, imaginative and good managers. The 
stumbling block seems to be how to tap into those productive resources. 
However, that is the challenge which New Zealand people seem 
increasingly to be winning. 
Whether or not there should be a separate rural policy for New 
Zealand is really up to the rural residents. However, if rural people 
cannot make up their minds about how they want to develop their areas, 
it is quite clear that urbanites will assume that responsibility for them. 
And while urban voters may have the best of intentions, they do not live 
in the areas about whose future they are quite willing to make decisions. 
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Chapter 29 
User Pays Revisited 
Geoffrey Butcher 
Economist 
Linco/n College 
Recently there have been significant changes in the range of services 
provided by Government and in the ways they are funded. These 
changes have been spurred by the need to increase growth in the 
economy and to reduce the Government's fiscal deficit. Many traditional 
Government programme have been examined to see whether their 
continuation is justified. A decision for continuation requires firstly that 
the programme be run efficiently (i .e. that it achieves its results with the 
least possible cost), and secondly that it be worthwhile (i.e. that the 
benefits exceed the costs). If the programme is worth continuing, a 
further question arises: Who should pay for it - the general tax-paying 
public or the user, or both? 
In the case of agriculture, the most obvious subsidies have been cash 
payments for production (e.g. Supplementary Minimum Prices) and cash 
subsidies for inputs (e.g. fertiliser). However, there have also been 
significant subsidies provided through low cost services provided to 
farmers (e.g. farm advisory services), subsidised services from which 
farmers receive significant benefits (e.g. agricultural pest destruction), 
and subsidised research. 
The total value of subsidies to agriculture is difficult to estimate, but 
Table 1 gives some idea of the situation prevailing in 1983/84, prior to 
the introduction of the user pays concept. 
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Table 1: Agricultural Subsidies, 1983/84 
Subsidies on inputs (mainly fertiliser) and 
outputs (mainly SMPs on meat and wool) 
Investment subsidies 
Services 
Irrigation and water supply 
Increasing stock numbers (LIS) and 
developed land (LDEL) 
Pest and disease control 
MAF services to agriculture (advisory, 
inspection, etc) 
Other research - primarily agricultural 
Financial Concessions (1982/83) 
Total 
$million 1 
405 
27 
30 
20 
95 
93 
275 
945 
Source: Economic Management: Land Use Issues, Treasury, 
Wellington, 1984. 
Since then, subsidies have been reduced. Fertiliser subsidies, land 
development encouragement loans, the agricultural investment allowance, 
the livestock incentive scheme and SMPs have been abolished; financial 
concessions to farmers (through the Rural Bank) and producer boards 
(through the Reserve Bank) have either been removed or greatly 
reduced; subsidies for irrigation and inspection services have been 
substantially lowered. Even advisory and research services are now 
being charged for. The' user-pays' debate in agriculture has been 
focused on payment for these last services, but continually arises in 
relation to requests for other subsidies. 
An often neglected, but extremely important, aspect of the user-pays 
debate relates to the property rights of various individuals which 
influence the decision as to who is the user. Take, for example, a flood 
protection scheme. Imagine that a farmer buys some forested land, 
clears the bush and plants it in grass, runs stock and then becomes 
aware of silting and flooding in the local catchment as a result of erosion 
and reduced water-retention. The flooding does not affect his farming 
29-2 
operation, but has a drastic impact on a neighbouring town. It is clear 
that a programme of destocking and reallocation will stop the flooding. 
Who should pay for this? Clearly, if the farmer has the right to do what 
he likes with the land regardless of consequences to others, then the 
town has to pay. However. if the farmer has the right to use his land as-
he sees fit only as long as it has no detrimental effects on others, then he 
should pay for the changes. 
Similar considerations are vital in as many aspects of user-pays. 
Property rights have a historical and political dimension to them. 
Economics can help examine the implications but not decide what they 
should be. 
Perfect markets lead to an appropriate allocation of resources from the 
viewpoint of efficiency. Frequently, perfect markets do not exist, and 
commodity subsidies may be used to 'correct' for this failure. 
Commodity subsidies may be used as a means of redistributing income 
but they do so inefficiently and give rise to undesirable side effects: 
(i) They give income to non-target groups (e.g. rich farmers as 
well as poor. 
(ii) They obscure the level of support being given. 
(iii) They encourage inefficiency when resources are diverted into 
areas of low return. 
The existence of these side effects has made many economists wary of 
using subsidies to change income distribution. Specific cash grants (or 
tax rebates) to those who are identified as being in need are a more 
efficient method. 
The large sums involved in agricultural subsidies have also led to 
intensive questioning as to whether market failure is evident. The main 
factors likely to be involved include: 
I . social and market costs differ 
2. public goods are involved 
3. there are high transaction costs 
4. economies of scale are present 
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5. market failure occurs elsewhere in the economy 
6. ignorance is present to a large degree 
7. risk aversion is a prime' management' goal. 
The last two factors do not necessarily indicate a need for government 
intervention. With respect to ignorance the Government may be no 
better informed than individual farmers, and in the second case society 
as a whole may have the same preference for risk as farmers. 
In some industries, economies of scale prevail. Railways are often 
cited as an example. Roughly speakjng, scale economies mean that as 
production increases, the average costs of production fall. In such rare 
circumstances, the desirable level of production required is greater than 
the firm can profitably provide - quite a curious situation. The only 
ways to get a level of output which is socially appropriate is to either 
subsidise production of the good or service, or practice discriminatory 
pricing. Thus efficient resource allocation may require a subsidy. 
Production is beneficial to society as long as social benefits exceed 
social costs. If benefits and costs in the market are equivalent to these 
social benefits and costs, then a competitive market will work. However, 
sometimes market and social costs differ. A simple example concerns 
air pollution. A factory makes fertiliser but produces a horrible smell. 
The smell is a cost to nearby residents, but not to the company since the 
company does not have to compensate the residents. The smell is a 
'negative externality' since it is external to the decisions of both 
producers and consumers of the fertiliser, and has a negative impact on 
society. Optimal resource allocation would require that the factory take 
the costs into account, and one way of doing this would be by levying a 
tax on 'smell prod uction' . 
There may be other distortions in the market which alter price signals, 
so that market prices no longer reflect social costs, particularly in cases 
where a subsidy or tax is appropriate. Then the subsidy should be paid 
on the item with the 'incorrect price' and not on some other article to 
compensate buyers of the first article (e.g. one should not subsidise 
fertiliser to compensate farmers for an over-valued exchange rate, but 
could subsidise the prices of export goods). 
There are some cases where society as a whole perceives a benefit 
from various activities in which they are not directly involved. 
Education is an example. We value living in a community which has a 
good level of education and are prepared to subsidise it heavily. 
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In other cases, it is not possible to exclude people from using a good, 
like trying to keep people from using a national park, Moreover, it may 
not be desirable to do so if the marginal costs of use are very low. Such 
a good is termed a public good; an example is a lighthouse. No-one can 
be stopped from seeing its light, and its operating costs are not changed 
at all by the number of people looking at the light. 
The problem with public goods is that every individual will try to leave 
provision of the good to others, yet the provision will depend on what the 
total community decides to make available. For example, defence is 
provided regardless of whether you contribute to the defence budget. 
Moreover, the quantity of defence will be virtually unaffected by your 
$100, but will depend on the $500 million provided by the rest of the 
community. Markets tend, therefore, to provide a less-than-desirable 
amount of public goods. 
Frequently the recipients of subsidies are not the only beneficiaries. 
For example, farm fertiliser subsidies lead to increased fertiliser use and 
increased farm production for processing. This provides benefits to both 
the fertiliser industry and the processing industry. Lattimore (1986) 
estimated the distribution of benefits from SMPs, and estimated that 
farmers received 63 percent of the subsidy, consumers 14 percent, the 
processing industry 13 percent, and suppliers of farm inputs 10 percent. 
This final incidence of benefits depends on the nature of the markets 
within which production takes place. Depending on the rationale for 
implementing these subsidies, it could be argued that all these groups 
are beneficiaries and they should all contribute to the funding of the 
subsidy. 
Sometimes, subsidised work undertaken by farmers may have benefits 
to other groups in society who. do not compensate the farmer for the 
benefit. Perhaps it would improve both the quality of debate and the use 
of resources if we changed the argument to focus on 'beneficiary pays' 
rather than 'user pays'. 
If the subsidy exists and is to continue, then it is necessary that the 
beneficiaries be identified in order that the subsidy can be funded in an 
appropriate way. An essential step in identifying the beneficiaries is to 
establish the justification for the subsidy. For example, if SMPs were 
bought in to compensate farmers for an over-valued exchange rate, then 
SMPs may be seen as an alternative to devaluation. But a devaluation 
would impose costs on all users of imports through higher prices so the 
beneficiaries of the SMPs which reduced the need for devaluation are 
really import users. 
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Similarly, if subsidies are introduced to offset other problems in the 
economy, then the true beneficiaries are those who benefit from the 
distortion. If the subsidies are introduced for purposes of increasing 
income, then it is pointless to identify the beneficiaries other than to see 
whether the subsidy is doing its planned job since user-pays is not a 
concept that one can usefully apply to the transfer to income. Imagine 
askhlg an unemployed person to pay for the unemployment benefit just 
received! 
This discussion of situations in which a subsidy might be justified 
leads to the question: 'How should subsidies be financed?' The 
financing should avoid altering people's behaviour in a way which either 
negates the initial intention of the subsidy or leads to other distortions. 
Subsidies paid for externalities should be paid for by those who benefit 
from the externalities. This may be the public at large, or some section 
of the public such as a regional population or a specific demographic 
group. In practical terms, it may be impossible to identify or tax such 
beneficiaries, particularly if the group is difficult to monitor. 
However, in some cases the particular 'public' using the good can be 
identified. and the users charged. For example, research into crop 
farming might be funded by a levy on crop farmers. If crop farmers 
refuse to pay the levy, it may indicate that research benefits are indeed 
less than costs - in which case the research should probably cease. On 
the other hand it might also indicate that farmers: (I) have no money, 
(2) have a higher discount rate than society, (3) view risk and innovation 
differently or (4) are trying to be 'free riders'. In all cases the decision 
as to whether or not to continue the subsidy from a national output 
perspective has to be weighed against its undesirability from a social 
equity point of view. 
In recent years, subsidies to agriculture have been justified as farm 
income support 'measures, offsets to an over-valued exchange rate or 
over-priced inputs, or as part of social policy to settle farmers onto the 
land. Subsidies have come about particularly in response to fiscal and 
macroeconomic policy instruments which have been installed for 
different reasons. A number of subsidies are now examined in the light 
of previous comments. 
The subsidies on irrigation capital works were introduced in 
recognition of the fact that 'production is inhibited in some areas 
through lack of water', (Budget, 1977). This justification for increased 
production provided little obvious reason to favour public investments in 
irrigated farming. (As an aside however, note that the case for 
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subsidising irrigation operating and maintenance costs in, for example, 
Central Otago raises some interesting issues of property rights. Earlier 
Governments had made promises that if those owning water rights would 
give them to the Government, then the Government would maintain the 
supply of water to them. Thus 'user-pays' has to take into account the 
apparent existence of these property rights, and the fact that current 
farmers have paid for their land under the assumption that these property 
rights would be honoured.) 
Where work is undertaken to reduce flooding, the beneficiaries are all 
those whose exposure to flooding has been reduced. This may include 
downstream owners of property (including public property such as 
bridges and roads). These downstream beneficiaries may be identified as 
'the public' (although it could be argued as to whether it is the national 
or the regional public), in which case the public should pay part of the 
cost. Note also the relevance here to property rights issues. 
Generally, education is seen as a merit good, and the community is 
prepared to pay for it. However, as education becomes more specifically 
related to profit. the benefits of extra education accrue more and more to 
the student, and less and less to. society. In the case of agricultural 
advisory services, the majority of benefits accrue to the farmer. 
However. there are several other issues to be addressed with regard to 
advisory services. 
Firstly, additional knowledge tends to become a public good over time 
since use by one person does not preclude use by another. Nor is it 
easy to exclude another person from acquiring that knowledge. So this 
public good should be provided freely. Secondly, distribution of 
knowledge is not a public good. Conveying advice to farmers benefits 
pri marily those farmers getting the advice directly, even though the 
results of those discussions are generally passed on informally to the 
neighbours. Thus, farmers should pay for that information, (except to 
the extent that farmer education is viewed as a merit good), Thirdly, 
when an advisor comes to a farm there is usually a two-way flow of 
knowledge. Should the advisor pay the farmer for the time taken and the 
information gained? 
A justification for forcing potential beneficiaries to fund research is 
that they are short-sighted or are not fully aware of the benefits of 
research. The research is good for them but they don't realise it. To 
let them not fund research, and to leave the research undone, is not in 
their best interests, so forced subsidisation is justifiable. Also, they 
cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of research so they should 
be forced to pay to prevent the 'free rider' problem from arising, 
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The value of research is frequently unknown before it is completed, 
and even then its value may not become apparent for many years. 
Frequently, it is not clear who will benefit from the research, since 
research results from one field can be, and often are, transferred to an 
entirely different field. 
Two issues are involved here, both of which suggest a justification for 
government funding of research. The first is the riskiness of research. 
Most organisations are averse to risk, yet if all the individuals of society 
shun risky research, then the whole of society loses. Government, 
however, is sufficiently large to carry the risk of research. There will 
be good projects and bad projects, but it is to be hoped that the benefits 
will outweigh the costs so that on balance society will gain. It is clear 
that the useful research will benefit some producers and consumers, but 
those groups cannot be identified or charged when the research is done. 
The second issue is the public nature of research results. Some 
research is of benefit to such a wide section of the community that it 
should be publicly funded. All research. once completed, is a 'public 
good' in that use by one person does not preclude use by another (i.e. 
the marginal cost is zero), and it is difficult to establish and maintain 
ownership of the research results. In these situations observation of the 
real world shows that public goods will be under-provided. 
The recent implementation of user-pays has brought some unexpected 
results which are indicative of problems likely to occur in future if user-
pays is introduced in inappropriate areas. In National Parks where hut 
fees per night have increased dramatically, revenues have actually fallen. 
People are either not using the huts (inefficient resource allocation - at 
least in the short term) or are using the huts but not paying what they 
consider to be an unreasonable fee. This is a case where the resource 
ought to be treated as a public good, and an appropriate price would be 
low. 
Typically, departments are being asked to recover a percentage of their 
costs, with the percentage rising each year. The departments are looking 
for paying work and are competing with private sector groups and other 
publicly funded agencies. In the early years, when they have to recover 
only part of their costs, they are able to undercut prices charged by 
private sector competitors. and possibly squeeze them out of the market. 
This is a problem where it leads either to a lack of long term 
competition, or where it causes an exit of skilled people from the labour 
market. 
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In summary, the major beneficiaries of many subsidised services are 
those who use the services, Other groups also get some benefits, 
especially where the subsidy is paid to offset a market distortion 
elsewhere. These groups should pay for some proportion of the subsidy. 
There are cases where user pays is inappropriate and will lead to an 
inequitable allocation of resources such as when there are public goods, 
or where production is particularly risky. Research 011 many potentially 
socially beneficial topics is an example of such an area. 
The implementation of user pays either in inappropriate areas or 
under inappropriate methods will likely cause problems in the longer 
term for which society as a whole will be the loser. 
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Chapter 30 
Summary and Conclusions: 
Tough Decisions Ahead 
Tim Wallace/Ralph Lattimore 
Agricultural Economists 
Lincoll1 College 
The most pleasing thing to us as editors was finding such a 
consistency of themes about New Zealand agriculture from such a 
diverse set of authors, representing such high calibre and experience. 
We interpret this in part as the thoughtful study and communication the 
authors have had with many people, and in part to a coming together of 
different opinions that indeed it is now time to look anew at rural New 
Zealand and the role it will play in the country's future. 
The rural economy continues to make a major contribution to New 
Zealand society (Hawke, Eastern, Ross). If the rural economy is 
considered broadly to include the wide range of a«tivities that surround 
food and fibre production the rural share has declined to some extent. If 
farming alone is considered, the rural share has been reduced more 
dramatically. At the same time the range of activities in rural areas has 
developed considerably to include a broadening and deepening of: tourist 
and recreational enterprises, intensive agricultural and horticultural 
pursuits on smaller farms, craft industries and farming as a second 
occupation. These developments will continue to flourish, on average, 
through the ingenuity and innovation of a large share of New Zealand's 
resources, human and physical, which reside ill rural areas. 
III these uncertain times it is helpful to draw together those elements 
that establish the environment we live and work in as a nation - elements 
over which we have little national or individual control. 
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The authors all point to change for the country as a whole in the 
future. They also indicate there is really no escape from these forces of 
change: technology, communication, international relations and 
economic policies (MacArthur, Wallace, Lattimore). We can choose to 
participate and benefit from these international linkages to a lesser extent 
(Rosenberg) or to a greater extent (Rayner, Lattimore, Lewis). 
Whatever the choice we can only live beyond our means to the extent 
that we are prepared to mortgage the income of our children. 
The impacts of previous economic and technological forces are shown 
in changes in farm size, in the rural work force, the capital needs of 
agriculture and the inevitable competition for limited amounts of land 
and water (Fairweather, Tipples, Pryde and Kerr). These threads are 
woven into more intricate patterns of rural living in discussions of past, 
present and future farm and agribusiness opportunities (Ross, Frengley, 
Wallace, luchau and Newman). The 'on-farm' rcsults can be 
summarised by saying New Zealand will have fewer farms but clustered 
around two general sizes. The first will be of relatively large 
commercial farms, many with contracts or participation involving 
vertically integrated firms which produce value added food items rather 
than raw food materials. The second cluster will be of smaller farm 
operations, tended by people who have a real interest in rural affairs and 
agriculture, but who draw their livelihoods primarily from non-farm 
employment. 
These outcomes are neither good or bad in the conventional sense. 
The point of view depends upon whether the observer believes he/she 
benefits or loses as a result of the changes. Other points of view are 
expressed outlining the seeming inevitability of certain decisions about 
economic and social 'progress' in rural areas (Wallace), and a 
perspective of farm women and Maori interests in the effective 
participation concerning those decisions (Grigg, Sandrey). 
Market awareness is introduced in many places. In fact, the notion 
pervades the chapters as the authors offer a realisation that New 
Zealand's size and productive potential needs, increasingly, to be 
presented on a larger scale than ever before. For example, the decision 
to reduce our isolation from the world economic environment meant 
higher material rewards for New Zealanders (Hawke). Yet in a 
seemingly peculiar fashion increased international economic exposure 
may actually have reduced our vulnerability rather than increased it. To 
see this argument we need only consider recent policies: did SMPs 
increase or reduce the vulnerability of the sheep farmers, has the 
synthetic fuel plant at Motunui increased or decreased our vulnerability 
to major dislocations of world trade (Rosenberg, Lattimore)? 
30-2 
The isolationist approach may involve lower growth in overall living 
standards and it may entail greater vulnerability to world events, but it 
has the advantage that it increases the nations perception of control over 
its destiny. 
The greater the degree of international exposure of New Zealand's 
economy the greater the potential growth for rural and allied resources. 
What resources will grow and who will benefit? Again the market 
approaches are explored (Schroder, Lattimore, Lewis). It is pointed to 
again and again that there is a persistent myth about the omnipotency of 
the independent producer who owns the land. It simply is not so. The 
great numbers of farmers ensure that they will be price takers. Unless 
there is some way to develop markets which can absorb sufficient 
quantities of value added, high quality food items of which New Zealand 
producers can be a 'cooperative part', the individual farmer will always 
be scrambling in direct response to economic forces rather than profit as 
a leader who grows something he/she has found the market wants. 
Attempts to differentiate the market, know it, and use it well are 
explored (Schroder, Cartwright, Brodie and Van Ameyde). The benefits 
of individual producer control, cooperative control, and organisational 
effort are explored and evaluated (Rae, Zwart, Martin, Lewis). Certain 
conclusions are inescapable: there is strength in numbers; cooperative 
action well managed and monitored is key to any successful 
production/marketing effort; market aware product differentiation will 
bring profits; yet everyone pursuing the same thing with the same 
commodity will lead to economic surplus and failure. There are limits 
to what any individual or group can achieve. 
Because private sector firms realise certain geographic and economic 
bounds there exists a role for Government to play. It is clear that the 
national focus is turning away from the SMPs of fonner years, the 
protected markets and subsidised inputs to farm production. 
Increasingly, though many other nations still persist along these lines, 
farmers and processors appreciate that the perceived benefits of those 
past policies will be unsuccessful if revisited to any great degree in the 
future: and that they were probably not as economically viable for the 
the country as a whole as was once thought. What should the role of 
Govei'nment be? There are many persuasions ranging from 'fortress 
New Zealand', to 'free trade' (Rosenberg, Lattimore, Rayner, Ross, 
Hawke). Public reaction to these past policies is freely expressed. Some 
authors are doubtful about the ability of agriculture to right itself by 
itself, others are restless to get into gear (Rosenberg, Kneebone, 
Johnson, Pryde, Grigg). 
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Throughout. there is the persisting question of who can or ought to 
pay for services rendered by public agencies (Butcher, MacArthur, 
Rayner), National goals are important guidelines for decisions about this 
question. The public purse is not a bottomless treasure chest, dispersed 
by a philanthropist embued with drives of social justice, economic 
growth. income equity and stability, and freedom of individual action. 
The built-in inconsistencies within such social/political goals means 
some type of compromise is inevitable. The questions are: what kinds of 
compromise, about what items, who will benefit/pay. and is the outcome 
politically acceptable? The last item is important because we are a 
democracy. trying in various ways to survive. to do the best job we can, 
and contribute to the informed leadership of agriculture, rural areas, and 
the country. 
Perhaps the greatest challenges presented 1>)' the authors concern 
changes in attitude - towards ourselves, about rural and urban priorities, 
about using land and water, about old market ties and new market 
opportunities. It is acknowledged that Kiwi ingenuity is a reality; it is 
also acknowledged that it has often been too finely focused on farm 
production, and not slanted outward enough to world markets, world 
concerns, and consumer desires. 
For example, while land ownership is prized by almost all farmers the 
effort of attaining this ownership has recently been the downfall of many 
of New Zealand's promising young farmers. For over a century 
ownership of land per se has been the least important agricultural 
resource; the most important being the human capital on farms - the 
skills, knowledge, drive, entrepreneurship and inventiveness of people. 
Almost all the contributors note this attribute, yet somehow its 
recognition gets lost between public acclaim and policy actions. 
Market volatility and therefore national vulnerability is noted. The 
decline of agriculture as 'the only' export sector indicates the positive 
growth of the non-farm economy. New Zealand's economic future 
doesn't have to rest solely on the shoulders of its farmers and 
agriculture. There is, and should be, plenty of room for all kinds of 
economic endeavour. But it will call for a change in attitude, an 
admission that while agriculture can increase, it can also playa declining 
role in the course of the nation. That perspective necessitates viewing 
agriculture and its needs broadly. 
Issue by issue agriculture will need to seek effective coalitions, often 
with those entities with which it has fought in the past. Yet the future 
livelihood of rural New Zealand will need to draw more and more on 
voting partners when debates and decisions about land and water use, 
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regional development, resource development, fisheries, environment, 
international trade and national fiscal policies arise. Increased 
competition for limited public revenues is inevitable between rural and 
urban residents; and so it will be, too, for the use of all the country's 
resources. 
Changes in land prices, in the value of forests, market shares or the 
volatility of commercial commodity markets do not spell the end to rural 
areas. Business cycles, livestock cycles, and population growth all 
contribute both to volatility and growth potential. The thing all authors 
guarantee is, simply, that it is highly likely the future will not be like the 
past, and that in the change process some people (communities) will lose 
while others will gain. 
Our authors have not all agreed on the goals or directions in which 
rural New Zealand should be headed. Nor have they agreed about who 
will win and who will lose. That situation was intended by us as editors 
because we believe the specific answers about rural New Zealand need to 
come from you. the readers. The appropriate balance of private sector 
and government leadership will evolve, certainly. It will be the better, 
however, for your thought and consideration. The decisions and 
outcomes will depend to a great extent upon how each of us assesses risk 
- personal, professional, and public. 
When it is all said, when the forces of change are reckoned and 
assessed, what are we really looking at in the years ahead? If producers 
aren't technologically and financially competent managers they will face 
increasingly tough times. Avenues to more profit and greater risks lie 
through differentiation of some kind for either fresh or processed items. 
Value added items offer promise, and challenge a blending of 
farmer/processor/marketeer imagination and creativity. The effort begins 
with effective market research which outlines a product - have no fear, 
New Zealanders can produce it once it is identified. 
These requirements will winnow the farm community. It will offer 
opportunity and entrepreneurial challenge to suppliers of new inputs, 
processors of new food items, financial managers, and the rest of the 
consumer aware food industry - retail food stores, restaurants and 
publicly sponsored institutional food outlets. 
Some rural communities will decline as new commercial and social 
patterns evolve; others will grow. Progress, our authors say, is not an 
even progression across the landscape. Personal values inevitably 
become interlaced with policy decisions. Leadership positions will 
evolve requiring the deepest and best commitment each of us can muster. 
We have to do it to remain internationally productive, a contributor to 
world events. We can do it. We will do it - well. 
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